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CHAPI'ER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A. Statement of ~ Problem 
The problem to be faced in this dissertation is the discovery, 
in the major writing of Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, and Tertul-
lian, of expressions and descriptive terms giving clear meaning to 
the ambiguous term "the goodness of God.u The intention of the dis-
sertation is to make a contribution to knowledge not merely in terms 
of a fuller understanding of the Church Fathers, per ~~ but also in 
terms of discovering what definite meaning they may give to a gen-
erally ambiguous term. The aim of the dissertation is, then, not 
merely the revealing of some neglected phase of the Fathers• thought, 
but also the throwing of light on a general problem for which their 
writings have been chosen as the resource. 
The ambiguity of the word good is clearly shown in a passage 
from the Encycl~ of Religion ~ Ethics. 
The meanings and implications of 1 good' and its opposite 
are most varied. Let us take at random • good measure,' 
'a good beating' (which, curiously is synonymous with a 
bad beating), •a good dinner,• 'good music,• •a good knife,• 
•a good soldier,• •a good intention,' •a good man.t In the 
series scarcely two will be found wherein • good • means in 
the one preciselywhat it means in the other. In all cases, 
in pronouncing a thing good we are judging its value, and 
the meaning of 1 good' or its opposite in a.ey- particular case 
depends upon the point of view from which we judge. It may 
be almost a purely quantitative judgment, ~.g. •a good ten 
inches. 1 It may be a judgment of sensuous value in which 
1 
case ' good' • 'pleasant' or 'agreeable,' ~·!• 'it tastes 
good, t 'a vile odor.' It may be an aesthetic judgment, !!_.g. 
'a good view,' 'bad music.' It may be expressive of the suit-
abilit,r or efficiena,r of tools, instruments, implements, etc., 
as means to particular ends, ~.g. 'a good knife.' It may be 
a judgment of skill, ~.g. 'a good workman.' Then come the 
senses of 'good' and 'evil' of most importance, and almost 
exclusive importance for our present purpose, good as well-
being, good as well-do~, evil as the opposite of both.l 
When it is possible to use a single term to express such a variety of 
meanings in the description of ordinary things and relationships, it 
is not surprising that uncertainty of meaning results when the same 
term is applied to God, Who so far outstrips human categories of meas-
urement and understanding. 
The continual occurrence of events that men judge evil in a 
world of which God is supposed to be the sole author, by itself, in-
dicates that the word good cannot be applied to God without qualifi-
cation. It is no doubt apparent that, in a certain sense, the problem 
posed for consideration in this dissertation is a back-door approach 
to the problem of evil and should shed some light on that problem, 
since the problem of evil often acquires a greater complexity than it 
would otherwise have because of the ambiguity of meaning in the word 
good. In fact, the problem of evil is often a real one simply because 
the ambiguit,r of the term goodness too easily permits its interpreta-
tion from a purely hedonistic perspective. 
Interest in this problem was evoked by the efforts of sane 
thinkers, such as J. s. Mill, William James, H. G. Wells, Edgar s. 
1. w. D. Niven, "Good and Evil," EnchcloEifrl.!a of Religion and Ethics, 
ed. James Hastings, VI (1914), 31 • - -
Brightman, and others, to show that if God were in any sense respon-
sible for evil in our world, or even pemitted evil to exist when He 
3 
had the power to prevent it, He could not properly be regarded as good. 
It is their intention to present us with a dilemma from which there is 
no escape except by limiting either God's power or His goodness. With-
out taking the trouble to consider f~ what limiting God's goodness 
would mean,l they proceed upon the assumption that perfect goodness is 
more essential to the nature of God than omnipotence. So, they usualzy 
propose to solve the dilemma by limiting God's power rather than His 
goodness, with the result of a dualism of creative principles, either 
in the form of a ttrefined" polytheism or of an ultimately incompre-
hensible and eternal dualism within God Himself. 
But, if good and evil are the products of different creative 
principles, then whatever interaction between good things and evil 
things and whatever unity our world may seem to exhibit are left un-
explained, and God is not the ultimate explanatory principle for the 
universe as we find it. If God is still to be regarded as the sole 
Creator of the universe, then what man judges evil, as well as what 
he judges good, must have its ultimate origin in Him, and the goodness 
of God must be consistent with human experiences of both good and evil. 
1. Not all the varied meanings of the term goodness are fully compat-
ible with one another, and therefore the idea of an infinite good-
ness is possible only because the term is undefined. For example, 
the notion of goodness as a concern for another's immediate happi-
ness or pleasure is not compatible with the notion of goodness as 
the concern for another's ultimate well-being which may use various 
forms of discipline to accomplish its end. 
4 
Furthermore, it would be impossible to draw a dividing line between 
good and evil in our world, so that the good might be attributed to an 
ultimate~ good principle and the evil to an ultimately evil one, be-
cause good and evil are relative to the needs of different creatures 
and therefore vary from creature to creature. From a lion's point of 
view, the consumption of a man might be good, since thereby his hunger 
is satisfied; but cer~ from the standpoint of the man involved 
this action would be an unmixed evil. In a similar way, man's use of 
beef as a food may be good from his point of view, but from the stand-
point of the poor cattle involved it is clearly an evil. Since, there-
fore, things that are good to one creature may be evil to another, the 
presence of good and evil in the world cannot be e~lained by a dualism 
of creative principles. 
It is like~ that whatever the Divine goodness may mean, it will 
be found lacking in the hedonistic overtones implicit in the arguments 
of the thinkers alluded to above. The term goodness when applied to 
God must have some special and definite meaning which does not preclude 
the presence of evil in the world from the point of view of varioUs 
creatures, in the way that presence of particular goods in the life of 
a man precludes the presence of corresponding evils. Thus, since the 
goodness of God is limited in the same sense that definitness of nature 
is a limit, and is not simp~ an amorphous concept, the need for dis-
covering the precise nature of the Divine goodness becomes apparent. 
Since a person's conception of God plays such a significant role 
in determining the form of his worship and dai:cy living and since there 
is no more important aspect of the conception than goodness, it is 
important that any insight which may lead to a clearer understanding 
of the meaning of the goodness of God be brought to light. For this 
reason a search of the major writings of these three ear:cy Church 
s 
Fathers for expressions that will bring some clarity and definiteness 
to the conception of Divine goodness has been initiated. Although 
the aim of this dissertation certainlY is not so ambitious as to at-
tempt the formulation of a completely satisfying conception of the 
Divine goodness, some progress should be made toward the accamplishing 
of that end. 
B. Area of Research __ .;;....;.;;;..;...;;~;.;
The area of research for this dissertation will be the major 
writings of three early Church Fathers: Irenaeus, Clement of Alex-
andria, and TertnJJ jan. These Fathers have been selected, not onl;r 
because all of them fall within a relatively short historical span, 
but also because their writings are especiall.y rich in speculative 
thought relevant to the problem of the dissertation. Irena.eus has 
been made the beginning point for the research connected with this 
dissertation, for it is in him that one first encounters any explicitly 
expressed idea relevant to the problem of this dissertation and that 
theology begins to reach mature expression. From the period immedi-
ate:cy following Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria and Tertullian are 
chosen, not only because their writings are rich in relevant materia1, 
but also because, with the exception of Origen, who is rather defi-
cient in material appropriate to this dissertation, they seem to be 
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the brightest lights on the horizon of theological thought during that 
time. Probab~ the factor which most near~ accounts for the unanimity 
of perspective and articulateness of thought concerning the goodness 
of God observable in the writings of these men is found in the views 
of heretics, like the Gnostics and Marcionites, which they felt im-
pelled to refute. 
Research will be limited largely to the major writings and a.ny 
relevant minor writings of these three Fathers, but all of their 
writings in English translation will be surveyed for possible rele-
vancy. Research will be done in English translations, since the na-
ture of the argument will not depend upon a literally exact repro-
duction of the thought of the Greek and Latin originals. 
The material for this dissertation will be drawn, for the most 
part, from the following writings: Irenaeus• Against Heresies; Clement 
of Alexandria's Exhortation to the Heathen, Instructor, Stromata., and 
Who Is ~ Rich Man That Shall Be Saved?; and Tertullian' s Ad Nationes, 
-
Against Hermogenes, Against Marcion, Against Praxeas, Answer~ the 
~~ Apology, De ~ in Persecutione, De Spectaculis, Execrable Gods 
of~ Heathen, On Exhortation to Chastity, ~Modesty, _2! Patience, 
On Prescription Against Heretics, On Repentance, On the Resurrection 
~~Flesh, To Scapela, Scorpiace, ~ Soul's Testimony, and A 
Treatise on the Soul. 
C. Other Treatments of the Problem ~~ ~..;;..;;;.~..;;;...;~-- ---
Investigation reveals no previous effort to deal with the specific 
problem posed in this dissertation. Of course, there have been many 
books written on the Fathers treated in this dissertation, some deal-
ing with various facets of one of the Father's thought and same deal-
ing with their systems as a whole. Quite naturalzy in discussing the 
thought of one of the Fathers some attention would have to be given 
to the conception of God; but in most cases this conception has re-
ceived far less consideration than it deserves, and the goodness of 
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God, where considered at all, has been given but the barest outline. 
For example, of the secondar,y sources consulted for this dissertation, 
only Robert E. Roberts• Theology; 5!!.. TertnJJ ian, John Patrick's Clement 
2£ Alexandria, Francis Eric Osborn's Philosophy of Clement of ~­
andria, J-ahannes Kunze's ~ Gotteslehre ~ Irenaeus, and Johannes 
Stier's Die Gottes-~ Logos-Lehre Tertullians devote as much as one 
chapter to the doctrine of God per .!!• Of the foreign works consulted, 
only Stier deals at a.ey length at all with the goodness of God, and his 
treatment is quite brief. With the writers in English, a little more 
attention is given to the concept of Divine goodness. Roberts devotes 
three small sections totalling ten pages to Tertullian'a concept of 
Divine goodness, with other references to it scattered throughout his 
book; Patrick uses nine pages to discuss Clement's views on the subject, 
in addition to references to it in connection with other themes; while 
Osborn alone devotes a complete chapter of nineteen pages to a discus-
sion of Clement's thought on the matter and two chapters totalling 
twenty-five pages to the goodness of things other than God. With the 
exception of stier's book on Tertullian's doctrine of God and the 
Logos, no book devoted solely to the conception of God, much less to 
the goodness of God, in any one of these Fathers, or in all three 
together, has been discovered. Furthermore, the same lack of mate-
rial is evident on the subject of the goodness of God and even on the 
subject of goodness in general. A number of books on the subject of 
goodness and its meaning are to be .found, but they deal with the sub-
ject only from the standpoint o.f moral goodness. To the knowledge of 
this writer, no book exists which deals with the ambiguity of meaning 
of goodness in general. This dissertation, therefore, seeks to deal 
with a problem that has not received previous treatment. 
D. Structure and Method 2£_ ~Dissertation 
Since the purpose of this dissertation is to throw light on a 
general problem as well as upon a neglected phase of the Fathers' 
thought, the approach to the problem will natural~ be colored by 
this perspective. In general, the approach to the problem and the 
method of the dissertation can be described as expository, compara-
tive, and critical. 
Follow.i.ng the introduction will be a section devoted to the 
exposition of the nature of Div:lne goodness and of the explicit~ 
stated and implied manifestations of Divine goodness found in the 
writings of the Fathers, one chapter being devoted to each of the 
three Fathers. Although major emphasis will be given to the Fathers' 
meanings which are clear~ stated, some effort will be made also to 
discover the meanings implied by the logic of their thought. Each 
individual chapter, then, will be limited to the exposition of the 
views of one of the Fathers on the Divine goodness. 
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Since all the Fathers studied describe the Divine goodness in 
largely the same way, with only slight difference of emphasis or of 
fullness of elaboration, critical evaluation of their views will be 
postponed until the fifth chapter. In the fifth chapter, their views 
will be compared and evaluated, in relation to one another and in re-
gard to their coherence within a total system. In most instances, 
some effort 'Will be made to show their agreement or disagreement with 
Scripture, although this test will not be applied rigorously or ex-
haustively. 
The order of the chapters is based upon chronological, rather 
than logical, considerations. Their order is determined, not by the 
dates of the Fathers' writings, but rather, in a rough way, by their 
periods of life--in particular, by their approximate birth dates, 
since their life-spans overlap. 
The order of the chapter sub-divisions dealing with the Divine 
goodness in abstraction follows no logical pattern and has no special 
signi£icance. However, the chapter sub-divisions dealing with empir-
ical manifestations of Divine goodness are arranged roughly according 
to the temporal order of their appearance either in history or in the 
lives of individual men. 
E. Definitions of Terms 
l\ro terms in the title of the dissertation stand in need of some 
explanation. They are the terms meaning and goodness. 
1. Meaning 
While philosophers have been duly concerned with the meanings of 
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various tem.s employed in their discussions, they have displayed a 
peculiar ineptitude in dealing with the meaning of meaning. "In fact, 
a careful study of the practice of prominent writers of all schools 
leads to the conclusion that in spite of a tacit assumption that the 
term is sufficiently understood, no principle governs its usage, nor 
does arry technique exist whereby confusion may be avoided."l The 
term has been defined as an intrinsic property, an unanalyzable rela-
tionship, the connotation of a word, something intended, the practical 
and theoretical consequences of a statement, the emotion aroused by 
anything, and a nmnber of other things.2 In this dissertation, ~­
~ is used to indicate other concepts, relationships, or actions to 
which the term in question may be reducible. 
To deal adequately with the meaning of God's goodness we pro-
pose to consider both its abstract nature and its empirical mani-
festations. It is quite possible to assert various qualifications 
of the Divine goodness without suggesting what it means in tem.s of 
or in relation to human experience. It is possible also to describe 
the Divine goodness entirely in terms of ita consequences for human 
existence without dealing with its abstract nature. This dissertation 
seeks to do both. 
2. Goodness 
Since inquiry into the meaning of goodness, especially in its 
1. c. K. Ogden and J. A. Richards, The Me~ of Meaning (8th ed. 
rev.; New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Ciilpan;y, 1946), p. 248. 
2. ~., PP• 186-87. 
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relation to God, is the main purpose of this dissertation, a fully 
adequate definition cannot be given at this point. It will suffice 
to make a few remarks indicating the perspective from which this dis-
sertation is written. 
However or wherever the word good is used, its use indicates a 
judgment of value.l And judgments of value suggest a relationship to 
centers of consciousness for which the objects so judged are values. 
Experiences of good and evil are an individual's subjective, quali-
tative judgments of the relationships of things and other individuals 
to him. Those relationships that prove harmful or inhibit his free-
dom a person judges evil, but those that contribute to his growth and 
well-being he regards as good. Nothing is good or evil in isolation. 
~ when things or persons came into relation with other conscious 
beings are value judgments concerning them meaningful. Thus, good 
and evil are subjectively relative to individuals. This does not mean 
that good and evil have no objective existence or universal appli-
cability. It means rather that good and evil obtain their meaning 
from the effects certain things have in relation to conscious beings 
and that their meaning is always a subjective judgment. Good and evil 
are objective in the sense that all human beings and the exi.sting 
order of things are so constructed that similar person-to-thing and 
person-to-person relationships produce like effects and judgments. 
An earthquake, tornado, or volcanic eruption in an area where 
1. Niven, "Good and Evil," Encyclopa:iia 2£ Religion and Ethics, VI, 
318. 
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there are no sentient beings merely is. It is judged evil only when 
it is in a relationship harmful to some conscious being. Some might 
urge that the statement that good is indicative of a relationship 
would not hold true when the word good is applied to esthetic judg-
ments, for an esthetic judgment is concerned only" with the nature of 
an object itself, apart from its serving any useful purpose or being 
the means to anything beyond. But even an esthetic judgment is a 
judgment of an object in a relationship. The object judged beautiful 
is so judged while it is in a relationship with some sort of physical 
medium through which connnunicatLon takes place and while it is in the 
relationship of something observed to an observer. The conclusion to 
be drawn is that the term goodness indicates a judgment based on 
things in relation, not upon things in isolation. We would expect 
then that application of the term good or goodness to God, if meaning-
ful, does not refer to God in isolation from everything else but in 
some relationship to man or to something ilnportant in the judgment of 
mankind. 
Not o~ does the use of the term good indicate a judgment of 
value, but also it indicates the presence of some desire or some need 
recognizably fulfilled or capable of being fulfilled by the object 
judged good. At the human level, good in the sense applying to objects 
stands in a direct relationship to human needs and desires. Niven, 
trying to find a common denominator for the many meanings for which 
the word good may be employed, says that 11 good. in all its senses is 
the desirable, and the evil is the undesirable.u1 Thomas Aquinas 
says that "the essence of goodness consists in11 its being 11in some 
way desirable" and that something is desirable because it is thought 
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to be capable of contributing to the potential perfection of the one 
who desires.2 We gain a similar understanding of why the good is de-
sirable when we turn to Paul E. Johnson, who says that the sense of 
worth is the result of interest and need. That which can satisfy a 
need is a potential value, and that which a person consciously recog-
nizes as capable of meeting a need becomes an actual value because of 
his interest in it and desire for it.3 Surely it is correct to say 
that desire originates from a sense of need, real or imaginary, which 
a certain object is believed capable of satisfying. We are led to 
conclude that what is judged good is that which fulfills felt human 
needs while what is judged evil is that which frustrates the satis-
faction of felt human needs and that real good is that which satisfies 
real human needs while real evil is that which frustrates the satis-
faction of real human needs. 
What we have been trying to say in the above paragraphs is what 
Peter Anthoey :&.rtocci has said so well. 
Values ••• cannot exist apart from human minds which prefer 
them and feel obligated to will their realization. This does 
1. "Good and Evil," Encyclopalia of Religion ~Ethics, VI, 318. 
2. Summa Theolo~a, I, Question 5, in Basic Writi~s of Saint Thomas 
Aq'iiliia:s, ed. ton C. Pegis (New Yorr:-'Raiidom ouse, 1944), !, 
42-43. 
3. Psycholof. of Religion (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1945), 
PP• 3B-4 • 
not mean that values are entire~ man-made or that they depend 
on the whims, interests, and needs of human minds. The alter-
native is not either relative or absolute (tha.t is, independent 
of the human :niiiid). The alternative is either relative or uni-
versal or absolute. True, if values are absolute they are in-
dependent of human minds and also universal. But values can be 
universal (applicable to all human beings) without being inde-
pendent of human experience. • • • Our whole view depends upon 
the validity of three distinctions, name~, between value-claim, 
true-value, and value-possibility. A value-~ is any ex-
perience or object which ~ consciousll desired. • • • To speak 
about anything being valuable in itself--that is, apart from 
anyone's wanting or desiring it--misplaces the emphasis, even 
though a truth is hinted at. The apple which I do not want is 
hardly a value-claim to me as long as I do not want it. This 
statement does not mean, however, that the apple does not have 
properties or possibilities which in relation to the properties 
of rrr:t body would make for improved health, or would ~ .£2:: a 
value if I wanted health •••• It is because we can desire ex-
periences which can turn out to be other than we expected, and 
because we can discover that experiences which we earlier did 
not want are more desirable than we realized tha.t we are now 
forced to make a distinction between value-claim and true-value • 
• • • It is clear, then, that things and people can ~value­
possibilities for me and for others and that those value-poiti-
bilities (not values) do not depend uplb ~ lmowing them. 
is alSo clear that if tliese value-poss ill ties in me;-In the 
physical world, and in other persons did not exist, there 
would be no satisfying value-claims. We do ~ ~ ~ the 
basic value-possibilities in the world. !his ••• is t~ 
essential truth rn the claim or-the objectivists, namely, 
that the values which men experience do not depend upon their 
wants alone; it appears that unless there was support for their 
value-cla1ms in the value-possibilities in things, there could 
be no continuing value-satisfaction and correction. But this 
is a statement different from the claim that there are values 
independent of man's wants altogether, or that values exist 
independent of man's wanting and consequently lmowing them.l 
If this ana~sis of the relationship between need and value is 
correct, then good must stand in a different relationship to God the 
Creative Source, than it does to man. Since God has no needs, good 
and evil therefore do not exist for Him as values relating direct~ 
1. Introduction to the Philoso~f. of Religion (New York: 
Hall, Inc., 1~1);-pp. 256- • -
Prentice-
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to Himself; for God, they exist as values for human beings. For the 
good is not something which God pursues as a means to His own perfec-
tion or fulfillment; rather it is that which He bestows upon man for 
the sustenance of his life, that which man must indeed pursue for the 
sake of his continued existence. 
On the basis of this, we may say that the term goodness can be 
applied to God in a broader sense than it can to man. A man may be 
described as good in several senses: as the means to some other man's 
satisfaction, ~.g., 11a good conversationalist" or "a good worker," or 
as a moral person. God also mccy- be called good in the sense of His 
being an object of man's desire, indeed, in this sense, the highest 
human good. A man is said to be morally good when his intentions and 
his life are such as to avoid purposely bringing injury or evil to 
others and himself and to preserve and prosper purposely the good for 
others and himself. This is a sense of goodness which we certainly 
believe is applicable to God. Man is also sometimes called good be-
cause he is charitable, benevolent, or humanitarian. God may be 
called good in this sense, also, but here his goodness begins to out-
strip that of man. Man can be good only as a manipulator of what God 
has placed here, but God's goodness is seen in His creating and be-
stowing that which is needed far His creatures• continued existence. 
It is !:rom Him that all good things ultimately come, and therefore upon 
Him all goodness finally depends. He is the source of human goodness, 
not only in the sense that He supplies man with all good things, but 
also in the sense that, having created human nature and the existing 
order, He is the determiner of what constitutes human goodness from 
the moral point of view. In the final ~sis, God1s goodness ex-
ceeds all finite forms of goodness because it is primal goodness--
without it no other form of goodness would be. 
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If good is the val.ue judgment of a conscious being placed upon 
things and other conscious beings in certain sorts of relationships 
to himself, then it follows that one's understanding of the nature 
of goodness for others must be in terms of things, relationships, or 
experiences familiar to himself. Man is a prisoner of his own psycho-
logical make-up. He can see the world only through human eyes and 
hear through human ears. In fact, his knowledge of the world is even 
more individualistic. In the last analysis, even when he has placed 
himself in a position to learn from the experiences of others by 
assuming that the knowing processes of others are similar to his own, 
what he learns from others becomes intelligible only in the light of 
what bas come to him through his own sight and hearing. The same 
thing is true in regard to judgments of value. Value experience is 
by its nature first-personal--the experience of a thinking subject. 
Any understanding that one person may have of the value experience 
of another must rest upon the assumption of a large measure of simi-
larity between the value consciousness and the need-value relation-
ship of the other person and oneself. One's understanding of the 
value experience of a dog will have to be based upon his observation 
of what a dog regularly chooses and the projection of a value-conscious-
ness somewhat similar to his own into the mentality the dog is assumed 
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to possess. Here our understanding of the value-experience of another 
conscious being is like~ to be fair~ accurate, because we can observe 
the need-value relationship. But this is knowledge pure~ of an ex-
ternal sort. When we want to understand inwardly the value experiences 
of another, we must attach to them the meaning of our own value ex-
periences which, on the basis of external observations, are similar to 
those we seek to understand. In short, man• s understanding of every-
thing is necessarilY subjective and in his thought about things and 
values he can never fu1l.y escape the limitations of his egocentric 
and anthropocentric frameof reference. 
Man is faced with a much more difficult problem when he seeks to 
understand the nature of God than he encounters in knowing the world 
about him, for he has not the certainty of direct observation of the 
actions of God that he has in the case of other men and animals. When 
he seeks to understand the inner life of God, it must be in terms of 
his awn inner life. Whatever terms of value he attributes to God will 
be terms of value for him. Not o~ will there be no surprise if the 
Church Fathers are found to describe the goodness of God in anthro-
pocentric terms, but it seems extremely doubtful that it is possible 
to make any meaningful statement about the Divine goodness that is 
not in terms of what seems good to man. 
CHA.PrER II 
DIVINE GOODNESS IN IRENAEUS 
In Irenaeus one encounters the first mature theologian since the 
time of the Biblical writers themselves. The writings of the interval 
between the time of Irenaeus and that of the New Testament itself were 
mainly moralistic in tone. The conception of God still remained only a 
sketchy outline, references to the attributes of the Divine Being con-
sisting more often of allusion and the barest suggestion than of direct 
and critical exposition. It is in Irenaeus that one discovers the first 
real effort to express the nature of the Divine goodness. "In fact, he 
is the first writer of the post-apostolic period who deserves the title 
of theologian.111 
Nothing in the writings of Irenaeus suggests that he was more than 
barely conscious of the type of problem undertaken in this dissertation. 
It is true that the attacks of skeptics and heretics roused him to de-
fend the proposition that God is good, but his writings give no indica-
tion that he was more than vaguely aware that the term goodness itself 
needed further explanation. ~in some of his arguments against the 
heretics does he approach a conscious definition of the Divine goodness, 
but even then his expression never reaches the level of a caref~ 
1. Franz Theodor Ritter von Zahn, "Irenaeus," The New Schaff-Herzog 
Encyclopedia, ed. Samuel Macauley Jackson, VI (1953), 30. 
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formulated definition. However, his defense of the fact of God's 
goodness is of such nature that some of the meanings of Divine goodness 
he would have affirmed are brought to light and others are discoverable 
b,y inference from the relationships of the concepts developed. 
Again and again Irenaeus makes the assertion that God is good. 
It is hardly possible to read more than a few consecutive pages without 
encountering such an ·assertion. All created objects, everything of 
benefit to man, and human goodness itself have their origin in the 
Divine goodness, for He alone is truzy good and the source of all good 
things. The whole scheme of human redemption, as well as man's exist-
ence itself, flows out of God's goodness. But what is the nature of 
the Divine goodness and how does it express itself? To a consideration 
of the answer Irenaeus would make to this question we now turn. 
A. Abstract Characteristics 2£ Divine Goodness 
1. Essential to Deity 
A number of passages in Irenaeus leave the impression that good-
ness and Godhood are the same; but, at one point especiallJ, in his 
argument against the god of simple goodness propounded qy Marcion, he 
clearly asserts that goodness is an essential attribute of the Divine 
nature. After showing how Marcion1 s belief in two gods, one of simple 
justice and one of simple goodness, makes both justice and goodness 
defective, Irenaeus adds that such a separation of justice and goodness 
destroys deity, "for he that is the judicial one, if he be not good, is 
not God, because he from whom goodness is absent is no God at all."1 
2. Complex and Homogeneous 
Irenaeus is opposed to a simple, unvariegated Divine goodness, 
such as that proclaimed by Marcion. Goodness, along with the other 
attributes of the Divine nature, is inseparably woven together with 
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all the other qualities and colored qy them. God should not be thought 
of as divisible into separate attributes, for each attribute permeates 
the entirety of His being. 
But since God is all mind, all reason, all active spirit, all 
light, and always exists one and the same, as it is both bene-
ficial for us to think of God, and as we learn regarding Him 
from the Scriptures, such feelings ~d divisions LOr operatio~ 
cannot fittingly be ascribed to Him. 
He is a simple, uncompounded Being, without diverse members, 
and altogether like, and equal to Himself, since He is wholly 
understanding, and wholly spirit, and wholly thought, and wholly 
intelligence, and wholly reason, and wholly hearing, and wholly 
seeing, and whol~ light, and the whole source of all that is 
good.3 
F. R. M. Hitchcock attributes this same thought to Irenaeus: 
"There are no differences or distinctions to be made in God. For with 
Him to think is to perform, as He is all thought and all will. n4 
But in Him who is God over all, since He is all Nous, and all 
Logos, ••• and has in Himself nothing more ancient or late 
than another, and nothing at variance with another, but con-
tinues altogether equal, and similar, and homogeneous, there 
1. Irenaeus, A~ainst Heresies, iii, 2.5, 3, in The Ante-Nicene Fathers 
(ed. Alexan er Roberts and James Donaldson; C1'i=and Rapids, Mich.: 
Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1951), I , 459. SUbsequent 
references to Irenaeus' own writings will omit his name and the 
name of the reference work in which his writings are reproduced. 
2.. Against Heresies, 11, 2.8, 4; I, 400. 3. ~., ii, 13, 3; I, 374. 
4. Irenaeus of Lugdunmn (Cambridge: University Press, 1914), P• 98. 
is no longer ground for conceiving of such production in the 
order which has been mentioned.l 
Johannes Kunze elaborates Irenaeus 1 view in considerable detail. 
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Ferner ist es eine u~ullnglichkeit menschlicher Aussagen ~ber 
Gott, dass sie das gottliche Wesen zerspa1Lten und in dasselbe 
Verschiedenheiten hineintragen, sodass Gatt ein zusannnengesetztes 
Gesch~pf zu sein scheint. Die Gnostiker sind sogar SOW'eit 
gegan~n, dass sie von Gott seinen Geist, sein Wort u.s.f. als 
selbRtandige Wesen (Aeonen) absonderten und damit ps,ychologische 
Vorgange, 11wie sie beim Menschen stattfinden, unpassender Weise 
auf Gott ube~en (II, 13, 10. I, 15, 5). Sie haben damit das 
Wesen Gottes vollig verkannt. Denn er ist simplex, et .!:2!! ~­
positus, et similimembrius, et totus ipse sibimetipsi similis, 
et aequa.lis fi, 13, 3. 28, 4; IV, 11, 2. Denn mit der Bezeichnung 
aott werden zugleich mitverstanden sensus, et verbum, et vita, 
et incorruptela et veritas, et sapientia, etbonitas, et Oiiiiida 
taili II, 13, 9. - Die Aeonen;-welche die Gnostiker von GOtt 
sondern, sind nur earum virtutum quae s~~unt ~ ~ 
a~llationes. D~ese virtutes sind ndt e er identisch, und 
ke e ist etwa frUher oder spater als die andere: a.a.o. et 
1
egue sensum ( -z.J~Ilv ) !:!:!:! antiguioren aliquis potest dicere;' 
~ em.m sensus vita~; ~vitam posterioran! sensu; uti 
~fiat allquando silie vita isqui est omnium sensus g est Deus, 
vgl. II, 1313.8 s.o. So kann man also von keiner jener II Wesensbezeichnungen sagen, sie gebe nur ein Stuck vom Wesen 
Gottes an, unterschieden von anderem, sondern, wie die mehrfach 
wiederkehrende Formel lautet: Gott ist II, 131 3 totus sensus, 
~ ~s spiritus, et totus sensuabilitas, et totus ennoia, ~ 
totus ratio, et totus auditus, .!! totus oculus, ~ totus lumen, 
~ totus ~omnium bonorum, vgl. 131 8. 9; 11, 28, 4--totus 
spiritus operans; IV, 11, 2 totus substantia. Da somit 81ie 
Verschiedenheiten in Gott aufgehoben sind, kann man sagen: II, 
13, 8 !!:! quo videt, !!:! ipso ~ audit, ~!!! quo audit, in ips~ 
!! vident; ~ ,!!! ~ Sensui est Nun in !12.£ !! Verbum ~ ~ 
Verbum ~ ~ hunc Nun. 
It is clear from the statement ''With God then are simultaneously 
exhibited power, wisdom, and goodness•~3 that Irenaeus regards the 
1. Against Heresies, ii, 13, 8; I, 375. 
2. Die Gotteslehre des Irena.us (Leipzig: Dorffling und Franke, 1891), pp; 37-38. -
3. Against Heresies, iv, 38, 3; I, 521. 
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various attributes of God as working conjunctive~. However, not only 
do they work conjunctive~, but also each is affected and modified by 
the others in its operation. 11God is all vision, and all hearing (for 
in what manner he sees, in that also He hears; and in what manner He 
hears, in that also He sees).nl Thus God's goodness is brought to per-
fection by His justice and the severity of His judgment is lightened by 
His goodness. Not only is His goodness justly and wise~ administered 
in His salvation of those who deserve salvation, but His goodness pre-
cedes and modifies His judgment on those who rightful~ deserve His 
judgment.2 
3. Eternal 
To say that God's goodness is eternal means, first of all, that 
it is without beginning and without end. Not only is goodness something 
which God has always possessed, but also it has manifested itself from 
the beginning and will continne to manifest itself in relation to human 
affairs. It is evident from his critic ism of the Gnostic theories that 
Irenaeus regards a goodness which is not operative from the beginning 
as inadequ.ate.3 A God who displays such a species of goodness must be 
regarded as subject to change. This is complete~ unlike God, who alone 
is "without beginning and without end, being tru~ and for ever the same, 
and always remaining the same unchangeable being. n4 As Kunze says, 
Gott ist nnn zunlichst unerschaffen und unerzeugt, anfangs und , 
endlos. Als solcher ist er vollkommen: IV, 38, 3 -r€.'A ~Los y-o.,{J 
1. Ibid., ii, 13, 8; I, 375. 
3. Ibid., ii, 4, 2; I, 363. 
2. Ibid., iii, 25, 3; I, 459. 
4. Ibid., ii, 34, 2; I, 411. 
c I I · , '_C.' (/ 1 , 
6 o..-retJ111]ros ovTo.S a~:. t;rrt. B6oS , n vgl. 38, 1, und ewig 
(II, 13, 9). Seine ~gkeit und Unverganglichkeit bed.ingen 
zugleich seine Unveranderlichkeit.l 
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He is "always full of all goodn2 and never ceases 11to confer benefits 
upon, or to enrich man,n3 since "a good will (towards us) is present 
with Him continually.n4 
Second~, the eternity of God's goodness indicates that it is 
incorruptible. When Irenaeus says that "the things which have been 
made by Him have received a beginning" and 11are liable to dissolution," 
standing "in need of Him who made them, 11.5 he implies thereby that be-
cause God is uncreated and without beginning He is not subject to dis-
solution or diminution of being. Nothing unbecoming or evil ever 
pleases Him, and He will not allow such to remain in His presence. 6 
He hates evil and judges those who practice it, not because it hurts 
or harms Him, but because it is destructive to the life of man. 1 There-
fore, His undergoing passion and death as the Incarnate Word involved 
no danger of destruction to Him but was the means of His recalling man 
to incorruption.8 
Just haw important the eternity of God's goodness is to Irenaeus 
is shown by his using it to explain the superiority of God to man. 
God alone, • • • is without beginning and without end. • • • 
But all things which proceed from Him, whatsoever have been 
made, and are made, do indeed receive their own beginning of 
II 
1. ~ Gotteslehre des Irena us, P• 30. 
2. Against Heresies, iv, 14, 3; I, 479. 3. ~., iv, 11, 2; I, 474. 
4. ~., iv, 37 J 1; I, 518. s. ~., ii, 8, 3; I, 422. 
6. ~., iv, 36, 6; I, 517. 7. ~., iv, 17, 3-4; I, 484. 
8. ~., ii, 20, 3; I, 388. 
generation, and on this account are inferior to Him who formed 
them, inasmuch as they are not unbegotten.l 
In fact, the eternity of the Divine Being is stressed not only as a 
reason for God's excellence in comparison with His creatures but also 
as an important evidence of the Divine perfection. 
And thus in all things God has the pre-eminence, who alone is 
uncreated, the first of all things •••• Immortality is the 
glory of the uncreated One •••• By this ••• man, a created 
and organized being, is rendered after the image and likeness 
of the uncreated God, ••• man making progress day by day, and 
ascending towards the perfect, that is, approximating to t~e 
uncreated One. For the uncreated is perfect, that is God. 
For He is Himself uncreated, both without beginning and end, 
and lacking nothing •••• But whatever things had a beginning, 
and are liable to dissolution, and are subject to and stand in 
need of Him who made them, must nec~ssarily in all respects have 
a different term £applied to the~7. 
In one passage, Irenaeus even implies that eternity is an essential 
"ingredient" in perfection. In discussing the question of why man was 
not made perfect, Irenaeus says: 
But created things must be inferior to Him who created them, 
from the very fact of their later origin; for it was not pos-
sible for things recently created to have been uncreated. 
But inasmuch as they are not uncrepted, for this very reason 
do they come short of the perfect.4 
4. Perfect 
The goodness of God is perfect for "God also is truly perfect 
all things. n5 "He is rich, perfect, and in need of nothing.n6 One 
1. ~., ii, 34, 2· , I, 411. 2. ~., iv, 38, 3; . I, 521-22. 
3 . ~., iii, 8, 3; I, 422. 4. ~., iv, 38, 1· 
' 
I, 521. 
s. ~., iv, 11, 2; I, 474. 6. ~., iv, 14, 1• J I, 478. 
in 
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reveals his ignorance 11 of things really good" if he assumes that he 
possesses a greater degree of goodness than God, "for He cannot be sur-
passed; 11 and it is pointless to n seek after any one above the Creator, 
for thou wilt not discover such. 111 
To say that God1s goodness is perfect means, in part, that it is 
eternal, as we noted in discussing the eternity of the Divine goodness. 
It is evident from his criticism of the goodness allegedly possessed by 
the supreme god of the Gnostics that Irenaeus regards a goodness not 
operative from the beginning as defective.2 This interpretation of 
perfection is implied also in Irenaeus 1 statement that "he who was 
formed but to-day, and received the beginning of his creation, is in-
ferior to Him who is uncreated, and 'Who is always the same. u3 This 
meaning is made explicit in the passage with which we closed the last 
section. Created objects are necessarily less perfect than God, for 
their later origin clearly indicates their dependence and lack of self-
sufficiency. Irenaeus thus assumed that eternity indicates independ-
ence and sufficiency.4 
Thus while perfection may at times be defined by Irenaeus in terms 
of Et.ernity, the primary meaning he seems to attach to the term is that 
of completeness, absence of deficiency, or self-sufficiency. 
In the beginning, therefore, did God form Adam, not as if He 
stood in need of man but that He might have Lsome one7 upon 
whom to confer His benefits •••• Service L!endere~7 to God 
does indeed profit God nothing, nor has God need of human 
1. Ibid., ii, 25, 4; I, 397. 
3. Ibid., ii, 25, 3; I, 397. 
2. Ibid., ii, 4, 2; I, 363. 
4. Ibid., iv, 38, 1; I, 521. 
obedience; ••• for He is rich, perfect, and in need of 
nothing.l 
God also is truly perfect in all things, ••• as He is all 
light, and all mind, and all substance, and the fount of all 
good. • • • Neither does God at ~ time cease to confer 
benefits upon, or to enrich man.2 
He is Himself uncreated, ••• and lacking nothing. He is 
Himself sufficient for Himself; and still further, He grants 
to all others this very thing, existence.3 
Nathanael Bonwetsch sums up and relates these two interpreta-
tions of perfection. 
Er ist ewig und unverbderlich daher vollkommen, durch seine 
Allmacht alles ~berragend, bedtlrfnislos (IV, 14, lff.), aber 
absolute Kausalitat und als der Herr von allem allen bekannt 
(II, 6, 1) .4 
5. United with Power 
The God of Irenaeus is both wholly good and all-powerful. As 
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Bonwetsch points out, it is for Irenaeus a foremost truth "class ein 
allmachtiger Gott ist, der durch sein Wort und seinen Geist alles 
gemacht, ordnet und leitet.n5 With Him goodness and power are simul-
taneous~ exhibited in creation. 
With God there are simultaneously exhibited power, wisdom, 
and goodness. His power and goodness lappeaiJ in this, that 
of His own will He called int9 being and fashioned things 
having no previous existence.o 
In his argument against the Gnostics and the Marcionites, Irenaeus 
1. ~., iv, 14, 1; I, 478. 2. ~., iv, 11, 2; I, 474. 
3. ~., iii, 8, 3; I, 422. 
4. Die Theologie des Irenll.us (Gtlters1oh: Druck und Verlag von c. 
Ber'telsmann, 1925), p. 52. 
'· ~., p. 51. 6. Against Heresies, iv, 38, 3; I, 521. 
introduces the idea that goodness without power sufficient to express 
itself is not real goodness. His argument rests upon the fact that 
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his opponents did not believe in a resurrection of the body and depends 
for its validity upon the unexpressed but assumed premise that the 
resurrection of the body is an unmixed good. However, quite apart 
from the question of its validity, the ar~nt does give us an in-
sight into Irenaeus' convictions. He argues that the fact that the 
Creator even now quickens our bodies, as well as our spirits, and prom-
ises a resurrection of the body proves Him to be more powerful and more 
truly good than the god of his opponents. For their so-called Father's 
not restoring life to the body, as well as giving innnortality to the 
spirit, must be due to the fact that he is either unable or unwilling. 
If he has the power to do so but is unwilling, then he is shown to be 
evil rather than good. But if he does not do so because he lacks the 
power, then he is clearly less perfect, or truly good, than the Creator .1 
Kunze affirms that the principle which underlies this argument, the 
principle that superiority is revealed by greater performance, is 
valid. By this test the Creator is shown superior to the good god of 
the Marcionites.2 
At another point in his polemic he suggests that goodness varies 
in direct ratio to the power and greatness of the Divine activity. 
While it is a case of argument~ hominem, as Hitchcock says,3 and 
1. ~., v, 4, 1-2; I, 530. 2. Kunze, 2£• cit., p. 34. 
3. Irenaeus of Lugdu.num, p. 90. 
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therefore of not much value a~ argument, it nevertheless gives a defi-
nite clue to Irenaeus' thinking. 
The superior person ought to be proved not by what is said, 
but by what has a real existence. 
What work, then, will they point to as having been accom-
plished through themselves by the Saviour, or by their l-1other, 
either greater or more glorious, or more adorned with wisdom, 
than those which have been produced by Him who was the disposer 
of all around us? What however have they established? what 
earth have they founded? what stars have they called into 
existence? or what lights of heaven have they caused to shine? 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
For the better man is shown by his works, and all works have 
been accomplished by the Creator.l 
While God's power is no doubt subject to the restrictions or 
limitations imposed by His nature of wisdom and goodness--which Irenaeus 
would probably not regard as any real limitation or restriction--, it 
is subject to no other limitation, internal or external. CertainlY it 
is limited by no inner necessity. 
It is not seemly, however, to say of Him who is God over all, 
since He is free and independent, that He was a slave of 
necessity •••• Otherwise they will make necessit.y greater 
and more kingly than God, since that which has the most power 
is superior to all /_Othery.2 
And just as certainly it is not limited by the power of some being 
external to God. In fact, it is inconceivable that a plurality of 
gods could exist, for each would be incomplete or lacking in comparison 
with the rest, thereby failing to possess the perfection and power es-
sential to being God) Kunze says: 
In diesem seinen Thun handelt Gott frei, nach eigener Wahl; 
kein Zwang oder Ver~gnis beschr~ ihn: II, 5, 4 ~ 
1. Against Heresies, ii, 30, 2-5; I, 404. 
2. ~., ii, 5, 4; I, 365. 3. Ibid., ii, 1, 5; I, 360. 
decet--~ qui super omnia sit Deus, ~ sit liber et ~ 
potestatis, necessitati servisse dicere vgl. ~ 2. Er 
gleicht nicht dem homer is chen Zeus, der etwas wider seinen 
Willen thun muss (II, 5, 4). Vielmehr steht alles, was ausser 
Gott ist, in AbhHngigkeit von seinem Willen; dieser ist das 
Prinzip von allem: II, 34, 4 principari enim debet in omnibus 
et dominari voluntas Dei; reliqua autem omnia huic cedere et 
subdita esse et in sei=Vitium dedita. Gott wird daher gewShiilich 
bezeichnet also T7Tt. 7T~VTW1J 8£..6s 11 ; 11 a1Wchtige Erhabenheit11 
ist der allgemeinste Wesensausdruck fur ihn.l 
"His will is the substance of all things, 112 and nothing exists 
or occurs contrar,y to His will.3 His power is always sufficient to 
accomplish His purposes, 4 for 11all things are possible to Him. 115 
God • • • has in Himself the disposition [to show kindnes~,7, 
because He is good; and the ability to do so, because He is 
mighty; and the faculty of fully garrying out His purpose, 
because 11He is rich and perfect. 11 
6. United with Wisdom 
God's goodness not only is undergirded with power but also is 
permeated with wisdom. As we noted above in discussing the union of 
goodness and power, Irenaeus regarded creation as a simultaneous ex-
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pression of God1s power, wisdom, and goodness. The participation of 
wisdom in creation is evident from the harmony of the finished product.7 
The Divine wisdom apparently brings barmoey and consistency not only 
to the world which God has fashioned but also to the conjunctive opera-
tion of the various attributes of God. For example, it ties together 
1. Kunze, ~· cit., p. 31. 
2. Against Heresies, iv, 30, 9; I, 4o6. 
3. Ibid., ii, 5, 3-4; I, 365. 
5. Ibid., iv, 38, 1; I, 521. 
7. Above, p. 26. 
4. Ibid., ii, 29, 2; I, 403. 
6. Ibid., ii, 29, 2; I, 403. 
and harmonizes the work of Divine goodness and Divine justice. 
For he that is the judicial one, if he be not good, is not God, 
because he from whom goodness is absent is no God at all; and 
again, he who is good, if he has no judicial p~er, suffers the 
same L!os!7 as the former, by being deprived of the character of 
deity. .And how can they call the Father of all wise, if they do 
not assign to Him a judiciAl faculty? For if He is wise, He is 
also one who tests others; but the judicial power belongs to him 
who tests, and justice follows the judicial faculty, that it may 
reach a just conclusion; justice calls forth judgment, and judg-
ment, when it is executed with justice, will pass on to wisdom. 
Therefore the Father will excel in wisdom all human and angelic 
wisdom, because He is Lord, and Judge, and the Just One, and 
Ruler over all. For He is good, and merciful, and patient, and 
saves whom He ought; nor does goodness desert Him in the exer-
cise of justice, nor is His wisdom lessened; for He saves those 
whom He should save, and judges those wortey of judgment.l 
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Thus it seems that for Irenaeus the goodness of God as it is known to 
men always exhibits a definite~ rational structure imparted qy the 
Divine wisdom. 
1. Divorced .from Need 
Unlike the good for man, which is related to human need, the 
goodness of God is absolutely divorced from need, since He is in need 
of nothing. 
This manner of speech may perhaps be plausible or persuasive 
to those who know not God, and who liken Him to needy human 
beings, • • • but it will not be regarded as at all probable 
by those who know that God stands in need of nothing, and that 
He created and made all things by His Word. 2 
In keeping with the thought suggested in the passage above, Irenaeus 
says elsewhere that God created the universe without the aid of &Qy 
intermediary beings, which were for Him completely unnecessary. 
The rule of truth which we hold, is, that there is one God 
Almighty, who made all things by His Word. • • • And these 
1. ~., iii, 25, 3; I, 459. 2. ~., ii, 2, 4; I, 361. 
eternal things He did not make by angels, or by any powers 
separated from His Ennoea. For God needs none of these things, 
but is He who, by His Word and Spirit, makes, and disposes, and 
governs all things, and commands all things into existence.l 
For God did not stand in need of these JOeing~, in order to 
the accomplishing of what He had Himsell determined with Him-
self beforehand should be done, as if He did not possess His 
own hands. For with Him were always present the Word and Wis-
dom, the Son and the Spirit, by whom and in whom, freely and 
spontaneously, He made all things.2 
God Himself has no need for human obedience and service, but 
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these are required because men need the fellowship with God which obe-
dience and service to Him make possible. 
In the beginning, therefore, did God form Adam not as if He 
stood in need of man, but that He might have ?some one7 upon 
whom to confer His benefits. • • • Nor did He stand in need 
of our service when He ordered us to follow Him; but thus He 
bestowed salvation upon ourselves •••• Thus, also, service 
§endered7 to God does indeed profit God nothing, nor has God 
need of 'fiuman obedience; but He grants to those who follow and 
serve Him life and incorruption and eternal glory •••• For, 
as much as God is in want of no5hing, so much does man stand 
in need of fellowship with God. 
Kunze makes it clear that God 1 s action in regard to man is in no way 
selfish. 
" Der Zwack, den Gott bei der Weltschopfung verfolgte, war 
nicht (wie dies die Gnostiker ihrem Demiurgen zuschrieben) 
irgendwie selb~chtiger Art. Gott bed~fte nicht etwa des 
Menschen und seines Dienstes, um si~h von ihW verherrlichen 
zu lassen, da er sich selbst vollstandig genugte. Vielmehr 
hat er die Welt um des MenRchen willen und diesen deshalb 
geschaffen, um ihn zum Gefass seiner Wohlthaten zu machen.4 
God, then, requires good works, not because He needs them, but because 
thereby men participate in His goodness. "For God, who stands in need 
1. ~., i, 22, 1; I, 347. 
3. ~., iv, 14, 1; I, 478. 
2. ~., iv, 20, 1; I, 487-88. 
4. Kunze, !?.E• cit., P• 44. 
of nothing, takes our good works to Himself for this purpose, that He 
may grant us a recompense of His own good things. 111 
B. Free, not Necessar,y 
As we have shown above, Irenaeus 1 God is subject to the limita.-
tion neither of inner necessity nor of any external power. God must 
be conceived of as free and independent. If He were subject to aey 
sort of necessity, that necessity would be superior and more powerful 
than He and would in reality be God.2 The idea that God could be 
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limited by the power of some being external to Himself is preposterous, 
since it is inconceivable that a plurality of gods could exist because 
each, being incomplete or lacking in comparison with the rest, would 
fail to possess the perfection and power essential to deity.3 KUnze 
points out that 11handelt Gott frei, nach eigener Wahl, n that 11kein 
Zwang oder Verhllngnis beschrlbkt ihn, 11 that "er gleicht nicht dem 
homerlschen Zeus, der etwas wider seinen Willen thun," but that "steht 
alles, was ausser Gott ist, in Abhllngigkeit von seinem Willen" since it 
"ist das Prinzip von allem. 11 4 
Although Irenaeus explicit~ denies that God's actions is the re-
sult of necessity, there is one passage in which a sort of inner neces-
sity is indicated. 
But when righteousness and love to God passed into oblivion, 
and became extinct in Egypt, God did necessari~, because of 
His great goodwill to men, reveailrj,mself by a voice, and led 
the people with power out of Egypt.5 fltalics mine.!? 
1. Against Heresies, iv, 18, 6; I, 486. 2. Ibid., ii, 5, 4; I, 365. 
3. Ibid., ii, 1, 5; I, 360. 4. Kunze, ~· cit., p. 31. 
5. Against Heresies, iv, 16, 3; I, 481. 
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While this passage does seem to suggest that God's goodness and love 
exercise an irresistible constraint upon the Divine will, such an 
interpretation is not the only possible one. For one thing, Irenaeus 
might not have intended the word necessarily to apply to God 1 s action 
at all but rather to indicate what was needed to improve the condition 
of His people. The reason for God's action is to be found in the sub-
ordinate clause, "because of His great goodwill to men, 11 for, as Hitch-
cock says, "the Will of God ••• is directed by internal love, not by 
external necessity.nl But even if the word necessarily is intended to 
convey the sense of a "must relationship" between God's action and His 
nature as goodness and love, to think of these as aspects of God sepa-
rate from the Divine will is not in keeping with the thought of 
Irenaeus. Intelligence and will and character are not separate in 
God, for all the Divine attributes constitute a complex unity. Just 
as Irenaeus could say that "in what manner He sees, in that also He 
hears,n2 so he might very well have said, "In what manner God acts, 
in what manner He reveals His power in delivering man, in that also He 
loves and expresses His goodness." God would simply be acting in keep-
ing with His nature and would still be free in relation to any power 
other than His own, for He is essentially an almigbtq"_, active, intelli-
gent, living, and good Will. 
Both Bonwetsch and Kunze point out that Irenaeus regarded God as 
1. Irenaeus ,2!: Lugdunum, P• 65. 
2. Against Heresies, ii, 13, 8; I, 375. 
being under no sort of compulsion in the act of creation. 
Aber nicht ein im Grunde naturnotwendiger Ausfluss des Wesens 
Got tes ist die scri)pfung, sondern eine durch nichts bedingte 
freie, seine Liebe bekundende Tat des pers~blichen Gottes.l 
Und zwan hat er dabei, seinem Wesen entsprechendd frei und 
selbstma~htig gehandelt, ohne durch irgend eine aussere oder 
innere Nbtigung bedingt zu sein. 2 
If God is to be conceived as acting freely and without compulsion in 
creating, no doubt He should be so regarded in respect to all His 
expressions of goodness. 
Nor is it because He must do so in order to make His goodness 
perfect that God creates and bestows good things upon mankind, for 
"He is always full of all good. 113 It is, rather, entirely a matter 
of free will, a free act of His goodness. 
It is proper, then, that I should ••• demonstrate that 
there is nothing either above Him or after Him; nor that, 
influenced by an;y one, but of His awn free will, He created 
all things, since He is the only God, the only Lord, the onlY 
Creator, the onlY Father, alone containing all things, and 
Himself commanding all things into existence.4 
9. Beyond Human Thought 
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God is rea~ beyond the reach of complete human comprehension. 
In His essence He is unknowable,5 for He is completely unlike the 
qualities found in man and is really above all such qualities. 
God is not as men are; and • • • His thoughts are not like the 
thoughts of men. For the Father of all is at a vast distance 
1. Bonwetsch, £E• ill•, P• 54. 2. Kunze, 2E• cit., p. 40. 
3. Against Heresies, iv, 14, 3J I, 479. 
4. ~., ii, 1, 1; I, 359. 5. ~., iii, 24, 2; I, 458-59. 
from those affections and passions which operate among men. 
He is a simple, uncompounded Being, without diverse members, 
and altogether like, and equal to Himself, since He is whol~ 
understanding, and wholly spirit, and wholly thought, and 
wholly intelligence, and wholly reason, and wholly hearing, 
and wholly seeing, and wholly light, and the whole source of 
all that is good. • • • 
He is, however, above Li~ these properties, and therefore 
indescribable.l 
Bonwetsch says: 
Nach Ir. darf der Ungezeugte (vgl. auch IV, 38, 1. 3) nicht 
II 
zugezahlt werden dem Gezeugten, der Unbegrenzte und daher 
Umfassbare nicht dem Begreyzten, der ohne Gestalt nicht dem 
Gestalteten (II, 12, 1). Uber allem menschlichen Erkennen 
durch seine Gr~sse erhaben, ist Gott in seinem Wesen 
unaussagbar (II, 13, 3, 4. 8; IV, 6, 3. 19, 2f. 20, Sf; v, 
1, 1). 2 
But while God's greatness implies His incomprehensibility, His 
love implies His self-revelation, as Kunze indicates. 
Bezeichnet aber Iren!us auf der einen Seite Gott nach der 
ganzen Fillle seines Wesens als unerkennbar, so betont er 
andererseits mit grossem Nachdruck, dass Gott seinen 
Gesch~pfen nie unbekannt gewesen ist, sondern durch seine 
Selbstoffenbarung sich den Menschen von allem Anfang an zu 
erkennen gegeben hat. Bedingt ~lich die Gr~sse Gottes seine 
Unerkennbarkeit, so Gottes Liebe seine 'Erkennbarkeit: das ist 
ein b!ufig wiederholter Grundgedanke im System des Irenlus. 
Zuweilen bezeichnet er auch die Vorsehung Gottes als den 
Grund flk Gottes Selbstoffenbarung: sie schliesst aus, dass 
die Wesen, auf welche sie sich erstreckt, Gott nicht kannten. 
Diese Selbstoffenbarung besteht zuerst darin, dass Gott der 
Vernunft des Menschen die Idee von sich als seinem allmRchti-
gen Herrn und SchBpfer einpflanzt. Neben dieser innerlichen 
Offen~ Gottes steht aber die Russerliche in den Werken 
der SchBpfung und Vorsehung.3 
"Although the poverty of human language prevents man from describing 
35 
the nature of God, and the weakness of human intellect debars man from 
1 • .!Q.g., ii, 13, 3-4; I, 374. 2. ~ Theologie ~ Irenltus, p. 52. 
3. Die Gotteslehre ~ IrenB.us, pp. 51-52. 
conceiving His goodness, God bas many ways of approach to the human 
soul."l Because of His kindness and love, God has made it possible 
for man to know Him as the author of His works. 2 Though He may have 
seemed invisible to men 11 on account of His superiority, 1111He could by 
no means have been unknown to them on account of His providence. n3 
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Furthermore, 11He is by no means unknown: for all things learn through 
His word that there is one God the Father.n4 ttMan was made by God to 
know Him and to grow like Him, 115 but, nevertheless, man's knowledge of 
God is but partial. It is impossible to comprehend His greatness or 
to declare fully His goodness on the basis of His works. 
God cannot be measured in the heart, and incomprehensible is 
He in the mind; He who holds the earth in the hollow of His 
hand. Who perceives the measure of His right hand? ••• 
But if man comprehends not the fulness and the greatness 
of His hand, how shall any one be able to understand or lmow 
in his heart so great a God? ••• That no one can f'u.1:cy 
declare the goodness of6God from the things made by Him, is a point evident to all. 
11For as His greatness is past finding out, so also His goodness is 
beyond expression."7 
1. Hitchcock, ~· cit., p. 100. 
2. Against Heresies, iii, 24, 2; I, 458-59. 
3. Ibid., ii, 6, 1; I, 365. 
-
4. Ibid., iv, 20, 6; I, 489. 
5. Hitchcock, £e· ~., P• 97. 
6. Against Heresies, iv, 19, 2-3; I, 487. 
7. ~., iv, 20, 5; I, 489. 
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B. The Goodness of God Revealed in Life and Salvation 
- -- ---
1. Creation 
The creation of the universe and all living things is the basic 
expression of God's goodness. Irenaeus is quite insistent that the 
Gnostic doctrine of an all-powerful god of pure goodness who redeems 
men but had no part in creating such an imperfect world as this is 
false.l This Kunze clearly recognizes. 
. " " Hatten die Gnost=4fer das Werk der Schopfung fur unvereinbar 
mit dem Wesen des hochsten Gottes angesehen, so ist es nach 
Irenlus, wie bereits aus dem Bmsherigen hervorgeht, Gott 
geradezu wesentlich, Schgpfer zu sein.2 
Irenaeus firmly insists that the goodness of God is "the beginning and 
the cause of the creation of the world, but not ignorance, nor an err-
ing Aeon, nor the consequence of a defect, nor the Mother weeping and 
lamenting, nor another God or Father."3 "His power and goodness 
fJ.ppeaiJ in this, that of His own will He called into being and fash-
ioned things having no previous existence. 114 The same God is respon-
sible both for human goodness and salvation and for the creation of 
all things. 
The lover of truth therefore ought not to be deceived by the 
interval between each note, nor should he imagine that one was 
due to one artist and author, and another to another, ••• 
but he should hold that one and the same person !Jormed the 
wholy • .5 
1. Ibid., ii, 30, 9; I, 406. 
-
2. Kunze, E.'e• cit., p. 39. 
3. !gainst Heresies, iii, 25, 5; I, 459-60. 
4. ~., iv, 38, 3; I, 521. 5. ~., ii, 25, 2; I, 396. 
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It is because of His great goodness that man has existence. God had 
no need of man or any service which he might be able to render. Rather, 
God created him simply that He might have some one upon whom to shower 
His benefits. "Thus it was ••• that God formed man at the first be-
cause of his munificence. 111 If God's goodness and mercy cause Him to 
benefit those who continue in His service, no doubt they are also the 
cause of that initial act of creation by 'Which He produced those who 
were to be the recipients of His benefits. As Kunze points out, for 
Irenaeus, the purpose pursued by God in creation, unlike that of the 
Gnostic demiurge, was in no way selfish. God had no need of men and 
their services, since He was wholly self-sufficient. Rather He created 
the world for the sake of man, in order that He might make man the 
receptacle of His good deeds.2 Addressing man, Irenaeus points out 
that he is "not an uncreated being ••• but now, through His pre-
eminent goodness," has received "the beginning of" his creation.3 
All of this is related, of course, to the idea that goodness is 
the principle of life or existence. For any one or anything to exist 
it must partake of goodness in some form, and God is "the whole source 
of all that is good."4 Therefore, Divine goodness is seen in His 
1. Ibid., iv, 14, 1-2; I, 478-79. 
2. Kunze, .2E• cit., p. 44. 
3. Against Heresies, ii, 25, 3; I, 397. 
4. Ibid.' ii, 13, 3; I, 374. 
imparting existence to things and to men, "for creation is an attri-
bute of the goodness of God.nl 
Irenaeus shows some inconsistency of expression, in that he at 
one time attributes creation to God, at other times to the Word, and 
at still other times to the Word and Spirit jointly. However, his 
basic meaning is the same in all instances, and the apparent inc on-
sistenc,y is only on the surface. 
There is one God Almighty, who made all things by His Word, 
and fashioned and formed, out of that which had no existence, 
all things which exist •••• He did not make by angels, 
• • • for God needs none of these things, but is He who, by 
His Word and Spirit, makes, and disposes, and governs all 
things, and commands all things into existence.2 
But there is only one God, the Creator. • • • He is Father, 
He is God, He the Founder, Be the Maker, He the Creator, who 
made all those things by Himself, that is, through His Word 
and His Wisdom--heaven and earth, and the seas, and all things 
that are in them. He is just; Be is good; He it is who formed 
man, who planted paradise, who made the world.3 
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Bonwetsch makes it clear that for Irenaeus God and His Word and Spirit 
are not to be regarded as something different. This is manifest in 
It II 
die aus der Uberlieferung uberkommene (vgl. Barnabas c. 5f.) 
Bezeichnung von Wort und Weisheit als der ~de Gottes,· es 
II besagt, dass Gott fur sein Schaffen und Wirken keines ausser 
ihm seienden Mittelwesens bedarf; zu Wort und ~ist hat Gott 
Gen. 1, 26 geredet. Auch schon die Ir. eigenthmliche 
durchgehende Unterscgeidung von Wort und Weisheit Gottes 
a1s Sohn und Geist liisst erkffnnen, dass es sich flh- ihn nicht 
um den Logos als ein se1btstandiges Mittelwesen hande1t, 
sondern dass Gott selbst sich durch Sohn und Geist bet~tigt• 
••• Durch sich se1bst, das heisst: "durch sein Wort und 
seine Weisheit" hat Gott alles gemacht •••• Es ist dasselbe, 
dass Gott se1bst, und dass er durch sein Wort al1es gemacht 
1. ~., iv, 39, 2; I, 523. 
3. ~., ii, 30, 9; I, 406. 
2. Ibid., i, 22, 1; I, 347. 
babe (II, 2, 4. 20, 9). Dur~ Sohn und Geist handelt Gott 
selbst (IV, 7, 4. 20, lff.). 
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In Irenaeus' thought God's act of creation is not separated from 
His work of redemption. Instead, at times creation itself seems to be 
regarded as a process, and also at times the initial act of creation 
seems to be for the purpose of contributing to the larger end of human 
redemption. 
For thou, 0 man, art not an uncreated being, • • • but now, 
through His pre-eminent goodness, receiving the beginning of 
thy creation, thou dost grad~ learn from the Word the dis-
pensations of God who made thee. 
In this passage, creation is clearly an uncompleted process and is no 
doubt equated with salvation. But creation may also be viewed as a 
stage or step in the salvation process. 
In the previous books I have set forth the cause for which 
God permitted these things to be made, and have pointed out 
that all such have been created for the benefit of that human 
Il!ture which is saved, ripening for immortality that which is 
LPossessed7 of its own free will and its own power, and pre-
paring ana rendering it more adapted for eternal subjection 
to God. And therefore the creation is suited to ~e wants 
o£7 man; for man was not made for its sake, but creation for 
the sake of man.3 
God thus determining all things beforehand for the bringi~ 
~ ~ ~ 2erfection, for his edification, and for the revela-
tion of His dispensation, that goodness may both be ~de ap-
parent, and righteousness perfected. Lltalics mine.:J4 
2. Providence and Natural Blessings 
God's goodness is shown in His exercise of watchful care, or 
1. Bonwetsch, .£2• cit., p. 6o. 
2. Against Heresies, ii, 25, 3; I, 397. 
3. ~., v, 29, 1; I, 558. 4. ~., iv, 37, 7; I, 520-21. 
providence, over the lives of men. Irenaeus attributes to providence 
the same creative and constitutive causality ascribed to the Divine 
goodness, indicating that providence is another characterization of 
the Divine goodness. 
He who is good, and righteous, and pure, and spotless, will 
endure nothing evil, nor unjust, nor detestable in His wedding 
chamber. This is the Father of our Lord, £[ whose providence 
all ~~s consist, and all are administered by His command; 
and HeCOnrers His free1gifts upon those who should /jeceive the!!!i'. Litalics rrdne .J 
Thus, in spite of the disbelief of some, God "exercises a providence 
over our affairs."2 For this reason, no doubt, He bas "made provision 
that all things shall turn out for good. 113 Divine providence is evi-
dent in the fact that 
alles wur~e geordnet zur V~rvollkommnung des Henschen und 
zw. Durc~~ung der HeUso"konomie; dami t in Bekundung der 
Gute und Vollendung der Gerechtigkeit Gottes die Kirche nach 
dem Bilde seines Sohnes gestaltet wer~e und der Mensch reif 
werde, Gott zu schauen und zu fassen.4 
Even man's apostasy or turning awa;y from God shall be made beneficial 
to him, for God bas determined "all things beforehand for the bringing 
of man to perfection, • • • that goodness may both be made apparent, 
and righteousness perfected. 115 
Furthermore, as a result of His providence, He bestows free~ 
upon men the natural blessings of earthly life. 
He has regard to all things, and exercises a providence over 
1. ~., iv, 36, 6; I, 517. 
3. ~., iv, 30, 3; I, 504. 
2. ~., v, 26, 2; I, 555-56. 
4. Bonwetsch, 2£• cit., p. 83. 
5. Against Heresies, iv, 37, 1; I, 520-21. 
all, "making His sun to rise upon the evil and then on the 
good, and sending rain upon the just and unjust.nl 
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And, as a quotation from St. Paul, used by Irenaeus in support of his 
argument, suggests, God's goodness is further revealed, not only in 
the fruit of the fields, but also in the blessings of the inner life 
of the human spirit.2 God is indeed the "fountain of all good things,n3 
and never ceases 11 to confer benefits upon, or to enrich man; nor does 
man ever cease from receiving the benefits, and being enriched by God.u4 
Indeed, all things 11 have been created for the benefit of that human 
nature which is saved •••• And therefore the creation is suited to 
fEhe wants o!] man; for man was not made for its sake, but creation 
for the sake of man.n5 
3. Knowledge Imparted by the Word 
Another evidence of God's goodness is His leading men to the 
truth and to a recognition of Himself through the Word. The Word has 
operated from the beginning to supply to human minds the light of 
understanding.6 It is through the mental power given by God that men 
may lmow good and evil and distinguish between them. 7 It is because 
of His love and ld.ndness that 11He has come within reach of human knowl-
edge; 118 but it is through the Word that such knowledge comes. 11 Since 
1. ~., v, 27, l; I, 556. 2. ~., ii, 12, 9; I, 434. 
~· ~., i, 12, 2· 
' 
I, 333. 4. Ibid., iv, 11, 2· 
' 
I, 474. 
5. ~., v, 29, 1• 
' 
I, 558. 
6. ~., iv, 20, 3; I, 488 and ii, 30, 9; I, 406. 
7. ~., iv, 39, 1; I, 522. 8. Ibid., iii, 24, 2; I, 458. 
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it was impossible without God, to come to a lmawledge of God, He 
teaches men through His Word, to lmow God. 111 Bonwetsch says: 
Dennoch ist durch den Logos Christus alle Gottesoffenbarung 
erfolgt (vgl. Epid. 47, o. S. 57). Er war ebenso durch die 
Sch~pfung der Offenbarer (II, 2, 4. IV, 6, 6), wie er dadurch 
Vater des Menschengeschleehts ist, dass er durch den Geist 
der S~denvergebung lebendig macht. Von Anbegirm ward durch 
ihn alle Erkenntnis Gottes vermittelt (IV, 7, 2.) • Er hat 
sich eine{ll Noah offenbart und das Gericht der Sintflut 
heraufgefUhrt (IV, 36, 3f.). Das Wort Gottes, nicht der 
Vater des Alles, der nicht geschaut ward, hat in Menschengestalt 2 mit Abraham Gen. 18 gesprochen (IV, 7, 4. TII, 6, 1. Epid. W.) • 
Men can expect to continue receiving and learning from God, 11because 
He is good, and possesses boundless riches, a kingdom without end, and 
instruction that can never be exhausted. 113 
The guidance of the Word is given to man in order that he might 
come to a recognition of the truth. As it is not the nature of a good 
teacher to lead men astray but to direct them to the truth,4 so the 
goodness of God reveals itself in imparting and preserving the truth. 
It is to this end, no doubt, that God 11has preserved ••• the unadul-
terated Scriptures" and by His grace insured their being interpreted 
with fidelity.5 
Since knowing God is for Irenaeus a meaning of fellowship with 
God, and since it will be shown that fellowship is the chief human good 
because it means participation in the goodness of God, God's revelation 
of His role in the creation and operation of the world and in the 
1. ~., iv, 5, 1; I, 466. 2. Bonwetsch, £2• ~., PP• 63-64. 
3. Against Heresies, ii, 28, 3; I, 400. 
4. ~., iv, 1, 2; I, 463. 5. ~., iii, 21, 3; I, 452. 
redemption of man must be regarded as an expression of His goodness. 
4. Activity of the Spirit 
The goodness of God is revealed also through the work of the 
Spirit, for to the Spirit at times Irenaeus attributes the same work 
which at other times he attributes to the Word or Son or to God Him-
self. He can do this, apparent~ without any sense of inconsistency, 
because he regards the Son and the Spirit as the hands of God. What-
ever they do is the work of God Himself, and it real~ does not matter 
which of them is credited with a particular work, since neither of 
them works in complete independence of the other. Hence the work of 
the Spirit is widely diversified and co-extensive with that of the Son 
and the Father. We shall not attempt, therefore, to detail all the 
modes of His activity. 
The activity of the Spirit is evident in the creation of all 
things. In his argument against the Gnostics, Irenaeus sa;ys that God 
has no need for the assistance of any emanated beings or subordinate 
forms of deity since He always has His two hands, "the Word and the 
Wisdom, the Son and the Spirit, by whom and in whom, free~ and spon-
taneously, He made all things.nl 11For God needs none or all of these 
things, but is He who, by His Word and Spirit, makes, and disposes, 
and governs all things, and commands all things into existence .n2 
11There is therefore one God, who by the Word and Wisdom created and 
1. ~., iv1 20, 1; I, 487-88. 2. ~., i 1 22, 1; I, 347. 
arranged all things.nl 
Durch das Wort babe Gott das Gewordene geschaffen und 
durch den Geist geordnet. Das Wort verleihe allem Sein und 
Bestand, der Geist ordne und gestalte die Dinge in ihrer 
Verschiedenheit, daher verde der Sohn das Wort, der Geist 
die Weisheit Gottes genannt.2 
Creation has already been shown to be an expression of the Divine 
goodness. 
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The role of the Spirit is seen also in revelation. It was "the 
Holy Spirit, who proclaimed through the prophets the dispensations of 
God" and the coming of Christ) "The Spirit of God pointed out by 
the prophets things to eome, forming and adapting us beforehand for 
the purpose of our being made subject to God, but it was still a 
future thing that man, through the good pleasure of the Holy Spirit., 
should see L'GoiJ.n4 
The work of the Spirit is displayed also in the vivifying and 
perfecting of man. "The flesh, therefore, when destitute of the 
Spirit of God, is dead, not having life, and cannot possess the king-
dom of God.n5 Irenaeus is referring, of course, to life in a spirit-
ual sense, for he says, "The breath of life, which also rendered man 
an animated being, is one thing, and the vivifying Spirit another, 
which also caused him to become spiritual. 116 Not only has the Lord 
redeemed us in giving himself for us but also he has "poured out the 
1. ~., iv, 20, 4; I, 488. 2. Bonwetsch, EE• cit., P• 65. 
3. Against Heresies, i, 10, 1; I, 330. 
4. ~., iv., 20, 8; I, 490. 5. Ibid., v, 9, 3; I, 535. 
6. ~., v, 121 2; I, 537. 
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Spirit of the Father for the union and communion of God and man, impart-
ing indeed God to man by means of the Spirit.n1 Irenaeus describes the 
indwelling Spirit as an earnest of man's perfection. 
This earnest, therefore, thus dwelling in us, renders us spirit-
ual even now, and the mortal is swallowed up by immortality • 
• • • If the earnest ••• does even now cause him to cry, 
"Abba, Father," what shall the complete grace of the Spirit 
effect, which shall be given to men by God? It will render us 
like unto Him, and accomplish the will of the Father; for it 
shall make man after the image and likeness of God.2 
The work of the Spirit is summed up by Bonwetsch: 
Die ganze Heils~'konomie durchwaltet der Geist. Insbesondere 
bereitet er einerseits die Erscheinwtg Christi vor <:q, 20, 
5f.), anderseits vollendet er dessen Werk (V, 18, 2). 
These actions which are so obviousiy aimed at man's good must 
sure~ be manifestations of the goodness of God. 
5. The Law, the Prophets, and the Gospel 
The instruction of the Law, the prophets, and the gospel is a 
further manifestation of the work of the Word and of the Spirit. 
Through them were the institution of the legal dispensation and the 
inspiration of the prophets. At one time, Irenaeus attributes these 
functions to the Word; at other times, to the Spirit. 
~refore the prophets, receiving the prophetic gift from 
the same Word, announced His advent according to the flesh.4 
The Holy Spirit ••• proclaimed throu5h the prophets the 
dispensations of God, and the advents. 
1. ~., v, 1, 1; I, 527. 2. Ibid., v, 8, 1; I, 533. 
3. Bonwetsch, 2.2• cit., pp. 66-67. 
4. ~ainst Heresies, iv, 20, 4; I, 488. 
5. ~., i, 10, 1; I, 330. 
The s~irit of God pointed out by the prophets things to 
come. 
For the Spirit Lor God7 is truly ~lik~ many waters, since 
the Father is both riCh and great. And the Word, passing 
through all those /foeiJ, did liberally confer benefits upon 
His subjects, by draWJ..Ilg up in writing ~ law adapted and 
applicable to every class ~among the3l. 
Through the institution of the Law and the calling of the prophets 
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is expressed the same God who, because of His goodness, makes possible 
the gracious redemption of the new covenant. 
The Gospel points out that it was God who spake to the fathers; 
that it was He who, by Moses, instituted the legal dispensation, 
by which giving of the law we know that He spoke to the fathers. 
This same God, after His great goodness, poured His compassions 
upon us •••• And therefore men were taught to worship after 
a new fashion.3 
And when he shall have divested his mind of such error, and of 
that blasphemy against God which it implies, he will of himself 
find reason to acknowledge that both the Mosaic law and the 
grace of the new covenant, as both fitted for the time Lit 
which they were give~, were bestowed RY one and the same 
God for the benefit of the human race. 
It is not, then, one God who judges, and another Father who 
calls us together to salvation. • • • But it is one and the 
same God, the Fath§r of our Lord, from whom also the prophets 
had their mission.~ 
The instruction and guidance of the Law, the prophets, and the gospel 
were given, not because God has need of human obedience,6 but because 
of His goodwill to men,7 for the benefit of man,B that he might become 
1. ~., iv, 20, 8; I, 490. 2. Ibid., iv, 14, 2; I, 479. 
3. ~., iii, 10, 2; I, 424. 4. Ibid., iii, 12, 11; I, 434. 
5. ~., iv, 36, 6; I, 517. 6. ~., iv, 14, 1; I, 478. 
7. Ibid., iv, 16, 3; I, 481. 8. Ibid., iii, 12, 11; I, 434. 
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a true disciple and followerl and eventually receive the salvation 
which communion with God through obedience makes possible.2 
And again Moses says: 11And now Israel, what doth the Lord 
thy God require of thee, but to fear the Lord thy God, to 
walk in all His ways, and to love Him, and to serve the Lord 
thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul?11 Now these 
things did indeed make man glorious, tr,y supplying what was 
wanting to him, namely, the friendship of God; but they prof-
ited God nothing, for God did not at all stand in need of man's 
love. For the glory of God was wanting to r, which he could 
obtain in no other way than by serving God. 
Moreover, the prophets indicate in the fullest manner that God 
stood in no need of their slavish obedience, but that it was 
upon the~ own account that He enjoined certain observances in 
the law.4 
Since such instruction is obviously for the benefit of man, the 
inspiration of the Law, the prophets, and the gospel is to be regarded 
as an expression of God's goodness. 
6. Judgment 
Irenaeus cannot insist too strongly against the views of the 
Marcionites that it is not one god who saves and another who judges 
but that it is the same God who executes judgment and bestows salva-
tion.5 Yet judgment or justice appears, not so much as a positive 
expression of goodness, but rather as that which is necessary to keep 
goodness from seeming imperfect. Unless God is both just and good He 
can appear to be neither, for a god who judges, without the goodness 
1. ~., iv, 16, 3; I, 481. 2. ~., iv, 14, 1-2; I, 478-79. 
3. ~., iv, 16, 4; I, 481-82. 4. Ibid., iv, 17, 1; I, 482. 
5. ~., iv, 36, 6· , I, 517. 
that bestows rewards upon those deserving them, will not seem fully 
just, and a god who bestows of His goodness, apart from the judgment 
deciding who are worthy of receiving it, will seem imperfect since 
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it does not bestow upon all alike.1 Irenaeus' logic is clear, although 
the form of his argument may not always be. If God is not good, then 
He cannot be just, for He will be capable only of punishing or inflict-
ing evil, but not of rewarding or bestowing good things, and this is 
not what is meant by justice. If God is not just as well as good, then 
a goodness which does not treat all alike will be seen as defective 
either in power or intention. Kunze comments on Irenaeus• view: 
Die Gttte Gottes be§timmt Ire~us ~er im Gegensatz zu 
Marcion, welcher rrute und richtende Gerechtigkeit einander 
ausschliessen liess (III, 25, 2ff.). Er waist nach, dass 
eP.ensowenig Gerechtigkeit ohne G\fte, wie diese ohne ~ene sein 
kMhne, und dass die Gerechtigkeit Gottes auch aus se~er 
Weisheit abfolge. So ergiebt sich ihm dar gnostische 
hbbhste Gott auch in der ethischen Motivierung Marcions 
als unn8tig, ja ummYglich. Vielmehr gilt v~n dem SchBpfer: 
~ iustus, ~ bonus II, 30, 9. IV, 36, 6. 
Bonwetsch's interpretation is similar. 
Obenan steht Gottes Gtite; aber seine Weisheit fordert sein 
Richteramt und dies Gerechtigkeit (III, 25, 2f.). Nur wenn 
auch gut, ist der Richtende ein gerec~ter und weiser Richter, 
und der Gute ist nur, wenn er auch pr~t, gerecht und gut 
(ebd.), als ein gerechter Vergllter gegen die seine Gtite 
nicht erkennenden (IV, 36, 6). 
While Irenaeus seems to recognize that real justice includes the 
expression of goodness, sometimes he speaks as though judgment is some-
thing different from, and even contrar,y to, goodness. 
1. ~., iii, 25, 3; I, 459. 2. Kunze, £E• ~., P• 39. 
· 3. Bonwetsch, £E• cit., p. 56. 
God therefore has given that which is good, as the apostle 
tells us in this Epistle, and they who work it shall receive 
glory and honour, because they have done that which is good 
when they had it in their power not to do it; but those who 
do it not shall receive the just judgment of God, because 
thel did not work good when they bad it in their power so to 
do. 
Neither does He show Himself unmercifully just; for His 
goodness, no doubt, goes on before, and takes precedency.2 
The God, therefore, who does benevolently cause His sun to 
rise upon all, and orders rain upon the just and the unjust, 
shall judge those who, enjoying His equally distributed kind-
ness, have led lives not corresponding to the dignity of His 
bounty; but who have spent their days ~ wantonness and lux-
ury, in opposition to his benevolence. 
In these passages, judgment seems to be used in a negative sense, 
that of inflicting punishment on those deserving it. Also, in these 
passages and in other similar ones, even where the term itself does 
not appear, judgment seems to have a note of retribution. There is 
no tendency to attribute to judgment, even in its negative sense 
alone, a reformatory and educative role. But the absence of a re-
formatory view of punishment is in perfect harmony with other prin-
ciples of Irenaeus' thought, and the apparent emphasis on punishment 
as retributory may be only an appearance. Judgment or punishment 
probably is not spoken of as a means to the further well-being of 
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the one punished, because the judgment or punishment is not something 
in addition to one's choice of evil but rather the inevitable conse-
quence inherent in the evil which is chosen. The punishment for choos-
ing evil is the evil chosen, and such punishment is not spoken of as 
1. Against Heresies, iv, 37, 1; I, 519. 
2. ~., iii, 25, 3; I, 459. 3. Ibid., iii, 25, 4; I, 459. 
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educative or reformatory because it by nature is the loss of existence 
and there can be no reformation of the non-existent. These conclusions 
seem to be implicit in the following passage: 
And to as many as continue in their love towards God, does 
He grant connnunion with Him. But communion with God is life 
and light, and the enjoyment of all the benefits which He has 
in store. But on as many as, according to their choice, de-
part from God, He inflicts that separation from Himself which 
they have chosen of their own accord. But separation from God 
is death, and separation from light is darkness; and separation 
from God consists in the loss of all the benefits which He has 
in store. Those, therefore, who cast away by aposta~ these 
forementioned things, being in fact destitute of all good, do 
experience every kind of punishment. God, however, does not 
punish them immediately of Himself, but that punishment fi_lls 
upon them because they are destitute of all that is good. 
Thus, we must conclude that judgment is an expression of goodness 
only in part. That aspect of judgment which distinguishes those choos-
ing good from those choosing evil and rewards the choice of good may 
be considered an expression of goodness; but that aspect of judgment 
which is concerned with meting out punishment to evil-doers, because 
it is a negation of life and therefore cannot be reformative or educa-
tive, must be viewed as something quite distinct from, if not actually 
opposed to, goodness. 
7. Grace, Love, and Mercy 
Grace for Irenaeus is not so much a separate expression of the 
Divine goodness as it is a synonym for it in many of its expressions. 
Many of the same things are wrought by grace that are attributed to 
the goodness of God. Life is 11bestowed according to the grace of 
1. ~., v, 27, 2; I, 556. 
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God,nl the faithful interpretation of the Scriptures is guaranteed 
by the grace of God,2 and salvation itself is the gracious work of 
God.3 But all of these are also results of goodness • . It seems cor-
rect, therefore, that grace is merely an alternate term for goodness 
rather than a distinct instance of it. 
LO'Ve is in somewhat the same position as grace. Some of the 
things Which have been attributed to the Divine goodness are also 
said to spring from the love of God. It certainly is possible to re-
gard love and goodness as synoeymous terms, for everything attributed 
to goodness can just as sensibly be attributed to love. However, this 
may not be the intention of Irenaeus, for the things which he traces 
to God's love are the sort of actions which seem to have the goal of 
fellowship with God as their ultimate end. So, it is as a result of 
love that He overcame the wealmess of human nature,4 that He became 
accessible to human knowledge,5 that Christ Jesus entered the sphere 
of human relationships.6 It may be the thought of Irenaeus that love 
is a special form of goodness within God, somewhat analogous to the 
various human emotions, but not an expression of goodness directly 
perceived in human experience. 
Mercy is the third of these terms whose exact relationship to 
goodness is not clearly apparent. Like the two preceding terms, mercy 
1. ~., ii, 34, 3; I, 411. 2. Ibid., iii, 21, 3; I, 452. 
3. ~., v, 2, 1; I, 528. 4. Ibid., iv, 38, 4; I, 522. 
5. ~., iii, 24, 2; I, 458. 6. ~., iii, 4, 2; I, 417. 
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appears occasionally as a stand-in for goodness, suggesting that it may 
be used as a partial s.ynonym. In some cases, mercy appears as the com-
passion which withholds the punishment justice demands. This is seen 
in his bestowing natural blessings upon just and unjust alike, 1 His 
continuing to give direction or counsel for man's improvement in spite 
of his waywardness, 2 and in His allowing goodness to temper the sever-
ity of His judgment.3 But mercy reveals itself also as the compassion-
ate treatment of the unfortunate. Thus it is because of His mercy that 
God permits man to know~ and benefits those who serve Him with good 
things and with fellowship.5 For Irenaeus, then, mercy is not some-
thing which becomes active only after human sin, to offset the harsh 
penalty which justice may demand; but mercy also operates prior to sin 
to lead man into the obedience whereby he may avoid evil and to bring 
man into fellowship with God. Mercy, thus, seems to be practically 
synonymous with both grace, love, and goodness. 
Regardless of whether or not it is correct to regard these three 
terms as s.y.nonyms of goodness or as internal aspects of it, they cer-
tainly are not expressions of the Divine goodness in the same sense 
that the other things dealt with are. For, even though it may be pos-
sible to think of grace, love, and mercy as distinct types of goodness 
within the Divine nature, they are not empirically observable 
1. ~., iii, 25, 4; I, 459. 
3. Ibid., iii, 25, 3; I, 459. 
5. ~., iv, 14, 1; I, 478. 
2. Ibid., iv, 17, 2; I, 483. 
4. ~·~ iii, 6, 4; I, 419. 
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expressions of goodness but are inferences from other expressions which 
are clearly perceptible through experience. Just as a child's belief 
in his mother's love is not a datum of experience but is rather an 
inference from the nature of his mother's action toward him, so these 
qualities in the Divine Being are inferences from His actions in re~ 
tion to men. 
8. Coming of Christ 
Irenaeus makes no definite statement that the entrance of Christ 
into the human sphere is an expression of the goodness of God. But 
several lines of argument may be employed to show that the work of 
Christ in general is an expression of God1 s goodness. At one point in 
his argument against the Gnostics and the Marcionites Irenaeus lays 
down as a general principle the proposition that the better person 
is shown by his works.l What one does is an indication of his essen-
tial nature. Whatever God does for the benefit of man must be regarded 
as an expression of His goodness. If salvation is regarded as benefi-
cial to man, then it will be an expression of the Divine goodness. 
Another line of argument begins with the recognition of a point of 
agreement between Irena.eus and his opponents. His opponents main-
tained that the one who saves man is a god of pure goodness, to whom 
judgment would be utterly foreign. Irenaeus argues against itm that 
the same God both saves and judges and so it must be if He is to be 
either just or complete~ good, but he remains in agreement with them 
1. ~., ii, 30, 2; I, 403-404. 
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that salvation is an expression of Divine goodness.l If the salvation 
of man is an expression of Divine goodness, whatever God does or what-
ever means He employs to make salvation possible must also be an expres-
sion of the same goodness. A third line of argument should be suffi-
cient to establish the point that the coming of Christ is an expression 
of God's goodness. It has been pointed out that God requires obedience 
from man in order that He may justly benefit him by granting him fel-
lowship with Himsel£.2 Such obedience or service is demanded by God, 
not because He has arry need of it, but that thereby He might bestow 
salvation upon man.3 But, in harmony with Gospel perspective, 
salvation for Irenaeus is often synonymous with life, life that is 
never consumed by death.4 Such life is clearly an act of His good-
ness: 11For as His greatness is past finding out, so also His good-
ness is beyond expression; by which having been seen, He bestows life 
upon those who see Him. 115 The means to life is fellowship with God, 
which is to know God and to enjoy His goodness. 6 But as has been 
shown, man !mows God only through the action of the Word. .And the 
fullest expression of the Word is the life of Christ. As Irenaeus 
says: 
For the glory of God is a living man; and the life of man 
consists in beholding God. For if the manifestation of God 
which is made by means of the creation, affords life to all 
1. Ibid., iii, 25, 3; I, 459. 
3. ~· 
5. ~., iv, 20, 5; I, 489. 
2. Ibid., iv, 14, 1; I, 478. 
4. Ibid., ii, 34, 3; I, 411. 
6.~. 
living . in the earth, much more does ·that revelation of the 
Fathir which comes f rom the Word, give life to those who see 
God. 
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Thus the coming of Christ is shown as an expression of Divine goodness. 
How it serves as a means to the end of salvation will be shown in the 
paragraphs that follow. 
It is quite eas,y to state abstractly the reason for Christ's com-
ing. Since the unending life of fellowship with God, which is the es-
sence of man's salvation, requires knowledge of God, and since nno one 
can lmow the Father" except "through the Word of God, 11 2 and since man 
can have knowledge only of that within the range of his experience, it 
was needful that the Word become flesh. Furthermore, there was, as a 
result of human apostasy, a weakness in human nature which had to be 
overcome before man could render to God the complete obedience neces-
sary for salvation, a weakness which man himself must overcome but 
which he could overcome only if some one showed him how. Irena.eus 
himself puts it: 
For in no other way could we have learned the things of God, 
unless our Master, existing as the Word, had become man. For 
no other being had the power of revealing to us the things of 
the Father, except His own proper Word. For what other per-
son "lmew the mind of the Lord," or who else "has become His 
counsellor?11 Again, we could have learned in no other way 
than by seeing c.ur Teacher, and hearing His voice with our own 
ears, that, having become imitators of His works as well as 
doers of His words, we may have communion with Him, receiving 
increase from3the perfect One, and from Him who is prior to all creation. 
1. ~., iv, 20, 7; I, 490. 
3. ~., v, 1, 1; I, 526. 
2. Ibid., iv, 6, 3; I, 468. 
Bonwetsch stresses the necessit,r for a revelation of God conducive to 
human obedience through the incarnation of the Son. 
Die Unsichtbarkeit Gottes blieb gewahrt, damit der Mensch 
Gott nicht verachte. Aber von Anfang hat der Sohn dem 
Menschengeschlecht gedient, den Menschen Gott gezeigt und 
Gotte den MensChen dargestellt (IV, 20, 7. 7, 4). Zuletzt 
ist er in sicn~er Gestalt gekommen (III, 6, 1. 2). Da der 
Vater fllr alles Gewordene unsichtbar, 11bedurfte es fllr die, 
die zu Gott gelangen sollten, der Hinzufilhrung zur Unterwerfung 
vor dem Vater durch den Sohn" (Epid. 47, o.s. 57).1 
But in addition to Christ's bringing man knowledge of God and 
instruction in the way of obedience, there are passages ~ich suggest, 
on the surface at least, that Christ engaged in some kind of meta-
physical manipulations. "For He fought and conquered; for He was 
man contending for the Father, and through obedience doing away with 
disobedience completely: for He bound the strong man, and set free 
the weak, and endowed His own handiwork with salvation, by destroying 
sin. n2 But to quote further indications of such a tendency f'rom the 
same context: 
Therefore, as I have already said, He caused man (human 
nature) to cleave to and to become one with God. For unless 
man had overcome the enenzy- of man, the enemy would not have 
been legitimately vanquished. And again: unless it had been 
God who had freely given salvation, we could never have pos-
sessed it securely. And unless man had been joined to God, 
he could never have become a partaker of incorruptibility. 
For it was incumbent upon the mediator between God and men, 
by His relationship to both, to bring both to friendship and 
concord, and present man to God, while He revealed God to man. 
For, in what way could we be partakers of the adoption of 
sons, unless we had received from Him through the Son that 
fellowship which refers to Himself, unless His Word, having 
been made flesh, had entered into communion with us? Where-
fore also He passed through every stage of life, restoring to 
1. £E. cit., p. 64. 2. Against Heresies, ii, 18, 6; I, 447-48. 
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all communion with God •••• For it behooved Him who l'Tas 
to destroy sin, and redeem man under the power of death, that 
He should Himself be made that very same thing wich He was, 
that is, man; who had been drawn by sin into bondage, but was 
held by death, so that sin should be destroyed by man, and 
man should go forth from death. For as by the disobedience 
of the one man wo was originally moulded from virgin soil, 
the many were made sinners, and forfeited life; so was it 
necessary that, by the obedience of one man, who was originally 
born from a virgin, many should be justified and receive salva-
tion. • • • But if, not having been made flesh, He did appear 
as if flesh, His work was not a true one.l 
For it was for this end that the Word of God was made man, ani 
He who was the Son of God became the Son of man, that man hav-
ing been taken into the Word, and receiving the adoption, might 
become the son of God. For by no other means could we have ob-
tained to incorruptibility and immortality, unless we had been 
united to incorruptibility and immortality. But how could we 
be joined to incorruptibility and immortality, unless, first, 
incorruptibility and immortality and become that which we also 
are, so that the corruptible might be swallowed by incorrupti-
bility, and the mortal by immortality, that we might receive 
the adoption of sons?2 
Certainly a rnnnber of interpreters of Irenaeus agree that Christ's 
work was objectively, rather than subjectively, accomplished. 
Gustaf Aul~n, for example, regards Christ's victory as a Divine 
Champion over sin, death, and the devil as the central element in 
Irenaeus 1 doctrine of recapitulation and as the most significant ex-
planation of Christ's coming for Irenaeus himself.3 
Irenaeus 1 whole line of thought then s tams out in har-
monious clearness. The Word of God, who is God Himself, has 
entered in under the conditions of sin and death, to take up 
the conflict with the powers of evil and carry it through to 
the decisive victory. This has brought to pass a new relation 
between God and the world; atonement has been made. The mercy 
of God has delivered men from the doom which rested upon them. 
1. Ibid., iii, 18, 7; I, 448. 2. Ibid., iii, 19, 1; I, 448-49. 
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3. Christus Victor (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954), pp. 20-21. 
Thus a clear and simple answer has been given to the question 
Ad ~ descendebat? Christ came down from heaven because no 
p-ower other than that of God Himself was able to accomplish 
the work that was to be done.l 
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In like manner, John Lawson sets forth in a very able disserta-
tion the work of Christ as a divine champion as the major element of 
Irenaeus' doctrine of recapitulation. "Recapitulation'' has held a 
variety of meanings for different writers on Irenaeus. To one it has 
meant "to unite under a single head, 11 while to others it has meant 
"to restore to the original, 11 11 to make a new start," 11 to bring to a 
climax," or "to go over the ground a second time.tt 2 Turning to 
Irenaeus 1 writings, one finds that all these notions have a place in 
his scheme of salvation, although the conception of "going over the 
ground again11 seems to be the basic and dominant one) 
Jesus Christ went over the same ground as Adam, but in the 
reverse direction. He placed Himself in the same circtml-
stances as Adam, and was confronted with the same choices. 
At every point where Adam weak:cy yielded, slipping down to 
destruction, Christ heroical:cy resisted, and at the cost of 
His agony retrieved the disaster. Thus was wrought out a 
decisive victory over the Adversary. The benefits of this 
victory can pass to mankind, because Christ was acting as 
the Champion of humanity. 11He was man contending for the 
fathers." ,Liu, 18, 6; I, 4417 The Incarnation was conse-
quentlY the great climax of the history of the human race. 
The ground lost in the Fall was kegained, and a new order 
of spiritual progress initiated. 
Passing through the same types of experience as Adam, Christ faced 
temptations and spiritual struggles which were real and grim, yet 
1. ~., P• 32. 
2. The Biblical Theology of St. Irenaeus (London: Epworth Press, 
'j'JU'S), pp. l.U-42. --
3. ~., P• 143. 4. Ibid., PP• 1.44-45. 
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emerged victorious in every instance. Through his obedience, in con-
trast with Adam's disobedience which had resulted in the enslavement 
of mankind, Christ overcame sin, death, and the devil and brought man 
into a new relationship with God.l Irenaeus spells out this work of 
Christ as a champion through obedience in more detail in his analogy 
between the careers of Christ and of Adam. 
By his obedience the Champion trod precisely the same path 
as Adam did in his disobedience, but in the reverse direc-
tion. Thus an analogy between the careers of Christ and 
Adam may be drawn. This is worked out to great elaboration 
in an endeavor to show that every circumstance in the career 
of Adam was duplicated in the career of Christ, and that at 
every point where the former made a wrong choice the latter 
made the counter-balancing right choice. In the first place, 
both were virgin-born. • • • Furthermore, the disobedience 
of a woman provided the historical occasion of the Fall. In 
like manner, the obedience of a woman provided the occasion 
of the Incarnation of the One Who recapitulated the Fall • 
• • • The "analogy" is further traced in Christ• s own obe-
dience. Regarding the Temptations Irenaeus writes: 11For 
as at the beginning it was by means of food that Lthe enerrfl.l 
persuaded man, although not suffering hunger, to transgress 
God's commandments, so in the end he did not succeed in per-
suading Him that was an hungered to take the food that pro-
ceeded from God •••• The corruption of man, therefore, 
which occurred in paradise' both £our first parenty eat-
ing, was done away with by the Lord' s7 want of food in this 
world. 11 £v, 21, 2; I, 54,2 So at the end, in 11 doing away 
with that disobedience of man which had taken place at the 
beginning by the occasion of a tree, 'He became obedient 
unto death, even the death of the cross'; rectifying that 
disobedience which had occurred by reason of a tree, through 
that obedienc~2which was £wrought out7 upon the tree." /J, 16, 3; I, 5~ -
One may also expound the notion of recapitulation in the sense 
of "going over the same ground again" by showing "that Christ shared 
successively every part of human experience. n3 His birth "hallowed 
1. ~., PP• 148-49. 
3. ~., p. 153. 
2. Ibid., pp. 150-52. 
our birth.nl "He passed through every stage of life, restoring com-
munion with God to all. 112 Lawson quotes the following passage: 
For He came to save all by means of Himself--all, I say 
••• infants, and children, and boys, and youths, and old 
men. He therefore passed through every age, becoming an 
infant for infants, thus sanctifying infants; a child for 
children, thus sanctifying those who are of this age. • • • 
So likewise He was an old man for old men, that He might be 
a perfect Master for all. • • • Then at last He came on to 
death itself.3 
11For three days He dwelt where the dead were, n4 preaching His 
advent there also, and Ldeclarin~7 the remission of sins received rr,r 
those who believe in Him.''' 
A second strand of thought in Irenaeus 1 doctrine of salvation, 
which Lawson regards as of secondary importance in the ~stem of 
61 
Irenaeus and as an indication of the influence of the secular culture 
of his day upon his gystem, is that man is to be made god or a son of 
God. 6 11He who was the Son of God became the Son of Man, that man 
• • • might become the son of God."7 
The process of divinization may • • • be spoken of almost in 
mechanical terms, as though it were a sort of spiritual inocu-
lation. • • • The Incarnate Son is represented as the One who 
brought down to earth from heaven the metaphysical substance 
of Divinity, and united it to the substance of humanity. Thus 
man comes to share in the8Divine Nature, and becomes 
11 incor-
ruptible11 and 11 immortal. 11 
1. Irenaeus, ~ Demonstration~ the Apostolic Preaching, trans. J. 
Armitage Robinson (London: Society for Propagating Christian 
Knowledge, 1920), 38. 
2. Against Heresies, iii, 18, 7; I, 448 . 
4. Ibid., v, 31, 1; I, 560. 
6. Biblical Theology of Irenaeus, p. 155. 
1. Against Heresies, iii, 19, 1; I, 448. 
3. Ibid., ii, 22, 4; I, 391. 
5. Ibid., iv, 27, 2; I, 499. 
B. Lawson, £E• ~., p. 156. 
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For the most part, however, Irenaeus teaches that man is divinized b.1 
beholding the vision of God in the incarnate Son. Using the Biblical 
motif :found in the Genesis story of man1 s creation in the image of 
God, Irenaeus portrays the work of Christ as the manifestation of God 
in visible form and the restoration of the image of God in man, which 
had been defaced or obliterated qy the :fall of Adam.l Irenaeus him-
self says: 
In times long past, it was~ that man w~s created after 
the image of God, but it was not £actually~; :for the 
Word was as yet invisible, after whose image man was created. 
Wherefore also he did easily lose the similitude. When, how-
ever, the Word of God became :flesh, He confirmed both these: 
:for He both showed :forth the image truly • • • and He re-
established the similitude after a sure manner, by assimilat-
ing man to the invisible Father through means of the visible 
Word.2 
There is a third strand of thought in Irenaeus' exposition of 
the doctrine of salvation, which neither Lawson nor Aul~n mentions 
but which the present writer regards, in spite of their silence con-
cerning it and their :faill.U'e so to regard it, as the real meaning be-
hind the various :figures Irenaeus uses to expound his doctrine of 
salvation, if not the :fundamental element in both his theory and his 
exposition. For lack of a better term, we refer to it as Christ's 
saving work as a moral example. 
The new covenant is to be carried out by Christ that men 11might 
always make progress through believing in Him, and by means of the 
L5uccessiv!7 covenants, should gradually attain the perfect salvation. 
For there is one salvation and one God; but the precepts which form 
1. ~., P• 155. 2. Against Heresies, v, 16, 2; I, 544. 
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man are numerous, and the steps which lead man to God are not a .few .nl 
It is interesting to note that .from a passage quoted to illus-
trate "recapitulation" as Christ's successive participation in every 
part of human experience, Lawson amits2 for some undefined reason all 
references to the work o.f Christ as an example. To show the importance 
o.f what has been omitted, we quote the passage below. 
For He came to save all through means of Himself --all, I 
say, who through Him are born again to God--infants, and 
children, and boys, and youths, and old men. He therefore 
passed through every age, becoming an infant for infants, 
t hus sanctifying infants, a child for children, thus sanc-
tifying those who are of this age, being at the ~ time 
made to ~ !.!! example of piety, righteousness, ~ sub-
mission; a youth for youths, becoming ~ example to youths, 
and thus sanctifying them for the LOrd. So likewise He was 
an old man for old men, that He might be a perfect Master 
for all, not merely as respects the setting forth of the 
truth, but also as regards age, sanctifying at the same 
time the aged also, and becoming !.!! example ~ them like-
wise. ,L!talics mine.J3 
Surely the occurrence in the above passage o.f three references to 
Christ as a moral example, plus the implication of the teaching title 
11Master, 11 is indicative that the moral influence of Christ is at least 
an element to be considered in Irenaeus 1 doctrine of salvation. 
At another point Irenaeus says: 
Again, we could have learned in no other way than by seeing 
our Teacher, and hearing His voice with our own ears, that, 
having became imitators of His works as well as doers of His 
words, we may have communion with Him, receiving increase 
1. ~., iv, 9, 3; I, 472-73. 
2. Cf. Biblical Theology of Irenaeus, p. 153, and Against Heresies, 
ii, 22, 4; I, 391. 
3. Against Heresies, ii, 22, 4; I, 391. 
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from the perfect One, and from Him Who is prior to all crea-
tion.l 
Indeed, all of the passages in Irenaeus where Christ appears as the 
visible manifestation of God and the restorer of the image of God in 
man are meaningful only in terms of an example. Certainly this seems 
to be the intended meaning of the statement: "He re-established the 
similitude after a sure manner, by assimilating man to the invisible 
Father by means of the risible Word." 2 The thought of Irenaeus in 
such passages seems to be that God is made risible so that men, in 
seeing Him, may through imitation become like Him. 
It might be well to note also that, in picturing Christ as the 
Divine Champion who through a victorious conflict with sin, death, and 
the devil delivers man from the power of these evils into a new and 
deepening relationship with God, Irenaeus does not suggest that the 
means by which Christ achieves victory over such demonic powers is 
inconsistent with Christ's serving as a moral example. In fact, since 
he does not tell us how Christ emerges as victor in this great dramatic 
struggle in those passages which thus describe His work, perhaps he 
means for the reader to infer that those passages depicting Christ's 
work as a moral example are indicative of the means of victory. 
In the context from which the passage quoted above about seeing 
and hearing our Teacher, was taken, Irenaeus sets forth the idea that 
Christ became a ransom to redeem mankind from captivity • 
.And since the apostasy tyrannized over us unjustly, and 
though we were by nature the property of the omnipotent 
1. Ibid., v, 1, 1; I, 526. 2. Ibid., v, 16, 2; I, 544. 
God, alienated us contrary to nature, rendering us its own 
disciples, the Word of God, powerful in all things, and not 
defective with regard to His own justice, did righteously 
turn against that apostasy, and redeem from it His own prop-
erty, not by violent means, as the Liposta~7 had obtained 
dominion over us at the beginning, when it ~atiably 
snatched away what was not its own, but !?z ~ of per-
suasion, as became a God of counsel, who does not use vio-
lent means to obtain what He desires; so that neither should 
justice be infringed ypon, nor the ancient handiwork of God 
go to destruction. Litalics mine~l 
Even apart from its context, this passage suggests that a moral in-
fluence is at work in redeeming man from the tyranny of Satan. And 
when the passage is considered in relation to the context stressing 
Christ's moral influence on men there can be little question whether 
it is man or the devil who is persuaded. Lawson writes concerning 
this passage: 
God's justice is not a concession to the Devil, nor even to 
His own reputation. It is a definition of the means taken 
to defeat Satan. "Vanquishing Satan" and the "persuasion" 
are really the same thing.Z 
F. R. Montgomery Hitchcock comments: 
And, therefore, our redemption was effected by persuasion 
(secundum suadelam), not by force (~ .!!) , the captives 
of sin being drawn out of its sphere and power by the spirit-
ual attraction of the Christ, the Incarnate Word. • • • The 
suadela or moral influence by which man is drawn out of the 
tyranny of the Apostasia, the kingdom of evil, consists in 
the example of perfect obedience to the moral government of 
the Father in the Son, Who recapitulated humanity in Him-
self, and the illustration of the Father'~ love and mercy 
in the Word, Who revealed God in Himself.j 
Irenaeus had no idea of compensation at all. He regarded 
man as having fallen, through his own disobedience and of 
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1. !gainst Heresies, v, 1, 1; I, 527. 
3. Irenaeus .£!: Lugdunum, pp. 168-69. 
2. Lawson, 2E• cit., p. 198. 
his own free will, albeit deceived, under the thraldom and 
tYTanny of the devil, which he called 11 the apostasy," and 
from that apostasy he could be delivered, not by any violent 
procedure against either devil or man, not by any compen-
sation or inducement offered to the devil, but by persuading 
men of their free will to abandon the devil and sin. The 
human race did not belong originally to the devil: it bad 
been seized by him, who held his possessions by force. It 
would not, however, be in keeping with the Divine character 
of justice and kindness to descend to the same level as the 
devil, and recover His own by force. The power of the devil 
over humanity had to be broken by man if the victory was to 
be a moral one; if man was to be induced of his own free will 
to abandon the devil and to allow himself to be fashioned anew 
in the image and likeness of God.l 
Liberation of mankind from the tyranny of the apostasy must neces-
sarily be accomplished through moral example and moral suasion, in 
order that the good which is man's end may be rational for him and 
become his own possession by the choice of that which he sees in-
tellectually to be desirable. 
The Lord has therefore endured all these things on our be-
half, in order that we, having been instructed by means of 
them all, may be in all respects circumspect for the time 
to come, and that, having been rationally taught to love 
God, we may continue in His perfect love: for God has dis-
played long-suffering in the case of ~'s apostasy; while 
man has been instructed by means of it. 
Perhaps the few passages we have quoted are insufficient to 
counterbalance the weight of scholarship favoring the view that the 
work of Christ as Divine Champion is the main strand of thought in 
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Irenaeus• doctrine of salvation--although there are many more passages 
of like nature which we could adduce and a number of other considera-
tions which suggest a different conclusion. At any rate, it is the 
considered opinion of this writer that salvation through divinization 
1. ~., pp. 171-72. 2. Against Heresies, iv, 37, 7; I, 520. 
67 
is the main strain of Irenaeus' doctrine of salvation, that the work 
of Christ as Divine Champion is merely a frequently used figure to 
illustrate, in part, how this end is accomplished, and that the work 
of Christ as a morai example is complementary and essential to the 
meaningfulness of both. 
First, in defense of this statement, we can point out that the 
concept of salvation as divinization, especially in its principal 
form of beholding the vision of God in the incarnate Word, is just 
what one would expect to find in a treatise written to refute the 
heresies of the Gnostics, for whom salvation was not b.1 faith or 
works, but knowledge. Since the aim of Irenaeus' great work was the 
refuting of false doctrines and supplanting them with the true faith, 
it would not be surprising if, in order to accomplish this purpose, 
his exposition of the true faith should be influenced by the nature 
of the heresies against which he contended--in particular, if he 
should describe salvation in terms of !mowing God. From the fre-
quency of occurrence of passages suggesting this thought, we conclude 
that it was his primary conception of salvation. Also, from the fact 
that the work of Christ as Divine Champion is sometimes cast, appar-
ently as an explanation of how man is to be made divine, in a larger 
context in which the divinization concept is being expounded, we con-
clude that it is a secondary element in Irenaeus' thought and results 
from his desire to express in his work the thought and language of 
Scripture. Furthermore, the concept of 11 Christus Victor," even though 
it may give an adequate answer to the question of why God must act to 
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make atonement possible, does not contain within itself an adequate 
explanation of why an incarnation was required. The idea of a Divine 
Champion who performs a purely objective work in doing for man what he 
could not do for himself is intrinsical~ the same apart from incarna-
tion. But the need of an incarnation arises when there must be not 
only an objective act performed but also a human "beholding" of that 
act and response to it--in short, when there is a recognition that 
atonement is subjective as well as objective. The divinization con-
cept of salvation combines the objective and subjective elements of 
atonement and therefore clear~ requires an incarnation. It should 
be regarded as more fundamental to the thought of Irenaeus, for it 
is only when the Divine Champion concept is included within the larger 
context of the divinization concept that the former becomes fully 
rational. But neither of these strands of Irenaeus' thought is com-
plete without the third, which we have called "Christ's work as a 
moral influence. 11 This is really an integral part of the diviniza-
tion concept, especial~ when it is expounded as the vision of God 
in the incarnate Word; but also it may be viewed as the subjective 
phase of atonement in regard both to the divinization concept of 
salvation and the Divine Champion concept when it is set within the 
context of the divinization concept. Thus, to this writer, the work 
of Christ, as a mora~ example seems to be an important and essential 
element in Irenaeus' theory of salvation, if it itself is not the most 
important element in that theory. 
There seems to be a tendency among the interpreters of ancient 
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writers and thinkers to read into them strange and irrational modes of 
thinking, but to this writer it seems the path of wisdom, when it is 
possible without doing violence to any facet of a man's thought to 
adopt a more reasonable interpretation and thereby illuminate more 
fully and reveal more clearly the internal consistency of his s.ystem 
of thought, to accept the most reasonable interpretation available as 
representative of the man's thinking. 
At any rate, it should be evident that in the thinking of 
Irenaeus it is because of God's great goodness that Christ appeared 
in human form to lead men by word and example to the goodness which 
means fellowship with God. 1 
9. Resurrection and Eternal Life 
The final indication of God's goodness is His gift of eternal 
life to man. 
But the Word of God did not accept of the friendship of 
Abraham, as though He stood in need of it, ••• but that 
He in His goodness might bestow eternal life upon Abraham 
himself, inasmuch as the friendshi~ of God imparts im-
mortality to those who embrace it. 
This immortality which God bestows upon man is not of the spirit alone, 
but also of the body.3 Indeed, Irenaeus regards an immortality which 
does not include the body as the expression of impotence or defective 
goodness on the part of deity. Irenae~• line of thought is summarily 
1. Ibid., iii, 10, 2; I, 424. 2. Ibid., iv, 13, 4; I, 478. 
3. ~., ii, 29, 2; I, 403. 
expressed and evaluated by Kunze. 
Ferner vermag der hBchste Gott nicht den vergHnglichen Leib 
mit der Unverg~glichkeit zu umkleiden; der Demiurg verheisst 
das (V, 4, lf.). Nun aber gilt der von Iren!us mehrfach ange-
wendete Grundsatz, dass der Vorztlglichere durch seine Werke 
als solchen sich ausweisen muss. Darnach erscheint der 
Demiurg als der m&chtigere und stRrkere und zugleich wahrhaft 
gute.l 
God is shown to be both more powerful and more truly good than the 
good god of the Marcionites and Gnostics by Hi~ imparting eternal 
life to the whole man and not to merely a part of him. 
Those persons who feign the existence of another Father 
beyond the Creator, and who term him the good God, do de-
ceive themselves; for they introduce him as a feeble, worth-
less, and negligent being, not to say malign and full of 
envy, inasmuch as they affirm that our bodies are not 
quickened by him. • • • For since the Creator does even 
here quicken our mortal bodies, and promises them resur-
rection by the prophets, as I have pointed out: who (in 
that case) is shown to be more powerful, stronger, or truly 
good? Whether is it the Creator who vivifies the whole man, 
or is it their Father, falsely so called? ••• Whether is 
it the case, then, that their Father does not bestow life 
upon them when he has the power of so doing, or is it that 
he does not possess the power? If, on the one hand, it is 
because he cannot, he is, upon that supposition, not a 
powerful being, nor is he more perfect than the Creator; 
for the Creator grants, as we must perceive, what He is 
unable to afford. But if, on the other hand (it bethat 
he does not grant this) when he has the power of so doing, 
then he is proved to be not a good, but an envious and 
malignant Father. 2 
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Irenaeus seems to have no concept of everlasting punishment for 
the wicked. Immortality by its very nature seems to imply fellowship 
with God born of likeness to Him. 11For by no other means could we 
have attained to incorruptibility and immortality, unless we had been 
1. Die Gotteslehre des Ire~us, P• 34. 
2. Against Heresies, v, 4, 1; I, 530. 
71 
united to incorruptibility and i.:mmortality.nl A number of passages 
suggest that extinction or annihilation may be the lot of those who do 
not win the favor of God or choose the friendship of God. 
Being ignorant of Him who from the Virgin is Emmanuel, they 
are deprived of His gift, which is eternal life; and not re-
ceiving the incorruptible Word, they remain in mortal flesh, 2 and are debtors to death, not obtaining the antidote of life. 
He who shall preserve the life bestowed upon him, and give 
thanks to Him who imparted it, shall receive also length of 
days for ever and ever. But he who shall reject it, and 
prove himself ungrateful to his Maker, inasmuch as he has 
been created, and has not recognized Him who bestowed_lthe 
gift upon ~' deprives himself of Lthe privilege o~con­
tinuance for ever and ever •••• Those who, in this brief 
temporal life, have shown themselves ungrateful to Him who 
bestowed it, shall just~ not receive from Him length of 
days for ever and ever. 
c. The Meaning of Divine Goodness Implied in the Human Good 
From Irenaeus' conception of the human good, it is possible to 
infer other expressions of Divine goodness. In order to make the 
basis of such inference clear, a brief description of the human good 
from the standpoint of its characteristics and essence is needed. 
1. Nature of the Human Good 
a. Characteristics 
(1) Inferior to Divine goodness.--Man is inferior to God, having 
received grace only in part. He is unlike his Creator in a:rry respect, 
1. ~., iii, 19, 1; I, 448. 
3. ~., ii, 3L., 3; I, 411-12. 
2. Ibid. 
-
but especially in respect to knowledge and understanding. 
Man is infinitely inferior to God. • • • He has received 
grace only in part, and is not yet equal or similar to His 
Maker; and, moreover, • • • he cannot have experience or form 
a conception of all things like God; but in the same propor-
tion as he who was formed but to-day, and received the begin-
ning of his creation, is inferior to Him who is uncreated, 
and who is always the same, in that proportion is he, as re-
spects knowledge and the faculty of investigating the causes 
of all things, inferior to Him who made him.l 
As the above passage suggests, the inferiority inherent in man 1s 
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nature is due to the fact that man is a created rather than an eternal 
being. Irenaeus accepts as a general principle the notion that what 
is created is inferior to what is uncreated. He says that because 
created things have a beginning and are not unbegotten they are inferior 
to their Maker.2 The later origin of things proves both their created-
ness and their inferiority to their Creator.3 "How, then, shall he be 
a God, 'Who has not as yet been made a man? Or how can he be perfect 
who was but lately created?114 Kunze says: 
Das gemeinsame Wesen alles Gesc~bpflichen liegt in dem 
Nichtunerschaffen-sein. Begr[ndet die Unerzeugtheit die 
Vollko:mrn.enhei t Gottes, so da.s Erschaffensein die Unvolkom-
menheit, Unselbstlndigkeit und Verglnglichkeit alles 
Geschgpflichen.5 
That such inferiority attaches to human goodness, as well as to other 
aspects of human nature and activity, is evident from Irenaeus' view 
1. ~., ii, 25, 3; I, 396-97. 
2. Ibid., ii, 34, 2· 
' 
I, 411. 
3. Ibid., iv, 38, 1; I, 521. 
4. Ibid., iv, 39, 2; I, 522. 
5. Kunze, E.E· .£!1·, P· 44. 
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concerning the eternity of Divine goodness, that a goodness which is 
not operative from the beginning is imperfect.1 If a Divine goodness 
which begins is imperfect, human goodness mUst for the same reason be 
imperfect and inferior to Divine goodness, which is eternal. 
Human goodness is inferior to God's also in that it is secondary 
and dependent while God1 s goodness is primary and substantive. Man1 s 
goodness is only manipulative, while God's is creative. 
While men, indeed, cannot make anything out of nothing, but 
only out of matter already existing, yet God is at this point 
pre-eminent~ superior to men, that He Himself called into be-
ing the substance of His creation, when previously it had no 
existence.2 
For creation is an attribute of the goodness of God; but to 
be created is that of human nature.3 
(2) Derivative and learned.--Unlike God, whose goodness is with-
out beginning, man's goodness is derived from God and must be learned 
from Him.4 
And in this respect God differs from man, that God indeed 
makes, but man is made; and tru~, He who makes is always 
the same; but that which is made must receive both begin-
ning, and middle, and addition, and increase. • • • Man 
receives advancement and increase towards God. For as God 
is always the same, so also man, when found in God, shall 
alw~s go on towards God. For neither does God at any 
time cease to confer benefits upon, or to enrich man; nor 
does man ever cesse from receiving the benefits, and being 
enriched by God.~ 
The prime reason for the incarnation of the Son and all the dispensations 
1. Above, P• 22. 
3. ~., iv, 39, 2; I, 523. 
5. ~., iv, 11, 2; I, 474. 
2. Ibid., ii, lO, 4; I, 370. 
4. Ibid., ii, 25, 3-4; I, 396-97. 
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of God throughout history is that man, through instruction, might re-
ceive goodness from God. Irenaeus declares that the Lord endured all 
aspects of earthzy life in behalf of man, in order that man might be 
instructed by his example and might, through rational understanding, 
have a perfect love for God. God, therefore, has arranged things from 
the beginning for the moral edication and perfection of man and for the 
revelation of His goodness and righteousness.l 
Though God has given man the capacity to distinguish between 
good and evil, knowledge of particular things which are good or evil 
must be learned through experience and through the instruction and 
example of the incarnate Word. And, therefore, man has received from 
God the capacity to recognize the good of obedience and the evil of 
disobedience, so that through his own experience he may know that dis-
obedience to God deprives him of life because it is evil and that obe-
dience preserves his life because it is good and, as a consequence, may 
be always diligent to obey.2 
Wherefore he has also had a two-fold experience, possessing 
lmowledge of both kinds that with discipline he may make choice 
of the better things. But how, if he had no knowledge of the 
contrary, could he have had instruction in that rrhich is good?3 
Furthermore, man could never have fully understood the mysteries of God 
or the way in which God intended him to live, if the Word of God had not 
appeared in human form to demonstrate for man the life which he was 
meant to live. 4 
l. Ibid., iv, 37, 7; I, 520-21. 
3. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., iv, 39, l; I, 522. 
4. Ibid., iv, 37, 1; I, 526. 
Man is granted freedom to choose good or evil, because only through 
experiencing the loss of the good can he come to a rational or intel-
ligent understanding of the worth of goodness and the terribleness of 
choosing evil. 
Since, then, this power has been conferred upon us, both 
the Lord has taught and the apostle has enjoined us the 
more to love God, that we may reach this fYriz~.7 for our-
selves by. striving after it. For otherwise, no doubt, 
this our good would be £virtuallz7 irrational, because 
not the result of trial. Moreover, the faculty of seeing 
would not appear to be so desirable, unless we had known 
What a loss it were to be devoid of sight; and health, too, 
is rendered all the more estimable by an acquaintance with 
disease; light, also, by contrasting it with darkness; and 
life with death.l 
(3) Voluntasf and rational.--Human goodness is not only deriva-
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tive and learned; it is also voluntary and therefore reasonable. 11And 
in man, as well as in angels, He has placed the power of choice • • • 
so that those who had yielded obedience might justly possess what is 
good, given indeed by God, but preserved by themselves.n2 Human free-
dom is necessary that man1s actions be ~1orthy of praise or condemna-
tion, for What is done as an expression of one's nature is not a matter 
for judgment. 
But if some had been made by nature bad, and others good, 
these latter would not be deserving of praise for being 
good, for such were they created; nor would the former be 
reprehensible, for thus they were made £originallz7. But 
since all men are of the same nature, able both to hold 
fast and to do what is good; and, on the other hand, hav-
ing also the power to cast it from them and not to do it,--
1. Ibid., iv, 37, 7; I, 520. 2. Ibid., iv, 37, 1; I, 518. 
some do justly receive praise even among men who are under 
the control of good laws (and much more from God), and ob-
tain deserved testimony of their choice of good in general, 
and of persevering therein; but the others are blamed, and 
receive a just condemnation, because of their rejection of 
"What is fair and good.l 
Furthermore, human freedom is necessary in order that man be fully 
conscious of the worth of goodness. A goodness which requires no 
effort or study and is incapable of being lost, but which expresses 
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itself inevitably and without choice on man's part, would mean nothing 
to man. Irenaeus expresses it: 
Thus it would come to pass, that their being good would be 
of no consequence, because they were so by nature rather 
than by will, and are possessors of good spontaneously, 
not by choice; and for this reason they would not under-
stand this fact, that good is a comely thing, nor would 
they take pleasure in it. For how can those who are ig-
norant of good enjoy it? Or What credit is it to those 
who have not aimed at it? And what crown is it to those 
who have not followed in pursuit of it, like those vic-
torious in the contest?2 
Thus before goodness can become truly man's property it must be ration-
ally understood and man must have the freedom to choose or reject it. 
But the good can be rational for man only when awareness of it is a 
result of empirical trial. 11For otherwise, no doubt, this our good 
would be ,LVirtualll7 irrational, because not the result of trial. 11 3 
Man must learn through experience what it is both to have and to lack 
that which is good. Therefore, Irenaeus says, it is necessary that man 
experience both good and evil, in order that the mini, possessing 
1. Ibid., iv, 37, 2; I, 519. 
2. Ibid., iv, 37, 6; I, 520. 
3. Ibid., iv, 37, 7; I, 520. 
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lmowled.ge of the intrinsic worth of both, may with intelligent dis crimi-
nation choose only the better things.l Hitchcock points out that 
Irenaeus thus regards evil as an indispensable part of man 1 s moral 
education.2 Kunze develops the idea in considerable detail. 
Sagt man aber, Gott hRtte den Menschen nicht so schaffen 
. " " sollen, dass er gleLch hatte undankbar werden konnen, so 
ist zu entgegnen: dies wMre nur auszuschliessen gewesen, 
wenn Gott ihn nicht zu einem sittlich f.reien, sondern zu 
einem instinktiv guten d.i. niederen Wesen gemacht hRtte 
(IV, 37, 6). Gott liess daher die Sllnde zu, aber im Hinblick 
auf die ErlBsung, die er von allem Anfang an fllr die 
Menschheit vorbereitete. Denn zu dieser verhRlt sich die 
Sllnde objektiv zwar gegensHtzlich, subjektiv aber bereitet 
sie dieselbe vor, indem sie den Menschen fllr die ErlBsung 
erzieht. Denn sie vermittelt ihm die Erkenntnis von Gut 
und B8se, die wahre Meinung llber Gott und sich selbst; 
sie bewirkt, dass der Mensch die Erl8sung als eine 
unverhoffte Gnadengabe Gottes hinnimmt, und dass er, 
der aus Erfahrung die Unseligkeit des B8sen kennt und 
allseitig erzogen ist, von urn so tieferer Liebe und dauernder 
Dankbarkeit gegen Gott ergriffen wird und nie die Meinung 
fasst, er habe die Seligkeit aus seiner Natur. Ferner wird 
die Erfahrung des B8sen auf das sittliche Streben des Menschen 
f8rderlich einwirken. Denn auch in Bezug auf das Gute gilt 
der allgemein menschliche Satz, dass wir ein Gut nur durch 
die Erkenntnis des gegenteiligen Uebels schRtzen lernen. 
Und zwar muss diese Erkenntnis, wie 8fters betont wird, 
durch wirkliche Erfahrung d.h. durch pers8nliches Erleben 
des Gegenteils erworben sein, denn diese ist gewisser, als 
ein auf Vermutung beruhender Schluss. Wie die Zunge nur 
durch Schmecken den Unterschied von sUss und Bitter kennen 
lernt, das Auge nur durch 1s Sehen den von Schwarz und Weiss, 
das Ohr durch 1s H8ren den der T8ne: so muss auch der Mensch 
durch Erfahrung das BBse kennen, urn so im Guten best!lrkt zu 
werden (VI, 39, 1).3 
The actual experience of evil contributes to making man's understanding 
1. Ibid., iv, 39, 1; I, 522. 
2. Hitchcock, £2• cit., p. 61. 
3. Kunze, 2E• cit., pp. 48-49. 
of good rational through revealing to him his weakness and dependence 
on God and the intrinsic meaning of losing the good. Several selec-
tions from Irenaeus sum the matter up. 
ffingels and meEJ were made rational beings, endowed with the 
power of examining and judging and were not /Jorme:l,7 as things 
irrational or of a ffiereJV animal nature, which can do noth-
ing of their own free will, but are drawn by necessity and 
compulsion to what is good, • • • who are incapable of being 
anything else except just what they had been created •••• 
Thus it would come to pass that their being good would be of 
no consequence, because they were so by nature rather than by 
will, and are possessors of good spontaneously, not by choice.l 
And the harder we strive, so much is it the more valuable; 
while so much the mere valuable it is, so much the mere de-
sirable should we esteem it. And indeed those things are 
not esteemed so highly which come spontaneously, as those 
which are reached by much anxious care. Since, then, this 
power has been conferred upon us, both the Lord has taught 
and the apostle has enjoined us the more to love God, that 
we may reach this JYrizi/ for ourselves by striving after 
it. For otherwise, no doubt; this our good would be /Jir-
tual.lz7 irrational, because not the result of trial. More-
over, the faculty of seeing would not appear to be so desir-
able, unless we had known what a loss it were to be devoid 
of sight.2 
Irenaeus asserts that man must experience both good and evil in order 
that the mind, recognizing that evil deprives man of life and good 
preserves man in life, might always make a reasonable choice of the 
good. Without experience of evil man could never really apprehend 
the worth of goodness. Just as the tongue learns the difference 
between sweet and bitter through actually tasting, and the eye dis-
criminates between black and white through actually seeing, and the 
ear recognizes the distinctions in sound by actually hearing; so the 
mind, through the actual experience of both good and evil, becomes 
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1. Against Heresies, iv, 37, 6; I, 520. 2. Ibid., iv, 37, 7; I, 520. 
more definitely oriented toward the good and toward obedience to the 
commandments of God.1 
(4) Absolute.--Good and evil are not a matter of mere human 
opinion,2 but rest upon a real distinction by the will of the Creator 
between things productive of life and those conducive to death.3 
b. Essence 
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(1) Obedience to God.--The human good is to be found in obedience 
to God. "They who have not obeyed shall, with justice, be not found 
in possession of the good."4 11For it is in man's power to disobey 
God, and to forfeit what is good. n5 This thought runs through 
Irenaeus 1 writing, but only a few examples will be indicated. 
Obedience means good for man, in the first place, because God 
knows that which is essential for the preservation and development 
of human nature and, because of His goodness and love, has commanded 
it. This is the import of the following passages. 
It is good to obey God, and to believe in Him, and to keep 
His commandment, and this is the life of man; as not to 
obey God is evil, and this is his death. Since God, there-
fore, gave (to man) such mental power (magnanimitatem) man 
knew both the good of obedience and the evil of disobedience, 
that the eye of the mind, receiving experience of both, may 
with judgment make choice of the better things; and that he 
may never become indolent or neglectful of God's command; 
1. Ibid., iv, 39, l; I, 522. 
3. Ibid., ii, 32, 1; I, 408. 
5. Ibid., iv, 37, 4; I, 519. 
2. Ibid., i, 25, 4; I, 351. 
4. Ibid., iv, 37, 1; I, 518. 
and learning by experience that is an evil thing which de-
prives him of life, that is, disobedience to God, may never 
attempt it at all, but that, knowing that what preserves 
his life, namezy, obedience to God, is good, he may diligentzy 
keep it with all earnestness.l 
But because man is possessed of free will from the beginning, 
• • • advice is always given to him to keep fast the good, 
which thing is done by means of obedience to God.2 
Moreover, the prophets indicate ••• that God stood in no 
need of their slavish obedience, but that it was upon their 
own account that He enjoined certain observances in the law.3 
But obedience to God means good for man also in the sense that 
thereby he enters the :favor of God and is rewarded by God with further 
goodness and the fruits productive of eternal life. Irenaeus says 
that the apostles taught the second coming of Christ and the judgment 
by the Son, "who shall freely give the good things of God to those 
who have kept His connnandments."4 "God ••• takes our good works 
to Himself for this purpose, that He may grant us a recompense of 
His own good things. n5 
And in man ••• He has placed the power of choice ••• so 
that those who had yielded obedience might justly possess 
what is good •••• God therefore has given that which is 
good, ••• and they who work it shall receive glory and 
honour, because they have done that6which is good when they had it in their power not to do it. 
God commanded man 1s obedience, not because of any need on His part for 
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the services of man, but as a condition for bestowing salvation. It is 
because of His goodness that He desires to bestow benefits upon man, but 
1. Ibid., iv, 39, 1; I, 522. 
3. Ibid., iv, 17, 1; I, 482. 
5. Ibid., iv, 18, 6; I, 486. 
2. Ibid., iv, 37, 4; I, 519. 
4. Ibid., iii, 5, 3; I, 418. 
6. Ibid., iv, 37, 1; I, 518-19. 
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it is because His goodness is modified by justice in its operation that 
the condition of obedience is attached to man's fullest enjoyment of 
His beneficence. With obedience, man receives the communion, or partic-
ipation in the riches of God's goodness, necessary to sustain his life.1 
(2) Fellowship with God.--Obedience to God is also fellowship. 
From an external point of view, obedience to God is the chief human 
good; inwardly, fellowship becomes the highest good. God requires 
the obedience and service of man because it is the means to the fel-
lowship 'Which man so desperately needs. God has absolutely no need 
for human obedience or service, but man's obedience brings him into a 
position within the conditions which Divine justice has established to 
receive further expressions of God's benevolence. Because of the re-
quirements of justice, human obedience to Divine commandments is a 
most important medium through 'Which man has fellowship with God, the 
fellowship without which man cannot really live.2 It is impossible 
to live without entering into some degree of fellowship with God, for 
fellowship consists of knowing God and enjoying His benefits. 
It is not possible to live apart from life, and the means 
of life is found in fellowship with God; but fellowship 
with God is to know God, and to enjoy His goodness.3 
1. Ibid., iv, 14, 1; I, 478. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., iv, 20, S; I, 489. 
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So long as one enjoys some good he has a measure of fellowship with 
God, but to experience the opposite of fellowship, separation, is to 
move in the direction of non-existence or death. Total separation from 
God means the absence of all good from one's life and death, for as we 
shall show later, for Irenaeus good is the principle of existence. 
Irenaeus says that God grants communion w.i. th Himself to those who love 
Him. Communion w.i.th God means increased understanding and participa-
tion in life in greater measure through the enjoyment of His blessings. 
But those who choose to depart from God experience separation from God, 
which is death, since it 100ans the loss of all His benefits. Those who 
choose to reject God experience all sorts of punishments, not as a 
result of God's direct agency, but "because they are destitute of all 
that is good. 111 Since fellowship is life and separation is death and 
good is that which constitutes and preserves life while evil is that 
which destroys life, it is evident that fellowship with God is a form 
of the chief human good. 
Fellowship with God in the sense of enjoying His benefits must 
be the experience of all men, but there seems to be another element in 
Irenaeus 1 conception of fellowship with God, which adds a new dimen-
sion to the lives of those who consciously enjoy it. This emphasis 
becomes apparent in his insistence that it is better "that one should 
have no knowledge whatever of any one reason why a single thing in 
1. Ibid., v, 27, 2; I, 556. 
creation has been made, but should believe in God, and continue in 
His love, than that, puf'fed up through knowledge of this kind, he 
would fall away from that love which is the life of man. 11 1 Perhaps 
it is correct to interpret this, along with what has been said pre-
vious~, as meaning that different degrees of fellowship are equiva-
lent to different levels or qualities of life. The highest level of 
life, in which one enjoys the highest form of goodness, is that of 
conscious awareness of the presence of God in all of His greatness, 
goodness, wisdom, power, and love. 11The life of man consists in be-
holding God. 11 2 It may be impossible to give a rational explanation 
of the difference, but life is better when there is a greater degree 
of fellowship with God. 
(3) Vision of God.--Fellowship with God is sometimes depicted 
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in terms of beholding the vision of God. Irenaeus s~s that life comes 
through fellowship with God and 11 fellmrship with God is to lmow God, 
and to enjoy His goodness. 113 Yet earlier in the same section Irenaeus 
attributes man's possession of life to the vision of God. 
This He grants to those who love Him, that is to see God • 
• • • The Father, to~ confers ••• incorruption for eter-
nal life, v1hich comes to every one from the fact of his 
seeing God. For as those who see the light are 'tdthin the 
light, and partake of its brilliancy; even so, those who 
s~e God are in God, and receive of His splendour. But 
Lffi~7 splendour viviffres them; those, therefore, who see 
God, do receive life. 
l. Ibid., ii, 26, 1; I, 397. 
3. ~., iv, 20, 5; I, 489. 
2. Ibid., iv, 20, 7; I, 490. 
4. ~-
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Obviously, in this passage "to see God" and 11 to know God" are equiva-
lent terms, indicating that beholding the vision of God is simply 
another way of expressing the same idea as that involved in having 
fellowship with God. 
"Men therefore shall see God, that they may live, being made 
immortal by that sight, and attaining even unto God.n1 This beholding 
of God is no mere exercise of man's material power of sight, but rather 
it is the result of the Son1 s manifestation of the Father and of the 
Spirit's illumining.2 
The exact relationship between the conceptions of the human good 
as obedience to God, fellowship with God, beholding the vision of God, 
and bearing the image and likeness of God seems vague in Irenaeus' 
thought, but perhaps it might be somewhat as follows. The Word be-
came the visible manifestation of God, that in seeing Him men might 
be instructed and inspired toward obedience and through obedience 
might be fashioned in the image and likeness of God and might enter 
into fellowship with God. In describing one strand of Irenaeus' 
thought regarding the work of Christ, John Lawson says: 
Irenaeus may be found teaching that man is to be di vinized 
by beholding the Vision of God in the Incarnate Son. • • • 
The Incarnate Son was God made visible to man. It followed 
that the work of Christ could be ~epresented as a restora-
tion, from the original Model, of the defaced or obliterated 
portrait of God in man. • • • The sighj of the Image of God 
restored to man the lost divine image. 
1. ~., iv, 20, 6; I, 489. 2. Ibid., iv, 20, 5-6; I, 489. 
3. The Biblical Theology: of Saint Irenaeus, pp. 155-56. 
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Then he quotes the passage from Irenaeus which points out that, though 
man was said to be created in the image of God, he soon lost his like-
ness to God because there was no visible manifestation of the image with 
which he might compare himself and that with the incarnation of the Word 
the image of God was manifested so that the likeness of man to God might 
be re-established.l These passages become mare meaningful if obedience 
to God is assumed to be the linking stage of thought between the vision 
of God and the restoration and perfection of the divine image in man, 
for thereby are answered the two questions of why God needed to be made 
visible and, how the vision of God would effect the restoration of man 
to the image and likeness of God. The vision of God in the incarnate 
Son, through man1s response of imitation and obedience, restores man 
to the image and likeness of God and brings man into the life-giving 
fellowship of God. Bonwetsch expresses Irenaeus 1 thought quite 
pointedly: 
Gott zu schauen ist die dem Menschen von Gottes Liebe 
zugedachte Bestimmung, zu der er schon a1s Kreatur, noch 
mehr, weil er sich zu ihr du.rch seinen Ungehorsam in 
Widerspruch gesetzt, nur durch Gott selbst gelangen kann. 
Ihn dafllr zu erziehen ist die Absicht aller Offenbarung 
Gottes. Durch seinen Willen geschaut von wem, wann und 
wie er will, bereitet Gott dadu.rch vor fUr das dereinstige 
vollkommene Gottschauen. Der Unerfassliche, Unbegreifbare 
und Unsichtbare hat sich sichtbar, begreifbar und erfassbar 
fUr seine GlHubigen gemacht, um lebendig zu machen den ihn 
durch den Glauben Erfassenden und Sehenden.2 
1. Against Heresies, v, 16, 2; I, 544. 
2. ~ Theologie des Irenllus, pp. 83-84. 
Perhaps Irenaeus' own words are the best conclusion for this 
section. 
And for this reason did the Word become the dispenser of 
the paternal grace for the benefit of men, for whom He made 
such great dispensations, revealing God indeed to men, but 
presenting man to God, and preserving at the same time the 
invisibility of the Father, lest man should at any time be-
come a despiser of God and that he should always possess 
something tmfards which he might advance; but, on the other 
hand, revealing God to men through many dispensations, lest 
man falling away from God altogether, should cease to exist. 
For the glory of God is a living man; and the life of man con-
sists in beholding God. For if the manifestation of God 
which is made by means of the creation, affords life to all 
living in the earth, much more does that revelation of the 
Father which comes through the Word, give life to those who 
see God.l 
(4) The image and likeness of God.--From another perspective 
the chief good for man is found in likeness to God. According to 
Irenaeus, the first creation of man took place in order that, under 
the molding of the two hands of God, the Word and the Spirit, man 
might be recreated in the image and likeness of God. 
So also, in /the times o!7 the end, the Word of the Father 
and the Spirit of God, having become united with the ancient 
substance of Adam1 s formation, rendered man living and per-
fect, receptive of the perfect Father, in order that as in 
the natural IJ.:dam7 we all were dead, so in the spiritual we 
may all be made alive. For never at any time did Adam escape 
the hands of God, to whom the Father speaking, said, 11Let Us 
make man in Our image, after Our likeness." And for this 
reason in the last times (fine), not by the will of the flesh, 
nor by the will of man, but by the good pleasure of the 
Father, His hands formed a living man, in order that Adam 
might be created ~ga~ after the image and likeness of God.2 
I To be in the image and likeness of God seems to have been the Te.'i-os 
1. ~., iv, 20, 7; I, 489-90. 2. Ibid., v, 1, 3; I, 527. 
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for man from the very beginning. For to accomplish the Father's will, 
the Son descended to the creature "that it should be contained by Him; 
and, on the other hand, the creature should contain the Word, and ascend 
to Him, passing beyond the angels, and be made after the image and 
likeness of God.nl In a like manner, the Spirit dwells in the hearts 
of men that it may ttrender us like unto Him and accomplish the will of 
the Father: for it shall make man after the image and likeness of 
God. u2 Kunze says: 
Denn dieser war zwar nach Gottes Bilde geschaffen, sofern 
er frei und selbstmHchtig war, aber noch fehlte ihm die 
Aehnlichkeit, zu der er nur bestimmt war; er war zwar durch 
die Einhauchung des g3ttlichen Odems ein psychischer Mensch, 
aber noch kein pneumatischer~ weil ohne den Besitz des 
Geistes, daher unvollkommen.~ 
Yet at times Irenaeus thinks of the likeness of God as an origi-
nal and lost endo'WITlent of man. He explains that the Son became in-
carnate to bring man to salvation, ttthat what we lost in Adam--namely, 
to be according to the image and likeness of God--that we might re-
cover in Christ Jesus.n4 As we noted above, he says that man was said 
to be created in the image of God, but because there was as yet no vis-
ible manifestation of the image to serve as a point of comparison since 
the Word was still invisible, man soon lost his likeness to God.S Ap-
parently he tends at times to look upon the created state of man as 
1. Ibid., v, 36, 3; I, 567. 2. Ibid., v, 8, l; I, 533. 
3. Kunze, ~· cit., pp. 47-48. 
4. Against Heresies, ii, 18, l; I, 446. 
5. Ibid., v, 16, 2; I, 544. 
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identical with the perfect state in one respect--that the end of man 
is in essence no different from the point of his beginning. Man was 
originally created in the image and likeness of God and this is also 
/ I 
the goal or leAoS for man. However, this passage seems to imply also 
a difference between the created and the perfected states of man. In 
his created condition man may have possessed the same qualities and 
traits he would have when he has realized his perfect end of likeness 
to God, but he was ignorant or unaware of wherein the image and like-
ness consisted, for he had no external image with which he might com-
pare himself. Therefore, he lost the likeness. But when the Word 
became incarnate he was possessed of the needed point of comparison 
whereby he might consciously realize and imitate the likeness of God 
within himself. So, for Irenaeus, the perfected state of man appears 
both as a restoration of man's original condition and as development 
on a higher level, since the dimension of conscious choice has been 
added to the perfected state of man. 
The process of restoring and perfecting man is a long and gradual 
one, which Irenaeus refers to almost as though it were a mechanical 
molding and shaping of man as an inert and passive substance by the 
hands of God. 
But we do now receive a certain portion of His Spirit, tend-
ing towards perfection, and preparing us for incorruption, 
being little by little accustomed to receive and bear God. 
• • • This earnest, therefore, thus dwelling in us, renders 
us spiritual even now.l 
1. Ibid., v, B, 1; I, 533. 
For by the hands of Father, that is, by the Son and the1 Ho~ Spirit, man • • • was made in the likeness of God. 
However, it would probably be a mistake to give too literalistic an 
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interpretation to Irenaeus' words, for surely a large measure of human 
agency is implied in the possibility of man's losing the likeness due 
to his ignorance of its constitution and of his regaining it because 
of a known externa~ demonstration of it. 
c. Principle of Life 
It is hardly surprising that Irenaeus regards good as the prin-
ciple of life and evil as the principle of death. The choice of the 
former preserves life, while choosing the latter brings death. 
As, then, he who was made a living soul forfeited life 
when he turned aside to what was evil, so, on the other 
hand, the same individual, when he reverts to what i~ good, 
and receives the quickening Spirit, shall find life. 
Although Irenaeus' words do occasionally suggest that life is given as 
a reward over and above the possession of good and that death is a 
punishment additional to the choice of evil,3 this does not seem to 
be his complete and ultimate meaning. Rather his meaning seems to be 
that choice of the good both preserves the life he now has and in-
creases the measure and quality of life, while the choice of evil re-
sults in the loss of life, at least to some degree. So, in a very 
real sense, participation in goodness is life or existence, while 
1. ~., v, 6, 1; I, 53l. 2. Ibid., v, 12, 2; I, 538. 
3. ~., iv, 37, 1; I, 518-19, and v, 28, 1; I, 556. 
turning away from good, or choosing evil, is death or loss of exist-
ence. For good is a positive qualit,y of existence, while evil is the 
negation or absence of that which is good. That which destroys hmnan 
nature and deprives one of life, disobedience to God, is evil, that 
which preserves and enhances life, obedience to God, is good. This 
is shown by Irenaus 1 own words. 
It is good to obey God, and believe in Him, and to keep His 
coJIUIJandment, and this is the life of man; as not to obey God 
is evil, and this is his death. • • • It is an evil thing 
which deprives him of life, that is, disobedience to God • 
• • • What preserves his life, namely, obedience to God, is 
good.l 
Bonwetsch comments that 11der Mensch dadurch lernen sollte, dass der 
Gehorsam das Gute und der Ungehorsam das B8se ist, ••• dass Gott 
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nicht zu gehorchen des Lebens beraubt, ihm zu gehorchen das Leben 
bewahrt.u2 Giving essentially the same interpretation to Irenaeus 1 
words, Gustaf Aul~n says, "It is not merely that death is mortality 
and the loss of immortalit,y; disobedience to God LWbich Irenaeus 
equates above with dea~ is essentially death.u3 Irenaeus points out 
that communion with God is the reward of loving God and separation from 
God is the consequence of apostasy. Just as communion with God means in-
creased understanding and participation in life in fuller measure through 
the enjoyment of His blessings, so separation from God is death and the 
loss of all His benefits. In addition, those who reject God experience 
every kind of punishment, not because God punishes them immediately of 
1. Ibid., iv, 39, 1; I, 522. 
3. Christus Victor, p. 25. 
2. Bonwetsch, ~· cit., p. 82. 
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Himself, but because they are destitute of all good.l The fact that 
such punishment falls upon them because they are destitute of all that 
is good rather than because of the direct agency of God indicates the 
truth of Aulen 1 s statement, that disobedience is essentially death. 
Good is indeed the principle of life, for "it is not possible to live 
apart from life, and the means of life is found in fellowship with God: 
but fellowship with God is to know God, and to enjoy His goodness .u2 
2. Meanings of Goodness Implied 
From the fact that human goodness is derivative and learned, 
inferior to the goodness of God, yet based on an absolute standard, 
it follows logically that God is the source of human values. Of 
course, God is the source of human values in the sense of his sup-
plying all things of value (This was treated earlier among the direct 
expressions of God 1 s goodness), but this is not the sense here in-
tended. Rather the sense of the term implied by the aforementioned 
characteristics of human goodness is that of God's being the source 
of human recognition of value or of human standards of value. Equip-
ping mankind with the capacity to discriminate between good and evil 
is a manifestation of His goodness. 
A second, but very closely related, meaning of Divine goodness 
implied by the nature of the human good is His regular government of 
the world according to moral principles intended for human well-being. 
1. Against Heresies, v, 27, 2; I, 556. 
2. Ibid., iv, 20, 5; I, 489. 
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This meaning is implicit in the notion that goodness is the principle 
of life and goodness is found in obedience to God, which in turn im-
plies both human freedom and human learning. If man's obedience to 
God is to prove conducive to his well-being, it must be because God 
maintains a regular order of relationships in accord with the moral 
principles or human standards of value which He imparts. God's thus 
maintaining a regular order of world conditions in accord with the 
moral principles intended to bring man to the enjoyment of his highest 
good is an expression of His goodness. 
D. Theodicy 
What may be regarded as Irenaeus 1 attempt at a theodicy appears 
in the larger setting of his defense of God against the attacks of the 
Gnostics. To the Gnostics, the difference between the Jewish and 
Christian religions seemed too great for both religions to have origi-
nated from the revelation of the same God, and so Irenaeus felt con-
strained to justify his concept of God as inspirer of both Old and 
New Testaments.l 
He begins with the principle that all changes and diversities 
of history must be attributed to men, since God, as the uncreated 
causality, is invariable, while man, as the created, is subject to the 
law of growth and development.2 Man's goal is to become perfect like 
God, but he can reach this goal only gradually.3 In accordance with 
1. Kunze, ~· cit., PP• 44-45. 
3. Ibid., iv, 38, 3; I, 521-22. 
2. Against Heresies, iv, 11, 2; I, 474. 
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the state of man's development, God communicates or withholds His 
revelation. God certainly could have made man perfect to start with, 
but man would not have been able to receive, understand, and retain 
perfection. In keeping, therefore, with the nature of man, God has 
arranged different levels of salvation, requiring a gradual education, 
for which He communicates His revelation at the proper time.l 
Although Irenaeus makes no attempt to explain the origin or 
cause of evil, he does show that it is a necessary element in the 
moral development of rnan.2 According to the Old Testament, evil did 
not simply originate in the will of the first man but was present even 
in his temptation. The consequences of man 1 s sin is death, although, 
being merely in the image of God as free and independent and lacking 
the likeness for which he was only destined since it required the 
gift of the Spirit, man was not immortal anyway. Immortality had 
been withheld, however, because God had foreseen that death might 
serve as blessing for man in bringing to an end his sinning.3 Accord-
ing to Kunze, Irenaeus regarded sin as a necessary part of human 
nature in its imperfect and developing state, anticipated by God 
as due to emerge from the weakness of human nature.4 God could have 
avoided the possibility of man's sinning only by creating him as a 
lower order of being who was good naturally or instinctively rather 
1. ~., iv, 38, l-3; I, 521-22. 2. Kunze, ~· cit., pp. 47-50. 
3. Against Heresies, iii, 23, 1-6; I, 455-57. 
4. Kunze, ~· ~., PP• 47-48. 
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than through free and intelligent choice.l Commenting on sections 
six and seven of the twenty-seventh chapter of Against Heresies, Kunze 
gives a graphic exposition of the positive contribution of sin to the 
ethical development of man. God tolerates sin, but He does so with an 
eye toward the salvation He intends for man, for while objectively sin 
is in contrast to salvation, subjectively it contributes to it in that 
it helps to educate man. For sin clarifies man 1s perception of good 
and evil and his understanding of God and himself. It causes him to 
recognize salvation as an undeserved act of God 1s mercy rather than a 
result of his own nature or effort and to respond with love and grate-
fulness to God. Furthermore, the experience of evil quickens man1s 
ethical aspiration, for it is a valid principle that man1s appreciation 
of something good is sharpened by his recognition of the opposite evil 
and that this recognition must be gained through the actual experience 
of said evil, since personal experience is more convincing than a con-
elusion based on surmise. Just as the tongue learns the difference 
between sweet and bitter only through tasting, the eye the difference 
between black and white only through seeing, the ear the difference 
between notes only through hearing, so man must by actually experiencing 
the evilness of evil learn true appreciation for the good.2 
Wird so das B8se fUr den Menschen die innerlich notwendige 
Durchgangsstufe auf dem Wege zur GottHhnlichkeit, so schlHgt 
es auch fUr Gott nur zur Verherrlichung aus. WHre allerdings 
der Mensch unrettbar dem Bgsen und dem Tode anhe:imgefallen, 
dann wHre Gottes Macht Hberwunden, da er doch den Menschen 
1. Against Heresies, iv, 37, 6; I, 520. 2. £E. cit., pp. 48-49. 
zum. Leben best~t hatte (III, 23, 1). 11Wenn nun aber Gott, 
wie es der Fall 1st, den Menschen vom Bosen und aus dem Tode 
befreit, so wird gerade an der menschlichen Schwachheit seine 
Kraft bewB.hrt, wie des Arztes Kunst an den Kranken. Das BBse 
also, weit entfernt, die gBttliche Harmonie in der Erziehung 
der Menschheit zu stgren, bringt dieselbe erst recht zur 
Geltung.l 
E. Synopsis 
95 
Perhaps Irenaeus 1 conception of Divine goodness, which has been 
presented analytical~ thus far, will be more fairly presented and 
more understandable if we close this chapter with a synopsis showing 
the various aspects of his thought in relation to one another. 
Without goodness God would lose His character as divinity. 
A1ong with other attributes, such as power, omniscience, uniqueness, 
and justice, goodness is held to be an element essential to the con-
cept of deity. God is a 11 simple, uncompounded Being, 11 2 yet His good-
ness is permeated and modified in its operation by other attributes 
of His being. In its essence, God1s goodness is an eternal attribute, 
which never ceases to express itself in benevolence and goodwill 
toward humanity. Uncaused by any necessity, internal or external, 
and unrelated to any need on the part of God Himself, the goodness 
which Irenaeus f inds characteristic of God is a free, just, rationally-
structured, and omnipotent goodness. While in its essence it is un-
lmowable and inexpressible, God1 s kindness in allowing it to be ma.ni-
fest in the lives of men makes it possible to have some knowledge of 
1. Kunze, £2• cit., pp. 48-50. 
2. Against Heresies, ii, 12, 3; I, 374. 
it on the basis of its phenomenal expression. 
So, God's goodness expresses itself through the two hands of God, 
the Word and the Spirit, in the act or creation, vrhich is to be con-
ceived both as an instantaneous beginning and a continuing and gradual 
process aimed at perfection. Creation is good because it demonstrates 
the existence of God and serves as a means for man to lmow Him in His 
goodness, because it provides God with same one upon whom to bestow 
His benefits, and because it is designed and adapted for the salvation 
of man. The goodness which first manifested itself in a beginning act 
of creation continues to make itself known in continuing creativity 
through the providential work of bestowing upon man the blessings of 
earthly life, of making "provision that all things shall turn out for 
good,"l and of so determining 11all things beforehand for the bringing 
of man to perfection, • • • that goodness may both be made apparent, 
and righteousness perfected. 11 2 The creative and providential mani-
festations of goodness are to be found also in the illumination of 
men's minds by the Word and the Spirit so as to distinguish values 
and to discover from God's activity some knowledge of Him. The in-
struction which comes to man by way of the Law, the prophets, and the 
Gospel is but an extension or continuation of this creative and provi-
dential ministry of the Word and the Spirit. Divine goodness is re-
vealed not only in its efforts to restrain man from evil and guide 
him in a path which is for his own benefit through commandments and 
1. ~., iv, 30, 3; I, 5o4. 2. Ibid., iv, 37, 7; I, 520-21. 
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warning but also in the operation of Divine justice in rewarding the 
good and punishing the wicked, for only in conjunction with the prin-
ciple of dispensing reward or punishment according to desert will a 
goodness which does not save all not be imperfect. Yet even while 
goodness displays same of the hues of justice it tends to renew its 
distinctive color in the mercy which tempers the severity of judgment, 
that continues to give direction and counsel for man's improvement in 
spite of his waywardness, and that treats the unfortunate with com-
passion and bestows natural blessings upon just and unjust alike. Its 
natural color becomes even more predominant in the gracious provision 
of God for man's spiritual development and in those benevolent actions 
indicative of love. With the incarnation of the Word in Christ the 
goal of Divine goodness in creation nears completion as man's chief 
enemies of sin, death, and the devil are defeated for him by Christ 
in his demonstrating for man's imitation the image and likeness of 
God. In the gift of immortality and eternal friendship with God to 
those who make a proper response, the Divine goodness finds the ful-
fillment of its intention, and in the resurrection of the body, which 
means the salvation of the total person, its power and its authenticity 
are clearly displayed. 
CHAPI'ER III 
DIVINE GOODNESS IN CLEMENT OF AlEXANDRIA 
Like Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria was not consciously con-
cerned with the type of problem proposed in this dissertation. His 
statements concerning the Divine goodness are not parts of a well-
worked out theological 5,1stem but rather they occur as parts of his 
general apologetic for Christianity and his responses to skepticism 
and heresy. By culling the pages with care, it is possible to gain 
fragmentary insights here and there into Clement's total conception of 
God's goodness, but it is hardly feasible to attempt fitting them into 
an organic whole. For the most part, he repeats the characteristics 
and expressions of Divine goodness suggested by Irenaeus, with slight 
differences in emphasis, insight, or extent of treatment. 
Again and again Clement reminds his readers that God is good. 
In the Exhortation to the Heathen he castigates the devotees of the 
Greek and Roman religions for serving "the tyrant instead of the right-
ful King--the evil one instead of the good. 11 1 When God's goodness has 
been shown in so many ways, he cannot see any justification for man to 
be unaware of it or mistake its true source. For indeed, God alone is 
1. Titus Flavinus Clemens, EOChortation to the Heathen, Chapter 10, in 
The Ante-Nicene Fathers (ed. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson; 
Grand Rapids, Mich.: 'Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1951), II, 
198. Hereafter, references to Clement's own writings will give only 
the name of the work, the book and chapter subdivisions as these 
apply, and the volume and page reference in the larger work, omitting 
the name of the author and the name of the larger work. 
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truly good,l and from Him all good things originate.2 It was His 
goodness that caused Him to create.3 It is because of His goodness 
that He provides the instruction of the Law and of Christ4 and offers 
salvation to man.5 It is also because of His goodness that He af-
flicts wrongdoers with suffering, that they might be turned to the 
right.6 But a more exact description of the nature and expression 
of the Divine goodness according to Clement will be set forth below. 
A. Abstract Characteristics of Divine Goodness 
1. Essential Attribute of Deity 
In a sense similar to that of Irenaeus, Clement asserts that 
goodness is an essential attribute of the Divine Being. In paraphrasing 
some of Clement's words, John Patrick says: 
Clement exhibits with great emphasis the absolute good-
ness of God. This goodness is based by him on the nature 
of God Himself, on the nature of the Good, with which God 
is identified, and on the teaching of Scripture. God does 
good, He does all good, and that voluntarily and designedly. 
He did not begin at some period to be Lord and good, being 
always what He is; His goodness is an essential constituent 
of His nature. Hence, He will never cease to do good. 7 
God is by nature good. 8 Just as it is of the nature of fire to warm 
1. Who is the Rich Man That Shall Be Saved?, i; II, 591. 
------------
2. Stromata, i, 5; II, 305. 
4. Stromata, ii, 16; II, 364. 
6. ~., i, 8; II, 226. 
3. Instructor, i, 9; II, 232. 
5. Instructor, i, 9; II, 230. 
7. Clement of Alexandria (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & 
Sons, 1914), P• 85. 
8. Instructor, i, 9; II, 230. 
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and of light to illumine, so it is God's nature to do good.1 Clement 
tells us that it is essential that God be both supreme and good, for 
both goodness and omnipotence are necessary for there to be aqy such 
thing as salvation, which is itself a clear evidence of God's goodwil1.2 
Truly, goodness is so inextricably a part of God's nature that "if He 
should ever cease from doing good, then He would cease from being 
God. u3 "God being essentially, and proving Himself actually, both 
Father and good, continues immutably in the self-same goodness. u4 
2. Free 
Although God never does evil,S nor ceases to do good,6 nor could 
refrain from doing good without ceasing to be God,7 it is not by ne-
cessity that He does good. Rather, His action is entirely voluntar,y. 
For neither is God involuntarily good, as the fire is warm-
ing; but in Him the imparting of good things is voluntary, 
even if He receive the request previously. • • • Wherefore 
God does not do good by necessity, but
8
from His free choice 
benefits those who spontaneously turn. 
This seems quite clear and definite until we remember that just 
a few pages earlier in his book Clement has used a quotation concerning 
fire and light with almost exactly the opposite import. He says: 
As the nature of the beneficent is to do good, as it is of 
the fire to warm, and the light to give light, and a good 
man will not do evil, or light produce dar1mess, or fire 
1. Stromata, ii, 7; II, 517. 2. Ibid., i, 27; II, 340. 
3. Ibid., vi, 16; II, 513. 4. Ibid., vi, 12; II, 504. 
5. Ibid., ii, 17; II, 517. 6. Ibid., v, 14; II, 476. 
7. Ibid., vi, 16; II, 513. 8. Ibid., vii, 7; II, 534-35. 
cold; so, again, vice cannot do aught virtuous. • • • Philoso-
phy is not, then, the product of vice, since it makes men 
virtuous; it follows, then, that it is the work of God, whose 
work it is solely to do good.l 
B,y implication it would seem that God does good as a result of some 
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internal necessity. But perhaps our difficulty arises because we are 
trying to carry the analogy too far. One should remember that Clement• s 
argument here is concerned with the origin of philosophy, not with the 
nature of God. So, perhaps Clement would say that the analogy serves 
only to sh~1 that just as there is an invariable regularity about the 
warmth of fire and the i1ltunining of light, so God's goodness is regu-
lar and dependable. Yet there remains a difference in the types of 
regularity displayed: fire and light perform their functions with 
invariable regularity as a result of some necessity over which they 
have no control, but the regularity of God's goodness is the result 
of an unchanging volition. Patrick says, 
He is occupied with unceasing acts of beneficience, and re-
mains unalterably in the same condition of goodness. But 
this goodness is not to be conceived as akin to any physical 
attribute; it is no mechanical goodness, but the goodness of 
a loving personality. Goodness, no doubt is as natural to 
God as warmth to fire--but with an important difference. 
Unlike the fire, He is not involuntarily good. He does not 
do good by necessity, but of His fre~ choice He benefits 
those who of themselves turn to Him. 
Eric Francis Osborn indicates agreement with this interpretation of 
Clement by saying, "Nor does God do good by necessity, but chooses to 
benefit those who choose him. 113 These considerations would save 
1. Stromata, vi, 17; II, 517. 2. Clement of Alexandria, p. 85. 
3. ~ PhilosoThy of Clement of Alexandria (Cambridge: University 
Press, 1957 , P• 67. 
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Clement from the apparent contradiction implicit in his double appli-
cation of the fire and light analogy. Yet there remains at least a 
surface contradiction, which we cannot now resolve, between the as-
sertions that goodness is an essential element in the nature of God 
and that, at the same time, God's goodness is free and the result of 
no necessity. 
3. Eternal 
From the facts that God is without beginningl and that goodness 
is an essential element in the nature of God, one must conclude that 
His goodness is eternal. Even before there were finite creatures who 
might judge Him, and other created objects by means of which He might 
be judged, God was good. Indeed, it was because of His goodness that 
He became Creator and Father. "For before He became Creator He was 
God; He was good. And therefore He wished to be Creator and Father.n2 
It is not at the time of his salvation that God first pities man, but 
from the very beginning.3 Even before creation God knew that His work 
would be good because He had already potentially made it so nby His 
purpose that had no beginning.n4 
It is then now clear to us, from what has been said, that 
the beneficence of God is eternal, and that, from an unbegin-
ning principl~ equal natural righteousness reached all, • • • 
never having had a beginning. For God did not make a begin-
ning of being Lord and Good, being always what He is.5 
1. Stromata, iv, 25; II, 439. 2. Instructor, i, 9; II, 232. 
3. Exhortation to the Heathen, i; II, 173. 
4. Stromata, vi, J2; II, 503. 5. Stromata, v, 14; II, 476. 
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In addition to being without beginning, God's goodness is also 
incorruptible. In spite of the various instances of its expression 
it has remained essentially the same.l For instance, God is not a 
respecter of persons, never has been, nor ever will be. 2 As the good-
ness of God was without beginning, existing before the creation of the 
universe, so it will never cease to be, even though all created ob-
jects come to an end.3 Not only is the Divine goodness subject to no 
change, but also it countenances no compromise with evil. God's love 
of goodness is so strong that, not wanting to behold evil, He punishes 
the evildoer in order that he may become a doer of good.4 Those 'tiho 
know God have eternal life because they participate in the power of an 
incorruptible goodness .5 
4. Active 
Closely related to the description of God's goodness as eternal 
is Clement's idea that the Divine goodness must be unceasingly active. 
In a discussion of the Ten Commandments, Clement says in regard to the 
reference of the commandment on the observance of the Sabbath to God's 
resting: 
God's resting is not, then, as some conceive that God ceased 
from doing. For, being good, if He should ever cease from 
doing good, then He would ~ase from being God, which it is 
sacrilege even to say.6 
1. Ibid., vi, 12; II, 504. 
3. ~., v, 14; II, 476. 
5. Stromata, v, 10; II, 459. 
2. ~., vi, 8; n, 495. 
4. Instructor, i, 8; II, 227. 
6. Stromata, vi, 16; II, 513. 
Patrick applies this same quotation to show that Clement regarded 
creation as eternal. 
God must be conceived as having been eternally at work. 
From the context it is plain that it liaS not the question 
of the relation of matter to God, nor of God's relation 
to matter, that was in his thought, but the nature of the 
Divine working; and that he declares to be eternal.l 
5. Primary 
104 
Not only is it the nature of God to do good, and eternally so, 
but God's goodness is primary, the cause or source of all finite forms 
of goodness.2 "For God is the cause of all good things; but of some 
primarily.") All things necessary and profitable for life are sup-
plied by God.4 This includes the supplying of food, clothes, and 
shelter. It includes the inspiration to produce literature or crea-
tive arts. But, above all, it includes giving man instruction in 
moral goodness, particularly through the example of His Son. 
6. Unique 
As E. F. Osborn suggests, for Clement God's goodness is unique.5 
The reply of Jesus to the rich young ruler is quoted or hinted at 
quite a number of times in Clement's writing. Some of these refer-
ences are explicit statements of the uniqueness of God's goodness. 
"Being good, He is called that which He alone is--'good•.n6 God is 
1. Clement of Alexandria, pp. 80-81. 
2. Stromata, vii, 4; II, 529 and iv, 25; II, 439. 
J. ~., i, 5; II, 305. 4. Ibid., vi, 8; II, 495. 
5. Philosophy of Clement, P• 65. 6. Instructor, i, 8; II, 227. 
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nalone perfect and good. 111 He quotes Jesus: 11 None is good, but my 
Father, who is in heaven. 11 2 Such passages imply that God's goodness 
is unique. It is different from all forms of finite goodness. 
7. Rational 
There is a faint emphasis in Clement on the fact that God's good-
ness is rational. He says that the "image of the Word is the true man, 
• • • assimilated to the Divine Word in the affections of the soul, and 
therefore, rational. 113 At another point he endorses the description of 
the good as "regular, 11 11fitting, 11 and "agreeing with itseli11 by the 
Stoic philosopher, Cleanthes Pisadeus, as a clear statement concerning 
the nature of God.4 Thus we conclude Clement to hold that God's good-
ness is rational in the sense of being self-consistent and relevant to 
all else God is and does. 
8. Linked with Power 
No dualism between the goodness and the power of God is conceiv-
able to the mind of Clement. Divine goodness is no mere intention-
ality, lacld.ng the power that might be needed to insure its actuality. 
For the God of goodness is also the God of supreme and limitless power. 
Human art, moreover, produces houses, and ships, and 
cities and pictures. But how shall I tell you what God 
makes? Behold the whole universe; it is His work: the 
heaven, and the sun, and angels, and man, are the works 
1. Who Is the Rich Man?, 1; n, 591. 2. Instructor, i, 8; II, 227. 
3. Exhortation to the Heathen, 10; II, 199. 
4. Ibid., vi; II, 192. 
of His fingers. How great is the power of God 1 His bare 
volition was the creation of the universe. For God alone 
made it, because He alone is truly God. By the bare exist-
ence of volition He creates; His mere willing was followed 
by the springing into being of what He willed.l 
And what hidden power in willing God possessed, He carried 
f~ out by the forth putting of His might externally in 
the act of creating, • • • There is nothing which God cannot 
do.2 
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Rightly does he condemn Marcion1 s dichotomy of the good god and the 
Creator.3 For absolute goodness of intention unaccompanied by supreme 
power could effect salvation only by accident. If God's will is to 
become effectual, He must have sufficient power to bring His creatures 
into line through punishment as well as to supply all their needs. 
The whole economy of salvation demands that goodness and power be 
joined in the same Being. 
It is essentiai, certainly, that the providence which 
manages all, be both good and supreme. For it is the power 
of both that dispenses salvation--the one correcting in 
~ • punishment, as supreme, the other showing kindness in the 
exercise of beneficence, as a benefactor.4 
A passage indirectly quoted by Osborn5 to show Clement's belief 
in God's providence also lends strong support to the wedding of Divine 
goodness and power. In his paraphrase, Osborn makes the passage refer 
directly to God, while in the original passage it describes the concern 
1. Exhortation to ~ Heathen, iv; II, 189-190. 
2. Instructor, i, 3; II, 211. 3. Stromata, v, 1; II, 445. 
4. ~., i, 27; II, 340. 
5. PhilosoJll!l ~ Clement, p. 69. 
of the Lord 11who for our sakes assumed flesh.nl 
For either the Lord does not care for all men; and this is 
the case either because He is unable (which is not be thought, 
for it would be a proof of weakness), or because He is un-
willing, which is not the attribute of a good being. • •• 
Nor can He who is the Lord of all, and serves above all the 
will of the good and almighty Father, ever be hindered by 
another.2 
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However, it is correct to app~ this passage proving the providence of 
the Word to God Himself, since it is descriptive of one who 11 serves 
above all the will of the good and almighty Father." 
The omnipotence of God's goodness is seen also in the manner in 
which God in His providence transmutes evil into good. 
Nothing withstands God: nothing opposes Him: seeing He 
is Lord and omnipotent. • • • It is according~ the greatest 
achievement of divine Providence, not to allow evil, which 
has sprung from voluntary apostasy, to remain useless, and 
for no good, and not to become in all respects injurious. 
For it is the work of the divine wisdom, and excellence, 
and power, not alone to do good ••• but especia.lJ.¥ to 
insure that what happens through the evils hatched by any, 
may come to a good and useful issue, and to use to advantage 
those things which appear to be evils.3 
9. Unrelated to Personal Need 
The goodness of God is close~ related to the needs of His crea-
tures but is absolutely divorced from any need of His own. For as 
Clement tells us again and again, God has no needs. 
The Deity neither is, then, in want of aught, nor loves 
pleasure, or gain, or money, being full, and supplying all 
things to everything that has received being and has wants.4 
1. Stromata, vii, 2; II, 524. 2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., i, 18; II, 320. 4. Ibid., vii, 3; II, 527. 
But how can He, to whom all things belong, need a.cything? 
But were God possessed of a human form, He would need equally 
with man, food, and shelter, and house, and the attendant 
incidents.l 
Benevolence is the wishing of good things to another for 
his sake. For He needs nothing; and the beneficence and be-
nignity which flow from the Lord terminate in us, being di-
vine benevolence, and benevolence resulting in beneficence.2 
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Many other passages of like import might be adduced, but they vTOul.d 
be superfluous. The greatness of God 1s love and goodness is seen in 
the fact that from all He does for the salvation of mankind the only 
advantage He receives is that we are saved.3 And to one with no needs, 
this is no advantage at all. 
10. Beyond Human Comprehension 
God is in essence beyond human expression or human comprehen-
sion. All unaided efforts of the human mind to discover God produce 
little more than negative results. J. Cognat reminds us that Clement 
believed it possible for the unaided human intellect to know that God 
exists, that this is His world, and that He governs all things. 
L'illustre ma~tre d 1Alexandrie pensait done qu1 une 
certaine connaissance de Dieu, consistant ~ sav6ir ~'il 
est, que ~ monde est~ ouvrage, et ~'il gouverne tout 
~ ~ providence, ne surpassait pas les forces de la raison 
numaine, et ne s~pposait pas necessairement un secours sur-
natural de Dieu.4 
However, he goes on to point out that such natural knowledge as men 
1. Stromata, vii, 5; II, 530. 2. Ibid., ii, 6; II, 353. 
3. Exhortation to ~ Heathen, i; II, 172-73. 
4. Cllment d 1 Alexandria-Sa Doctrine et ~ Pole'mique (Paris: E. Dentu, 
Libraire-Editeur, 1B58T, p. 149. 
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have of God is hardly worthy of the term !mow ledge at all. 
" Sans doute, tous les hommes ont naturellement en eux-memes 
une notion du Dieu v~ritable plus ou moins distincte, plus 
ou moins pure, plus ou moins de'veloppe'e. Sans doute, tous 
les peuples ont cru ~ 11existence d 1une nature sup~rieure, 
et il n'y a pas de soci~t~ possible sans 1a fo~ 'a 1a Provi-
dence . San doute, enfin, des philosophes, aides et soutenus 
dans leurs recherches par un enseignement sup~rieur, sont 
alles plus avant et ont attribu~ cette Providence ~ un Dieu 
unique et immat~riel. Mais il y a loin de cette foi instinctive 
et confuse de la foule, de cette connaissance si incompl~te 
encore de quelques philosophes, ~ la connaissance de Dieu, tel 
~'il est, dans son essence.l -
If a man would think about God, he must begin by abstracting 
from the object of his thought all physical properties, all spatial 
dimensions, and even the notion of position, until he arrives at a 
conception of pure unity. Combining this with the greatness seen in 
Christ and with the immensity implied Qy the concept of holiness, one 
may approach a conception of God, although it is knowledge more of 
what He is not than what He is. 
If, then, abstracting all that belong to bodies and things 
called incorporeal, we cast ourselves into the greatness of 
Christ, and thence advance into the immensity by holiness, we 
may reach somehow to the conception of the Almighty, knowing 
not what He is, but what He is not.2 
Indeed, so far beyond the reach of human thought and expression is God 
that the fullness of His nature is inexpressible even by His own power.3 
For He is above genus, species, or number, and to Him no predicates 
can properly be applied. Without parts and indivisible, He outstrips 
all human measurements and limitations. He is infinite and inscrutable. 
1. ~., p. 155. 2. Stromata, v, 11; II, 461. 
3. Ibid., v, 10; II, 46o. 
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Though names may be applied, they are but conveniences for the finite 
mind and are in no sense adequate to describe His nature. 
This discourse respecting God is most difficult to handle. 
For since the first principle of everything is difficult to 
find out, the absolutely first and oldest principle, which 
is the cause of all other things being and having been, is 
difficult to exhibit. For how can that be expressed which 
is neither genus, nor difference, nor species, nor individual, 
nor number; nay more, is neither an event nor that to which 
an event happens? No one can rightly express Him wholly. 
• • • Nor are any parts to be predicated of Him. For the 
One is indivisible; wherefore also it is infinite •••• 
And therefore it is without form and name. And if we name 
it, we do not do so properly, terming it either the One, or 
the Good, or Mind, or Absolute Being, or Father, or God, or 
Creator, or Lord. We do not speak as supplying His name; 
but for "1-Tant, we use good names, in order that the mind may 
have these as points of support, so as not to err in other 
respects. For each one by itself does not express God; but 
all together are indicative of the power of the Omnipotent. 
For predicates are expressed either from what belongs to 
things themselves, or from their mutual relation. But none 
of these are advisable in reference to God. Nor any more 
is He apprehended by the science of demonstration. For it 
depends on primary and better known principles. But there 
is nothing antecedent to the Unbegotten.l 
If some one protests that the Scriptures refer to God in human terms, 
Clement replies that it is merely as an acco.rmnodation to human weak-
ness not because the terms in any measure express His real nature.2 
As R. B. Tollinton says, 
!he only statement we can still make respecting Him is 
that He exists, He is. • •• So transcendent is the real 
nature of the Deity, so entirely is He removed from all 
contact with the material world of change and movement, 
so far is He separated, in the distant purity of His own 
unstained existence, from the grasp of the human mind, and 
even from affinity with human goodness, that man is left 
with no single fact of which he can be sure in relation to 
1. Ibid., v, 12; II, 463-64. 2. Ibid., ii, 16; II, 363. 
the ultimate character of the Divine Being, save the one 
bare, solitary truth of His existence .1 
"All this description of the Divine Being seems absolutely 
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fatal, 11 says Patrick, "to the thought to which he has given emphatic 
expression, that the knowledge of God was life. What possible knowl-
edge of, or fellowship can there be with, One who cannot be scientifi-
cally known, because He cannot be logical~ demonstrated, who is a 
mere abstraction, of whom we can predicate nothing but negations, who 
seems only 'the deification of zero,' and whose transcendence seems 
to put Him out of all possible relation to us?11 2 It is true as 
Patrick goes on to say that there is a sense in which these sayings 
of Clement are in harmony vr.Lth Scripture and reflect a profound truth 
"which forms an essential element in all true theism--viz., that the 
essence of God must ever escape our analysis, that we may apprehend 
but cannot comprehend the nature of Deity, that He may be known to 
be infinite though not known as infinite. 113 Yet, despite this admis-
sion, if this i3fue whole of Clement's thought about the possibility of 
knowing God, his system would not only be sundered by a serious in-
consistency but also his conception of God would be little better than 
outright atheism. But fortunately this is not all. When God through 
grace and the influence of the Word becomes our teacher, we can attain 
unto some knowledge of Him. 
11 It remains that we understand, then, the Unknown, by divine 
1. Clement of Alexandria (London: Williams and Norgate, 1914), I, 336. 
2. Clement 2f Alexandria, p. 71. 3. ~., p. 72. 
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grace, and by the word alone that proceeds from Him.n1 But it is 
with difficulty that even those who claim God as their teacher attain 
a conception of God.2 
B. Manifestations of Goodness in God's Activity 
1. Creation 
Underlying all other expressions of His goodness is God's activ-
ity in the creation of the universe and all within it. Clement agrees 
with Irenaeus that the same Being is both Savior and Creator.3 In 
fact, His purpose to save the highest portion of His projected creation, 
man, caused Him to 11make the rest also.n4 So, in creation, as well as 
in saving, He revealed His goodness. Indeed, it was His goodness that 
made Him Creator in the first place: 
For before He became Creator He was God; He was good. And, 
therefore, He wished to be Creator and Father. And the 
nature of all that love was the source of righteousness--
the cause, too, of His lighting up the sun, and sending 
dmin His own Son.5 
The very fact that anything exists is proof that God loves it, for 
since He is the sole creative agent and has all power, if He hated 
anything it would cease immediately to exist. Therefore, man's very 
existence is an indication of God's love for him.6 Indeed, "God had 
no other reason for creating him, than that unless he came into being 
1. Stromata, v, 14; II, 464. 
3. ~., v, 1; II, 445. 
5. Instructor, i, 9; II, 232. 
2. ~., vi, 18, II, 519. 
4. Ibid., vi, 17; II, 516. 
6. Ibid., i, 8; II, 225. 
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it was not possible for God to be a good Creator, or for man to ar-
rive at the knowledge of God. For God would not have accomplished 
that on account of which man was created otherwise than by the crea-
tion of man. nl According to F. R. M. Hitchcock, Clement believed that 
the world was in a double sense an expression of God's goodness: 
"first, as being a Divine creation ••• ; and then as being the 
sphere of man's discipline, for which it was especially prepared. 11 2 
There are times when Clement attributes the work of creation to 
the Word or Son. Osborn says: 
There appears to be a confusion in Clement's description 
of the first principle and the Creator of the cosmos. Both 
God and the Logos are described as the ultimate first prin-
ciple and as the Creator of the cosmos.3 
This inconsistency is probab~ due in part to the Scriptures them-
selves and Clement• s tendency as an eclectic writer to borrow material 
from various sources without ful~ assimilating them to what may have 
been his own point of view. For example he quotes with approbation 
the Fourth Gospel's statement concerning the Logos: 11For all things 
were made by Him, and without Him was not anything made. 11 4 Perhaps 
it is correct as Tollinton implies, that Clement felt it necessar,y to 
call upon the Logos concept to bridge the gap between God and the cos-
mos because he regarded God as so complete~ transcendent.5 But, 
1. Instructor, i, 3; II, 211. 
2. Clement of Alexandria (London: Society for Promoting Christian 
Knowledge, 1899), P• 179. 
3. Philosophy ~ Clement, P• 40. 4. Instructor, i, 11; II, 234. 
5 . Clement of Alexandria, I, 351-52. 
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regardless, since Clement regards the Logos as the agent of God and 
the executor of the Father's will, the only one who as just and good 
is truly "in the image and likeness of the Father, 111 whatever formal 
inconsistency he may be guilty of is of no serious consequence in re-
gard to our discovering of what he believed to be the nature and 
character of God. 
2. Providence and Natural Blessings 
Clement frequently uses the word Providence as a synonym for 
God, as when he says, 11 It is essential, certainly, that the providence 
which manages all, be both supreme and good. 11 2 And again, he speaks 
of the Savior as "the secret and sacred token of the great Provi-
dence.113 But also he employs the term to designate God's watchful. 
oversight of human affairs, both as guardian and protector and as 
supplier of human needs. 
Patrick lays special stress on providence in the former sense 
as an expression of the Divine goodness. 
His goodness is seen in His providential care, which is at 
once supreme and good, universal and individual. It is ever 
at work, and is like the care of a shepherd for his sheep or 
a ld.ng for his subjects. All things are arranged by the Lord 
of the universe, both generally and particularly, with a view 
to the safety of the universe.4 
However, to define providence as God's guardianship over human affairs 
1. Instructor, i, 11; II, 234. 2. Stromata, i, 27; II, 340. 
3. Ibid., v, 2; II, 446. 
4. Clement of Alexandria, pp. 84-85. 
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does not mean that God prevents the occurrence of evil. Indeed, 
Clement defends God against tbe charge that not to prevent evil when 
one has the power to prevent it is to be the cause of the evil. He 
says that causation attaches to activity, as in the case or a ship-
builder in relation to the building of a vessel or a carpenter in re-
lation to the construction of a house. 1 Here, there is a connection 
between the action and the result, 11but that which does not prevent 
is separated from what takes place. 11 2 God's providence is seen, not 
in preventing evil, but rather in the transmutation of evil into good. 
God does not allow evil to exert its full destructive force on man; 
instead, He enables man to use and even derive benefit from evil by 
taking it up into a larger purpose and broader perspective. 
It is accordingly the greatest achievement of divine Provi-
dence, not to allow evil, ••• to remain useless, and for no 
good, and not to become in all respects injurious. For it is 
the work of the divine wisdom, and excellence, and power, not 
alone to do good (for this is, so to speak, the nature of God, 
as it is of fire to warm and of light to illumine) but espe-
cially to insure that what happens through the evils hatched 
by any, may come to a good and useful issue, and to use to 
advantage those things whlch appear to be evils.3 
An example of this is seen in Clement's thesis that pagan philosophy 
originated from divine truths stolen, distorted, and imparted to men 
by the devil, but that this theft was turned to advantage by Divine 
providence.4 
Related to this is Osborn's view that providence means for 
1. Stromata, i, 17; II, 319. 2. Ibid. 
3. ~., i, 17; II, 320. 4. Ibid., i, 17; II, 319. 
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Clement 11foreknovrledge and omniscience as well as the benevolent ex-
ercise of power. • • • There is no limit to this providence. All 
things are for the best."l Thus providence as guardianship means 
both that through His foreknowledge and omniscience God has ordered 
things generally for the promotion of good and that He exerts His in-
fluence in particular instances to bring evil to good consequence. 
Another aspect of Divine providence and evidence of Divine good-
ness is to be seen in God's bestowing the natural blessings necessar.y 
for the preservation and enrichment of life. Clement never seems to 
tire of saying that all good things come from God. 11For God is the 
cause of all good things; but of some primarily • 11 2 He makes the sun 
to shine and the rain to fall on all persons, good and evil, obedient 
and disobedient.3 He dispenses food to all, ungrudging1y.4 Indeed~ 
all things necessary and helpful for life He supplies; 
and to speak comprehensively, all benefit appertaining to 
life, in its highest reason, proceeding from the Sovereign 
God, the Father who is over all, is consummated by the Son.5 
But the greatness of God's goodness is really indicated by the fact 
that these acts of kindness and generosity are unsolicited and in 
some cases unmerited. 
And to those who are worthy, things which are really good 
are given, even without their asking.6 
Now, that the God and Father of our Lord Jesus is good, 
the Word Himself will vouch: 11For He is kind to the 
1. Philosophy of Clement, p. 69. 
3. Instructor, i, 8; II, 227. 
5. Ibid., vi, 17; II, 518. 
2. Stromata, i, 5; II, 305. 
4. Stromata, ii, 18; II, 366. 
6. Ibid., vii, 12; II, 544. 
unthankful and the evil; 11 and ••• in addition ••• He 
says, "My Father makes His sun to shine on all. 11 1. 
There can be no doubt that God's generous showering of good things 
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upon man was regarded by Clement as an expression of God's goodness, 
for argument after argument sho¥rs it. His care for man is proof of 
His goodness. 
God, therefore, does good. And the Good, in virtue of its 
being good, does nothing else than good. Consequently God 
does all good. And He does not good to man without caring 
for him.2 and He does not care for him without taking care of him. 
3. The Word as Instructor 
Another expression of God's goodness is His instruction of man-
kind through the action of the Word. As Patrick says, God's concern, 
God's love for man is clearly shown by His giving the word to man as 
Instructor.3 
We have already noted that God is beyond human comprehension. 
If man is to know God at all, it will require the help of God. So, 
Clement readily agrees with Plato that such limited knowledge is pos-
sible o~ because of 11a certain divine effluence11 which has been in-
stilled in all men.4 Again, he says that "no one knows God but the 
Son, and he to whom the Son shall reveal him.n.5 Therefore, 11 l'en-
seignement du Verbe est n~cessaire pour r~soudre d'une maniere 
1. Instructor, i, 8; II, 227. 2. Instructor, i, 8; II, 22.5. 
3. Clement ~ Alexandria, p. 86. 
4. Exhortation to ~ Heathen, 6; II, 191. 
5. ~., 1; II, 174. 
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compl~te la question la plus importante, la plus essentielle ~ la vie 
humaine, la question de 1 1 essence et de la nature de Dieu.nl 
But not only is the activity of the Word required to bring knowl-
edge of God to man, but the soul has become so enfeebled that it cannot 
know spiritual reality in general without the help of a Teacher.2 But 
God has acted to offset this weakness. 
Contemplate a little, if agreeable to you, the divine 
beneficence. The first man, when in Paradise, sported free, 
because he was a child of God; but when he succumbed to 
pleasure • • • was as a child seduced by lusts. • • • Man 
••• was found fettered to sins. The Lord then wished to 
release him from his bonds •• • • Wherefore, since the Word 
Himself has come to us from heaven, we need not, I reckon, 
go any more in search of human learning •••• For if we 
have as our teacher Him that filled the universe with His 
holy energies in creation, salvation, beneficence, legis-
lation, prophecy, teaching, we have the Teacher from whom 
all instruction comes.3 
Hitchcock points out: 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
This Word, according to Clement, is in the world inspir-
ing every thought that is good, every sentiment that is 
chaste, and every desire that is pure~ in Christian and 
pagan, without distinction of person.q 
Whatever good there was to be found in any system of 
religion or philosophy, he traced back to the influence--
exhibited in a less degree perhaps--of the same Divine 
Wisdom that spake in the days of old to patriarch and prophet 
in many fragments and in many ways. God in Christ was ever 
in the world, educating man, now by new trials, now by new 
light, until the time was ripe for the fuller revelation of 
God among men when the Word became flesh.s 
J. Cognat, Cl~ment d'Alexandrie, p. 152. 
Stromata, v, 1; II, 446. 
Exhortation to ~ Heathen, ii; n., 202-203. 
Clement .£!: Alexandria, p. 84. 5. ~., p. 171. 
The pre-incarnate activity of the Word was universal in its range, 
says Patrick. 
The progressive education of humanity was His distinctive 
work. It was He who gave philosophy to the Greeks. It was 
He who acted as Tutor to the people of Israel, who appeared 
to Abraham and Jacob. It was He who by signs and wonders in 
Egypt and in the desert incited the people to salvation. It 
was He who spoke by Moses and all the prophets.l 
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It is clearly a mark of goodness that God as the Word, or Instructor, 
leads man in the way of good to salvation. 11 It has been God's fixed 
and constant purpose to save the flock of men: for this end the good 
God sent the Good Shepherd. 11 2 11The word of God becomes man, n says 
Clement, 11 that thou mayest learn from man how man may become God. 1.3 
And so, 11 our superintendence in instruction and discipline is 
the office of the Word, from whom we learn frugality and humility, 
and all that pertains to love of truth, love of man, and love of ex-
cellence.114 By "admonishing, upbraiding, blaming, chiding, reproving, 
threatening, healing, promising, favouring; and as it were, by many 
reins, curbing the irrational impulses of humanity115 the Word seeks 
to bring wholeness to the total life of man.6 God deals with man in 
many ways because it is His intention not only to impart knowledge but 
to heal spiritual diseases.7 It is by no means a denial of His love 
1. Clement of Alexandria, p. 101. 
2. Exhortation to the Heathen, ii; II, 204. 
3. Exhortation to the Heathen, 1; II, 174. 
4. Instructor, i, 12; II, 235. 5. Ibid., i, 9; II, 228. 
6. Ibid., i, 2; II, 210. 7. Ibid., i, 1; II, 209. 
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and goodness that the Instructor sometimes reproves and even inflicts 
with pain, for these are intended to bring about man's correction and 
are thus for his ultimate good.l In a beautiful and eulogic passage, 
Tollinton gives expression to the variety of the Word's ministry as 
Instructor. 
It is difficult to exhaust the varieties of form and 
manner through which this educative beneficence is exerted. 
The Word is all-seeing, the sleepless guardian of humanity, 
the overseer ( t7TL(f"/<.07TOS ) of our hearts, the partici-
pator in all our secrets. He cares for all His handiwork, 
for that 11herd of men11 who are at once His creation and His 
charge, ever ready to accommodate Himself to human need, 
ever varying His method as times, persons, places change. 
So the instruction comes 11at sundry times and in divers 
manners, n as the suggestive phrase of another Alexandrine 
writer had expressed it; but however it comes, and in what-
ever measure we may be able to receive it, 11 every fair and 
admirable lesson is learned from God through the Son. 11 So 
it was He who gave philosophy to the Gr~eks. It was He 
who gave Moses the Law. In prophecy it was the Word who 
spoke. He is the milk of spiritual babes, the meat and 
drink of the full-grown and adult. He can reprove or re-
ward, drive or lead, attract by gentleness , compel by the 
wholesome discipline of pain. The magnet which draws the 
kindred substance tp itself, the yoke which even though 
easy is the symbol of control and toil, are not too dis-
similar to be each the type of His influence. He may make 
man His instrument, or He may build in man His shrine. He 
is the spiritual Paradise or Garden in which the soul is 
planted. All things by His influence become 11an ocean of 
blessings11 upon which the voyage of life is made. He never 
sleeps. He never leaves His own. He never fails His pupils. 
He neglects none of the many methods of salvation. Where 
He is absent, there is confusion and turmoil and evil deeds. 
~There He comes, there is harmony, there is light, there is 
purity, there is likeness and conformity to His very image, 
so far as the hindrances which beset humanity allow. To 
all phases of human need it is His joy to minister. The 
Logos will be present, as the Incarnate Christ was, at a 
convivial banquet. He will advise us in ¥t er~ of attire, 
or He will instruct the seeker after God. 71 ~e- e.t/pefl.l; $t: tfr..t>o, 
1. ~., i, 9; II, 228. 
each advance in knowledge is through the Son. And all this 
long and varied process of correction, discipline, instruc-
tion, enlightenment, seems to reach its culmination when, 
after each previous stage of training has been accomplished, 
the soul is led, in the very footsteps of the great High 
Priest, to those solemn and distant forecourts, which fringe 
the Presence Chamber of the illimitable, absolute, and sov-
ereign Godhead. Much more might be said. In particular we 
might show how the conception of the Saviour and the Physician 
fuse and blend with the central and dominating conception of 
the Teacher, but it is better to leave this great thought of 
Clement without undue amplification.l 
4. The Demands of the Law 
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Among the forms of God's goodness is the Law, for Clement re-
minds us that 11God pities richly, being good, and giving commands by 
the law and the prophets. 11 2 The Law is indeed beneficial because it 
is ttthe opinion which is good, and what is good is that which is true, 
and what is true is that which finds 1 true being, I and attains to 
it."3 In reply to those who claimed that the Law was not good because 
it brought knowledge of sin, Clement states that the Law did not cause 
sin, but revealed sin.4 For the Law is intended to warn one against 
the things that destroy life and to enjoin the things that fulfill and 
increase life.5 
Let no one, then, run down law, as if, on account of the 
penalty, it were not beautiful and good. For shall he who 
drives away bodily disease appear a benefactor; and shall 
not he who attempts to deliver the soul from iniquity, as 
much more appear a friend, as the soul is a more precious 
thing than the body? Besides, for the sake of bodily health 
1. Clement of Alexandria, I, 355-57. 
3. Ibid., i, 25; II, 338. 
5. Ibid. 
2. Stromata, ii, 16; II, 364. 
4. Stromata, ii, 7; II, 355. 
we submit to incisions, and cau.terizations, and medicinal 
draughts; and he who administers them is called saviour and 
healer, even though amputating parts, not from grudge or ill-
will towards the patient, but as the principles of the art 
prescribe, so that the sound parts may not perish along with 
them, and no one accuses the physician's art of wickedness; 
and shall we not similarly submit, for the soul's sake, to 
either banishment, or punishment, or bonds, provided oply 
from unrighteousness we shall attain to righteousness?! 
But it is the highest and most perfect good, when one is 
able to lead back any one from the practice of evil to virtue 
and well-doing, which is the very function of the law. So 
that, when one falls into any incurable evil--when taken pos-
session of, for example, by wrong or covetousness,--it will 
be for his good if he is put to death. For the law is benefi-
cent, being able to make some righteous from unrighteous, if 
they will only give ear to it, and by releasing others from 
present evils; for those who have chosen to live temperately 
and justly, it conducts to immortality.2 
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So, to those who hedge at calling the Law good Clement makes answer: 
What then, will they have the law to be? They will not 
call it evil, but just; distinguishing what is good from 
what is just. But the Lord when He enjoins us to dread 
evil, does not exchange one evil for another, but abolishes 
what is opposite by its opposite. Now evil is the opposite 
of good, as what is just is of what is unjust.3 
"Thus reading a beneficent purpose in the law, 11 says Hitchcock, "Clem-
ent was able to reconcile the love and the justice of God, and to an-
swer the arguments of Marcion. 11 4 
5. Admonition and Judgment 
To the mind of Clement judgment is not only compatible with good-
ness, but is one form in which goodness finds expression.5 But he 
1. Ibid., i, 27, II, 339. 
3. Stromata, ii, 8; II, 356. 
5. Instructor, i, 10; II, 233. 
2. Ibid., i, 27; II, 339-340. 
4. Clement of Alexandria, pp. 171-72. 
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must, for the most part, regard it as a negative expression of good-
ness, because his most frequent use of the term limits the meaning of 
judgment to the negative sense of rebuke and chastisement. 
For the same who is Instructor is judge, and judges those 
who disobey Him.l 
And the Word, having unfolded the truth, showed to men the 
height of salvation, that either repenting they might be 
saved, or refusing to obey, they might be judged. This is 
the proclamation of righteousness: to those that obey, glad 
tidings; to those that disobey, judgment.2 
Less frequent:cy he uses justice--which, incidental:cy, he uses 5ynon:y-
mous:cy with judgment--in the conventional sense of rewarding as well 
as punishing in accordance with one's deserts.3 
No doubt Clement• s views regarding the relationship of justice 
and goodness were brought into much sharper focus than they might 
otherwise have been b,y the Marcionites. 
The controversy raised b,y Marcion led Clement to touch 
specially on the relation of the Divine justice to the 
Divine goodness. Marcion had sought to explain the dif-
ference between the representation of God in the Old Testa-
ment and that in the New Testament b,y ascribing the origin 
of the Old Testament to a subordinate God whose essential 
nature was justice, and the New Testament to the Supreme 
God whose essential nature was goodness. He assumed, there-
fore, that justice and goodness were irreconcilable attri-
butes.4 
Clement, however, had no doubt that the same God is responsible for 
both testaments and that He is both just and good. 11He who is tru:cy 
1. ~., i, 7; II, 224. 
2. Exhortation to ~ Heathen, 11; II, 204. 
3. Such usage occurs in the Exhortation.:!::£~ Heathen, 10; II, 197. 
4. Patrick, Clement of Alexandria, p. 90. 
124 
God is just and good; who is Himself all, and all is He; for He is 
God, the only God.nl Not only is God just as well as good, but His 
justice is an expression of His goodness and results from the fact 
that He is primarily good. 11 God is good on His own account, and just 
also on ours, and He is just because He is good. 11 2 11 Thus basing the 
justice of God upon His goodness, Clement was able to see in God1s 
dealings with sinners a scheme of improvement rather than a system 
I 
of retribution, and to regard the Word as the Amender ( ~LofBu>ntS 
I 
and k~TeUBII1''"17)f ) rather than the Avenger ( IL)I..Wp0.5 ) of sin. 113 
To those who deny the goodness of God because of His administer-
ing threats and chastisements to wrong-doers, Clement replies that 
such action on God's part is proof of His concern for, rather than 
His hostility toward, man. God hates nothing which exists, f'or if He 
did, being the source of all existence, His hatred would cause it to 
cease to exist. If anything exists, it is proof that He approves 
rather than hates it. If he does not hate anything, it follows that 
He must love everything, especially man, His finest created object. 
To love everything is to wish good for it. Therefore, God wishes 
good for man, and does good to him by taking care of him. This is 
accomplished, not only by bestowing on him things which are useful 
and enjoyable, but also by instructing, warning, and disciplining, so 
that he may be guided to the way which is eternallY good.4 If someone 
1. Instructor, i, 9; II, 231. 2. Ibid., i, 9; II, 232. 
3. Hitchcock, Clement of Alexandria, p. 219. 
4. Instructor, i, 8; II, 225-227. 
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asks, "If God loves man and desires his good, why does He punish?," 
Clement replies that such mode of treatment is often advantageous in 
the training of children, since many of the passions are cured by 
punishment.l "Reproach is like the application of medicines, dissolv-
ing the callosities of the passions, and purging" the soul of its im-
purities.2 It is not then the mark of ill-will, but of good, since 
it is done in kindness with the intention of correcting one's faults.3 
Just as the general of an army administers disciplinary penalties for 
the improvement of the individual soldier, as well as for the good of 
the army as a whole, so God admonishes and chastises "those who throw 
off the restraints of His law, that He may effect their release from 
slavery, error, and captivity of the adversary.4 But though God ad-
monishes and threatens, because of His goodness, He is reluctant to 
punish and speaks many times before proceeding to act.5 Nevertheless, 
it is better for God 11 to wound the apathetic soul11 salutarily, in-
stead of mortal~, in order to secure "exemption from everlasting 
death by a little pain.n6 
He goes on to defend the goodness of God expressed in discipli-
nary judgment by using a quotation from Plato to the effect that all 
who suffer punishment are really treated well, since they are bene-
fited by the improvement of spirit and attitude resulting from just 
1. Ibid., i, 8· 
' 
II, 225. 2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., i, 8; II, 226. 4. Ibid., i, 8· , II, 225-226. 
5. Ibid., i, 8· , II, 226. 6. Ibid., i, 8· , II, 228. 
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punishment.l Indeed, the truest expression of love is not ~erely 
acting in such a way as to please the one loved, but doing that which 
is for the other's well-being, even though it causes temporary pain.2 
nit is not immediate pleasure, but future enjoyment, that the Lord ha.s 
in view.n3 It is a mark of the highest and most perfect good to be 
"able to lead back any one from the practice of evil to virtue and 
well-being.u4 
But while reproof and punishment are ne~ded primarilY for the 
correction and ultimate good of the wrong-doer, they are required also 
to hold wickedness in check. Many will obey out of fear One who is so 
rigorous~ good as to punish all forms of evil, while a love that is 
always mild may be despised and utterly ignored.5 On~ by punishing 
sinners can God insure that His will for goodness will remain the su-
preme law of life.6 This idea clearly emerges in Clement's own words, 
in the second and third reasons he lists for Divine correction of hu-
tnan error: 
Therefore the good God corrects for these three causes: 
First, that he who is corrected may become better than 
his former sel.f; then that those who are capable of being 
saved by examples may be driven back, being admonished; 
and thirdly, that he who is injured may not readily be 
despised, and apt to receive injury.? 
So, Clement tells us that it is characteristic of God both to judge 
1. ~., i, 8; II, 226. 2. ~., i, 9; II, 228. 
3-~· 4. Stromata, i, 27; II, 339. 
5. Instructor, i, 9; II, 231. 6. Stromata, i, 27; n, 340. 
?. Stromata, iv, 24; II, 438. 
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and to do good, for judgment is required by His dedication to goodness 
and for man to arrive at goodness. "So God is good on His awn account, 
and just also on ours, and He is just because He is good. 111 
The goodness of Divine justice is evident also in the way it 
operates in the life after death. Osborn gives us one interpretation 
of Clement' s view: 
God's justice is good and his goodness is just. This prin-
ciple is applied to three classes of people. The unbeliever 
is spiritually dead and remains so. He is like the chaff 
which the wind blows away, or a piece of metal which does 
not respond to the pull of the magnet and falls to the ground. 
He is outside salvation, a limb which cannot live because it 
is separated from the boqy of Christ. He is in the same 
plight as a branch torn from the true vine. The gnostic 
who on earth has reached perfection soars straightway to 
heavenly bliss and climbs God's holy hill. There he joins 
the apostles in uninterrupted contemplation of God. Last~ 
the believers who have not gone on to perfection undergo a 
purifying discipline before they take their place in a lorrer 
mansion. They are conscious of a 11 great abiding sorrow" 
because they know that, had they so lived as to deserve it, 
they would be in a better place. In each of these three 
classes, whether through the destruction of evil men, the 
perfection of good men or the just grief of those who were 
not good enough, the final triumph of God's goodness is 
complete.2 
But while Osborn interprets Clement as saying that the goodness of 
Divine justice in the after-life is shown in the annihilation of the 
wicked, Patrick offers a different interpretation. He says that three 
views concerning the destiny of the unrighteous have been ascribed to 
Clement--annihilation, eternal punishment by fire, and universal sal-
vation. He rejects the hypothesis of annihilation because the pas-
sages general~ adduced to support such an assumption clear~ refer 
1. Instructor, i, 9; II, 231-32. 2. Philosophy of Clement, p. 83. 
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to life in the flesh and contain no implications that the same prin-
ciple is operative in the life of the spirit itself. One passage 
which states that 11 it is the highest and most perfect good, when one 
is able to lead back any one from the practice of evil to virtue and 
well-doing •••• When one falls into any incurable evil, ••• it 
will be for his good if he is put to death111 clearly implies that 11the 
flesh is destroyed that the spirit may be saved. 11 It cannot mean that 
annihilation is better than eternal punishment, as there is no sug-
gestion of such an alternative in the passage.2 
In regard to the hypothesis of eterna1 punishment, Patrick 
acknowledges the fact that many passages in Clement affirm that in 
a general way it will not be well with the unrighteous or unbelieving 
after death. Again and again the contrast is drawn between eternal 
life and punishment by fire. The exact l-Jeight of such passages, how-
ever, cannot be gauged without considering what Clement meant by fire, 
"as well as b,y examining other passages and principles with which 
these positions are in open or implicit antagonism." He finds Clement 
to mean by fire an inward and spiritual force whose function is 11 to 
cleanse and discipline, not to destroy. 11 11Fire is conceived as a 
force, good and powerful, destructive of what is worse, preservative 
of what is better. 11 Such passages, he admits, may be inconclusive. 
But when accompanied by certain general principles, the presumption 
is reasonable that punishment in the after-life remains disciplinar,y 
1. Stromata, i, 27; II, 339. 2. Clement of Alexandria, p. 132. 
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and reformative rather than unending and retaliatory. There can be 
little doubt of Clement's belief in the possibility of repentance in 
the life after death, since its possibility is limited by the way man 
exercises his free will rather than by the nature of God. Further-
more, 11God does not take vengeance, for vengeance is a retaliation for 
evil, but He corrects with a view to the good; both public and private, 
of those who are corrected. 111 The principle of equality of opportu-
nity when accompanied by Clement's view that disembodied spirits pos-
sess clearer vision of the things of God suggests a similar conclu-
sion, since, if with a clearer vision of Christ one who had heard but 
resisted the call of Christ on earth has no further opportunity, it 
is better for him never to have heard at all, that he might respond 
to Christ's invitation given to those in Hades, an alternative l'Thich 
Clement with his missionary zeal would never for a moment have ad-
mitted. Patrick, therefore, finds it inconceivable that Clement as-
cribed to God a method of discipline that final~ failed to accomplish 
its purpose.2 Certain~, Patrick could never agree with Osborn's 
statement that in "the destruction of evil men, the perfection of 
good men or the just grief of those who were not good enough, the 
final triumph of God • s goodness is complete •113 Instead, he would 
say that if the Divine goodness expressed in justice stopped at this 
1. Quoted as in Patrick. Compare with wording in the version being 
used in this dissertation: Stromata, vii, 16; II, 553. 
2. Clement o:f Alexandria, pp. 133-36. 
3. Philosophy of Clement, p. 83. 
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point it would be weak and imperfect. Only if it goes on to accom-
plish its goal of universal salvation is the final triumph of God 1s 
goodness complete. 
6. Righteousness 
The term righteousness seems at times to be equated by Clement 
with goodness, as when he says, 11For God's righteousness is good, and 
His goodness is righteous."l And again, he says: 
Righteousness, therefore, has characteristics corresponding 
to all the aspects in which goodness is examined, both pos-
sessing equal properties equally. And things which are 
characterized by equal properties are equal and similar to 
each other. Righteousness is, therefore, a good thing.2 
Also, sometimes righteousness is used as almost an exact s,ynonym for 
goodness, the same results frequently being attributed to both. "You 
see how the law proclaims at once the righteousness and goodness of 
God, who dispenses food to all ungrudgingly. 113 
At other times, and more frequently, however, the term is used 
very nearly, if not entirely, as an equivalent for the word justice, 
or judgment, in the sense of the distribution of rewards and punish-
ments according to deserts. 
For God dispenses to all according to desert, His distribu-
tion being righteous.4 
This is the proclamation of righteousness: to those that 
obey, glad tidings; to those that disobey, judgment.5 
1. Stromata, vi, 14; II, 505. 
3. Stromata, ii, 18; II, 366. 
2. Instructor, i, 8; II, 225. 
4. Ibid., iv, 6; n, 41.4. 
5. 'Exhortation to ~ Heathen, 11; II, 204. 
And that He who alone is God is also alone and truly 
righteous, our Lord in the Gospel itself shall testify • 
• • • For He who placed some 11 on the right hand, and 
others on the left," ••• is called that which alone 
He is--11 good.ul 
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While the word itself suggests action in conformity to a correct 
standard, it gives no indication of what that standard may be and, 
when used as an equivalent for goodness, is subject to the same ambi-
gui ty of meaning. Even when used in the specific sense of justice, 
no new content is given the meaning of the term. Yet we are reminded 
that God, who is good, is "characterized by righteousness from the 
beginning to the end. n2 It may be that Clement t s intention is to 
gain our recognition of the fact that God always acts in faithful 
conformity to an equitable standard and, therefore, is worthy of our 
complete trust. Although we are not told specifically what the nature 
of such standard may be, perhaps it will not be too hazardous to ven-
ture a guess. 
In the first place, God may be called righteous because he 
treats all persons with equality. He measures all by one and the 
same standard. 
One righteous man, then, differs not, as righteous, from 
another righteous man, whether he be of the Law or a Greek. 
For God is not only Lord of the Jews, but of all men, and 
more nearly the Father of those who lmow Him. For if to 
live well and according to the Law is to live; and those 
who live right~ before the Law were classed under faith, 
and judged to be righteous,--it is evident that those, too, 
who were outside the Law, having lived rightly.3 
1. Instructor, i, 8; II, 227. 2. Stromata, ii, 18; II, 367. 
3. ~., vi, 6; II, 491. 
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Furthermore, God is righteous because the standard itself is a 
fair one. Our clue to what the standard is, is found in the equiva-
lence of the term righteousness with the term justice, or judgment. 
A.:Lthough God is good in the sense of His bestowing many good things 
indiscriminately upon all, His goodness is righteous in that He be-
stows greater good upon those who voluntari~ pursue goodness . In 
punishing those who choose evil through withholding from them greater 
goods or allowing them to reap the normal consequences of their ac-
tions, He is not treating them unfairly, for they had the power to 
choose good, but did not do so. That this line of thought is rea-
sonably accurate is shown by Clement's own words. 
The Shepherd, then, cares for each of his sheep; and his 
closest inspection is given to those who are excellent in 
their natures, and are capable of being useful. • • • 
Again, I reckon it is the part of the Law and right reason 
to assign to each one what is appropriate to him, and belongs 
to him, and falls to him. For as the lyre is only for the 
harper, and the flute for the flute-player; so good things 
are the possession of good men.l 
The Gnostic has consequently been demonstrated by us to 
be the only pious man. • • • 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Him God helps, by honouring him with closer oversight. 
For were not all things made for the sake of good men, for 
their possession and advantage, or rather salvation? He 
will not then deprive, of the things which exist for the 
sake of virtue, those for whose sake they were created. 
For, evidently in honour of their excellent nature and 
their holy choice, he inspires those who made first choice 
of a good life with strength for the rest of their salva-
tion; exhorting some, and helping others, who of them-
selves, have became worthy.2 
1. Ibid., vi, 17; II, 517. 2. Ibid., vii, 7; n, 536. 
Finally, God is righteous because the standard He employs is fairly 
applied. 
But if one say to us, that some sinners ever obtain 
according to their requests, /Ye should saz7 that this 
rarely takes place, by reason of the righteous goodness 
of God. And it is granted to those who are capable of 
doing others good. Whence the gift is not made for the 
sake of him that asked it, but the divine dispensation, 
foreseeing that one would be saved by this means, renders 
the boon again righteous.l 
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Thus far it has been shown only on what basis God 1 s goodness may 
be called righteous, but it has not been clearly demonstrated that 
God 1s righteousness itself can be regarded as an expression of good-
ness. Apparently, the only basis for drawing this conclusion is that 
the application of God's equitable standard, or the operation of His 
righteousness, results in further good for those who voluntarily choose 
the good. So righteousness as an expression of Divine goodness is to 
be understood in a more limited sense than other forms of its expression. 
7. Redemptive Concern: Mercy, Love, and Grace 
a. Mercy 
Co-incidental to the expression of the Divine goodness as justice, 
or judgment, is its expression as mercy in the sense of withholding or 
lightening the punishment justice demands. Because God is merciful, 
He is long-suffering and waits for men to turn from their evil ways 
before executing judgment against them. 2 
And while He threatens, He manifestly is unwilling to 
1. Ibid., vii, 12; II, 544. 2. Who Is the Rich Man?, 39; II, 602. 
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inflict evil to execute His threats; but by inspiring man 
with fear, he cuts off the approach to sin, and shows His 
love to man, still delaying, and declaring what they shall 
suffer if they continue sinners. • • • 
God then is good, and the Lord speaks many a time and 
oft before He proceeds to act, • • • often restrains, and 
always exhorts humanity, and shows what ought to be done. 
And this is a good device, to terrify lest we sin.l 
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Thus by inspiring men with fear, He seeks to divert them from sinful 
ways. Also, it is actually because He is merciful that He afflicts 
with hardships and sufferings those who fail to choose the good, in 
order that they may be led to repentance, grace, and salvation.2 
Mercy also is seen in the form of pity and compassion, and in 
this sense it becomes virtually a synonym for goodness. It is because 
of His pity that He watches over us and cares for us.3 Thus, it is, 
no doubt, a result of His mercy that He enables men to benefit from 
the evil that befalls them and make it contributory to a larger good. 
As various quotations from Scripture show, it is a consequence of His 
mercy that He saves.4 Therefore, He provides the commands of the Law, 
the warnings of the prophets, the guidance of the Instructor, and many 
other helps toward salvation. Thus, as with Irenaeus, mercy does not 
wait for human sin to come into play, to offset or lighten the se-
verity of punishment; but merc.y also operates prior to sin in all the 
things that work toward salvation. In thus being a concern to bring 
1. Instructor, i, 8· , II, 226. 2. Ibid., i, 8; II, 227. 
3. Stromata, vii, 7; II, 535. 
4. Exhortation to the Heathen, 1; II, 172, and Instructor, i, 9; II, 
230. 
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man to a good state of being, or a better state of being, mercy is a 
form of Divine goodness. 
b. Love 
Love is not so much a separate expression of the Divine goodness 
as it is a synonym for goodness. It is the .motive that lies behind 
the particular expressions of Divine goodness and behind the whole 
scheme of redemption. Referring to I John 4:8, Clement says: 
11 God, n then, being good, "is love, 11 it is said. Whose 
"love worketh no ill to his neighbor," neither injuring 
nor revenging ever, but, in a wo~ doing good to all ac-
cording to the image of God.l 
From the fact that God's goodness is used to explain His love and His 
love then becomes the doer of good to all, it is clear that love is a 
synonym for goodness. Like the Divine goodness, it lies behind all 
God's particular acts of goodness. Clement says in one place, that 
God hates nothing that exists. If He hates nothing, then it follows 
that He loves everything. But he "Who loves anything wishes to do it 
good. God, therefore, does good.2 
Though love seems to be a synonym for goodness, it expresses it-
self in a rrumber of particular ways. God 1 s love is seen in His con-
cern for man in his sinful condition. Because of His great love God 
comes to the aid of man in his struggle to overcome evil and realize 
the good.3 His love is apparent in all of His methods of instruction 
1. Stromata, iv, 18; II, 430. 2. Instructor, i, 8; II, 22$. 
3. Exhortation to the Heathen, 10; II, 197. 
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and guidance. "But the Lord in His love to man, invites all men to 
the lmowledge of the truth, and for this end sends the Paraclete.nl 
So intense is the Divine love that He admonishes His children, "not 
as a teacher spe~king to his pupils, not as a master to his domestics, 
nor as God to men, but as a father. 112 God's love is displayed even in 
His emplqyment of rebuke and various means of correction.3 Osborn 
says: 
There is nothing inconsistent in the idea that the Saviour 
should speak severely in love. For this is the medicine which 
the divine love administers to produce modesty and shame. It 
is better to cause the soul a little pain than to let it die 
eternally •••• God 1s anger (to which such strong objection 
had been made by Marcion) is actually a sign4of God's love, for God descended to emotion for man's sake. 
In a paraphrase of Clement's own words,5 Hitchcock shows that punish-
ment is an indication of God's love. 
But why does He punish us if He loves us? This is a sen-
sible question, and Clement gives a sensible answer to it. 
He who loves a thing wishes to do it good. Now love is 
shown when one who cares for a person takes care of him. 
But parents show their care for their children by punishing 
them. In fact, punishment is necessary to the right train-
ing of children. Many of the passions are cured qy punish-
ment, as well as by instruction in certain principles. 
Moreover, good generaLs inflict corporal punishment on of-
fenders, having in view the good of the whole army. 
In the same way God, Who has before Him the salvation of 
man--His children--seeks to move them to repentance by se-
verity as well as by forbearance. The Divine anger is 
therefore full of love to man, and punishes him for his 
good. This is the answer to the question, "Why does God 
1. Exhortation to ~ Heathen, 9; II, 196. 
2. ~., 9; II, 195. 3. Instructor, i, 8; II, 227. 
4. Philosophl of Clement, p. 59 . 5 . Instructor, i, 8; II, 225-26. 
punish us if He loves us?" for it is the prerogative of the 
same power to be beneficent and to be just.l 
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But more than in any other way, the Divine love is revealed in the 
coming of the Word to be the Instructor2 and, having become incarnate, 
to give his life that men might live. 
For this also He came down. For this He clothed Himself 
with man. For this He voluntarily subjected Himself to the 
experience of men, that by bringing Himself to the measure 
of our weakness whom he loved, He might corresponding~ bring 
to us the measure of his own strength. And about to be of-
fered up and giving Himself a ransom, He left for us a new 
Covenant-testament: My love I give unto you. And what and 
how great is it? For each of us He gave His life,--the equiva-
lent for au.3 
c. Grace 
The word grace sometimes means unmerited Divine favor, and it is 
sometimes employed in this sense by Clement, in which case it becomes 
a virtual synonym for goodness. One such instance is found in a 
Clementine fragment: 111 But the God of all grace,• he says. 'Of all 
grace,' he says, because He is good, and the giver of all good things.n4 
At other times, he uses grace to refer to the expressions of the Divine 
goodness coming as a consequence of human choice. 
To you still remains the conclusion, to choose which will 
profit you most--judgment or grace. For I do not think 
there is even room for doubt which of these is better, nor 
is it allowable to compare life with destruction.5 
1. Clement ~ Alexandria, pp. 104-105. 2. Instructor, i, 8; II, 225. 
3. ~ Is~ Rich Man?, 37; n, 601. 
4. Fragments from Cassiodorus, 1; II, 572. 
5. Exhortation to the Heathen, 12; II, 206. 
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You have, then, God1 s
1
promise; you have His love; become 
partakers of His grace. 
At first glance this may seem to be a departure from the usual mean-
ing of grace, in that human merit has been introduced as a condition 
of receiving grace. This, however, does not seem to be Clement's 
thinking. In reality the good that God bestows as a result of proper 
human choice is not all that is included in the conception of grace. 
For what man chooses is to accept God's help and guidance or to reject 
it. It is the help of God, which is wholly unmerited on man's part, 
that leads man into the life of greater and greater goodness. The 
grace that man is urged to choose, then, is not merely the life of 
goodness but the guidance of God leading one to a life of goodness. 
Though it is impossible to arrive at the perfection of good without 
free choice, the achievement of the good does not depend entirely on 
our own purpose: 
"For by grace we are saved: 11 not, indeed, without good 
works; but we must by being formed for what is good acquire 
an inclination for it. And we must possess the healthy 
mind which is fixed on the pursuit of the good; in order 
to which we have the greatest need of divine grace, and 
of right teaching, and of ho~ susceptibility, and of the 
drawing of the Father to Him. 
This seems also to be the import of the following passage: 11Now the 
law is ancient grace given through Moses by the Word. 113 The law was 
ancient grace, but now· we are blessed with 11 the care, and wisdom, and 
power of the Instructor. 114 However, Patrick says that this is the 
1. Ibid., 1; II, 173. 2. Stromata, v, 1; II, 445. 
3. Instructor, i, 1; II, 224. 4.~. 
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grace of revelation rather than grace in the sense employed most fre-
quentq in the New Testament and, because of his emphasis on the self 
determination of man, little place is left for "the action of divine 
grace in the specifically Christian sense of the word. 111 11In spite of 
such sporadic expressions and the occasional use of the word, the func-
tion which grace plays in the teaching of Clement is relative:cy unim-
portant.n2 
As was the case with Irenaeus, mercy, love and grace seem to be 
alternate terms for goodness rather than distinct instances of it. Un-
like some of the expressions of goodness we have noted, these are not 
empirically observable but rather must be inferred from other indica-
tions which are perceptible in experience. They are goodness seen 
from different perspectives, but not distinct forms of it. 
8. Salvation and Eternal Life 
In the concept of salvation all the various expressions of the 
Divine goodness in Clement's thought are seen to merge. It is not 
hard to see how all the modes of goodness described so far play a con-
tributory role in the manifestation of goodness as salvation. Salva-
tion is the unifying principle, which blends all the other forms of 
goodness into one benevolent purpose. 11For this, and nothing but 
this, is His only work--the salvation of man. 113 11It has been God's 
fixed and constant purpose to save the flock of men: for this end the 
1. Clement of Alexandria, p. 146. 2. Ibid., P• 147. 
3. Exhortation to~ Heathen, 9; n, 196. 
good God sent the good Shepherd .nl All things are arranged with this 
end in mind.2 So, the Saviour worketh in many ways to lead man to 
salvation: with signs and wonders in Egypt and the desert, by the 
word of reason given through Moses, by threats and fear, by upbraid-
ing, by showing pity, by cheering with song.3 Salvation is an evi-
dence of Divine goodness, for "it is the prerogative of goodness to 
save. 114 11And how is it possible that He who saves shall not be good?115 
If one seeks to find a clear and unambiguous definition of sal-
vation in Clement, he will be disappointed, for at times salvation 
seems to mean one thing to him and at other times, something else. 
At times it is the realization of the goal of human life, assimilia-
tion to God; at other times it is kn~ledge of God, contemplation of 
God, enjoyment of the "beatific vision"; and at still other times it 
is equated with life in its fullest sense, eternal life in fellowship 
with God. Probably, however, Clement's intention is not so much to 
present us with a number of different meanings of salvation as it is 
to describe the same thing from severai different perspectives. But 
let us turn to some of Clement's interpreters. Tollinton says: 
On humanity's need of a Saviour he speaks with as much 
emphasis as do those who have felt spiritual burdens press 
far more heavily than he had ever done himself. But given 
this need of salvation, in what does it consist? How shall 
man appropriate it for his own? 
Now, there is no one answer to this question. Clement would 
1. ~., 11; II, 204. 2. Stromata, vii, 2; II, 526. 
3. Exhortation to~ Heathen, 1; II, 173. 
4. Instructor, i, 9; II, 230. 5. Stromata, i 1 18; II, 3 21. 
have agreed with the teaching of his great pupil, Origen, that 
the Saviour becomes many things, perhaps even all things, ac-
cording to the needs of the whole creation capable of being re-
deemed by Him. But it is clear that for Clement the main pur-
pose of the Word's Advent was to reveal the mind and purpose of 
the Father. The central thought is that of self-manifestation • 
• • • Still ••• the outcome of the process, after all, is no 
bare intellectualism, but the raising of humanity to the divine 
level. For Clement anticipates all that is taught in the 
Athanasian Hymn on the 11 taking of the manhood into God." 11Yea, 
I say, the Word of God became man, that you may learn from a 
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man how man becomes God. 11 By this heavenly teaching man is made 
divine. The full meaning of silvation, it seems, is nothing less 
than to share the life of God. 
Patrick also points out the ambiguity in Clement 1 s use of the terms 
11Saviour11 and 11salvation. 11 
We nmst not read into the words 11Saviour11 or 11salvation, 11 as 
used by him, the ordinary connotation of the words. For this 
conception of sin determines in large measure the conception 
of salvation. If sin be slavery, salvation is freedom; if sin 
be moral disorder or disease, salvation is moral health; if sin 
be ignorance, salvation is knowledge; if sin be death, salvation 
is life. • •• Of all good things salvation is the greatest. To 
save men is the eternal purpose of God. For this reason the good 
God sent the good Shepherd. The Word unfolded the truth and 
showed to men the height of salvation. The salvation of men is 
His only work. As sin is disease, a moral disease due to igno~ 
ranee, the work of the Saviour is pre-eminentlY that of a physi-
cian, and His medicine is tuition or discipline. Passions are 
diseases of the soul. The Word is the all-healing physician of 
human infirmities and the holy charmer of the sick soul •••• 
As a good physician uses all methods--fomentation, cautery, am-
putation--to heal the bodies of the sick, so the Saviour has a 
voice of many tones and varied methods in the salvation of men. 
His aim is to create true health in the soul. As all are sick 
in respect of passions and evil desires, all need a Saviour. 
• • • The fundamental conception of salvation in Clement is that 
of spiritual health.2 
1. Clement of Alexandria, II, 13-14. 
2. Clement of Alexandria, pp. 121-23. 
Hitchcock says: 
Consequent:cy- he saw that the sunnnum bonum of our humanity 
was not merely deliverance from the actual evil that the 
flesh is heir to; but that it also involves a realization 
of all that God designed that we should become--a self-
realization of self by self in God. 
This, the ideal of our human condition, has been realized 
by one man, who was also God, and is therefore realizable 
by those who have been "regenerated unto Him." It is, in a 
word, 11 the likeness of God," which is attained by following 
Christ. This, according to Clement, is the final end of 
man, what God intended at the beginning that he should be-
come. 
This theory of salvation as a making whole, as a full 
development of our highest powers, as the attainment of 
the perfection ( T~~tLWa-LS ) of body, souli and spirit, 
implies no constraint upon the human will. 
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There is little doubt that knowledge of God and likeness to God 
are very closely related, if not one and the same thing, in the 
thought of Clement and constitute the chief end of man. Since Clement 
speaks so frequently of the lmowledge of God as 11 the life of man, 11 it 
should not be surprising that Clement sometimes speaks as though eter-
nal life is the essence of salvation. "To be ignorant of the Father 
is death, as to know Him is eternal life. 11 2 
Could we, then, suppose anyone proposing to the Gnostic 
whether he would choose the knowledge of God or everlast-
ing salvation; and if these, which are entirely identical, 
were separable, he would without the least hesitation choose 
the knowledge of God.J 
A number of other passages also imply this identity of salvation and 
eternal life. 
The Saviour, who existed before, has in recent days • • • 
appeared as our teacher. The Word, who in the beginning 
1. Clement .2f Alexandria, pp. 193-94. 
2. Stromata, v, 10; II, 459. 3. Ibid., iv, 21; II, 434. 
•• 
bestowed on us life, as Creator when he formed us, taught 
us to live well when He appeared as our teacher; that as 
God He might afterwards conduct us to the life which never 
ends. He did not now for the first time pity us for our 
error; but he pitied us from the first, from the beginning. 
But now, at His appearance, lost as we already were, He 
accomplished our salvation.l 
Enough, metpJUiks, of words, though, impelled by love to 
man, I might have gone on to pour out what I had from God, 
that I might exhort to what is the greatest of blessings--
salvation. For discourses concerning the life which has 
no end, are not readily brought to the end of their dis-
closures.2 
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Indeed, it is the intention of the Word, through His instruction, to 
lead men into the life that never ends) Since it was also the aim of 
His instruction to bring men to salvation, salvation and everlasting 
life must be identical. 
If salvation is regarded as equivalent to immortality, Clement 
no doubt would regard it as a restoration of the state of Adam lost 
as a consequence of human sin. Clement says of Adam, ''What is base 
he readily chose, following his wife, and neglected what is true and 
good; on which account he exchanged his immortal life for a mortal 
life, but not forever."4 But certainly mere immortality is not all 
that Clement means by eternal life, for involved in _it is the knowl-
edge of God and likeness to God. As Osborn says, Clement seems to 
hold that God made man in His image but reserved the likeness as "the 
1. Exhortation to the Heathen, 1; II, 173. 
2. ~., 12; II, 206. 3. Ibid., 1; II, 173. 
4. Stromata, ii, 19; II, 369. 
goal of the process of spiritual perfection. 111 
Our Paedagogus, s~s Clement, having spoken through the 
law and the prophets sketched the outline of true living 
and educated man in Christ. This was part of a general. 
plan. He formed man out of dust, regenerated him with 
water, made him grow with the Spirit, trained him with the 
Word, and directs him to sonship and salvation by holy com-
mandments. The purpose behind all this work is that, by 
his advent, the Logos might mould the earth-born man into 
a holy and heavenly man and so fulfill the divine words, 
"Let us make man in our own image and likeness." These 
words have been fulfilled in Christ alone: The rest of 
humanity has been only in the image and not in the like-
ness of God. 2 
There can be little doubt that salvation represents a higher state 
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than that of the first man before his sin, for all that Clement says 
about God's not making man good by nature but giving him the power of 
choice that he might possess a goodness which was praiseworthy and 
which was in a sense truly his min points in this direction. 
That salvation as eternal life is more than mere everlastingness 
is to be seen in the contrast Clement frequently draws between the 
state of the righteous and the state of the wicked after death. 11 The 
good and godly receive the good reward, inasmuch as they hold goodness 
in high esteem; while on the other hand, the wicked receive their pun-
ishment.n3 11 The soul which has chosen the best life--the life that is 
from God and righteousness--exchanges earth for heaven.n4 
0 the prodigious folly of being ashamed of the Lord 1 He 
offers freedom, you flee into bondage; He bestows salvation, 
1. Philosophy of Clement, p. 89. 2. Ibid. 
3 . Exhortation to the Heathen, 10; II, 197. 
4. Stromata, iv, 26; II, 440. 
you sink down into destruction; He confers everlasting life, 
you wait for punishment, and prefer the fire which the Lord 
11 has prepared for the devil and his angels.nl 
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Quite apart from any comparison, eternal life is filled vd.th the en-
jQy.ment of good things, but seen in contrast with its alternative is 
even more evidently so. 
It is an enterprise of noble daring to take our way to God; 
and the enjoyment of many other good things is 1-li thin the 
reach of the lovers of righteousness, who pursue eternal 
life. • • • Noble and desirable is this inheritance: not 
gold, not silver, not raiment, which the moth assails, and 
things of earth which are assailed by the robber, whose eye 
is dazzled by worldly wealth; but it is the treasure of sal-
vation to which we must hasten, by becoming lovers of the 
Word. • • • Wherefore, the Scripture, as might have been ex-
pected, proclaims good news to those who have believed. 
11 The saints of the Lord shall inherit the glory of God and 
His power. 11 ••• You have, 0 men, the divine promise of 
grace; you have heard, on the other hand, the threatening 
of punishment. • • • The Lord • • • counsels you as a 
father to obey God. 11For if ye hear Me, 11 He says, 11 and 
be willing, ye shall eat the good things of the land: 11 
this is the grace attached to obedience . 11But if ye obey 
Me not, and are unwilling, the sword and f~re shall devour 
you: 11 this is the penalty of disobedience. 
Thus it seems evident that those who consistently choose good in 
their earthly life are assured of a heritage of greater good in the 
life beyond the grave. This is quite obviously an indication of Di-
vine goodness. But what of those whose lot is punishment? 
~n the punishment which God inflicts in the life after death 
Clement would regard as an expression of Divine goodness, for as we 
noted above under the section dealing with judgment Clement tends to 
be a universalist in respect to salvation. It is true that he speaks 
1. Exhortation to the Heathen, 9; II, 195. 
2. Ibid., 10; II, 198. 
146 
often of the punishment and the fire which await the unrighteous in 
the life after death, yet even this is disciplinary and remedial, 
hence for the ultimate good of those who endure it. Fire, for Clement, 
seems to be an inward and spiritual force whose function is "to 
cleanse and discipline, not to destroy. 111 Thus, even in the life 
after death, the Divine punishments, which must be judged temporary 
evils from the standpoint of those who experience them, contribute 
to the completeness of the Divine goodness. There can be no doubt of 
the supremacy of Goodness since He has carried His purpose fully to 
completion in bringing all men to the highest estate, that of assimi-
lation to Himself and enjqyment of the riches of His fellowship. 
9. The Incarnation of the Word 
We have already noted that Clement regards salvation as a mani-
festation of the Divine goodness. "It is the prerogative of goodness 
to save.n2 llAnd how is it possible that He who saves shall not be 
good?113 It natural]y follows that Clement should regard the Incarna-
tion as an expression of God's goodness, for certainty it is the pur-
pose of the Incarnation to bring to fruition man's salvation and high-
est good. Clement says: 
The Saviour, who existed before, has in recent days appeared. 
He, who is in Him that truly is, has appeared: for the Word, 
who "was with God," and by whom all th:ings were created, has 
appeared as our Teacher. The Word, who in the beginning be-
stowed on us life as Creator when He formed us, taught us to 
1. Patrick, Clement of Alexandria, p. 134. 
2. Instructor, i, 9; II, 230. 3. Stromata, i, 18; II, 321. 
live well when He appeared as one Teacher; that as God He 
might afterwards conduct us to life which never ends. He 
did not now for the first time pity us for our error; but 
He pitied us from the first, from the beginning. But now, 
at His appearance, lost as we already were, He accomplished 
our salvation.l 
Earlier in the same work Clement says: 
This Word, then, the Christ, the cause of both our being at 
first (for He was in God) and of our vrell-being, this very 
Word has now appeared as man, He alone being both, both God 
and man--the Author of all blessings to us; by whom we being 
taught to live well, are sent on our way to life eternal.2 
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Clement says that the knowledge of God is life, but he also describes 
God as beyond the reach of human perception or understanding. He can 
be lmown only through 11 divine grace, and by the word ••• that pro-
ceeds from Him."3 Because God in His essence is so remote to human 
understanding 11 1' enseignement du Verbe incarn~ e'tai t • • • ne"cessaire 
au genre humain.n4 
The Incarnation is regarded by Clement, not as an isolated 
event, but as part of and continuation at a higher level of the min-
istry of the Word. Tollinton says: 
With the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel and the Epistle 
to the Hebrews, this later Alexandrine teacher sees the 
Incarnation as an event in a series. What happened at the 
Parousia had occurred before, in a lower degree and in dif-
ferent modes. The purpose of God for humanity has been 
gradually unfolding itself, and reaches a further stage in 
the coming of the Son. The earlier dispensation of the Law, 
the later dispensation of Christianity, are parts of a single 
scheme. Through the Greek, as well as through the Jew, the 
1. Exhortation to the Heathen, 1; II, 173. 
2. Ibid. 3. Stromata, v, 12; II, 464. 
4. J. Cognat, Cl~ent ~'Alexandria, p. 144. 
same Logos who came in the humanity of Jesus had been at 
work. The Word is the "instrument" or organ of God, but 
Salvation is an ancient melody, and long before He became 
incarnate and "took a name," the Word was active for the 
welfare of humanity. So Clement does not hesitate to speak 
of the Incarnation as the greatest evidence of the divine 
Love, or as the "more intimate" revelation of the divine 
Will, in each case mentally classing it with other modes 
of God's beneficence.l 
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Patrick also points out that the Incarnation for Clement is but 
a part of the total ministry of the Word and, like the pre-incarnate 
ministry of the Word is a work of revelation and instruction. 
What was the primary end of the Incarnation? In accordance 
with His pre-incarnate fUnction and ministry, it was essen-
tial~ a work of revelation and tuition. It was a continua-
tion of, and an advance on, that ministry. From the Word 
came the gift of life; from the Word Incarnate came the gift 
of living well. • • • The revelation which He brought was in 
part a revelation of God to man, in part a r evelation through 
a man of his highest self and of the method of realizing it. 
• • • Because the soul of man was too feeble to apprehend 
things as they are, we needed a divine teacher. Accordingly, 
the Saviour was sent down, the ineffable and holy manifesta-
tion of the great Providence. God was inaccessible to the 
senses. Hence the Son is said to be the Father's face, be-
cause by the Incarnation He became accessible to the senses. 
• • • He assumed flesh in order to show what was possible to 
man in the way of obedience to the commandments.2 
"The Incarnation of the Word, in Clement's system," says Hitch-
cock, "was the crown and consummation of creation. 11 3 
Clement himself asserts that it was the intention of the Word 
Incarnate 
to open the eyes of the blind, and unstop the ears of the deaf, 
and to lead the lame or the erring to righteousness, to exhibit 
God to the foolish, to put a stop to corruption, to conquer death, 
to reconcile disobedient children to their father. The instru-
ment of God loves mankind. The Lord pi ties, instructs, exhorts, 
1. Clement of Alexandria, II, 9. 
3. Clement of Alexandria, p. 186. 
2. Clanent of Alexandria, pp. 115-16. 
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admonishes, saves, shields, and of His bounty promises us the 
kingdom of heaven as a reward for learning; and the o~ ad-
vantage He reaps is, that we are saved. For wickedness feeds 
on men's destruction; but truth, like the bee, harming nothing, 
delights only in the salvation of men.l 
Where Clement uses the word truth in contrast to wickedness, one ex-
pects to find the word goodness ; and certainly it would have been ap-
propriate for Clement to use it, since the Word became incarnate in 
order to save and it is 11 the prerogative of goodness to save. 11 
0. Meanings Implied in Criticism of Pagan Dei ties 
From Clement's criticism of the nature and activity of the 
legendary gods of the Greek and Roman religions it is possible to 
infer certain characteristics of the Christian God. 
1. Purity 
Nothing is given greater emphasis by Clement in his Exhortation 
to ~Heathen than his belief that the pagan divinities are unworthy 
of worship. On page after page he recounts the sordid tales of their 
sexual impurity and moral insensitivity, their cruelty and injustice, 
and their limitations in power and self-sufficiency. "And now, then, 
hear the loves of your gods, and the incredible tales of their licen-
tiousness, and their wounds, and their bonds, and their laughings, 
and their fights, and their servitudes too, and their banquets, and 
furthermore, their embraces, and tears, and sufferings, and lewd de-
lights.112 The goddess Demeter was delighted by the sight of a nude 
1. Exhortation to the Heathen, 1; II, 172-73. 
2. ~., 2; II, 180. 
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woman.l Poseidon deflowered a whole troop of damsels.2 But Zeus, 
the father of the gods, was the worst of all. In a fit of passion, 
he had intercourse with his mother, Demeter, and later with his own 
daughter) 
Thou madest Zeus venerable, 0 Hamer; and the nod which 
thou dost ascribe to him is most revered. But show him 
only a woman's girdle, and Zeus is exposed, and his locks 
are dishonoured. In what pitch of licentiousness did that 
Zeus of yours proceed, who spent so many nights in volup-
tuousness with Alcmena? For not even those nine nights 
were long to this insatiable monster. But, on the contrary, 
a whole lifetime were short enough for hi~ lust; that he 
might beget for us the evil-averting god.4 
Hercules, the son of Zeus, "in one night deflowered the fifty daughters 
of Thestius, and thus was at once the debaucher and bridegroom of so 
many virgins. 115 Likewise, the female deities were given to passionate 
adultery: 
Eos, having disgraced herself with Ti thonus, Selene with 
Endymion, Nereis with Aeseus, Thetis with Peleus, Demeter 
with Jason, Persephatta with Adonis. And Aphrodite hav-
ing disgraced herself with Ares, crossed over to Cimyra 
and married Anchises, and laid snares for Phaethon, and 
loved Adonis. She contended with the ox-eyed Juno; and 
the goddesses unrobed for the sake of the apple, and pre-
sented themselves naked beforg the shepherd, that he might 
decide which was the fairest. 
Such beings, Clement says, are not gods but demons, "unclean and 
impure spirits, acknowledged by all to be of an earthly and watery na-
ture, sinking downwards by their own weight, and flitting about graves 
1. ~-, 2· , n, 176-177. 2. Ibid., 2· , II, 180. 
3. ~., 2· , II, 175. 4. Ibid., 2· , II, 180. 
5.~. 6. Ibid., 2· , II, 180. 
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and tombs.n1 Even men can easily be shown "better than these gods, who 
are but demons.n2 In fact, those now called gods were once men, whom 
fable and time raised to divinity.3 
The implication of the biting criticism and scathing ridicule 
which runs for so many pages is that the true God is wholly unlike any 
of these sordid, pitiful beings. He is certainly free from the in-
satiable lusts and immoral deeds, predicated of the pagan gods. Clem-
ent's judgment that man is better than these so-called gods suggests 
that purity must be one aspect of the Divine goodness. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that Clement urges his readers to seek means of 
purification worthy of God, in the form of righteousness and temper-
ance.4 For, as he says, "The pure must ascend to Heaven. • • • Seek 
Him who created thee; thou art a son •••• Acknowledge thy Father. 11 .5 
2. Perfection of Qualities 
A second indication of the urnvorthiness of the pagan gods is 
their limitations and imperfections. The constant struggles among the 
gods indicate that none was really supreme in power or authority. 
Persephatta was abducted by Pluto, and her mother, Demeter, was power-
less to do anything about it.6 Dionysus was torn limb from limb by 
the Titans.? Mars was bound in chains for thirteen months.8 Various 
1. ~., 4; II, 187. 2. Ibid., 3; II, 183. 
3. Ibid., 4; II, 187. 4. Ibid., 1; II, 174. 
5. Ibid., 10; II, 199. 6. Ibid., 2· 
' 
II, 179. 
7. Ibid. 8. Ibid., 2· 
' 
II, 179. 
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gods were wounded by other gods and suffered pain.1 Jupiter, because 
of limited knowledge--ignorance of the fact that his human host had 
killed and cooked his own son--once feasted on human flesh.2 Even 
mutilated or imperfect~ developed beings are said to be worshtpped 
in some places. 11 Is not Zeus the Bald-head worshipped in Argos?113 
Clement can scarce~ conceive how worship of such impotent and imper-
fect beings is possible.4 He says, "There is the case of the Macedo-
nian Philip of Palla, the son of Amyntor, to whom they decreed divine 
worship in Cynosargus, although his collar-bone was broken, and he 
had a lame leg, and had one of his eyes knocked out. 115 But if worship 
of such beings as these is irrational, it is even more foolish to wor-
ship an image. 
The Romans, who ascribed the greatest successes to Fortune, 
and regard her as a very great deity, took her statue to 
the privy, and erected it there, assigning to the goddess 
as a fitting temple--the necessary. But senseless wood 
and stone, and rich gold, care not a whit for either sa-
voury odor, or blood, or smoke, ••• no more do they for 
honour or insult. And those images are more worthless 
than any animal. I am at a loss to conceive how objects 
devoid of sense were deified, and feel compelled to pity 
as miserable wretches those that wandered in the mazes of 
this folly: for if some living creatures have not all 
the senses as worms and caterpillars, and such as even 
from the first appear imperfect, as moles and the shrew-
mouse, which Nicorden says is blind and uncouth; yet are 
they superior to those utterly senseless idols and images. 
For they have some one sense. • • • Images do not possess 
even one sense. • • • But images, being motionless, inert, 
and senseless, are bound, nailed, glued,--are melted, filed, 
1. ~., 2; II, 181. 
3. ~., 2; II, 182. 
S. ~., 4; II, 187. 
2. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., 2-4; II, 174-190. 
sawed, polished, carved. The senseless earth is dishonoured 
by the makers of images.l 
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The clear implication of such criticism is that the Christian 
God is subject to no such limitations and imperfections. In Him then 
is absolute perfection of all qualities. He has no deficiencies at 
all. 
The Parian stone is beautiful, but it is not Poseidon. 
The ivory is beautiful, but it is not yet the Olympian 
Zeus. Matter always needs art to fashion it, but the 
deity needs nothing.2 
Once again, Clement's judgment that even man is better than such impo-
tent, deficient, and deformed deities3 indicates that perfection of 
the Divine qualities may be regarded as a mark of His goodness. 
3. other Expressions 
It is possible to infer other aspects of the Divine goodness, by 
contrasting it with the cruelty of human sacrifice, the trickery, and 
the injustice of the pagan gods described by Clement.4 But, since 
these have been treated already as direct allusions, we shall not list 
them again here. 
D. Meanings Implicit in the Conception of the Hwn.an ~ 
Just as it was possible to infer certain modes of the Divine 
goodness from Clement's criticism of the pagan gods, so other expres-
sions of God's goodness can be inferred from his idea of the human good. 
1. EXhortation to the Heathen, 4; II, 186. 
2. Ibid., 4; II, 188. 3 • Ibid., 3; n, 183 • 
4. ~., 2-4; II, 174-90. 
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But, in order to make the ground of such inference clear, a brief de-
scription of the human good from the standpoint of its characteristics 
and essence is needed. 
1. Nature of the Human Good 
a . Characteristics 
(1) Voluntary.--Human goodness is, first of all voluntary, not 
an innate quality of one ' s nature . 
Neither are we born by nature possessing virtue, nor after 
we are born does it grow naturally, as certain parts of the 
body; since then it would neither be voluntary nor praise 
worthy.l 
Human freedom is necessary for man1s actions to be worthy of praise or 
condemnation,2 for what is done through ignorance or necessity is not 
a matter for judgment.3 Patrick comments: 
In opposition to the natural determinism of Basilides, 
Clement showed that moral freedom was essential to re-
sponsibility. If faith lfere only an advantage of nature, 
as Basilides maintained, there could be no room for praise 
or censure in the case of belief or unbelief, for man 
would be the creature of a natural, if divine, necessity. 4 
Gustave Bardy says: 
Clement commence par definir 1es actes invo1ontaires et 
par montrer qu1 i1s ne sont pas susceptibles de recevoir 
une qualification morale: "Les actes involontaires ne 
sont pas jug~s. Ils sont de deux sortes, suivant qu'ils 
sont cornmis soit par ignorance, soit n~cessit{. Comment 
1 . Stromata, vii, 3; II, 528 . 2. Ibid. , i, 17; II, 319. 
3 . ~., ii, 14; II, 361. 
4. Clement of Alexandria, p. 145. 
pourrait-on condamner ceux qui p chent selon ces modes in-
volontaires?111 
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Likewise, a person who chooses good out of fear or in the hope of re-
ward is not voluntarily or spontaneously good. 
But we desire to learn about the man who is always and in 
all things righteous; who, neither dreading the penalty pro-
ceeding from the law, nor fearing to entertain hatred of 
evil in the case of those who live with him and who prose-
cute the injured, nor dreading danger at the hands of those 
who do wrong, remains righteous. For he who, on account of 
these considerations, abstains from anything wrong, i s not 
voluntarily kind, but is good from fear. Even Epicur~s 
says, that the man who in his estimation was wise, 11would 
not do wrong to any one for the sake of gain; for he could 
not persuade himself that he would escape detection." So 
that, if he knew he would not be detected, he would, accord-
ing to him, do evil. And such are the doctrines of darlmess. 
If, too, one shall abstain from doing wrong from the hope of 
recompense given by God on account of righteous deeds, he is 
not on this supposition spontaneously good. For as fear makes 
that man just, so reward makes this one; or rather, makes him 
appear to be just. 2 
Clement states elsewhere: 
It is impossible for a man to be steadily good except by 
his own choice. For he that is made good by compulsion 
of another is not good; for he is not what he is by his 
own choice. For it is the freedom of each one that makes 
true goodness and reveals real wickedness.3 
Therefore, objects which may be used either for good or ill are not 
to be blamed, but rather responsibility rests with the free spirit 
which so uses them. 
That then which of itself has neither good nor evil, being 
blameless, ought not to be blamed; but that which has the 
1. Cl&nent ~'Alexandria (Paris: / J. Gabalda, Editeur, 1926), p. 83. 
2. Stromata, iv, 22; II, 435-36. 
3. Greek Fragments (Maximus, Sermon 55), 10; II, 581. 
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pm~er of using it well and ill, by reason of i t s possessing 
voluntary choice.l 
Only things "that depend on choice are subjects for judgment. 11 2 
(2) Rational.--The human good is also rational. Indeed, man 
is granted reason in order that he may pursue the good and avoid the 
bad.3 "For there is no good of the very best instruction without the 
exercise of the receptive faculty on the part of the learner. 114 Be-
fore the good can be chosen, it must be rationally understood. Con-
earning Clement's discussion of the benefits of experience resulting 
from man's freedom in the choice of good and evil, Hitchcock comments: 
Neither condition of life is of any benefit to us without 
knowledge. Only virtuous actions done vd th knovTledge--a 
true consideration of the motive,
5
the end, and the ethical 
value of the act--are profitable. 
But the human good is rational also in the sense that it con-
stitutes a consistent whole in harmony with a reasonable pr i nciple. 
Patrick says: 
Nothing is to be done contrary to nature. We must beware of 
all that is unnatural and all that is excessive. Everything 
is to be done in harmony with right reason. Moderation should 
be our aim in everything. vle are not to take away what is 
natural to man but to impose upon it a just measure. The 
life of the Christian ought to be a unity. It should be a 
kind of organized whole of rational actions--that is, an in-
fallible fulfillment of what is taught by the Word. He 
1. Who Is the Rich Man?, 14; n, 595. 2. Stromata, ii, 14; II, 361. 
3. Greek Fragments (Marcarius Chrysocephalus, Oration on Luke 15), 11; 
n, 583. 
4. Stromata, ii, 6; II, 353. 
5. Clement of Alexandria, p. 128. 
ought to live after the image of the Tutor.l 
Let us turn to Clement's own words: 
Everything that is contrary to right reason is sin. • • • 
If then, disobedience in reference to reason is the generat-
ing cause of sin, how shall we escape the conclusion, that 
obedience to reason--the Word--which we call faith, will of 
necessity be the efficacious cause of duty? For virtue it-
self is a state of the soul rendered harmonious by reason 
in respect to the whole life. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
The life of Christians, in 'Which we are now trained is a 
system of reasonable actions--that is, of things taught by 
the Word--an unfailing energy vThich we have called faith. 
The system is the commandments of the Lord, which, being 
divine statutes and spiritual counsels, have been written 
for ourselves, being adapted for ourselves and our neighbors.2 
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(3) Sought for its ~ sake.--True goodness does not consist in 
abstinence from evil because of fear of punishment, nor in the doing 
of good with a hope of recompense.3 Goodness is genuine only when it 
is sought for its own sake, because it alone is regarded as excellent, 
and not because of any advantage in what pertains to the seeker.4 A 
man is truly good when he does good because he thinks it right to do 
good, "so as to pass life after the image and likeness of the Lord. 115 
But, let Clement speak for himself: 
The man of understanding and perspicacity is, then, a 
Gnostic. And his business is not abstinence from what is 
evil (for this is a step to the highest perfection), or 
the doing of good out of fear. • • • Nor any more is he 
to do so from hope of promised recompense •••• But only 
the doing of good out of love, and for the sake of its own 
1. Clement of Alexandria, p. 12. 
2. Instructor, i, 13; II, 235. 
4. Ibid., iv, 22; n, 434. 
3. Stromata, iv, 6; II, 414. 
s. Ibid. 
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excellence, is to be the Gnostic's choice •••• For, ••• 
to desire knowledge about God for any practical purpose, 
that this may be done, or that may not be done, is not 
proper to the Gnostic, but the knowledge itself suffices 
as the reason for contemplation •••• Could we, then, sup-
pose any one proposing to the Gnostic whether he would choose 
the knowledge of God or everlasting salvation, and if these, 
which are entirely identical, were separable, he would with-
out the least hesitation choose the knowledge of God, deeming 
that property of faith, which from love ascends to knowledge, 
desirab.Le, for its mm sake. This, then, is the perfect man's 
first form of doing good, when it is done not for any advantage 
in 1-1hat pertains to him, but because he judges it right to do 
good; and the energy being vigorous]y excited in all things, 
in the very act becomes good; not, good in some things, and 
not good in others; but consisting in the habit of doing 
good, neither for glory, nor, as the philosophers say, for 
reputation, nor from reward either from men or God; but so 
as to pass life after the image and likeness of the Lord.l 
(4) Derivative and learned.--Not only do all good things come 
from God but even that quality of life knmm as goodness must be learned 
from God. 11For it is not by nature, but by learning, that people be-
come noble and good, as people also become physicians and pilots. 112 
Indeed, the soul has become too enfeebled to apprehend realities with-
out the aid of a divine teacher.3 Consequently, it is on~ with the 
aid of God himself that man can form a conception of God.4 Man's only 
wisdom is 11 the God-taught wisdom we possess; on which depend all the 
sources of wisdom, which make conjectures at the truth.u5 And so the 
Christian life is fittingly 11 a system of reasonable actions--that is, 
of those things taught by the Word. 11 6 Patrick lists some of the ways 
1. Stromata, iv, 22; II, 434. 
3. ~., v, 1; n, 446. 
5. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., i, 6; rr, 307. 
4. Ibid., vi, 18; n, 519. 
6. Instructor, i, 13; rr, 235. 
in 1ihich human goodness and virtue depend upon the agency of God. 
God-given rdsdom, which is a power of the Father, stimu-
lates the will. In a general1~ay, too, no progress in 
virtue or knowledge is possible apart from the assistance 
of God. Because we wander in the darkness of the world, 
we need a guide who does not stumble or go astray • ••• 
The thoughts of virtuous men derive their origin from the 
inspiration of God, from the contact of the divine will 
with the souls of men. Apart from the Saviour the film 
of ignorance cannot be removed that man might thus gain 
true knowledge of himself or of God. l 
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"The goodness of man, though distinct from that of God, is only good, 11 
says Osborn, ••as it participates in the ultimate goodness of God. u2 
(5) Spiritual. --The good man is not primarily concerned with 
the tangible and perishable, but vd th the spiritual. His aim is to 
lay up treasures in heaven.J For, while some things must be regarded 
as evil because they are harmful to the body, 11 care for the body is 
exercised for the sake of the sou1. 114 11It is not, then, the aspect 
of outward man, but the soul that is to be decorated with the orna-
ment of goodness . 115 Only in the soul are beauty and deformity truly 
shown. 6 The things which are really good are those which concern the 
soul rather than the body. ? Goodness, then, is a quality of the 
spiritual rather than the material nature of man. But it is spiritual 
also in the sense that it is perceived by the mind rather than any of 
1. Clement of Alexandria, pp . 146-47 . 
2. Philosophy~ Clement, p. 109. 
4. Stromata, iv, 5; II, 413. 
6 . Ibid. , ii, l3; rr, 268 . 
3. Instructor, iii, 6; II, 280. 
s. Instructor, iii, 2; n, 272. 
7. Stromata, vii, 7; n, 535. 
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the physical senses.l 
(6) Dependent ~ ~ material medium.--While the good itself is 
spiritual, it is dependent upon a material medium. But Clement does 
not seem to use material in the modern sense of an objective stuff 
from which all things are made but rather more nearly in the Aris-
totelian sense. Things acquire their nature as good or evil from 
their relation to something more fundamental. Here are Clement's own 
words: 11But without things intermediate which hold the place of 
material, neither good nor bad actions are constituted, such I mean 
as life, and health, and other things or circumstantials. 11 2 
(7) Positive and inclusive of the total life.--For a man to be 
good, it is not enough merely to abstain from evil; goodness is some-
thing positive. 
For the defence of his panoply alone, and abstinence from 
sins, are not suff icient for perfection, unless he assume 
in addition the work of righteousness--activity in doing 
good.3 
Goodness also includes the whole of one's life. It is not enough 
merely to correct one 1 s behavior, for 11 those whose speech is evil are 
no better than those whose practice is evi1.n4 The entire life, out-
ward and inward, word and deed, must be in conformity with what is 
good. 
Such is then our position who are the attendants of Christ. 
11As are men's wishes so are their words; 
1. ~., v, 3; n, 448. 
3. Ibid., vi, 12; 1[, 504. 
2. Stromata, iv, 6; n, 416. 
4. ~., i, 1o; rr, 310. 
As are their words, so are their deeds; 
And as their works, such is their life. 11 
Good is the whole life of those who have known Christ.l 
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(8) Passionless.--Clement displays a similarit,r to Stocism when 
he describes the truly good man as absent of all desire and passion. 
Although all things created for our use are good, such as marriage and 
procreation, when used in moderation, "it is better than good to be-
come free of passion, and virtuous by assimilation to the Divine.n2 
The Gnostic is ••• subject o~ to the affections that 
exist for the maintenance of the body, such as hunger, thirst, 
and the like •••• ,LThe Savio!:? was entirely impassible; in-
accessible to any movement of feeling--either pleasure or pain. 
While the apostles, having most gnostical~ mastered, through 
the Lord's teaching, anger, and fear and lust, were not liable 
even to such of the movements of feeling, as seem good, courage, 
zeal, joy, desire, through a steady condition of the mind, not 
changing a whit •••• 
And should it be granted that the affections specified above, 
when produced rationally, are good, yet they are nevertheless 
inadmissable in the case of the perfect man, who is incapable 
of exercising courage: for neither does he meet what inspires 
fear, as he regards none of the things that occur in his life 
as to be dreaded; nor can aught dislodge him from this--the 
love he has toward God. • •• Nor is he angry, for there is 
nothing to move him to anger, seeing he ever loves God, and 
is entirely turned toward Him alone, and therefore hates none 
of God's creatures. No more does he envy; for nothing is 
wanting to him. • • • 
So that on these accounts he is compelled to become like 
his Teacher in impassibilit,r •••• 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
But the Gnostic does not share either in those affections that 
are commonly celebrated as good, that is, the good things of the 
affections which are allied to the passions: such, I mean, as 
gladness, which is allied to pleasure; and dejection, for this 
is conjoined with pain; and caution, for it is subject to fear.3 
Clement's meaning seems clear enough, but the state of being described 
1. Exhortation to the Heathen, 12; II, 2o6. 
2. Stromata, iv, 23; II, 436. 3. Ibid., vi, 9; II, 496-97. 
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is not one kmwn to experience. Probably this is an overstatement of 
the truth that a really good man is undisturbed by the vicissitudes and 
changing circumstances of life, but remains in steady devotion to good 
and to God. Tollinton explains Clement's notion of apathy: 
The process of purification leads at last to a state of entire 
"Apathy." Of this inward condition Clexoont has much to say. 
It is one of his dominant ideas in the moral domain. His 
fondness for the conception has laid him open to much criti-
cism. Perhaps it is peculiarly difficult for western minds, 
under modern conditions, to be fair or patient in their esti-
mate of this principle. Clement held that, in proportion as 
the soul attained to purity, it f:Cquired independence of the 
passions and affections. For tr~8os meant all liability to 
external influence, all risk of a man's true self, which to 
the Greek was his reason, being overpowered by the solicita-
tions that came to him chiefly, though not exclusively, through 
the channels of sense. To arrive at so pure and so calm a state 
that all these influences found no interior response, was the 
final and conclusive freedom of the spirit, the absolute liberty 
essential for perfect contemplation. This ideal is, of course, 
as well a gradual process: it is indeed another aspect of 
purification and discipline. Human nature is to strip off the 
appetites of the flesh, and the soul to be gradually separated 
from the body. The moderate and regulated condition of the 
desires gives way at length to a state in which the desires are 
not so much regulated as non-existent. Neither courage, nor 
grief, nor anger, nor jealousy, nor any sort of passion, re-
main; even ordinary affection must go with the rest.l 
b. Essence 
(1) Some negations .--Few things could be more certain than the 
fact that pleasure does not consti. tute the highest human good for Clem-
ent. Again and again he reminds his readers that "to regard pleasure 
as a good thing, is the sign of utter ignorance of What is excel-
lent."2 This bold repudiation of pleasure leads him quite naturally to 
1. Clement of Alexandria, II, 86-87. 
2. Instructor, iii, 7; II, 280. 
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affirm that the end of life is not food and drink,l nor wealth,2 nor 
luxury,3 nor adornment.4 Also, excessive sleeping is not a mark of 
the good man, in whom the "sleepless Word11 dwells.5 Frivolity and 
ludicrous behaviour are to be prohibited, with only moderate pleas-
antry allowed.6 Absolutely forbidden are filthy speaking and listen-
ing to dirty conversation.? 
(2) Good deeds.--Since human goodness is positive and inclusive 
of the total life, the essence of the human good will include, not 
only virtue, but also the doing of good.8 Mere abstinence from wrong-
doing is not sufficient for true goodness; one must also become active 
in doing good.9 The tru~ good man, recognizing that God showers good 
things upon all, in order that he may be like his heavenly Father, 
will in like fashion bestow good things, so far as he is able, upon 
his fellows and seek to do good to all men.lO Thus, he works benefi-
cence because, in becoming like unto God, he has become a fit "instru-
ment of the goodness of God.ull 
(3) Knowledge of God.--Nothing is of greater importance to the 
1. ~., ii, 1; rr, 237. 2. ~., ii, 3; JI, 248. 
3. ~., ii, 3; n, 246-48. 4. Ibid., iii, 3; JI, 275-276. 
5. Ibid., ii , 9; JI, 258-259. 6. Ibid., ii, 5; li, 249. 
7. Ibid., ii, 6; n, 250. 8. Stromata, vi, 12; rr, 5o2. 
9. ~., vi, 12; rr, 504. 10. Ibid., ii, 18; Ir, 368-369. 
11. ~., vii, 13; JI, 547. 
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Gnostic, or perfect man, than knowledge,l and knowledge of God is not 
only the highest form of knowledge, but also the ultimate human good. 
In fact, man was made principally for this end. 2 Just as animals are 
put to doing the work for which they are best suited, so man is in-
vited to that for which he was created--knowledge of God.3 Knowledge 
of God is, therefore, to be preferred to everything else.4 Knowledge 
of God is important to man because it is the sustenance of life and 
the means to fuller life. 
For this is the immutable and immovable source and support 
of life, the knowledge of God, who really is, and who be-
stows the things which really are, that is, those which are 
eternal, from whom both being and the continuance of it are 
derived to other beings. For ignorance of Him is death; but 
the knowledge and appropristion of Him, and love and likeness 
to Him, are the only life.-' 
To be ignorant of the Father is death, as to know Him is 
eternal life, through participation in the power of the in-
corrupt One. And to be incorruptible is to participate in 
divinity but revolt from the knowledge of God brings cor-
ruption.6 
But, though knowledge of God and life are inseparably tied together so 
that one cannot know God 1iithout becoming more truly alive, knowledge 
of God is so supremely desirable that it should be sought for its own 
sake, not as the means to anything else. Indeed, if it came to a 
choice between knowledge of God and salvation, or eternal life, one 
1. ~., vi, 10; rr, 498. 2. Ibid., vi, 8; rr, 495. 
3. Exhortation to ~ Heathen, 10; [, 200. 
4. ~., 1o; n, 201. 5. Who Is the Rich Man?, 7; IT, 593. 
6. Stromata, v, 10; II:, 459. 
should without hesitation choose knowledge of God. 
For I will dare aver that it is not because he wishes to be 
saved that he, who devotes himself to knowledge for the sake 
of the divine science itself, chooses knowledge •••• Could 
we, then, suppose anyone proposing to the Gnostic whether he 
would choose the knowledge of God or everlasting salvation; 
and if these, which are entirely identical, were separable, 
he would without the least hesitation choose the knowledge 
of God, deeming that property of faith, which from love 
ascends to knowledge, desirable, for its own sake.1 
Tollinton interprets this passage in the same way as have we. 
Much as he says about Love and Beneficence and Salvation and 
Purity, these are not the ultimate criteria of attainment: 
they are the conditions of Vision or, as in the case of Love, 
they pass into it and are valid, if the question is pressed 
home, for their relation to it. The end, he says, i s Con-
templation. • • • Obedience i s good, Beneficience is good, 
but Contemplation stands first. The knm-rledge of God and 
final salvation are so inseparably connected as to be in 
fact identical. But if their severance were possible, and 
the Gnostic were offered his choice between the two, it is 
on the knowledge of God that, vdthout a moment's hesitation, 
his choice would fall.2 
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Intertvrlned with and indispensable to the acquisition of knm1l-
edge is faith. Faith and knovTledge are so inter-related that there 
is no knowledge without faith, nor faith without knowledge.3 As Hitch-
cock says, "Clement shows that the lmowledge of God can only be at-
tained through faith. n4 Similarly, J. Cognat says that 11la foi, loin 
d'~tre contraire '8. la science, lui est d'un indispensable secours.n5 
Faith appears first in the form of trust in axiomatic or self-evident 
1. ~., iv, 22; n, 434. 
2. Clement of Alexandria, II, 97-98. 
3. Stromata, ii, 4; TI, 350. 4. Clement of Alexandria, p. 150. 
5. Cl~ment ~'Alexandrie, p. 152. 
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principles upon which all demonstration must depend.l In this sense 
faith is the pre-requisite of all knowledge . Faith also enables one 
to determine the difference between true and false values.2 As E. F. 
Osborn says, it is a criterion by which the truth claims of that pur-
porting to be knowledge are tested.3 Faith therefore both precedes 
and follavs lmowledge . At times faith appears as what is necessary 
to fill the gap when logical investigation is impossible .4 Indeed, 
the meanings of faith for Clement are many and varied, as shown by 
Osborn's listing of faith as trust in an indemonstrable first prin-
ciple, as an acceptance of such first principle as coming from God, 
as a criterion of knowledge, as a preconception which gives meaning 
to various term~ as obedience to God 1 s commands and the instruction 
of Scripture, as an assent of the mind, and as an alternative when 
logical means of inquiry fail .5 Faith and knowledge, then, are re-
ciprocally related . Faith is the foundation of knowledge, 6 and by 
knowledge faith is perfected. 7 
Wilhelm Wagner writes of the distinction Clement draws between 
the ordinary believer and the Christian gnostic . 
Von besonderem Interesse ist fUr uns hier der Stufenun-
terschied, welchen Clemens zwischen dem G~ubigen und dem 
1. Stromata, viii, 3; Ir, 559 . 
3 . Clement of Alexandria, p . 135. 
5. Clement of Alexandria, pp . 139-40. 
6. Stromata, ii, 4; TI, 349-50. 
1. Ibid. , vi, 18,; n, 519. 
2. Ibid. , u, 4,; n, 35o. 
4. Stromata, v, 1,; Ir, 445 . 
Gnostiker macht. Die Gl~ubigen sind die christliche Menge, 
die Gnostiker sind die Elitechristen. Jene sind Chtisten 
zweiten, diese sind Christen ersten Ranges. Die Glaubigen 
sind Knechte Gottes, die Gnostiker sind Gottes Freunde und 
Sghne.l 
However, as Tollinton indicates, it is not Clement's intention to 
draw a line of separation between faith and knowledge, as though 
Christians could be classified by their having one or the other. 
The "common faith" is never invalidated, never abandoned. 
It remains the foundation, the basis, the preparation for 
all later and nobler spiritual erections. Without it, the 
higher gifts could not come to us. It is necessary, as the 
air we breathe; assimilated, like the milk of our childhood, 
into the more settled and developed nature. Nothing is 
further from Clement's mind than to sever Faith from Knowl-
edge. It finds its completion and perfection by growing up 
into surer vision, only lost, as childhood is lost, in ma-
turity. For there is continuity in the spiritual life. 
Faith itself becomes of a higher quality as the soul as-
cends.2 
Just as faith may mean different things, so also may knowledge. 
Of knowledge in general, he says there are two types. One is that 
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which appears to all men, in which not onlY the rational but irrational 
powers play a part, in the apprehension of objects through sensation. 
This, he says, should not be called knowledge. True knowledge bears 
the impress of judgment and reason.3 But the meaning of knowledge 
most distinctive to Clement is different from either of these--it is 
knowledge as 11gnosis. 11 Such knowledge certainly is not identical with 
the intellectual apprehension of certain facts about God--or even all 
1. Der Christ und die Welt nach Clemens von Alexandrien (Ggttingen: 
Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1903), p. 2~ 
2. Clement of Alexandria, II, 77. 
3. Stromata, vi, 1; II, 480. 
168 
the facts about God--, nar is it the same at all as ordinary cogni-
tion. His use of the term is more in the Johannine sense. Knowledge 
becomes more completely experiential. Knowledge of God becomes the 
experiential awareness, enjoyment, and possession of a living rela-
tionship. It is a kind of cognition that is acquired by conscious 
involvement in the activity of God. It is life- sustaining and life-
fulfilling, not only because it includes receiving good things from 
the hand of God, but also because it means entering more deeply into 
the plans and purposes of God and, by aligning oneself with them, com-
ing into the possession of even greater good. 
Osborn agrees that knowledge means more to Clement than mere 
intellectual cognition. 
For Clement knowledge means two things. It is a thing of 
the intellect and a thing of the spirit. Knowledge finds 
truth by logical procedure and classifies things and con-
cepts by reference to a system of thought. It begins with 
a faith which must inquire and it ascends to the knowledge 
of God. On the other hand knowledge is a life of the spirit 
and a growth in virtue. It begins with a faith which is 
God's power to salvation and goes on to a perfection in the 
contemplation of God. These two kinds of knowledge start, 
continue and finish together. They begin with faith and 
end in the vision of God. Their practices--logical inquiry 
and Christian piety--are interdependent ways of doing the 
same thing.l 
In substance, Hitchcock expresses the same view. 
Nor is Clement's gnosis a mere intellectual doctrine, 
but it is a "divine science" which by reason of faith must 
express itself in the life. 
"Thus knowing and living here become one. n 
then, is that spiritual wisdom which springs 
insight into the Bein2 of God, and manifests 
ituality of the life. 
True gnosis, 
from a spiritual 
itself in spir-
1. Philosophy of Clement, p . 146. 2. Clement of Alexandria, p. 153. 
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Of course, it may be apparent to the reader that there is a dif-
ficulty between Clement 1 s thought that God is above and beyond all hu-
man categories and powers of understanding and description, and the 
idea that knowledge of God is the essence of the chief human good. It 
is true that God cannot be known in His essence. But while God cannot 
be known as He is, some experiential knowledge of Him is derivable 
from His actions relative to the world and to mankind. That Clement 
himself recognized the difficulty is apparent in his statements that 
knowledge of God requires the help of God's grace . 
(4) Likeness ~ God.--From a different perspective, the highest 
human good is seen also as likeness to God. Bardy remarks that 
Clement estime que 1 1 homme est fait pour ressembler ~ 
Dieu: 11 Pour nous, nous devons arriver 'a une fin infinie, 
en ob6issant aux commandements, c'est ~dire~ Dieu en 
vivant sans reproche et sans i gnorance selon ces com-
mandements, par la connaissance de la volonti divine. 
La ressemblance avec Dieu selon la droite raison et dans 
1a mesure du possible, telle est notre fin.ul 
11 The good man, 11 Clement says, 11 is godlike in form and semblance as re-
spects his soul. 11 2 This is certainly true of the Gnostic, or perfect 
man, 11who imitates God as far as possible, deficient in none of the 
things which contribute to the likeness as far as compatible.n3 But 
the idea comes out most clearly, when, in a long passage in which he 
discusses the views of various philosophers as to what constitutes the 
chief good, he quotes with approval Plato's view that the chief good 
1. Cl~ment ~'Alexandrie, pp. 40-41. 
2. Stromata, vi, 9;II, 497. 3. Ibid., ii, 19; II, 369. 
is found in likeness to God. Patrick says: 
The question as to 11 man1 s chief end11 is dealt with at 
some length by Clement. He details the opinions of the 
representative schools of philosophy, for the most part 
without criticism or comment, though he promises to give 
a refutation of some of these in due time. But both by 
direct approval and by specific appropriation of the words, 
he accepts the Platonic conception of the end as assimilation 
to God.l 
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Clement goes on to say that Plato inherited his view from the Scrip-
ture,2 and finally concludes the discussion by showing that Plato's 
view is virtually the same as that of Paul. Speaking in reference 
to Paul, he says, 
Assimilation to God, then, so that as far as possible a 
man becomes righteOus and ~o1y with Wi"Sd''m-;-he lays dow 
as-the aim of faith, ana-t e endlte be that restitution 
of the promise which is effected by faith . From these 
doctrines gush the fountains, which we specified above, 
of those who have dogmatized about the end. n3 
Clement makes the idea his own when he says, 11 It is better than good 
to become free of passion, and virtuous by assimilation to the divine. 11 4 
Tollinton points out that Clement frequently defines the likeness of 
man to God in terms of apathy ar passionl essness. 
It is worth noting how frequently this likeness of man to 
God is mentioned in connection with 11Apathy. 11 The two can 
hardly be said to have been identical, for resemblance to 
the divine nature must have involved much else--elements 
of a more positive character, and a fuller measure of the 
abundant life. But of these it was not easy to speak in 
human language . They belonged to the domain that lies 
beyond the range of eye and ear and understanding. Hence, 
in default of any detailed account of the soul ' s ultimate 
estate, this somewhat negative 11Apathy11 remains as a 
1 . Clement of Alexandria, p . 149. 
3 . ~., ii, 22; D: , 377. 
2. Stromata, ii, 22; II, 376. 
4. Ibid . , i v, 23; rr, 436 . 
principal feature in his sketch of spiritual attainment. 
To possess it is so far to resemble God.l 
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As we noted above in discussing the human good as sought for its 
own sake, Clement regards only that which is sought for the sake of its 
own excellence, not for the sake of any advantage or reward, as truly 
good. That he may live in the image and likeness of God should be a 
man's highest motivation.2 
Osborn points out that, unlike Irenaeus, who thought that the 
likeness of God had been an original human characteristic but had 
been lost through human sin and could be restored only through the 
perfecting of man through assimilation to the Logos who had taken 
on human nature to accomplish that end, Clement believed that man 
had been created only in the image of God and that likeness to God 
was the goal of the process of spiritual perfection.3 Then he goes 
on to describe Clement's concept of assimilation in greater detail. 
• , t " -1 I t / I 
0J.LOLWH5, i£oJLOL.W<fl..S11 11\1<0}.. ou 9L~, OLKE. LIIJ a-"LS1 JA.>L.tul\ f'LS describe a life of increasing likeness, obedience, and prox-
imity to God, a life which possesses certain moral and spir-
itual qualities--justice, holiness, wisdom, kindness, love of 
man, and a grand service of God. The virtues which contri-
bute to the likeness are elsewhere listed as continuence, 
patience, righteousness, control of passions, liberality, 
and beneficence. Great importance is given to passionless-
ness, for God is passionless. Purit.y and holiness lead to 
the holy vision of God. We must remove all passions, yet 
in our assimilation to intellectual things, still maintain 
wonder and reverence for creation and Creator. Forgiveness 
sevent.y times seven and forgetfulness of evil make us like 
1. Clement of Alexandria, II, 91. 
2. Stromata, iv, 22; II, 434. 3. Philosophy of Clement, pp. 88-89 . 
the God who makes his sun shine on the just and the unjust. 
SimpJ.icity of life rThich has fevr needs makes us like the God 
who needs nothing. Love which is linked with passionlessness 
brings us to perfect manhood.l 
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In regard to the degree that man can become like God, Clement 
is somewhat inconsistent. Patrick presents the view that likeness to 
God is only partial. 
But this likeness has its limitations. We are called upon 
by the Scripture to strive to know God as far as possible. 
It is impossible and impracticable for any one to become 
perfect as God is perfect, for that were to imply that the 
virtue of man and God is the same. All that is demanded 
is that living according to the obedience of the Gospel, 
we should be irreproachably perfect. Moreover, by assimila-
tion to God is meant assimilation to God the Saviour and 
that only as far as possible from human nature. For to this, 
too, there is a limit. 11 It is sufficient if we be as the 
!1aster, not in respect of essence, for it is impossible that 
that which is by adoption should be e~ual in point of sub-
sistence to that which is by nature." 
Tollinton, on the other hand, points out that in his enthusiasm for 
the idea of man's assimilation to God Clement occasionally implies an 
actual identity with God rather than a simple likeness and even as-
serts the deification of the gnostic or perfect man. 
And then, in J.anguage which sounds strange to our ears, he 
passes even beyond this conception of resemblance. This 
higher way of the soul leads to more than similarity. It 
issues at last in an actual identity with God, a state in 
which man can be described as being God. That man was to 
be equal with the angels, or that God was to make His shrine 
within human nature, or that there vras an ancient and inborn 
affinity in man with heaven, are claims made frequently by 
Religion and Philosophy alike. Clement, like other Greek 
Fathers , goes beyond them; he says it is possible for the 
Gnostic to become God, and to walk about a god in human 
flesh. He appeals in support to language used by Heraclitus 
and by Plato and to the Psalmist's words , used also by the 
1. Ibid., p . 92. 2. Clement of Alexandria, p . 149. 
Lord, 11 I said ye are gods ." How far the deification of 
the Emperors, or the conviction of thoughtful minds that 
many of the gods of Olympus had originally been men, con-
tributed to make such a conception possible, it is hard 
to say. It was genera~ly allowed in the Greek Church; it 
was to be found even in Western writers, and survived, 
Harnack tells us, till Saint Augustine brought it to an 
end. Some reduction in our conception of the g odhead is 
certainly involved in such phraseology. Clement, after 
his manner , finds no difficulty in asserting elsewhere 
that there is no identity between divine and human virtue. 
It is hard to say exactly how much he intended by this 
&f:.o7(oL~a"l- S • It is not his own invention. Here, as 
o1'ten, he is using one of the conceptions current in his 
world. In other respects his supreme Deity is not too 
near, but rather too remote, from human life. The bold-
ness of his claim, however startling to western ears, im-
plies no real irreverence. He follows the progress of the 
spirit along the higher way, and if faith and hope carry him 
somewhat further than we can accompany him, we should rather 
envy his optimism than criticise his terms.l 
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Likeness to God is not another and distinct element from knowl-
edge of God, in the essence of the human good. Rather it is but 
another perspective from which the essence of the human good is 
viewed. With this Patrick agrees.2 "Knowledge of God" and "likeness 
to God11 refer to the same thing, for likeness to God is the end of 
the knowledge of God,3 and knowledge of God is the means by which the 
end is reached. 
c. Principle of Life 
As vdth Irenaeus, so with Clement also, good is the principle of 
life and evil is the principle of death. One indication of the 1-1edding 
1. Clement of Alexandria, II, 91-92. 
2. Clement of Alexandria, p . 149. 3. ~-
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of goodness and life in the thought of Clement is found in the Scrip-
ture he quotes. 
ncome, ye children, n says the Lord. ttWho is the man that 
desireth life, that loveth to see good days?" ••• 11 Stop 
thy tongue from evil, and thy lips from speaking guile. 
Depart from evil, and do good, 11 ••• 11The eyes of the Lord 
are on the righteous and His ears are to their prayer. But 
the face of the Lord is against those that do evil, to root 
out their memory from the earth •••• nl 
But there are myriads of injunctions to be found, whose 
aim is the attainment of what is good, and the avoidance 
of what is evil. • • • And by Ezekiel, the life supplies 
commandments: 11The soul that sinneth shall die • • • 
This is a righteous man. He shall surely live, sai th the 
Lord. 11 The words contain a description of the conduct of 
Christians, a notable exhortation to the blessed life, 
which is the reward of a life of goodness.;.-everlasting 
life.2 
Further, the Barbarian philosophy recognizes good as 
alone excellent, and virtue as sufficient for happiness, 
when it says, 11 Behold, I have set before your eyes good 
and evil, life and death, that ye may choose life. 11 For 
it calls good, 11 life, 11 and the choice of it is excellent, 
and the choice of the opposite 11evil.u3 
But the idea is brought out again when Clement asserts that knowledge 
of God, which, as we have already seen, he regards as the ultimate 
good,4 is life and i gnorance of Him is death. 
Wherefore the greatest and chiefest point of the instruc-
tions which relate to life must be implanted in the soul 
from the beginning--to know the eternal God, the giver of 
what is eternal, and by knowledge and comprehension to pos-
sess God, who is first, and highest, and one, and good. 
For this is the immutable and immovable source and support 
of life, the knowledge of God, who really is, and who bestows 
1. stromata, i v, 17; II, 429. 2. Instructor, i, 10; II, 233. 
3. Stromata, v, 14; II, 467. 
4. Above, p. 16h. 
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the things which really are, that is, those which are eter-
nal, from whom both being and the continuance of it are de-
rived to other beings. For ignorance of Him is death; but 
the knowledge and appropriation of Him, and love and like-
ness to Him, are the only life.l 
For he who has not the knowledge of good is wicked: for 
there is one good, the Father; and to be ignorant of the 
Father is death, as to know Him is eternal life, through 
participation in the pmver of the incorrupt One. 2 
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Tollinton draws the same conclusion from Clement's conception of the 
chief human good, the knowledge of God. 
Indeed, if we are to gain life, the chiefest and greatest 
of all lessons to be implanted in the soul is the knowledge 
of the one good and eternal God. This is our first principle, 
beyond controversy, beyond attack. I gnorance of God is 
death. The knowledge of Him, the love of Him, assimilation 
and full resemblance to Him, is the only life.3 
Osborn refers to Clement's view that knmrledge of God is life while 
ignorance of Him is death and his acceptance of the Scriptural posi-
tion that sin is eternal death f or the soul as 11 a kind of conditional 
imm.ortality.n4 Elselvhere he says that while Clement never explicitly 
teaches annihilation, "he could not consistently reject it, for some-
thing of the kind would be involved, if his scheme were set out as a 
complete theory.u5 
Certainly the knowledge of God to which Clement refers is not 
mere intellectual cognition. He uses the term knowledge in the same 
sense as the author of the Fourth Gospel, to indicate a living 
1. ~ Is the Rich Man?, ?;II, 593. 
2. Stromata, v, lO;II, 459. 3. Clement of Alexandria, I, 309. 
4 . Philosophy of Clement, p. 79. 
5. Ibid., p . 250. 
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experience of and with. Thus, to know God is to recognize and experi-
ence the many expressions of His goodness. 
Finally, we can refer again to the bestowal of salvation, or 
everlasting life, on man as the consequence of his choice of the good 
life as a clear indication that goodness is the principle of human 
existence. 
2. Ideas of Divine Goodness Implied in the Human Good 
From the description of human goodness set forth above it is 
possible to infer several meanings of Divine goodness which are co~ 
sistent with Clement's thought and which he may have had for his own. 
a. Ground of Existence 
From the fact that good is the principle of existence, it natu-
rally follows that God, the source of all good, must be the Ground of 
existence. As Patrick says, "The universe, according to Clement, owes 
its continual subsistence as well as its origin to God. He is as es-
sential to the continuance of the universe as He was to its creation.nl 
Of course, this conception of God1s goodness was fairly explicit in 
the expression of the Divine goodness in creation. That the impart-
ing of existence is a clear sign of God 1s goodness is shown as Clement 
tells us, anticipating St. Augustine as he does so, that as a conse-
quence of His goodness God conferred "on them at the beginning this 
first boon, that of existence. For that to be is far better than not 
to be, will be admitted by everyone.1112 
1. Clement of Alexandria, p. 15. 2. Stromata, vi, 17; II, 516. 
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God ' s goodness, therefore, consists in His being the Groud of exist-
ence. 
b. Governing of the World in Accord lvith Human Well-being 
Closely related to the above conception is the idea that God's 
goodness consists in His regular government of the world according to 
fixed laws in accord with human need and with the moral principles He 
has inspired for human direction. This is implicit in the fact that 
good is the principle of life and human good is identified with knowl-
edge of God . If the good is that which sustains and promotes life and 
if knowledge of God is good in this sense, it must be because the 
knowledge itself concerns God ' s manner of working in and administer-
ing the world. If God ' s manner of working in the world is to be the 
object of knowledge, it must be regular and uniform. And if knowledge 
of God in this sense is to be humanly helpful, it must be because God ' s 
manner of working is in accord with human need. 
c. Source of Value Distinctions and Teacher of Virtue 
From the fact that human goodness may be described as voluntary, 
derivative and learned, and in essence may be called 11 knowledge of 
God, 11 it naturally follows that God is the teacher of virtue. It is, 
therefore, a clear indication of God ' s goodness that through the Word 
He imparts to man the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong, 
between higher and lower values, and that through the Law, the prophets, 
and the incarnate Instructor, He teaches men to lead virtuous lives. 
This, indeed, has already been made evident in the section dealing with 
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direct allusions to the Divine goodness. 
E. Theodicy 
In his defense of the providence and goodness of God, Clement 
gives us at least a partial theodicy. Stating the problem he gives 
his answer. God did not will that Christ and the martyrs should suf-
fer; yet nothing ever happens which is not God 1s will.1 The only 
solution that preserves God1s providence and goodness is that such 
things happen without the prevention of God.2 Causation attaches to 
activity, but not to failure to prevent. Good things are caused by 
God but evil things happen without His prevention.3 While the idea 
of non-prevention may seem weak in itself, it is somewhat strengthened 
by two other ideas of Clement. First, God does all He can to prevent 
sin by persuasive, non-arbitrary means.4 Our Teacher uses many de-
vices to turn us from sin. Secondly, after sin has been committed, 
God is active to modify the effects of sin and to make evil contri-
bute to a good end.5 
The transformation of evil into good is actually the second 
point of his theodicy. God uses up evil for good and turns evil into 
good. Clement insists that an important aspect of the work of Provi-
dence consists in preventing evil from being wholly injurious and from 
remaining useless and without value. Providence so orders and relates 
1. Stromata, iv, 12; II, 424. 
3. Ibid., i, 17; II, 319. 
5. Stromata, i, 17; II, 320. 
2. Ibid. 
4. Instructor, i, 2; II, 210. 
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earthly affairs that seeming evils are used to advantage and real evils 
are made contributory to good by their being caught up in a larger per-
spective.l 
We find the third point of Clement 1s theodicy in the statement 
that "Providence is a disciplinary art (or form of correction), in the 
case of other people because of their own sins and in the case of the 
Lord and the apostles because of ours. 112 While the death of martyrs 
is the result of the sin and injustice of their persecute~ rather 
than of God's judgment for the sins they may have committed, yet even 
the suffering of the martyrs is used by God for discipline, as they 
are brought by it to a firmer faith and a deeper fellowship--in short, 
to their sanctification.3 In rep~ to the objection of some that if 
God loves man He surely would not threaten and chastise wrong-doers, 
Clement replies that is a proof of God 1s concern rather than His 
hostility. 4 For chastisement is not to avenge the past but rather to 
amend the fUture. God, therefore, chastises a sinner for three reasons 
--for his own improvement, for an example to others, and for the pro-
tection of the person who has suffered at his hands.5 In his second 
great work, The Instructor, Clement develops the idea of the Divine 
training and tutorship in great detail. Its aim is not so much correct 
knowledge as right living. 
1. Ibid. 2. Ibid., iv, 12; II, 424. 
3. Ibid., iv, 12; II, 425. 4. Instructor, i, 8; II, 225-27. 
5. Stromata, iv, 24; II, 438. 
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F. Summary 
Like God Himself, goodness in its essence is beyond the reach 
of the categories of human understanding and is therefore incompre-
hensible and inexpressible. Yet because it does manifest itself phe-
nomenally in the realm of human experience, it is possible to describe 
the phenomena through which it finds expression and to deduce fram 
them certain general terms of description which may be applied to 
goodness in its essence without giving any understanding of the es-
sence in terms of perceptual content. 
With Clement, important as parrer and wisdom and other attributes 
of the Divine Being appear to be, goodness remains the dominant and 
most important element in the conception of God. To be sure, it is 
no simple concept of goodness which Clement has in mind, but rather 
it is a free, just, intelligent, and omnipotent goodness to which he 
again and again refers. For goodness is an eternal constitutive and 
motivational factor in the Godhead, to which men and all things owe 
their origin. The creation of all things was due to the eternally 
good purpose of God to bring to perfection, or salvation, a being who 
could be in character like Himself and could enter into fellowship 
with Himself. God knew beforehand that creation would be good because 
of 11His purpose that had no beginning, nl an intention to save the 
highest portion of His projected creation--man--, which caused Him 
11 to make the rest also. 112 That creation is good is apparent in the 
1. Stromata, vi, 12; II, 503. 2. Ibid., vi, 17; II., 516. 
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fact that, due to its adaptation to hwnan need and the .furtherance of 
man's well-being, it is instrumental to man 1s highest good. An indi-
cation of this adaptation and of God 1s goodness is seen in the work 
of Divine providence in so ordering the world that hwnan needs are 
provided for and evils which befall man are made contributory to 
larger good. 
It is no doubt a continuation as well as a differentiation of 
the providence of God that the Word becom3s man1s Instructor and the 
world becomes his school and educational environment. It is because 
of the illumination of the Word within him that man is able to react 
in such fashion to the evils he experiences so as to make them educa-
tive and contributory to a larger future good. The concern of God for 
man1s well-being through the educative work of the Word finds further 
manifestation in the demands and penalties of the Law, and particu-
larly in the operation of Divine justice in rewarding the righteous 
and punishing the wicked. God1s good will to man is revealed in the 
fact that penalties for disobedience and wrong-doing are not vindic-
tive and retribu~ but are intended for the r eformation and cor-
rection of the wrong-doer, to save him from that 'Which undermines and 
destroys his life and to turn him in the direction of his ultimate 
good. The dependability of God1s goodness is apparent from His right-
eous administration of it according to the principle of justice. But 
at the same time that goodness is colored in its operation by justice, 
it preserves its own character in the merciful withholding or tempering 
of chastisements in severity according to the response of the one 
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chastised, in the merciful compassion which results in the showering 
of natural blessings upon mankind without consideration of their in-
dividual merit, in the gracious and unmerited help God offers man 
through the guidance of the Word for the discovery of the good life, 
and in all those kindnesses of God which, because of their undeserved 
and spontaneous nature, are best characterized as love. The Divine 
goodness expressed in the educative work of the Word finds a climax 
in the Word's incarnation for the purpose of serving as an example and 
pattern for the accomplishment of creation's goal--the likeness of 
man to God. Goodness finds its culmination in the accomplishment of 
the purpose which it has had from the beginning--to bring man to sal-
vation, which consists of bringing wholeness to the life of man through 
the perfection of his character in likeness to God and of the enjoyment 
of an unending and unlimited life of fellowship with God. In Clem-
ent's tendency toward universalism, the omnipotence of the Divine 
goodness as an intention to do good to each and every human creature 
is clearly demonstrated and the final triumph and supremacy of good-
ness is assured. 
CHAPTER IV 
DIVINE GOODNESS IN TERTULLIAN 
Probably of all the men whose writings are studied in this dis-
sertation, Tertullian presents the most s,ystematic treatment of the 
Divine goodness. This is not to say, however, that he is the most con-
sistent; for, though his argument is almost always impressive, it fre-
quently lacks convincing quality and is noticeably out of harmony with 
other things he has said. But Tertullian does make a quite evident 
and systematic effort to deal with the Divine goodness. To refute 
the heretical contention that goodness and judgment are incompatible 
and to show how the nature of each demands the other was the main pur-
pose of his great work against Marcion. It is in the first two books 
of this work that the great bulk of his thinking concerning the good-
ness of God is to be found. In this writing he first of all sets 
forth for the judging of Marcion1 s god certain principles to which 
Divine goodness will be found to conform. Then he proceeds to ex-
pound the nature and various modes of expression of the goodness to 
be found in the true God. 
In his treatment of the Divine goodness Tertnllian elaborates 
or touches upon, in some cases by almost bare suggestion, most of the 
insights of the other Fathers referred to in this dissertation. On 
some points, as for example, his showing that punishment is not o~ 
compatible with but necessar.y to the complete expression of goodness, 
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he is more incisive and complete than any of the other Fathers; but 
in a number of other points, he appears complete~ unaware of or ob-
livious to the insights of other Fathers. 
Scattered throughout the whole of his writings are repeated as-
sertions of the goodness of God. So apparent is God's goodness and 
so many are the expressions of His goodness that Tertullian declares 
that it would be tedious to show that God is good.l Indeed, so evident 
is the fact of God's goodness that it is the untutored admission of 
every soul.2 To the elaboration of the nature and meaning of the Di-
vine goodness as conceived by Tertull ian we now turn. 
A. Abstract Qualities 2!_ Divine Goodness 
1. Eternal 
For Tertullian, foremost and most certain among the qualities of 
the Divine goodness is its eternity. This is the case because eter-
ni ty is the ~ qua ~ of deity itself. Interpreting Tertullian' s 
argument against Hermogenes, Robert E. Roberts says: 
Eternity is an attribute of God without which He could 
not be God. It is a peculiar and exclusive attribute of 
His. To claim that it may be possessed by anything else 
is to claim in effect that that something is God. At first 
sight this might seem to be a precarious argument. It may 
be maintained that as goodness, e.g., is an attribute of 
man and of God, and man's sharing it does not rob God of 
1. Quintus Septimius F1orens Tertullianus, Scorpiace, 5, in The Ante-
Nicene Fathers (ed. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson; Grancl 
Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1957) III, 637. 
Later references to Tertullian1 s own works will omit his name and 
the name of the reference work in which his writings are reproduced. 
2. Soul's Testimony, 7; III, 176 and Apology, 17; III, 32. 
goodness, so eternity is an attribute which may be pos-
sessed by matter as well as by God. 
But there is an essential difference betvreen attributing 
goodness to man and eternity to matter. Goodness in God 
is original; in man it is derived from God . But if eter-
nity is abscribed to matter, it must be original in matter. 
Likewise, if abscribed to God it must be original in God. 
Thus a second original eternal existence is set over against 
God, and He is no longer supreme, because He is eternal~ 
conditioned by that other original existence. So Tertullian 
maintains that eternity is an inalienable, peculiar property 
of God.l 
In Ad Nationes Tertullian lays down the proposition that nothing 
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which comes into being or passes out of existence can be a god be-
cause it is lacking in eternity, the 11 essential character of divin-
ity.112 In his argument against Marcion, he asserts both that God is 
11 the great Supreme, existing in eternity, unbegotten, unmade, without 
beginning, without end11 and that it is His eternity which makes Him 
the great Supreme.3 The same idea is echoed in his treatise in op-
position to Hermogenes.4 Eternity, indeed, it is insisted, is an 
essential property of God and of God alone. 
For what other estimate of God is there than eternity? 
vnhat other condition has eternity than to have ever existed, 
and to exist yet for evermore by virtue of its privilege of 
having neither beginning nor end? Now, since this is the 
property of God, it will belong to God alone, whose property 
it is--of course on this ground, that if it can be ascribed 
to any other being, it will no longer be the property of God, 
but will belong, along with Him, to that being also to which 
it is ascribed. For "although there be that are called godsll 
in name, 11whether in heaven or in earth, yet to us there is 
1. The Theology of Tertullian (London: The E~vorth Press, 1924) , pp. 
142-43. -
2. Ad Nationes, ii, 3; III, 131. 3. Against Marcion, i, 3; III, 273. 
4. Against Hermogenes, 7; III, 481. 
but one God the Father, of whom are all things; 11 whence 
the greater reason why, in our view, that which is the 
property of God ought to be regarded as pertaining to God 
alone, and why (as I have already said) that should cease 
to be a property, when it is shared by another being. 
Now, since He is God, it must necessarily be a unique 
mark of this quality, that it be confined to One. Else, 
what will be unique and singular, if that is not which has 
nothing equal to it? What will be principal, if that is 
not which is above all things, before all things, and from 
which all things proceed? By possessing these He is God 
alone, and by His sole possession of them, He is One.l 
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But not onzy is eternity a quality without which God 1·1ould be 
neither supreme nor true deity; it is also a result of God 1s being 
eternal that He is both the highest good and the One who is alone 
truly good.2 Real and ultimate goodness must therefore be without 
beginning or without end. He criticizes the god of Marcion for not 
revealing his goodness from the beginning of the created order. His 
failure to do so must indicate either his unwillingness or his in-
ability , a defective and malicious goodness on the one hand or a god 
unworthy of human trust and dependence on the other.3 He goes on to 
point out that the goodness of God is no 
sudden goodness issuing in some accidental boon or in 
some excited impulse, such as must be dated simply from 
the moment it began to operate. For if it did itself pro-
duce its own beginning vThen it began to operate, it had 
not, in fact, a beginning itself when it acted. When, 
however, an initial act had been once done by it; the 
scheme of a temporal seasons began, for distinguishing and 
noting which, the stars and luminaries of heaven were ar-
ranged in their order •••• Previous, then, to this 
temporal course, (the goodness) which created time had 
1. Ibid., 4; III, 479. 2. Ibid., 11; III, 483. 
3. Against Marcion, i, 22; III, 287. 
not time; nor before that beginning which the same good-
ness originated, had it a beginning.l 
Commenting on the above passage, Roberts says: 
Goodness is an attribute of God neither temporal nor ac-
cidental. It did not come into existence after the crea-
tion, nor did it find its birth in the moment of its ex-
pression. But it was prior to time and the world, eter-
nally present in the character of God.2 
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But to say that the Divine goodness is eternal means also that 
it is essentially without change. Tertullian says in reference to God 
that 11 all His blessedness would disappear, if He -vmre ever subject to 
change . 113 Johannes Stier points out that for Tertullian the eternity 
of God implied His unchangeableness. 
Mit dieser ~ngkeit Gottes war flir Tertullian implicite 
auch Gottes unverM.nderliches und unl-randelbares Sein 
ausgesprochen •••• Und wie konnte der, der nicht geboren 
und nicht gemacht war, anders gedacht werden, als un-
beweglich und unverkehrbar? • • • Er war und ist doch 
ein Gott , dem alle Zeit lebendige Gegenwart is\ d.h . der 
in der absoluten Freiheit eines zeitenlosen Seins lebt. 
Der Begriff des Werdens und der Ver~nderung findet auf 
diesen Gott keine Anwendung; und der allein ~st der rechte 
Gott, der e-vng war und ewig derselbe bleibt . 4 
God's goodness continues, therefore, to express itself in accord rdth 
fixed and unchanging principles . This is illustrated in his reply to 
those who accused God of being inconstant in respect of persons . Some 
said that God approved men rTho should be condemned and condemned men 
1. Against ~ffircion, ii, 3; III, 299. 
2. Theology of Tertullian, pp . 127-28. 
J. Ad Nationes , ii, 6; III, 134. 
4. Die Gottes-und Logos-Lehre Tertullians (GBttingen: Vandenhoeck 
Uiid Ruprech-r,-1'8'9'9'}," pp. 19-20. 
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who ought to be approved. A good judge, says Tertullian, must choose 
or reject on the basis of present merit . And so, God chooses Saul 
before he has become the despiser of God's prophet Samuel andre-
jects Solomon after he has fallen prey to foreign women and idolatry. 
But a man who is al1-1ays good will never be rejected and one who is al-
ways bad will never be chosen. God's goodness is expressed in keeping 
with the fixed and unvarying principle of justice.l 
2. Natural 
Inseparably related to the qualification of God's goodness as 
eternal is its character as natural. In his work against Marcion, 
Tertullian sets forth several rules for examining God's goodness, 
the first of which is that goodness must be a natural attribute. 2 
For God to be worthy of the title, He must be eternal. If His good-
ness is to be eternal, it must be a natural attribute. As a natural 
attribute it will be perpetual and unbroken in its expression, under-
lying all material existence from the beginning and never ceasing in 
its operation.3 It cannot be regarded as coming into expression as 
the result of some temporal cause, for then it would not be natural. 
It must become manifest purely because such is its nature.4 Thus the 
goodness of God is entirely unlike that of man, who is good only in 
the sense that it becomes his by free choice and disciplined obedience. 
1. Against 11arcion, ii, 23; III, 315. 
2. Ibid., i, 22; 287. 
4. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
Only God is truly good~ nature.l And so, God does good because it 
is His nature to do so. Indeed, "if man had never sinned, he would 
simp~ and sole~ have known God in His superlative goodness, from 
the attribute of His nature. 112 But now, because of his sin, he ex-
periences Him as just as well as good.3 Tertullian points out that 
God's goodness was natural and innate while His subsequent severity 
1B9 
was "accidental" and the result of a cause. God 1s severity was neces-
sitated by human sin and would have been non-existent if there had 
been no sin. In contrast, God's goodness found expression, not because 
of outer conditions, but because it was God's nature to do good.4 
3. Rational 
A second rule which Tertullian prescribes for examining the 
goodness of Marcion•s god is that goodness must be rational. As Stier 
says, "So muss nun eine jede der librigen ggttlichen Eigenschaften, um 
sich als g8ttliche legitimieren zu k8nnen, dieses Kennzeichen der 
ggttlichen ratio aufzeigen kgnnen. 115 Tertullian says: 
Here is another rule for him. All the properties of 
God ought to be as rational as they are natural. I re-
quire reason in His goodness, because nothing else can 
properly be accounted good than that which is rationally 
good: much less can goodness itself be detected in any 
irrationality. More easily will an evil thing which has 
1. Ibid., ii, 6; III, 302. 
2. ~ Resurrection £f the Flesh, 14; III, 554. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Against Marcion, ii, 11; III, 3o6. 
5. Stier, £E• cit., p. 5B. 
something rational belonging to it be accounted good, 
than that a good thing bereft of all reasonable quality 
should escape being regarded as evil.l 
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Just as God is good by nature, so by nature He is also rational. In 
fact, the rational element of the human soul must be believed to be 
its natural condition because man is in the image of his 1-iaker, who 
is essential~ rational. 2 Nothing irrational owes its origin to God, 
but rather proceeds from the author of evil, the devi1.3 Roberts 
also is in agreement with this interpretation of Tertullian. 
We are told that this rational element in the soul is the 
natural condition, impressed upon it from its very first 
creation by its Author, who is Himself essentially rational, 
and that their rational e~ement has come later from the in-
stigation of the serpent.4 
When Tertullian says that God's goodness is rational, he means 
first of all that it is expressed toward its proper object. He criti-
cizes the goodness of Marcion's god because it is bestowed upon an 
alien creature. While some might argue that it is a supreme and per-
feet goodness which is showered upon strangers without any expected 
return, the correct order of procedure for God would be first the 
doing of good to His own creatures and then perhaps to those belong-
ing to some other god.5 In the second place, to describe God's good-
ness as rational is to label it as righteous . Assuming that God 's 
1. Against Marcion, i, 23; III, 288. 
2. ! Treatise~~ Soul, 16; III, 194. 
3. Ibid., 16; III, 194-195. 4. Theology of Tertullian, p . 66. 
5 . Against Marcion, i, 23; III, 288. 
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goodness does begin at the second stage of its rational operation, 
that is on an object not properly His own, His goodness will be ra-
tional only when it operates without wrong to whoever has the first 
claim. "It is righteousness which before everything else makes all 
goodness rational."l Tertullian goes on to say that goodness which 
has met the first test of rationality in being related to its proper 
object will be ful:cy rational when it is also righteous.2 . This im-
plies a different meaning for righteousness than the one suggested 
above. Perhaps he means that God's goodness must be expressed toward 
its proper object in accordance with some right or reasonable prin-
eiple. Such a principle he seems to suggest when he says, 
God will be angry, with perfect reason, with all who de-
serve His wrath; and with reason, too, will God desire 
whatever objects and claims are worthy" of Himself. For 
He will show indignation against the evil man, and for 
the good man will desire salvation.3 
Thus God 1 s goodness will not be best011ed capriciously or haphazardly, 
but rather in accord with the principle of human choice, which is fair 
and right because possessed by all. Finally, to speak of God • s good-
ness as rational means that it is generally consistent and coherent 
in its modus operandi. 
Oh, what a god is this l everywhere perverse; nowhere ra-
tional; in all cases vain; and therefore a nonentity:--in 
whose state, and condition, and nature, and every appoint-
ment, I see no coherence and consistenc.y; no, not even in 
the very sacrament of his faith: For what end does baptism 
serve, according to him? If the mmission of sins, how will 
1.~. 2. Ibid. 
-
3. ! Treatise ~ the Soul, 16; III, 195. 
he make it evident that he remits sins, when he affords no 
evidence that he retains them? Because he would retain them, 
if he performed the functions of a judge. If deliverance 
from death, how could he deliver from death, who has not 
delivered to death?l ----
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This, of course, but sums up in general terms the two meanings set 
forth above. 
In one passage, Tertullian even goes so far as to claim that 
something is good because it is rationally directed. Thus persecu-
tion, in spite of its seeming to be evil, is really good because it 
is "a divine and reasonable appointment." "Unless, as it depends on 
the Lord, one either perishes irrationalJy, or is irrationally saved, 
he will not be able to speak of persecution as an evil, which while 
it is under the direction of reason, is, even in respect of its evil, 
good. 11 2 
4. Perfect 
A third test which should be applied to the goodness of Marcion's 
god is that of perfection.3 As Stier says, Tertullian 1s concept of 
God is the idea "des absoluten, des allervollkonnnensten Wesens, des 
sunnnum magnum."4 For nothing is more certain than that He who supplied 
the universe with a government of perfect wisdom is Himself perfect.5 
Although men sometimes base their opinions of God's qualities, such 
1. Against Marcion, i, 28; III, 293. 
2. DeFu~a in Persecutione, 4; IV, 118. 
3. Against Marcion, i, 24; III, 289. 
4. Stier, .2E• cit., p. 17. 5. Apology, ll; III, 27. 
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as, meekness, patience, mercy, and 11the very- parent of them all_, good-
ness" upon similar human qualities, this is real.JJ foolish because God 
alone possesses sueh qualities in perfection.l 
Having set forth the rule that God's goodness must be perfect, 
Tertullian goes on to show how Marcion1 s god is imperfect in goodness. 
It is imperfect, of course, because it is neither natural nor rational. 
But it is imperfect also because it does not save all mankind. This 
is proper, of course, for One who is a God of both justice and goodness 
but not for a god of pure goodness, whose only reason for not saving 
must be either umrillingness or lack of power. Fina~, the goodness 
of Marci.on' s god is imperfect because it produces an imperfect salva-
tion--of the soul but not of the boqy.2 WWbat could have been a better 
proof of a perfect goodness, than the recovery of the whole man to sal-
vation?n3 
5. Linked with Power 
The goodness of God is undergirded with power sufficient to 
make it effective. Far God is "the great Supreme in form and in rea-
son., and in might and in power.n4 That He should ever in ;my manner 
fail in power must not be thought.5 With Him nothing is impossible 
but what He does not will.6 "For with God, to be willing is to be 
1. Against Ma.rcion, ii, 16; TII, 310. 
2. ~., 1, 24; nr, 289-290. 3. ~., 1, 24; m, 29o. 
4. ~., i, 3; III, 273. 5. ~., i 1 22; III, 287. 
6. ~ ~ Flesh of Christ, 3; III, 522. 
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able, and to be unwilling is to be mable; all that He willed, however, 
He has both been able to accomplish; and has displayed His ability.nl 
The greatness of God's power bas been revealed in His creation 
~ nihilo.2 It is He that dispenses kingdoms, ordains the changes of 
dynasties, and causes the rise and fall o£ states.3 Upon Him rulers 
are entire~ dependent for their power. In comparison with Him the 
power of the emperor is as nothing, for he cannot, indeed, make war 
on heaven or lead angels captive.4 That it is God alone, not the 
gods of Greek and Roman legend, who controls the destin;y of history 
is shown by the utter powerlessness of those who are called gods to 
defend their patron cities.5 
To those who worship such deities, wham history shows once to 
have been men, Tertu11ian poses the question of how they became dei-
ties. There must of necessity have been some wholesale dispenser of 
divinity. But divinity would have been bestowed o~ to reward merit 
or because God needed help. Clearly the character of these beings is 
not such as to make their supposed divinity a result of merit. The 
only alternative remaining is that God must have crowned them with 
divinity because in need of assistance, but this is unworthy of One 
with such power that He can make gods outright, without using dead 
1. Against Praxeas, 10 J III, 605. 
2. A.gainst Marcion, ii, 5; III, 301. 
3. Apologz, 26; III, 40. 4. ~., 30; III, 42. 
5. Ad Nationes, ii, 17; III, 146. 
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men.l But there is not room even for this alternative, for the uni-
verse at its creation was fitted "with a government of perfect wis-
dom, n 2 clearly revealing the greatness and pow-er of God. 
Especially in his treatise against Hermogenes does it became 
evident that for TertnJJi.an supreme goodness rests upon supreme power. 
If God is not supreme in power then He can not be supremely good. 
Therefore, the extent of God's pawer is an important issue. Not only 
must God be supreme in pow-er within the created order, but also He 
must be supreme at the time of creation, re4ring on nothing besides 
Himself for the production of all things. His power must be suffi-
cient to create ex nihilo. 
- ~_..;...-
Now more glory accrued to Him from a creation of His own 
will than from one of necessity; in other words, from a 
creation out of nothing, than from one out of matter. It 
is more worthy to believe that God is free, even as the 
author of evil, than that He is a slave. Power, whatever 
it be, is more suited to Him than infir.mity.3 
This same idea is repeated a number of times in the treatise to which 
reference has been made.4 Tertnllian lays great stress on the impor-
tance of a creation out of nothing because it protects God's supramaa.y. 
If God bad created out of some eternally existing substance His su-
premacy would have been lost, for 11He could not have been the Lord ot 
1. ~ Nationes, ii, 13; III, 142-143. 
2. Apology, 11; III, 27. 
3. Against Hermogenes, 14.; m, 485. 
4. See Against Hermogenes, 16.; III, 486. 
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a substance which was co-equal w.i th Himself •111 If God is not supreme 
in power, no resort to a dualism, in which good comes from the eternal 
God and evil rises from same eternal substance which God must use be-
cause of limited power, will be sufficient to save God t s perfect good-
ness. For if God were Lord over evil matter, before using it He would 
convert it into good.2 If He does not do so, it is either because He 
is unable or unwilling. If He is unwilling then He is llimself evil, 
because He favors evil by allowing it to exist, even though He does 
not produce it.3 11 By bearing with evil as a good instead of rather 
extirpating it, He proved Himself to be the promoter thereof; crimi-
nally, if through His awn will--disgracefully, if through necessity.n4 
Roberts comments on Tertullian's argument that attributing the origin 
of evil to matter does not relieve God of responsibility: 
The existence of evil must not be attributed to God, 
but that is what follows as a necessary inference if mat-
ter is eternal. To explain evil as inherent in matter is 
not to relieve God of the responsibility. TertuJ J ian 
states the familiar dilemma--if God wills to exclude evil, 
but cannot, He is not omnipotent; if He is unwilling to 
exclude evil, though He has the power of doing so, He is 
not good. Applied to the notion of evil as inherent in 
matter, which is eternal, the dilemma may be stated thus. 
If God willed matter to be free from evil, but could not 
give effect to His will, then where is His omnipotence? 
If He acquiesced in the inherent evil of matter, what be-
comes of His goodness? So the explanation of evil as in-
herent in matter is inconsistegt with the truth of the 
supremacy and goodness of God.5 
1. ~., 9; III, 482. 2. Ibid. 
3. ~., 10; In, 482-483. 4. ~., 1o; m, 483. 
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Thus we see that if evil exists it will not be because God lacks 
the power to prevent its existence, for God is supreme in power. If 
there is any deficiency in the expression of God's goodness it cer-
tainly is not traceable to a lack of power but rather must be sought 
in the nature of the goodness itself. Whatever goodness God has, His 
power is sufficient to make effective; any deficienc,y therefore will 
be a failure of goodness itself before it is a failure of power. But 
Tertullian has told us that God is perfect in goodness. Yet there is 
nothing more certain than the fact that evil is real in our world. 
If God is perfect in goodness and if His power is sufficient to make 
His goodness effective and supreme, how can there be evil? To this 
question we shall try to give Tertullian 1 a answer in an outline of 
his theodicy. 
6. Purposive 
Divine goodness is a goodness with purpose. To those who charged 
that man ought not to have been endowed with free-will since such free-
dan might turn out to be injurious, 
was rightly so constituted. It was as a result of God's goodness~ 
purpose, or of a goodness combined with purpose, that man was produced 
as a free being. This union is necessary, "for His purpose is no pur-
pose without goodness; nor is His goodness goodness without a purpose, 
except forsooth in the case of Marcion1 s god, who is purposelessly 
good, as we have shown."l So in allowing man freedan, which can lead 
1. Against Marcion, ii, 6; III, 301. 
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to evil as well as good, and in deferring the destruction of the 
devil, thus providing man opportunity through his free-will to over-
come him, God acts consistent~ with the purpose of His own goodness.l 
For it is His purpose that man might have a goodness which, though 
bestowed upon him by God, is yet peculiarly his own because of his 
free choice of it.2 Tertullian tells us that God created man with 
the purpose, not that he should live a purely natural life, but that 
he should virtuously. Therefore, He prescribed a law, that by living 
in relation to Him and to His law man might, through his choice of 
good, win life for himself.) 
7. Essential Attribute of Deity 
Tertullian would agree with Irenaeus and Clement that goodness 
is an essential attribute of God. He says, "Yet for all that, a 
thing is therefore good because it is of God, as divine, as reason-
able; for what is divine and not reasonable and good? 11 4 And again he 
states that it is generally agreed that "God is some great essence of 
good. n5 While the idea is but barely suggested in the above passages, 
it becomes clearly explicit in the following: 
It would be tedious to show that my God is good,--a 
truth with which the Marcionites have been made acquainted 
1. Ibid., ii, 10; III, 3o6. 2. Ibid., ii, 6; III, 302. 
3. Ibid., ii, 8; III, 303. 
4. De Fuga in Persecutione, 4; IV, 118. 
5. On Repentance, 3; III, 658. 
by us. Meanwhile it is enough that He is called God for its 
being necessary that He should be believed to be good. For 
if any one make the supposition that God is evil, he will be 
bound either to affirm that he whom he has thought to be evil 
is not God, or that he whom he has proclaimed to be God is 
good. Good, therefore, will be the will also of him who, 
unless he is good, will not be God.l 
B. Free 
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The goodness of God is the result of free will, not of any form 
of compulsion or necessity external to God. In his treatise against 
Hermogenes, Tertullian points out that creation in no sense owes its 
origin and order to necessit,y or the compulsion of some superior ex-
ternal power. Certainly more credit is due God if He can create freely 
as He wills than if, in creating, He must be limited by the external 
compulsion of an already existing substance. It is better to regard 
Him as free, even as the Author of evil, than as the slave of necessity.2 
For it is more worthy of God that He produced even these 
of His own will, by producing them out of nothing, than 
from the pre-determination of another, (which must have 
been the case) if He produced them out of Matter. It is 
liberty, not necessit,y, which suits the character of God. 
I would much rather that He willed to create evil of Him-
self than that He should have lacked abilit,y to hinder its 
creation.3 
Stier points out that Tertullian felt constrained to refute Hermogenes 1 
view because it threatened to undermine the "absolute freedom of God." 
Nicht mgglich, dass dem ewigen Gott eine 11 el-1ige Materie 11 
gegenHberstUnde! ••• Eine Materie, die ungeschaffen, 
1. Scorpiace, S; III, 637. 
2. Against Hermogenes, 14; III, 485. 
3. Ibid., 16; III, 486. 
die ewig wire, w!lre die Setzung eines zweiten ggttlieben 
Prineips ••• --eine Paradoxie, die die absolute Freiheit 
des gBttlichen Wesens verleugnete. • • • So w!re Gottes 
frei-sch~pf'erische ThH.tigkeit eine Illusion, und was in 
Wirklicbkeit wH.re, das wire ein Handeln Gottes an einem 
Objekte, das diesem Handeln apriori den Weg wiese, die 
Grenze stecke •••• Wo w~e die fmglichkeit, die 
MSglichkeit rnr Gott, ein ewig-sllndiges und ein ewig-
fihles zu tlberwinden? ••• whe eine 11ewig Materie, 11 
ein ewiges Prinzip von S~de und ftbel--wie kann es 
geschehen, dass aus ihr Gutes gebildet werde? • • • 
Man mag sich diese "ewig Ma.terie" ausgrhbeln, wie man 
wolle, ••• ihre Setzung, allgemeil'l angesehen, bezeichnet 
dennoch die Verneinung jener allgemeinen absoluten 
Fneiheit Gottes, und speciell ••• die Verneinung der 
gbttlich-absoluten sittlichen Freiheit. 
Es ist nunmehr die absolute Freiheit Gottes nur zu 
behalten, sofern Gott als schlechthiniger Grund alles 
Sein und Daseins, seine SchBpfung als eine f'reie SchBp-
fung aus dem Nichts (ex nihilo) verstanden bleibt.l 
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He proceeds to argue against Hermogenes that since matter is evil by 
nature, having no good in it, good could not have been made of' matter. 
It must either have been made of' God or of nothing. Since it has al-
ready been established that nothing could have been produced out of 
God, it follows that good must have been made of' nothing, by His own 
power alone, as a product of His w111.2 
There is an apparent inconsistency between the idea that God's 
goodness is a natural and essential mark of deity and the view that 
His goodness is free. If' God is good by nature and would not be God 
if He were not good, how can His goodness be said to be free? The 
problem is probab~ more a question of' semantics than of' logic. First 
of all, it is not at all certain when he describes God's goodness as 
1. ~ Gotte~und Logos-Lehre Tertullians, pp. 45-46. 
2. ~., 14; III, 485. 
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"by nature" that Tertullian means to imply some internal necessity, 
but possibly an unvarying habit or form of expression. The term es-
-
sentia.l comes closer to suggesting an internal necessity. It is pos-
sible, however, that Tertullian means by the term that, since the 
created order contains countless forms of good and God is regarded 
as the sole creative source, then God must be good, or He will not be 
the sole creative source. Gocl's goodness, thus, may be entirely a mat-
ter of His volition. But, on the other hand, if by the use of such 
terms as nature and essential Tertullian does mean to suggest some 
internal necessity, God 1s goodness may still be voluntary in the sense 
of being the result of no force or coercion external to God. Particu-
~ ~ of goodness will be voluntary, as the free expression of a 
good nature, not in the sense of their being the outcome of a choice 
in which evil was an alternative. 
The question, therefore, of whether God is good because His will-
ing makes Him so or whether His will is good because He is good seems 
with Tertullian to incline toward the latter. Goodness has a rational 
structure which removes it from the capriciousness of mere willing. 
As Adhemar D1Ales says, "Tout est raisonnable en Dieu •••• En realite', 
1 1 id~e d 1une volunte d~sor-donne'e serait en Dieu un simple non-sens; 
1 1hypothese d 1un conflit entre la puissance et la sagesse ne se pr~­
sente pas. nl 
1. La Th~ologie de Tertullien (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne et Cie., 
Fdi teurs, 190>)', pp. 66=67. 
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9. Complex 
In his criticism of Marcion • s god, Tertullian makes it clear 
that the goodness of God is a complex, rather than a simple, one. 
As touching this question of goodness, we have in these out-
lines of our argument shown it to be in no way compatible 
with Deity,--as being neither natural, nor rational, nor 
perfect, but wrong, unjust, and unworthy of the very name 
of goodness,--because, as far as the congruity o1· the divine 
character is concerned, it cannot indeed be fitting that 
t hat Being shoul.d be regarded as God who is alleged t o have 
such a goodness, and that not in a modified way, but simp:cy 
a:rur solely. For it is, furthermore, at this point, quite 
open to discussion, whether God ought to be regarded as a 
Being of simple goodness, to the exclusion of all those 
other attributes, sensations, and affections, which the 
Marcionites indeed transfer from their god to the Creator, 
and which we acknowledge to be worthy characteristics of 
the Creator too, but only because we consider Him to be 
God. Well, then on this ground we shall deny him to be 
God in whom all ~ings are not to be f 01md which befit 
the Divine Being. 
The mere exposition of a 11 lonely goodness" is sufficient to show its 
inadequacy. If God is capable of no sense of rivalry, anger, or in-
jury and refuses to act as a judge, then no system of discipline will 
be consistent with Him.. For how can He connnand if He does not intend 
to execute His commands, or forbid sins if He does not intend to punish 
them?2 Therefore, Tertnllian concludes that, since the "deliverance 
of man is an operation of goodness, it .f'ollmrs that this goodness 
avails nothing 'Without its endo'Wl!lents, that is to say, without those 
sensations and affections whereby it carries out its purpose.n3 Di-
vine goodness is, therefore, complex rather than simple. 
1. Against Marcion, i, 25J III, 290. 
2. ~., i, 26; III, 291. 3. ~., i, 25; III, 291. 
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10. Divorced from Need 
TertuJ1ian does not state quite so clearly as either Irenaeus 
or Clement that God 1 s goodness has no direct relationship to His own 
need, but the idea is suggested in several passages. Speaking of 
God 1 s doing away w.i th the institution of sacrifice, he says that 
this serves to indicate that God never did require such homage be-
cause it was of any actual service to Him.l Again when rebutting 
those who worship many gods, whom history shows once to have been men, 
he sa;ys that it must be supposed that there was some wholesale distri-
butor of divinity, who made men gods either because he needed their 
assistance or to reward them for their merit. But, immediately, he 
goes on to say that such conduct would be unNorthy of a Being whose 
power is so great that He can make gods outright.2 The same idea is 
brought forth with even more force in his Apolog;r. 
It, then, there be one who is able to make gods, I turn 
back to an examination of a:rry reason there may be for mak-
ing gods at all; and I find no reason other than this, that 
the great God has need of their ministrations and aids in 
perfoming the offices of Deity. But first it is an un-
worthy idea that He should need the help of a man, and in 
fact a dead man, when, if He was to be in want of this as-
sistance from the dead, He might more fittingly have created 
someone a god at the beginning. Nor do I see any place for 
His action. For this entire world-mass-whether self-existent 
and uncreated, as Pythagoras maintains, or brought into being 
by a creator's hands, as Plato holds--was manifestly, once for 
all in its original construction, disposed, and furnished, and 
ordered, and supplied with a government of perfect wisdom. 
That cannot be imperfect which has made all perfect.3 
1. ~., ii, 22; III, 314. 
2. ~ Nationes, ii, 13; III, 142. 3 • Apology, ll; III, 27. 
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If God is perfect, as is here suggested, and has such power that His 
will is the only limit to what He can do, it oerta:inly is unlike:cy 
that goodness would stand in the relationship of something f'ul.filllng 
a need, to Him. 
ll. Basic 
In Tertnl1ian's own words there is only a suggestion that God's 
goodness is basic to all other forms of good, but the idea is clearly 
implicit in the logic of much of his thought. God is the great Su-
preme in every area, in goodness as well as in power. In creation His 
goodness is seen to be the basis for all finite forms of existence. 
Likewise, His goodness is the source of all human goodness, which is 
derived and learned from Him. Again and again Tertul]ian sets forth 
the proposition that God is the sole creative source of the universe. 
We give offense to some, he says, because we proclaim that "there is 
one God, to whcm the name of the Lord alone belongs, from whom all 
things come, and who is Lord of the whole universe.nl All things were 
created by Hi:m. alone out of nothing.2 Therefore, "He will be first, 
because all things are after Him; and all things are after Him~ be-
cause all things are by Him; and all things by Him, because they are 
of nothing. 113 It all things are by Him alone, then it will follow, 
that His goodness must be basic to all forms of finite goodness. 
1. The Soul's Testimonz, 2; m, 176. 
2. _Q!! Prescription Against Heretics, J3; lli, 249. 
3. AgainSt Hermogenes, 17; m, 486. 
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Tertullian indicates that various human goods depend upon God when he 
says that some good things are so great that only the grace of divine 
inspiration enables one to attain or practice them. The highest goods 
depend mostlY upon God, and only as He bestows them can man possess 
them.l 
12. Not FullY Comprehensible 
For Tertullian, God is at the same time known and unknown. Much 
that he says indicates that God is to some extent within the reach of 
human knowledge. As Roberts points out, 2 his refutation of Marcion 1s 
second God rests upon this assumption. Marcion held that the true God 
was unknown prior to the revelation of Christ. But Tertullian main-
tains "that God neither could have been, nor ought to have been un-
known; could not have been because of His greatness; ought not to have 
been because of His goodness."3 Roberts says: 
God was known to men even before Moses gave the knowledge 
of Him in the Pentateuch. Man 1s knowledge of God dates 
back, in fact, to Paradise, for the very creation testi-
fies to His existence, and the goodness of His works at-
tests the beneficence of His character. This is further 
proved by the testimony of the soul, "The soul was before 
prophecy," and, even when idolatry overshadowed the world, 
the soul bore its witness to the existence and the provi-
dence of God. 11If God pleases, 11 "I commend you to God. tt 
11Which may God grant," were, even in pre-Mosaic days, the 
sentiment found on the lips of men. 
1. On Patience, 1; III, 707. 
2. Theology of Tertullian, p. 125. 
3. Against Marcion, i, 9; III, 277. 
That knowledge was enlarged--strengthened by the prophets, 
and amplified b,y Jesus Christ.l 
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Yet in the essence of His being God is incomprehensible. Because 
of His greatness God is in many respects unlmowable. Indeed, 11 the 
greatness which is called God; ••• were it possible for it to have 
been lmown in every respect, would not be greatness.2 
To be sure, God took upon Himself the emotions and affections 
of man, because it was necessary for man's understanding of Him.3 But 
at the same time, one must remember that in affirming Him to be God, 
he admits that 11He is undoubted.ly d1 verse from every sort of human con-
ditions. 11 It is foolish therefore to think of God as having qualities 
like those of man rather than man having qualities like God, for, even 
though God and man :m.a,y have the same emotions and sensations, they are 
not the same kind, and only God possesses them in perfection. This is 
especially true in regard to goodness.4 A further proof of the fact 
tba. t God is incomprehensible is tha. t His judgment and His ways often 
seem to run counter to those of man. 
We, however, know that 11 the foolishness of God is wiser than 
men, and the weakness of God is stronger than men. n Accord-
ingly, God is then especially great, when He is small to man; 
then especially good, when not good in man's jldgment; then 
especially unique, when He seems to man to be two or more.5 
PP• 125-26. 
2. Against Marcion, ii, 2; III, 298. 
3. ~., ii, 27; III, 318. 
5. ~., ii, 2; III, 298. 
4. ~., ii, 16; III, 310. 
No one knows "what is in God, except the Spirit of God. 11 1 So Tertul-
lian says, 
The eye cannot see Him, though He is spiritually visible. 
He is incomprehensible, though in grace He is manifested. 
He is beyond our utmost thought, though our human faculties 
conceive of Him. • • • That which is infinite is known o~ 
to itself. This it is which gives notion of God, while yet 
beyond all conceptions--our very incapacity of fully grasp-
ing Him affords us the idea of what He really is. He is 
presented to our minds in His transcendent greatness, as 
at once lmown and un1mown.2 
The Scriptures themselves describe God as both visible and in-
visible. God is frequently described as inscrutable and above human 
thought and powers of comprehension, yet the Scriptures tell of men 
who have seen and lmown God. Tertullian shows the same ambivalence 
of thought in trying to be true to the Scriptures. The distinction 
between the invisible and the visible God he resolved, Roberts tells 
us, 11 by ascribing invisibility to the Father and visibility to the Son.u3 
Roberts continues in regard to Tertullian 1 s thought on the per-
ceptibility of God to human minds. 
There is little trace in Tertnlli an of the theory de-
veloped by the Neo-Platonists and reflected in the thought 
of Clement of Alexandria that God Himself is unknowable and 
incapable of possessing attributes. Tertullian readily 
recognizes that God transcends human thought, and acknowl-
edges the anthropomorphic nature of men's conclusions re-
garding Him. But he does not on that account lose faith 
in the power of man to know God. He recognizes that the 
true way to the lmowledge of God is not by a negation of 
the validity of human thought about God, but by a dialectic 
that stretches upward from the imperfections of the human 
conception of God to the perfection of His nature.4 
1. Ibid. 2. Apology, 17; III, 31-32 • 
.3. Theology of Tertullian, P• 126. 4. Ibid., pp. 126-27. 
It is evident, however, that in His inner nature God is inac-
cessible to human understanding, and what is true of God in general 
will also be true of His goodness in particular. 
B. Goodness Shown in Divine Activity 
1. Creation 
With Tertullian, as with Irenaeus and Clement, the fundamental 
expression of God's goodness is the creation of all things. 
To the question "Where are the evidences of the good-
ness of God?" The answer of Tertullian is that they 
are found in the work of creation. By observing the works 
of God, which are prior to the existence of man, it is pos-
sible to secure a starting-point from which to proceed to 
the examination and explanation of the world order •••• 
This starting-point is the obvious goodness of the 
natural creation. Tertullian finds no discord or imper-
fection in the world of nature. It is pure~ good.l 
There is only one God, says Tertullian, who created all things 
out of nothing through His Word, who later appeared among men in the 
form of Jesus Christ.2 It is not, therefore, one God who creates and 
another who saves, as Marcion would have people think. But the same 
God who of His goodness sends His Son, is also Creator of all things, 
which everywhere testi~ to His goodness. ' Adhemar D'Ales comments: 
Ils1 Lthe Marcioni teiJ ;en veul~nt surtout a 1'a. bont' du Createur. Cette bonte apparait dans son oeuvre, avec 
son existence m~e. Elle porte Dieu ~ se manifester 
par la criation~ avec cette premi~re manifestation, le 
temps commence.~ 
1. Ibid., p. 128. 
2. On Prescription Against Heretics, 13; III, 249. 
3. D'Al~s, ~· cit., p. 56. 
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"The the things which the Father delivered to the Son are good, and 
the creator is therefore good, since all His things are good.nl In-
deed, nobody can de!V' that God is the maker of the universe and that 
it is good,2 for the whole world is "inscribed~ the goodness of 
~ Maker. 113 "The Creator's works testify at once to His goodness, 
since the.y are good.n4 Not only is God's work in creation good, but 
His goodness is the cause of His creation. From the very first God 
has been both just and good, and the two attributes have been dis-
played together. "His goodness created, His justice arranged, the 
world; and in this process it even then decreed that the world should 
be formed of good materials, because it took counsel with goodness. 11 .5 
He goes on: 
The work of justice is apparent, in the separation which 
was pronounced between light and darkness, between day and 
night, between heaven and earth, between the water above and 
the water beneath, between the gathering together of the sea 
and the mass of the dry land, between the greater lights and 
the lesser, between the luminaries of the day and those of 
the night, between male and female, between the tree of 
knowledge of death and of life, between the world and para-
dise, between the aqueous and the earth-born animals. As 
goodness conceived.!!! things, Litalics mini/ so did justice 
discriminate them.6 
11The first goodness, then, was that of the creator, whereby God was 
1. !gainst Marcion, iv, 2.5; III, 390. 
2. ~ Spectacules, 2; III, 80. 
3. Against Marcion, ii, 17; III, 310 • 
4. ~·~ ii, .5; III, 301. .5. Ibid., u, 12; nr, 301. 
6. Ibid. 
-
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umdl.ling to remain hidden forever.nl ''The world, created out of 
nothing," says Roberts, was created by the goodness of God, for the 
purpose of making that goodness lmmm." 2 
Unlike the two Fathers we have previous~ considered, Tertul-
lian gives us an insight into the rationale of his position. A great 
amount of his criticism of Mar cion 1 a god centers around the fact that 
he has done nothing to make himself known. He has no works by which 
even his existence, much less his character, is made apparent.3 But 
the Creator from the very beginning has been rna.n:if'est through His 
works that He might be known as God. 4 Marcion' s god he convicts of 
impudence and malignity: 
of impudence in aspiring after a belief which is not due 
to him, and for which he has provided no foundationJ of 
malignity, in having brought .l1la.ey" persons under the charge 
of unbelief by furnishing to them no ground work for their 
faith.s 
So, creation is good and reveals His goodness, because through it His 
intention for man's ultimate good is shown. Nothing is better for men 
than lmowledge of God, and creation gives him something by which God 
can be known. 
The first goodness, then, was that of the Creator, whereby 
God was unwilling to remain hidden forever; in other words, 
(unwilling) that there should not be a something by which 
God should become known. For wha~l. indeed, is so good as 
the lmowledge and fruition of God ?V 
1. ~., ii, 3; nr, 299. 
3. Against Marcion, i 1 10-17; III, 278-283. 
4. ~., i, 10; III, 278. 
6. ~., ii, 3; nr, 299. 
5. ~., i 1 12; III, 280. 
P• 110. 
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At first glance there seems to be some confusion and inconsis-
tency in Tertul.lian's thought as to who is the agent of creation, for 
at times he seems to regard "the work of the creation of the world as 
being essentia~ the Son1 s. 111 Whether he attributes creation to God 
or to the Word or Son of God seems to be determined by his polemical 
or apologetic purpose. When he is contending against Marcion' s belief 
in two gods, the just creator-god of the Old Testament and the good 
god of the New Testament, he refers the creation to God. When he is 
defining or describing the work of the Son or thinking along the lines 
of the Rule of Faith which he believed so important and which in two 
of the forms which he quotes attributes creation to the Word or Son, 
he generally attributes creation to the Word or Son. However, creation 
is still the work of God even when attributed to the Son, since Ter-
tullian evidently regards him as a subordinate of God, acting as His 
agent. 
2. Li.fe and Freedom of Man 
God 1 s goodness is shown in the imparting of life to man. Be-
cause Marcion advocated abstaining from marriage, Tertullian criti-
cizes the god of Marcion as not wishing man to come into existence by 
forbidding the institution from which his birth arises, thus showing, 
in a negative way, that the giving of life to man is an expression of 
God's goodness.2 When the Marcionites seek to reply to the charge 
1. Roberts, Theology~ Tertu1Jian, p. 168. 
2. Against Marcion, i, 29; III, 294. 
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that their god has no works to prove his goodness by saying that his 
one work in the redemption of man is superior to all creation, Ter-
tullian retorts: 1'What superior god is this, of whom it has not been 
possible to find any work so great as ~ ~ of the lesser god 1'11 
The implication certainly is that the creation of man is an indication 
of God's superior goodness. But it is not necessary to derive his 
position from negative statements, for he gives us a positive state-
ment that Divine goodness is expressed in giving life to man. 
The goodness of God having, therefore, provided man for 
the pursuit of the knowledge of Himself, added this to its 
original notification, that it first prepared a habitation 
for him, the vast fabric (of the world) to begin with, and 
then afterwards the vaster one (of a higher world) that he 
might on a great as well as on a smaller stage practice and 
advance in his probation, and so be promoted from the good 
which God had given him, that is, from the hi2h position, 
to God's best; that is, to some higher abode. 
But Tertullian goes on to state the idea even more explicitly. 
Meanwhile the world consisted of all things good, pJainly 
foreshadowing how much good was preparing for him for whom 
all this was provided. Who indeed was so worthy of dwelling 
amongst the works of God, as he who was His own image and 
likeness? That image was wrought out by a goodness even 
more operative than its wont, with no imperious word, but 
with friendly hand preceded by an almost affable utterance: 
11Let us make man in our image, after our likeness • 11 Good-
ness spoke the word; Goodness formed man of the dust of the 
ground into so great a substance of the flesh, built up 
out of one material with so many qualities; Goodness breathed 
into him a soul, not dead, but living.3 
11The whole process of creation," Roberts says," manifests the goodness 
1. Against Marcion, i, 17; m, 283. 
2. ~., ii, 4; III, 299. 3. Ibid., ii, 4; III, 300. 
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of God, and of that process man is the consummation.ttl And again, he 
says: 
But the crowning work of the creative goodness of God 
was the forming of man. Man was made in the image of God. 
It was for him that the world was made--both the world that 
is and tha. t which is to be. 2 
God's goodness is shown not only in His giving life to man but 
also in His making man in the image of Himself, that is, as a free 
I ' being. Adhema.r D'Ales says that the goodness of God not only caused 
His manifestation in creation but that "entre autres bienfaits di"rlns, 
l'homme recut le don de la libert~.n3 It was His purpose to create 
a being worthy of knowing Him, a being made in His likeness, capable 
of free~ choosing goodness, and thus possessing it as tru:cy his own. 
"The goodness of God, then, you can learn from His gracious gift to 
man, and His purpose from His disposal of all things.u4 Even though 
He foreknows the misuses man may make of his free-will, God does not 
interfere with its operation, because to do so would be to rescind 
the freedom "which He had permitted with set purpose, and in goodness.n5 
For the same reason he allows the devil a sphere of operation, that man 
having free choice, may crush his enemy through his voluntary selection 
of the good and thus prove worthy of plucking the tree of life. The 
fact that God is willing to wait for man spontaneous~ to turn to good 
1. Theology.£!: Tertullian, p. 128. 2. ~., pp. 143-44. 
i' 3. ~ Theo1ogie de Tertullien, p. 56. 
4. Against Mareion, ii, 6; III, 302. 
5. ~., ii, 7; III, 303. 
is a clear indication of the greatness of His goodness.l 
3. Providence and Hatura1 Blessings 
Another indication of God's goodness is His providence, or watch-
ful oversight of human affairs. Since providence means "having over-
sight" or the 11act of over-seeing," its basic manifestation is pro-
viding for human needs. In his Wl'itten debate with Marcion, he shows 
that Jesus' words, "But your Father lmaweth that you have need of these 
things, 11 apply to the Creator rather than to Marcion t s god and ind.i-
cate His goodness, because He has made provision for human needs while 
Marcion's god has not.2 After creating man, the goodness of God pre-
pares a habitation for him.3 Roberts says that it was for man 
that the world was made--both the world that is and that 
which is to be, "the vast fabric (of the world) to begin 
with and tPis afterwards the vaster one (of a higher world) 
that He might on a great as well as on a smaller stage 
practise and advance in his probation." Thus in a world 
created out of the goodness of God man was brought into 
being, and the whole world was made to minister to the 
growth of goodness in him. On the stage of the world he 
was to practise and advance in his probation, 11 and so be 
promoted from the good which God had given him, that is 
from his high position, to God's best, that is to some 
higher abode. 114 
His concern in providing for the needs of His children is shown in his 
supplying the Hebrews with manna and the flesh of birds during the days 
of their wandering in the wilderness.5 His goodness is shown in an 
1. ~., ii, 10; III, 306. 
3. ~., ii, 4; III, 299. 
2. ~., iv, 29; III, 397. 
4. Theology of Tertnllian, p. 144. 
5. Against Marcion, iv, 26; III, 393. 
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impartial beneficence. He 11 sendeth rain on the just and the unjust, 
and maketh His sun to rise on the evil and on the good1 11 thus n sus-
taining and nourishing and assisting even Ma.rcionites themselves•"l 
In a comprehensive listing, Tertullian sets forth these examples and 
others: 
Goodness formed man of the dust of the ground into so great 
a substance of the flesh, built up out of one material with 
so many qualities; Goodness gave him dominion over all things, 
which he was to enjoy and rule over1 and even give names to. 
In addition to this, Goodness annexed pleasures to higher de-
lights being translated into paradise, out of the world into 
the Church. The self-same Goodness provided also a help meet 
for him1 that there might be nothing in his lot that was not 
good. For, said He, that the man be alone is not good •••• 
The law, however, which you find fault with1 and wrest into 
a subject of contention, was imposed on man by Goodness, 
aiming at his happiness, that he might cleave to God •••• 
Learn then the goodness of our God amidst these things and 
up to this point; learn it from His excellent works1 from 
His kind~ blessings, from His indulgent bounties, from His 
gracious providences, from His laws and warning, so good 
and merciful. 2 
A second and less elear~ delineated work of providence is the 
endowment of mankind 'With natural faculties and with laws and precepts 
to promote and safeguard his growth in the direction of goodness. His 
criticism of a certain school of philosophy reveals his conviction 
that man's native faculties were implanted by God with a good end in 
view. "You obscure," he sa:ys, "the good providence of God Himself: 
for the senses of man which God has appointed over all His works, that 
we might understand, inhabit, dispense, and enjoy them, (you reproach) 
as fallacious and treacherous tyrants p3 In the long passage quoted 
1. ~., iv1 36; III, 410. 2. ~., ii, 4; III, 300. 
3. ! Treatise .2!! ~ ~, 11; III, 196-197. 
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just above, we noted that the law was a dispensation of God1s provi-
dent goodness, intended to promote the happiness and ultimate well-
being of mankind. 
Finally, God's watchful oversight results in an on-going and a 
final judgment of h'wnan beings and their actions. Some, he says, in-
deed do not deey the existence of God, yet "hold withal that He is 
neither Searcher, nor Ruler, nor Judge; treating with especial disdain 
those of us who go over to Christ out of a fear of a coming judgment, 
as they think, honouring God in freeing Him from the cares of keeping 
watch, and the trouble of taking note,--not even regarding Him as 
capable of anger •111 The importance of an eternal judgment becomes 
apparent when one considers "His providential arrangings. n "For He 
who once for all appointed an eternal judgment at the world's close, 
does not precipitate the separation, which is essential to judgment., 
before the end.n2 God's providence, however, will result in an on-
going as well as a final judgment, through which the benefits of His 
goodness are showered more abundantly upon those who do his will than 
upon those who do not, so that it appears to those wishing to criti-
cize Him that He plays favorites and is "inconstant in respect of per-
sons." Tertnllian says, however, that such criticism is false, because 
nothing is more tl'licy an indication of a good judge than to choose or 
reject on the basis of present merit. Therefore God chooses Saul be-
fore he has became the despiser of the prophet Samuel and rejects 
1. !!!! Soul's Testimogy, 2; m, 176. 2. Apology, 4l.; m, 48. 
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Solomon after he has fallen prey to foreign women and foreign gods. 
The man who is always good will never be rejected while the man who is 
aJ.wa.ys evil Will never be chosen. God "does not change His judgments 
through inconstancy or want of foresight, but dispenses reward accorG-
ing to the deserts of each case with a most unwavering and provident 
decision."1 Thus, because God keeps watchful oversight of human af-
fairs, He continually judges the lives of men, dispensing the fruits 
of His goodness in accord With His judgments. 
4. Commandments and Warnings 
"The law was the product of God's goodness, and even the warn-
ings of the results which would follow transgression were promoted by 
the goodness of God.n 2 In answer to Marcion's charge that the law was 
not good, Tertullian first shows how certain specific injunctions, 
such as the statute of retaliation requiring an eye for an eye and a 
tooth for a tooth--actually a provision for restrai~ing violence--, 
are really good.3 Then he quotes Paul's description of the law as 
4 just and good to show that the Creator must be so regarded. Though 
every soul seems to bear an intuitive or instinctive witness to the 
greatness and goodness of God, God has also provided a written revel~ 
tion that man might have more authoritative kno\>rledge of the way he is 
meant to live. 
But, that we might attain an ampler and more authoritative 
knowledge at once of Himself, and of His counsels and will, 
1. Against Marcion, 11, 23; III, 315. 2. Roberts, ,2E• ~·, P• 144. 
3• Against Marcion, ii, 18; III, 311. 4. ~·, v, 13; III, 459. 
God has added a written revelation for behoof of everyone 
whose heart is set on seeking Him, that seeking he may find 
and finding believe, and believing obey. For from the first 
He sent messengers into the world,--men whose stainless 
righteousness made them worthy to !mow the Most High, and 
to reveal Him,--men abundant~ endowed with the Ho~ Spirit, 
that they might proclaim that there is one God only who made 
all things .1 
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So-- 11as is congruous with the goodness of God, and with His equity, as 
the Fashioner of mankind--He gave to all nations the self-save law • 112 
The giving of commands and warnings through the Law and the prophets 
is good, no doubt, because it is intended to accomplish a good purpose. 
It was not in severity that its Author promulgated the law, 
but in the interest of the highest benevolence, which rather 
aimed at subduing the nation's hardness of heart, and by 
laborious services hewing out a fealt.Y which was (as yet) 
untried in obedience: ••• it simp~ bound a man to God, 
so that no one ought to find fault with it, except him who 
does not choose to serve God. To help forward this benefi-
cent, not onerous, purpose of the law, the prophets were 
also ordained by the self-same goodness of God, teaching 
precepts worthy of God, how jhat men should 11 cease to do 
evil, and learn to do well." 
The same idea occurs earlier in the same work, with the addition, 
that warning and the threat of punishment for disobedience or indif-
ference to Divine laws, as well as the giving of commandments and 
laws, are expressions of goodness. The law, which men criticize, was 
imposed on man by goodness and was aimed at man's happiness, that he 
might remain in fellowship with God 
and so not show himself an abject creature rather than a free 
one, nor reduce himself to the level of the other animals, 
• • • but might, as the sole human being, boast that he alone 
1. Apology, 18; III, 32. 2. Answer to the Jews, 2; III, 152. 
3. Against Marcion, ii, 19; III, 312. 
was worthy of receiving laws from God. • • • To secure the 
observance of this law, Goodness likewise took counsel by 
help of this sanction: 11In the day thou eatest thereof, 
thou shalt surely die." For it was a most benignant act 
of His thus to point out the issues of transgression, lest 
ignorance of the danger should encourage a neglect of obe-
dience. Now, since it was given as the reason previous to 
the imposition of the law, it also amounted to a motive for 
subsequently observing it, that a penalty was annexed to its 
transgression; a penalt,r indeed, which He who proposed it was 
still unwilling that it should be incurred.l 
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Thus the goodness of God is clearly evident even from His laws and 
warnings, which are intended for man1s ultimate good.2 And so, Roberts 
tells us: 
The imposition of the law was a manifestation of Goodness. 
Its purpose was to secure the happiness of man, to lead him 
to cleave to God and to utilize his freedom aright. It was 
a rational guide to a being of a rational nature. Even the 
sanction, "In the day that Thou eatest thereof thou shalt 
die," was prompted by the goodness of God, for it was a warn-
ing of the danger that would accrue from the neglect of the 
law.3 
Occasionally, one stumbles on a statement of Tertullian1s which 
arouses the suspicion that, no matter how important a place it is 
given in his debate with heretics and critics of the faith, goodness 
is not for man's consideration the most important element in the con• 
cept of God. There can be no doubt, says Tertullian, "that what God 
enjoins is good and best." However, he continues, "I hold it audacity 
to dispute about the •good' of a divine precept; for, indeed, it is 
not the fact that it is good which binds us to obey, but the fact that 
God has enjoined it."4 
1. Against Marcion, ii, 4; III, 300. 2. Ibid. 
3. Theology of Tertullian, p. 129. 4. On Repentance, 4; III, 660. 
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5. Self-r.evelation 
From the number to showing how the 
failure of Marcion1s god to disclose himself is a defection in good-
ness, one must conclude that God1 s revelation of Himself is an in-
stance of His goodness. He begins his argument by asserting that MaP-
cion's god neither could have been nor ought to have been unknown--
"could not have been, because of His greatness; ought not to have 
been, because of His goodness."l In the pages that follow Tertul-
lian repeats again and again the argument that belief in God1 s exist-
ence depends upon His works. / ' Paraphrasing TertnJlian, Adhemar D1Ales 
says: 
Le dieu de Marcion n 'a rien cr~e. Pourquoi? c•~tait 
pourtant le vrai moyen de se faire connai tre. Il semble 
m~me qu1il efrt du cr6er avec d'autant plus de magnificence 
qu1il est, d 1apr'es Marcion, au-dessus du Cr6ateur. Il ne 
l 1a pas fait. Est-ce faute de vouloir? Est-ce faute de 
~uissance? En tout cas, ce dieu ~tranger a mauvaise grice 
a venir reclamer 1 1hommage de l 1homme, qui ne le conni!t 
pas et qui ne lui doit rien.2 
When there are no works to serve as evidence, the existence of a being 
cannot be lmown and is extreme:cy- doubtful.3 Because of his inactivity 
and lack of works Marcion' s god is accused of impudence and malignity: 
11 of impudence, in aspiring after a belief which is not due to him, and 
for which he has provided no foundation; of malignity, in having 
brought many persons under the charge of unbelief by furnishing to 
1. Against Ma.rcion, i, 9; III, 277. 
2. D 1Al~s, ~· ~., PP• 52-53. 
3. Against Ma.rcion, i, 12; lli, 280. 
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them no groundwork for their faith.nl No excuse for Marcion's god's 
tardy revelation of himself will stand up, and so, after hav:i.ng alreaey 
shown the absurdity of tbjnldng that a god could or would make himself 
known so late in history, Tertullian says, 11This topic, however, we 
shall afterwards more fu.lly treat, with a condemnation of the tardy 
manifestations; we at present simply point it out.n2 
Since the knowledge and fruition of God is the chief good for 
man, the first expression of God's goodness i~ therefore, that of 
creation, whereby He produces things by which He may be known.3 
Roberts expresses this as follows: 
The whole work of God in the creation of the world is sub-
sidiary to a fuller manifestation of His goodness. This 
consists in the self-communication of God. The knowledge 
of God is the best of all good things. Wherefore God created 
man, to whom He could communicate the knowledge4of Himself, and the world as the means of communicating it. 
Nature reveals the existence of God and something of His character.5 
But knowing Him onl:y by natural revelation is knowing Him afar off, 
and not as His 11friends. 116 Therefore, in order that man may bave a 
more authoritative knowledge of Himself and of His will, God bas 
given a written revelation. 7 So, in his argument against Marcion, 
Tertnllian says, 11We maintain that God must first be lmown from!!!-
~~ and afterwards authenticated by instruction: from nature, by 
1. Ibid. 
-
3. Ibid., ii, 3; III, 299. 
-
5. ,!2 Scapula, 2; III, 105. 
1. Apology, 18; III, 32. 
2. Ibid., i, 17; III, 284. 
4. Theology _2!: Tertu11ian, p. 128. 
6. ~ Spectaculis, 2; III, 80. 
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His works; qy instruction, through His revealed announcements.nl 
Since God is incomprehensible, it is only through grace that He 
can be known.2 It is only by God's sel.f-revelation that man may lmow 
Him. "From God you may learn about that which you hold of God; but 
from none else will you get this lmowledge, if you get it not from 
God. For who is to reveal what God has hidden?"3 
For qy whom has truth ever been discovered without God? 
By wham has God ever been found without Christ? By whom 
has Christ ever been explored without the Ho~ Spirit? 
By whom bas the Holy Spirit erer been attained without 
the ~sterious gift of faith?4 
Even with God's revelation of Himsel.f, His greatness is so great that 
man cannot know Him in every respect.5 He appears to us as One "at 
once lmown and unlmown.n6 Therefore, since knowledge of God is a 
great good for man and knowledge of God can come only from God Him-
self, it is an evidence of His goodness that He makes such lmowledge 
possible for man through the revelation of Himself in creation and 
inspired writings. 
6. Judgment 
Among the convictions that appear as one surveys the writings of 
Tertullian perhaps none is more prominent than his certainty of a day 
o£ judgment !or man at the hands of God. At present God bestows his 
1. !gainst Marcion, i, 18; III, 284. 2. Apology, 17; III, 31-32. 
3. ! Treatise~ the~' 1; III, 182. 
4. ~., 1; III, 181. 
5. Against Marcion, ii, 2; III, 298. 6. Apology, 17; III, 32. 
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blessings alike upon the wicked and upon his own elect 1 but He has 
appointed an eternal judgment in which all must appear before Him.l 
The soul continues to exist after death, anticipating the coming ~ 
of judgment. 2 Then, because of the coming judgment, the whole human 
race is one ~ resurrected.3 Indeed, the coming judgment is the o~ 
reason for the resurrection: that, in order for the judgment itself 
to be a fair one and for the one judged to be capable of f~ ex-
periencing the suffering or bliss which is his due, the total person--
soul and body--may be present for judgment.4 
The certainty of a coming judgment is grounded in the fact that 
the same God who bestows all good and who offers salvation is also 
Judge and Punisher of evil. In its random and allllost instinctive ut-
terances the soul itself witnesses that God is Judge.5 At the same 
time God is both Teacher of righteousness and Judge and Averter of 
sin.6 Although some seek to honor God by denying His role as a judge,7 
a separation between goodness and justice cannot be maintained,8 for 
without judgment and its aceo:mpaeying expressions goodness must appear 
defective in giving tacit permission to evil.9 After devoting many 
pages to arguments showing the absurdities of believing in a god of 
1. ~ Scapula, 2; III, 105. 
3. Apology, 48; In, 54. 
5. ~., 11; III, 32. 
7. Soul' a Testimon;y:, 2; III, 176. 
2. Soul's Testimony, 4; III, 177. 
4. ~., 48; III, 53. 
6. ~., 40; III, 48. 
8. Against Marcion, ii., 12; m, 307. 
9. ~., i, 27; III, 292. 
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simple goodness who exercises no judicial function and demonstrating 
the compatibility of goodness and justice, Tert11llian summarizes his 
position and the results of his efforts: 
We have already made good the Creator 1 s claim to this two-
fold character of judgment and goodness--11killing in the 
letter11 through the law, and nquickening in the Spiritn 
through the Gospel. Now these attributes, however different 
they be, cannot possibly mal<2 two gods; for they have al-
ready (in the prevenient dispensation of the Old Testament) 
been found to meet in One .1 
Before the fall of man God was simply good, but after that He 
became a God of justice as well. 2 God was good because it was His 
nature to be good, but He became just as a consequence of human sin. 
If man bad never sinned, he would have known God only in His goodness, 
but as a result of his sin he now knows Him as a God of justice as 
well as a God of goodness.3 
Thus God 1 s prior goodness was from nature, His subsequent 
severity from a cause. The one was innate, the other ac-
cidental; the one His own, the other adapted; the one issu-
ing from Him, the other admitted by Him. But then nature 
could not have rightly permitted His goodness to have gone 
inoperative, nor the cause have allowed His severity to 
have escaped in disguise or concealment. God provided the 
one for Himself, the other for the oocasion.4 
In the relationship between justice and goodness described above, 
justice makes a later appearance than goodness and seems to be purely 
an adaptation on the part of God to offset the dreadful consequences 
of human freedom misused in sin. Tertullian, however, is not always 
1. ~., v, 11; III, 453. 2. ~., ii, 11; III, 306. 
3. Resurrection 2.f ~Flesh, 14; In, 554. 
4. Against Marcion, ii, 11; III, 306. 
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consistent with this position. For instance, in a passage on the page 
imm.ediate}Jr following the one containing the above quotation, he makes 
justice much more essential in the nature of God and describes it as 
contemporaneous with goodness in its initial appearance. 
Where the just is, there also exists the good. In short, 
from the very first the Creator was both good and just, and 
both His attributes advanced together. His goodness created, 
His justice arranged, the world; and in this process it even 
then decreed that the world should be formed of good materials, 
because it took counsel with goodness. The work of justice 
is apparent, in the separation which was pronounced between 
light and darkness, between day and night, between heaven and 
earth, between the water above and the water beneath, between 
the gathering together of the sea and the mass of the dr,r 
land, between the greater lights and the lesser, between the 
luminaries of the day and those of the night, between male 
and female •••• As goodness conceived all things, so did 
justice discriminate them. With the determination of the 
latter, everything was arranged and set in order •••• Do 
not suppose that His function as a judge must be defined as 
beginning when evil began, and so tarnish His justice with 
the cause of evil. By such considerations, then, do we show 
that this attribute advanced in compan;y with goodness, the 
author of all things,--worthy of being herself, too, deemed 
innate and natural, and not as accidentally accruing to God, 
inasmuch as she was found to be in Him, her Lord, the arbiter 
of His works.l 
However, since this seems to be the only place where this view appears 
while the position presented above recurs in a number of other pas-
sages, the first position apparently was the one he favored most. He 
refers to it not only in the passages from Against Marcion and ~ 
Resurrection of the Flesh to which we have made reference above, but 
also in a passage in Against Hermogenes: 
God is in like manner a Father, and He is also a Judge; 
but He has not always been Father and Judge, mere:cy on the 
1. !£ainst Marcion, ii, 12; III, 307. 
ground of His having always been God. For He could not 
have been the Father previous to the Son, nor a Judge pre-
vi.ous to sin.l 
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Thus, in the view most often expressed, justice appears in a subordi-
nate relationship to goodness, although nevertheless a necessar.y form 
of its expression. 
Stier, on the other hand, regards the thought of justice 1 s having 
worked in harmony with goodness from the beginning as the mare basic 
in TertuJ.lian 1 s thought. 
Auch die SUnde resp. ihre Reaktion, die strafende Gottes-
Gerechtigkeit, kann nicht n~tigen, einen theologischen 
Dualismus zu bekennen. Man darf getrost im monotheistischen 
Gottes-Gedanken stehen bleiben. Die Gerechtigkeit Gottes 
war sozusagen die rechte Hand der gBttliohen Gftte gewesen--
und die rechte Hand der gBttlichen Gftte ist sie geblieben, 
auch als die ~e, die Sch~pfung Gottes zu verwBsten drohte. 
Denn die Antwort Gottes auf die St!nde, die strafende Gerech-
tigkeit, ist keine andere Gerechtigkeit, als die ewig Gottes-
Gerechtigkeit, die in Begleitung der ewigen G~te waltet. Sie 
ist diesselbe Gerechtigkeit--nunmehr als Schutz der g~ttlichen 
ante. Gqte und Gerechtigkeit Gottes, wie sie sich von Anfang 
in Gemeinschaft bethitigt haben, sie bethitigen sich in 
derselben Gemeinschaft im Verlauf der Geschichte, auch im 
Verlauf der Geschichte der SUnde. Man kBnnte im Sinne Ter-
tu1 1 i ans sagen: Ibr ununterbrochenes Verhlhtnis zu einander 
ist nunmehr reciprok geworden der Verhlltnissen des abwech-
selnder Lebens der wirklichen Welt resp. der th£tigen Mensch-
bait.. . Darum. sieht sich nun freilich unter dem Gesichtspunkt 
der SUnde die ewige Ordnung der ggttlichen G~te und Gerechtig-
kffit viel anders an, als etwa unter dem Gesichtspunkt der noch 
sttndenfreien SchBpfung--aber, was die sande verursacht hat, 
das war nur das, d.ass Gott diese ewige Ordnung, fern davon, 
sie auseinanderzureissen, nach Massgabe der zwischen eingetre-
tenen sande regelte, verschob, richtete.2 
Having discussed the relationship between goodness and justice, 
1. Against Hermogenes, 3; TII, 478. 
2. Stier, ~· ~., p. 60. 
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Tert1111ian goes on to assert that they constitute a virtual identity. 
Since there is nothing hostile to evil which is not good, 
and no enel!\V of good which is not evil. It follows, then, 
that as injustice is an evil, so in the same degree is 
justice a good. Nor should it be regarded as simply a 
species of goodness, but as the practical observance of 
it, because goodness (unless justice be so controlled as 
to be just) will not be goodness, if it be unjust. For 
nothing is good which is unjust; while everything, on the 
other hand, which is just is good.l 
/ \ Adhemar D'Ales comments: 
D'UI?.e part c'est la bont' qui arme la justice, m~e 1a 
justice vindicative; d'autre part la justice ne poursuit 
qu' un but: le regne du bien. La bonte' ne va pas plus 
sane la justice que la justice sans la bont~. 2 
Even though, as a consequence of his sin, man no longer experiences 
the simple goodness of God but experiences His justice along with His 
goodness, yet through the exercise of justice itself God's goodness is 
made known. 11For by both succouring the good and punishing the evil, 
He displays His justice, and at the same time makes both processes 
contribute proofs of His goodness, whilst on the one hand He deals 
vengeance, and on the other dispenses reward~!3 
Why is justice good? Tertullian lists several ways in which the 
goodness of divine judgment becomes apparent. 
First of all, justice is good because it administers the benefits 
of divine goodness in accord with human seeking after it and therefore 
rewards with greater good those deserving of it. 
But yet, when evil afterwards broke out, and the goodness 
of God began now to have an adversary to contend against, 
1. Against Marcion, ii, 11; III, 307. 
3. Resurrection~ ~ Flesh, 14; III, 554. 
God • s justice also acquired another function, even that of 
directing His goodness according to men1 s application for 
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it. And this is the result: the divine goodness, being 
interrupted in that free course whereqy God was spontaneous~ 
good, is now dispensed according to the deserts of every man; 
it is offered to the wort~, denied to the unworthy, taken 
away from the unthankful, and also avenged on all its enemies.l 
While Tertullian goes on to show the goodness of the negative or pun-
ishment aspect of divine judgment, at this point in his argument his 
emphasis seems to be focused entire~ on the positive or reward as-
pect. Divine judgment is good because it bestows good as a reward 
upon those who deserve to be rewarded. 
Secondly, the justice of God is good because it serves as a de-
terrent to wrong-doing. On Tertnl 1 ian 1 s thought concerning penal jus-
tice, Roberts comments: 
As the imposition of the law was consistent with the 
goodness of God, so the annexing of punishment to the in-
fringement of the law was a course of justice. It was 
right that, when man swerved from the path of the law 
intended for him by the good purpose of God, he should be 
punished. For the fear of punishment restrains from wrong-
doing, and the certainty of punishment contributes to good. 
Thus Justice in its penal aspect is an ally of Goodness.2 
Tertullian himself says: 
Thus the entire office of justice in this respect becomes 
an agency for goodness: whatever it condemns by its judg-
ment, whatever it chastises by its condemnation, whatever 
(to use your phrase) it ruthlessly pursues, it, in fact, 
benefits with good instead of injuring. Indeed, the fear 
of judgment contributes to good, not to evil. • • • But 
who, when s~ many incentives to evil were assailing him, 
would desire that good, which he could despise with 
1. Ag&inat Marcion, ii, 13; III, 307. 
2. Theology of Tertullian, pp. 129-30. 
impunity? Who, again would take care of what he could 
lose without danger?l 
Fear plays a vital role in the theology of Tertullian. The fear of 
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punishment not on.J.;y restrains many from wrong-doing but also motivates 
them to seeking after and doing positive good. That this is the case 
-
in actual experience is shown by the influence of fear and threatened 
punishment on the lives of Christians. 
No doubt about it, we, who receive our awards under the 
judgment of an all-seeing God, and who look forward to 
eternal punishment from Him for sin,--we alone make real 
effort to attain a blameless life, under the influence of 
our amplier knowledge, the impossibility of concealment, 
and the greatness of the threatened torment, not merely 
long-enduring but everlasting.2 
According to Tertullian, punishment is to be evaluated in the light 
of its intention and ultimate effect, not in terms of its immediate 
pleasantness or unpleasantness. The disciplinar,y action of God, which 
has good as its sole intention, must be regarded as good, even though 
it may seem to its recipient to be an evil; and when it finally does 
succeed in winning the one to whom it is applied from evil to good 
then its goodness is clearly shown. 
Will you call this justice an evil, when it is all unfavour-
able to evil? Will you de~ it to be a good, when it has 
its eyes towards the good?3 
ThirdlY, God's judgment is good because it clearly shows H:im as 
the champion of good and the enemy of evil. It is at this point that 
Marcion1s god of simple goodness is seen to be defective. He plainly 
1. Against Marcion, ii, 13; ni, 307. 
3. Against Marcion, ii, 13; m, 308. 
2. Apology, 45; III, 50. 
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judges evil by not willing it and condemns it by warning against it, 
yet he acquits it and le~it go free by not punishing it.l 
What a prevaricator of truth is such a god, what a dis-
sembler with his own decision 1 Afraid to condemn what he 
reall.y condemns, afraid to ha. te what he does not love, per-
mitting that to be done which he does not allow, choosing 
to indicate what he dislikes rather than deep~ examine 
it 1 This will turn out to be an imaginary goodness, a 
phantom of discipline, perfunctory in duty, careless in 
sin.2 
"Nothing," says Tertullian, 11is so un"t-rorthy of the Divine Being as not 
to execute retribution on what He has disliked and forbidden. 113 He 
ought to do it, first of all, in order to vindicate his authority--to 
show that goodness is really the supreme law in life. But He ought 
to do it also because consistency requires it: "hostile opposition 
is inevitable to what He has disliked to be done.n4 Not to do it is 
to show Himself subject to chaotic and irrational impulses rather than 
directed by rational or consistent purposes. Tertullian summarizes 
his argument as he continues: 
Moreover, it would be a more unworthy course .for God to 
spare the evil-doer than to punish him, especiall.y in the 
most good and holy God, who is not otherwise ful~ good 
than as the enemy of evil, and that to such a degree as 
to display His love of good by 'the"batred of evil, and to 
fulfill His defence of the former by the extirpation of 
the latter.5 
Again he says: 
What sort of being ought you to wish God to be? Would it 
be right to prefer that He should be such, that sins might 
1. Against Marcion, i., 27; ITI, 292. 
3. Ibid., i, 26; III, 292. 
5. ~-
2. Ibid. 
4.~. 
flourish under Him, and the devil make mock at Him? Would 
you suppose Him to be a good God, who should be able to make 
a man worse by security in sin? Who is the author of good, 
but He who also requires it? In like manner, who is a 
stranger to evil, except Him who is its enenzy-? Who its 
enemy, besides Him who is its conqueror? Who else its con-
queror, than He who is its punisher? Thus God is wholJ.y 
good, because in all things He is on the side of good.l 
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Therefore, God's responsibility for penal evils in no way oasts re-
proach upon His goodness, for, while they are no doubt evil to those 
by whom they are endured, nevertheless they are 11 still on their own 
account good, as being just and defensive of good and hostile to 
2 I \ sin." Adhemar D1Ales says: 
Avec le p~ch~ de l'homme appara~t la vengeance de Dieu: 
loin de s 1opposer ~ la bont~, la justice en est ins,parable, 
comme le z~le qui pursuit le mal et favorise le bien. Cela 
suffit ~ condamner le syst'eme qui, admettant deux dieux, 
attribue a 11un la bont~, ~ l'autre la rigueur.3 
God's final judgment of man will be fair, or "righteous, not 
bearing less heavily on any particular part. 114 This is seen in the 
resurrection of the boqy and the judging of soul and boqy together. 
Thus it follows that the fulness and perfection of the judg-
ment consists simply in representing the interests of the 
entire human being. Now, since the entire man consists of 
the union of the two natures, he must appear in both, as it 
is right that he should be judged in his entirety; nor, of 
course, did he pass through life except in his entire state. 
As therefore he lived, so also must he be judged, because 
he bas to be judged concerning the way in which he lived. 
For life is the cause of judgment, and it must undergo in-
vestigation in as many natures as it possessed when it dis-
charged its vital functions.5 
1. Against Marcion, ii, lJ; m, 308. 
3. ~ ThEfologie ~ Tertullien, p. 58 • 
2. !£!!!., ii, 14; nr, 308. 
.4. Res:\lrrection £!:.~Flesh, J..4; III, 555. 
s. Ibid. 
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But God's continuing judgment is also fair because it is based 
on the merits of the present moment. 
Now, although you will have it that He is inconstant in 
respect of persons, sometimes disapproving where approba-
tion is deserved; or else wanting in foresight, bestowing 
approbation on men who ought rather to be reprobated, as 
if He either censured His own past judgments, or could 
not forecast His future ones; yet nothing is so consistent 
for even a good judge as both to reject and to choose on 
the merits of the present moment. • • • What must the Creator 
do, in order to escape the censure of the Marcionites? Must 
He prematurely condemn men, who are thus far correct in 
their conduct, because of future delinquencies? But it is 
not the mark of a good God to condemn beforehand persons 
who have not deserved condemnation. Must He then refuse 
to eject sinners, on account of their previous good deeds? 
But it is not the characteristic of a just judge to forgive 
sins in consideration of former virtues which are no longer 
practised. Now, who is so faultless among men, that God 
could always have him in His choice, and never be able to 
reject him? Or who, on the other hand, is so void of any 
good work, that God could reject him for ever, and never 
be able to choose him? Show me, then, the man who is always 
good, and he will not be rejected; show me, too, him who is 
always evil, and he will never be chosen. Should, however, 
the same man, being found on different occasions in pursuit 
of both (good and evil) be recompensed in both direct.ions by 
God, who is both a good and judicial Being, He does not 
change Hisjldgments through inconstancy or want of fore-
sight, but dispenses reward according to the deserts of 
each case with a most unwavering and provident decision.l 
This passage indicates that God's fairness in judging according to 
the merits of the present moment is a mark of His goodness. If it 
is a negation of goodness for God to condemn previous to their sin 
persons whom God forelmows will fall into sin, by implication it must 
be a mark of goodness to refrain from such premature condemnation. 
There are several rather noticeable inconsistencies in Tert111 1 ian t s 
1. Against Marcion, ii, 23; III, 315. 
233 
thought concerning the divine judgment. The first of these is the 
one we have alreacy noted in discussing the relationship between jus-
tice and goodness. The most prominent view in Tertullian is that jus-
tice appears later than goodness. It arises as a consequence of human 
sin, for the purpose of regulating goodness in relation to sin. Good-
ness appears as a natural attribute, while justice is adopted because 
of human sin. In one passage, however, Tertullian takes the position 
that justice and goodness make their appearance simultaneous~, the 
one creating and the other arranging. If the word justice means the 
same thing in these two positions, there is in Tertullian's thought 
an inescapable inconsistency at this point. If, however, the word 
has different meanings in the two positions, Tertullian's thought 
might still be consistent. There is, of course, no doubt that Tar-
tullian uses the word in different senses, yet his argument suggests 
that he means his reader to asstnne that justice is the same in the 
one case as in the other. 
An apparent inconsistency, similar to the one noted in our dis-
cussion of creation as a manifestation of God's goodness, is to be seen 
in a vacillation in Tertullian' s thought as to who is the agent of 
judgment. At times he speaks as though God is the One who executes 
judgment; at other times, it is the Word or the Son who sits in judg-
ment. Roberts says: 
Nor was it as the Agent of revelation alone that the 
Son was known in the Old Testament times. He was the 
Agent of Judgement from the very beginning.l 
1. Theology of Tertullian, p. 169. 
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But probab:cy-, as with creation, this is on:cy- a surface disagreement, 
as Tertullian seems to look upon the Word as subordinate to God and in 
no sense an independent agent. 
A third inconsistency is seen in the conflict between the prin-
ciple underlying God's day-to-day judgment and the principle of a 
final judgment meting out an everlasting condition of reward or pun-
ishment. The fact that the consequences of the final judgment are 
everlasting emerges in a number of treatises. In his Apology, Tertul-
lian says that all mankind will be resurrected in order 11 to have its 
dues meted out according as it has merited" and 11 to have these paid 
out through the immeasurable ages of eternity.nl He says again that 
"God's judgment will be more full and complete, because it will be 
pronounced at the very last, in an eternal irrevocable sentence, both 
of punishment and of consolation. 11 2 After death the soul remains in 
existence, looking forward to the day of judgment, to a sentence of 
either "misery or bliss, in either way of it forever.u3 There is no 
thought here that punishment serves in a reformative or educative role, 
but rather is purely retributive and everlasting. Those who are not 
true worshippers of God are to be 11 consigned to the punishment of ever-
lasting fire--that fire which, from its very nature indeed, directly 
ministers to their incorruptibility. 114 Roberts says: 
The judgement of God is twofold--of salvation and of pun-
ishment--and the punishment consists of consignment to the 
1. Apology, 48; III, 54. 2. ! Treatise ~ the Soul, 33; III, 215. 
3. ~Soul's Testimony, 4; In, 177. 
4. Apology, 48; m, 54. 
fire. There is no hope of salvation in the "lower world," 
where even the good and those destined for Paradise must pay 
the exaot equivalent in suffering of their debt to God. 
There is certainly no hope of deliverance beyond the judge-
ment. Both body and soul. are to be punished in hell. They 
are not to be annihilated; that would be to consume them, 
not to punish them; but the fire of hell is everlasting, and 
so is its punishment. It is not a merely human murder--
which is temporal--but a never-ending killing.l 
Now, such a sentence of everlasting duration, whether it be to unend-
ing reward or endless punishment, seems inconsistent with God's prac-
tice of judging according to the merits of the present moment. A 
sentence to everlasting punishment would be due only if a man's life 
had been who~ evil and had in it no good for which he might deserve 
a reward. Likewise a reward of everlasting bliss is consistent for 
a God who is concerned with judging fairly according to the merits of 
the present moment only when a person's life is entire~ free fram sin 
or evil, which would deserve punishment. Nor is the inconsistenqy re-
moved by assuming that the final judgment is concerned w1 th the pre-
ponderance of good or evil in a person's life and, therefore, God may 
judge even here according to the same principle. It is not possible 
to strike an average to determine whether a person is predominantly 
good or evil, for good is different from evil and the one cannot be 
cancelled by the other. The fact that either good or evil may pre-
dominate in a man 1 s life in terms of total amount cannot negate the 
fact of the other's presence. If, however, God should issue an eternal 
decree of reward or punishment according to whether a man at the last 
moment happened to be caught in a good or an evil deed, Be would be 
1. Theology .2!_ Tertullian, p. 216. 
acting consistently with the principle of judging according to the 
merits of the present moment but His action would be so harsh and 
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capricious that all men would have to regard His goodness as a gross 
fiction. 
In Tertullian, as well as in both Irenaeus and Clement, we have 
been conscious of a problem at this point. While each of these men 
has tried in every way possible to show the goodness of divine judg-
ment, there remains an inescapable and inexplicable feeling that good-
ness and judgment are not the same, which seems to lurk in the back-
ground of their thinking and to creep out from time to time in their 
language. It seems that judgment can be at best but a 11foreign work" 
of goodness. This background uncertainty of a complete identity of 
goodness and justice comes out in Tertullian at several points. In 
one passage he says: 
If man had never sinned, he would simply and solely have 
known God in his superlative goodness, from the attribute 
of His nature. But now he experiences Him to be a just 
God also, from the necessity of a cause; still, however, 
retaining under this very circumstance His excellent good-
ness, at the same time that He is also just.l 
The very language, "a just God also11 and "also just," implies an aware-
- -
ness of distinction and difference between goodness and justice. But 
perhaps the clearest example of this is folmd in the passage in which, 
after reminding his reader that he has already demonstrated God's pos-
session of a twofold character of judgment and goodness, he s~s: 
Now these two attributes, however different they be, cannot 
1. Resurrection .2f ~Flesh, 14; In, 554. 
possib~ make two gods; for they have already ••• been 
found to meet in One.l 
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In spite of his attempts to demonstrate the identity of goodness and 
justice, Tertullian may still have thought them to be different. At 
aqy rate, it is hard to avoid speaking--and also thinking--of them as 
different, for in contrast to the various expressions of goodness 
that are self-evident~ good judgm=mt involves punishment, which 
seems to the one punished to be an evil. Since, therefore, Tertullian 
has labored so hard to show that the punishment aspect of judgment is 
consistent with goodness, perhaps his recognition of a difference 
between them is mere~ an accommodation to the language and thought 
patterns of the people. Although he believes that judgment even in 
its negative sense is a good, hemust, in referring to it, contrast 
it with the good easi~ recognized as good because it~ different. 
In seeming contrast to much that has been said, Roberts points 
out that even though Tertullian pays lip service in large measure to 
the Divine goodness and, at times in his polemic against Marcion, 
refers to it as even more fundamental in God than justice, yet justice 
seems to dominate in the working out of his thought and punitive 
justice definitely has the last word. 
The two chief attributes of God are goodness and justice. 
The former of these would, if it were given an adequate 
place in the character of God, or even if Tertullian con-
sistent~ gave it the prominence in his own thought that 
he does in his polemic against Marcion, go a long way toward 
relieving the bare justice which stands out so cold and rigid. 
But, despite the eloquent description of the goodness of God 
1. Against Marcion, v, 11; III, 453. 
which TertuJlian gives as an eternal attribute, which is 
manifested in His dealings with man, we must aclmowledge 
that it is in the heat of his ardour against the doctrines 
of Mareion who taught that the God of the Old Testament was 
just but not good, rather than a dominant conviction of the 
inherent goodness of God, which led Tertullian to place the 
attribute of goodness beside that of justice in his descrip-
tion of the character of God. The dominant idea in his mind 
is that of the justice of God. • • • When God is thought of 
as the Great Supreme, the Fountain of Righteousness, the out-
come for feeble, sinful man is terrible indeed. The order of 
the divine attributes inscribed upon the portal of hell is, 
according to Dante, Power, Wisdom, Love. If such an abode 
is the logical deduction from the God whose attributes rank 
in that order, what wonder that from a God who is Power and 
Righteousness alone, with no leaven of Love, men were led to 
the conclusion that even upon the abode of earth for the 
multitude the doom is inscribed: "Abandon hope ye who enter 
here."l 
1. Mer~, Grace, and Compassion 
a. Mercy 
God's justice or judgment is not properly conceived until it is 
seen in conjunction with His mer~. Because God is merciful, He pa-
tient:cy withholds the execution of His judgment, forgives and pardons 
the iniquities of those who repent, and in His compassion provides laws 
and warnings for man1s direction. 
One of the ways in which God's mercy finds expression is the 
patience with which he deals with wrong-doers. 
Nay, this very long-suffering of the Creator will tend to 
the condemnation of Marcion; that patience, (I mean,) which 
waits for the sinner's repentance rather than his death, 
which prefers mer~ to sacrifice, averting from the Ninevites 
the ruin which had been already announced against them, and 
vouchsafing to Hezekiah 1 s tears an extension of his life, 
1. Theology of Tertullian, pp. 238-39. 
and restoring his kingly state to the monarch of Babylon 
after his complete repentance; that merqy, too, which con-
ceded to the devotion of the people the son of Saul when 
about to die, and gave free forgiveness to David on his 
confessing his sins against the house of Uriah; which also 
restored the house of Israel as often as it condemned it, 
and addressed to it consolation no less frequently than re-
proof. Do not therefore look at God simply as Judge, but 
turn your attention also to examples of His conduct as the 
Most Good. Noting Him, as you do, when He takes vengeance, 
consider Him likewise when He shows mercy. In the scale, 
against His severity place His gentleness.l 
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In this passage patience seems to be a s.ynonym for mercy in most aspects 
of its manifestation, including the holding back of punishment, for-
giveness and pardon, and the compassion or pity that leads to comfort 
and benevolence. At the same time, the grammatical structure and ar-
rangement of the passage suggests that Tertullian is contrasting pa-
tience and mercy even while identifying them. The impression of their 
distinctness is conveyed by other passages also. 
It is well, therefore, that he premised the attribute of 
the most good God as most patient over the wicked, and most 
abundant in mercy and kindness over such as acknowledlred 
and bewailed their sins, as the Ninevi.tes were doing.2 
So, again, mercy on account of the erring, and patience on 
account of the impenitent, • • .3 
Perhaps, as these passages seem to indicate, Tertullian intends the 
word patience when applied in a narrow and particular sense to mean 
the holding back prior to a man's repentance of the punishment justice 
demands, even though it may be applied in a larger sense to the whole 
range of merciful acts; while at the same time he intends that mercy 
1. !gainst Marcion, ii, 17; III, 310-11. 
2. ~., ii, 24; III, 315. 3. ~., ii, 16; III, 310. 
240 
sometimes be understood in its widest, and most inclusive sense and 
at other times in the narrow and specific sense of forgiveness, pardon 
and lightening of punishment for the penitent. But regardless of how 
Tertullian intends for these terms, which he sometimes uses as s.ynonyms 
for each other, to be understood, it is clear that one important aspect 
of God's mercy is seen in His withholding for a time the penalty or 
punishment that justice would require. 
As we have already indicated above, another aspect of God's 
mercy is forgiveness, pardon, or even lightening of punishment for 
those who repent. This is another way in which the Creator shows hi.m-
self superior to the god of Marcion. 
Now if the title of Father may be claimed for (Marcion's) 
sterile god, how much more for the Creator? To none other 
than Him is it suitab:Le, who is also 11 the Father of mercies," 
• • • How inflexible was he at the tears of Hezekiah 1 How 
ready to forgive Abab, the husband of Jezebel, the blood of 
Naboth, when he deprecated His anger. Haw prompt in pardon-
ing David on his confession of his sin--preferring indeed, 
the sinner's repentance to his death, of course because of 
His gracious attribute of merey.l 
He has ever been "most abundant in mercy and kindness over such as 
aclmowledged and bewailed their sins. 11 2 It was for this reason, in-
deed that "the Ninevites obtained forgiveness of their sins from the 
Creator.n3 In his quotation of a passage of Scripture as evidence of 
the Creator's goodness, we see this relationship between mercy and for-
giveness. 
Concerning the forgiveness of sins, Micah also says: "Who 
1. ~., v, 11; TII, 452. 
3. ~., iv, 10; III, 358. 
2. ~., ii, 24; III, 315. 
is a God like unto Thee? pardoning iniquity, and passing 
by the transgressions of the remnant of Thine heritage. He 
retaineth not His anger as a testimony against them because 
He delighteth in mercy. He will turn again, and will have 
compassion upon us; He wipeth away our iniquities, and casteth 
our sins into the depths of the sea.nl 
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The clause "because He delighteth in mercy" shows that for Micah mercy 
is the parent of forgiveness and, since his words are quoted without 
reservation, for Tertullian as well. 
God's mercy shows itself also in laws and warnings, which are 
designed for man's welfare, to lead him toward salvation. As we noted 
in discussing the expression of God1s goodness in commandments and warn-
ings, Tertullian says that the law, imposed on man by the goodness of 
God, was aimed at man's happiness and at drawing man into fellowship 
with God. The threat of punishment was attached to the law to insure 
man's obedience, but it was never God's desire that the penalty be in-
curred. The law was for man's welfare and was an indication of God's 
goodness and mercy.2 Thus, we see, as with Irenaeus and Clement, mercy 
does not operate merely as a consequence of human sin, in the form of 
patience, forgiveness, and pardon; but mercy also operates prior to 
sin in all the things that work toward salvation. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that Tertullian sometimes 
speaks of mercy as a general compassion or pit,r for man's estate that 
results in God's providence and acts of benevolence. 
Compassion also does He teach: "Be ye merciful," says he, 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., ii, 4; III, 300. 
"as your Father also that had mercy upon you." This in-
junction will be of a piece with, "Deal tey bread to the 
hungry; and if he be houseless, bring him into thine house; 
and if thou seest the naked, cover him;" also with, "Judge 
the fatherless, plead with the widow." I recognize here 
that ancient doctrine of Him who "prefers mercy to sacri-
fice."l 
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Since one is enjoined to be merciful as God is merciful by feeding 
the hungry and clothing the naked, it is evident that God's provision 
for human needs is an expression of His mercy. His mercy is shown 
through His repeated reminders that "the poor, and the orphan, and 
the widow should be protected, assisted and refreshed. 11 2 Such pity 
for man's law estate culminated in God's incarnation for the sake of 
mankind3 and is revealed especia~ in the universality of Christ's 
invitation to salvation. "Henceforth Christ extended to all men the 
law of His Father 1 s compassion, excepting none from His mercy, as He 
omitted none in his invitation. 114 
Not only is God merciful but His mercy is wholly unlike its 
human counterpart, for God's mercy is perfect whereas human mercy 
is not. 
Him whom you do not deny to be God, you confess to be not 
human; because, when you confess Him to be God, you have, 
in fact, already determined that He is undoubtedly diverse 
from every sort of human conditions •••• For we indeed 
do not possess them in perfection, because it is God alone 
who is perfect.5 
There can be little doubt, from the nature of the ccncept above, 
1. Against Marcion, iv, 17; III, 373. 
3. ~., ii, 28; III, 319. 
5. ~., ii, 16; III, 310. 
2. ~., iv, 16; III, 372. 
4. ~., iv, 16; III, 372. 
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that mer~ is an expression of goodness; but in the passage immedi-
ately above and another referred to earlier in this section Tertul-
lian' s own words show it to be so. He speaks innnediateJ.zy- above of 
goodness as the parent of mercy and earlier of mer~ as a highest 
form of goodness. 
Do not therefore look at God simply as Judge, but turn your 
attention also to examples of His conduct as the Most Good. 
Noting Him, as you do, when He takes vengeance, consider 
Him likewise when He shows mercy .1 
b. Grace 
The term grace is used sometimes as a synonym for goodness and 
also for mercy in general or in one of its particular aspects. When 
Tertu1lian says, "For the herald of good, that is, of God's 'grace'" 
he seems to identify the terms good and grace. 2 'When he asks the 
polytheists of the nations whether God will 11prostitute before men 
the attribute of His inexhaustible grace and mer~" he seems to treat 
grace and mercy as s.ynonymous terms since both terms constitute a 
single attribute.3 Again, he treats SEaee and mercy synonymously when 
he says that God is "the Father of mercies" and has been described in 
the prophets as 11full of compassion, and gracious, and plenteous in 
mercy."4 And when he says "For neither does grace exist, except after 
offence; nor peace, except after war,n5 he seems to be identifying 
1. ~., ii, 17; III, 311. 2. ~., v, 5; m, 438. 
3. ~ Nationes, ii, 7; III, 135. 
4. Against Marcion, v, 11; III, 452. 
5. ~., v, 5; III, 438. 
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grace with forgiveness, which has been shown to an aspect of mercy. 
Tertullian sometimes thinks of grace as the unmerited divine 
favor that results in provision for man's needs and happiness. "Learn 
then the goodness of our God amidst these things and up to this point; 
learn it from His excellent works, from His kin~ blessings, from 
His indulgent bounties, from his gracious providences •111 God's grace 
is seen in His showering upon man undeserved blessings, both material 
and spiritual. It becomes especi~ apparent when He is seen in con-
trast with Marcion 1 s god. 
How can he be kind who had previously shown no evidences 
of such a kindness as this, which consists to us of the 
loan of sunshine and rain?--who is not destined to receive 
from the human race (the homage due to that) Creator,--who, 
up to this very moment, in return for His vast liberality 
in the gift of the elements, bears with men while they offer 
to idols, more readily than Himself, the due returns of His 
graciousness. But God is truly kind even in spiri tua.l 
blessings.2 --- ---
Grace also means, for Tertullian, divine guiding and empowering. 
This may be the meaning of the tem in a passage where the word grace 
is ambiguous: "It is the office of Christ' a gospel to call men from 
the law to grace, not from the Creator to another god.n3 However, 
since the intention here could be to contrast human merit and un-
merited divine favor, we cannot draw any definite conclusion from this 
quotation. Another passage, however, demonstrates this as a meaning 
1. ~., ii, 4; TII, 300. Italics mine. 
2. Ibid., iv, 17; III, 373. 
-
3. Ibid., v, 2; III, 432. 
-
of grace quite elearzy. 
And, would that this "blushing" would bring a remedy, so 
that shame for not exhibiting that which we go to suggest 
to others should[prove a tutorship into exhibiting it; 
except that the magnitude of same good things--just as of 
some ills too--is insupportable, so that only the grace of 
divine inspiration is effectual for attaining and practis-
ing them. For what is most good rests most with God; nor 
does aqy other than He who possesses it;-d!spense it, as 
He deems meet to each.l 
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Some good things obviously can not be obtained by unaided human effort 
but are obtainable only through divine inspiration and empowerment. 
Roberts says, 11The grace of God is almost absent from the thought 
of Tertullian.n2 From the evidence adduced above, it is apparent that 
this statement represents some exaggeration. However, it is true, as 
Roberts probably would agree, that, even though the concept of grace 
appears in his writing, the relative emphasis he gives it in compari-
son to the necessity of human acts of obedience to the divine law is 
rather slight. 
o. Compassion 
We have already noted how Tertullian sometimes identifies cam-
passion and mercy. Compassion, or compassionate acts, may be regarded 
as an aspect of mercy; while at the same time the showing of mercy may 
be an expression of the feeling of compassion. Because compassion, 
regarded as an attitude similar to love, may be the motive behind 
numerous particular acts of mercy and kindness and behind all of God's 
efforts tdWard human salvation, including the sending of Christ, this 
1. ~Patience, 1; III, 101. 2. Theology~ Tertullian, p. 225. 
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short paragraph has been added to show that compassion might be re-
garded as another form of God's goodness. 
This1 however1 is as close as he attains to the New Testament 
conception of the love of God. "It is noteworthy1 11 says Roberts1 
"that to Tertullian the goodness and the justice of God are the attri-
butes of the greatest importance1 and that he never attains to the 
New Testament conception of the love of God.ul The judgment of Loofs 
is true: 
Auch er betont vornehmlich die Gerechtigkeit und G~te 
Gottes und versteht die neutestamentliche Gedanken von der 
Liebe Gottes und der Liebe zu Gott nicht besser ala die 
Apologeten.2 
8. Work of Christ 
Another expression of the goodness of God is found in the work 
of Christ. The purpose of Christ's coming is stated in a number of 
ways1 all conveying essentially the same meaning. It was his mission 
"to introduce a new generation ••• into the promised land which 
flows with milk and honey, that is, into the possession of eternal 
life. 113 11He appeared among us1 whose coming" was intended 11to reno-
vate and illuminate man's na. ture. tt4 He was meant to be the great 
"Enlightener and Trainer of the human race. 115 It was the function of 
1. Theology£!: Tertullian, p. 130. 
2. Friedrich Armin Loofs, Leitfaden ~ Studium der Dogmengeschichte 
(rev. ed; Halle: Niemeyer, 190S), p. 153. 
3. Against Marcion, iii, 16; III1 334-35. 
4. Apologz, 21; III, 34. 5.~. 
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his gospel "to call men from the law to grace.ul Indeed, he accom-
plished the redemption of mankind.2 But all of these were simply the 
outgrowth of his main work, which was to reveal God. His revelation 
would enlighten men and point them to the truth whose acceptance would 
transform their lives.3 
. 
Roberts maintains that the purpose of Christ' s life and work was 
not so much the revealing of God as the redemption of man. He says: 
We have already seen that the birth, life, and death of 
Christ are, according to Tertullian, inseparably connected 
in one great purpose. What that purpose was it is now neces-
sary to determine. 
Was it to reveal the Father? There is no development of 
this idea in the writings of Tertullian, though he was not 
unaware of it. There is no elaborate doctrine of the Logos 
as the revealer of the Father such as is found in the writings 
of Clement and Origen, because there is not the same philo-
sophical background. TertuJ 1 ian did not regard the Father 
as unlmowable, without attributes or qualities, as those 
writers did. He appreciated the knowledge of God derived 
from the observation of the works of His hands, from the 
witness of the Old Testament writers and from the testimony 
of the same, and, as a natural result, the revelational 
function of the Logos sank out of sight. But there are 
indications that he recognized the function of Christ, 
as the revealer of the Father, as one side of His activity, 
though not as the main purpose of His coming. He says of 
Christ, "He had to announce to the world the mighty purpose 
of the Fathe1, even that which ordained the restoration of 
man." He speaks of Christ as the Revealer of the Father. 
In the Old Testament He was the Lord who there appeared to 
man. He was the visible, as contrasted with the invisible 
God. And in his incarnate life He gave the fullest revela-
tion of God, but that was not the chief purpose of the in-
carnation. 
Was it to redeem man? No doubt that was the maili purpose 
of His coming, in the opinion of Tertullian. 4 
1. Asainst Marcion, v, 2; III, 432. 2. ~., v, 7; m, 443. 
3. Apology, 21; III, 36. 
4. Theology- of Tertullian, p. 178. 
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There is obviously some inconsistenqy here, since Roberts first s~s 
that there is no development of the idea of Christ as revealer of God 
in Tertullian and then proceeds to show how Tertullian does develop 
the idea. It really is senseless to debate the issue of whether Christ's 
main purpose was the revelation of God or the redemption of man, for 
both are parts of a single purpose in the mind of Tertulli.an. It is 
no doubt true that Tertullian believed the salvation of man to be the 
final objective of Christ's life and work, but necessar.y for man's 
salvation, he believed, was God's self-manifestation, the full accam-
plishment of which was the reason for Christ's incarnation. Christ 
became the revealer of God and His way for man in order to accomplish 
man's salvation. Whether the purpose of his incarnation is described 
in terms of revealing God or saving man will depend upon the point 
from which one views the total purpose. 
We have already seen how important Tertullian regards self-
revelation on the part of God to be. It is necessary not only as a 
proof of His existence but as a sign of His goodness as well. Although 
He has made some revelation of Himself in nature and in the words of 
the Scriptures, an adequate revelation of Himself is found only in 
Christ.l "By whom has God ever been found without Christ?n2 It is 
God's intention to reveal Himself more fully and to share His life 
with man that lies behind the incarnation. 
God would have been unable to hold any intercourse with men, 
if He had not taken on Himself the emotions and affections 
1. Above, pp. 220-22. 2. ! Treatise .2!! the Soul, 1; m, 181. 
of men, by means of which He could temper the strength of 
His majesty, which would no doubt have been incapable of 
endurance to the moderate capacit.Y of man, by such a humilia-
tion as was indeed degrading to Himself, but necessary for 
man.l 
Those qualities which you censure as unworthy must be sup-
posed to be in the Son, who has been seen, and heard, and 
encountered, the Witness and the Servant of the Father, 
uniting in Himself man and God, God in mighty deeds, in 
weak ones man, in order that He might give to man as much 
as He takes from God. What in your esteem is the entire 
disgrace of my God, is in fact the sacrament of man's sal-
vation. God held converse with man, that man might learn 
to act as God. God dealt on equal terms with man, that man 
might be able to deal on equal terms with God. God was found 
little, that man might become very great.2 
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Since we have already shown self-revelation to be a form of Di-
vine goodness, it is evident that in so far as it is a revelation of 
God the work of Christ must be an expression of goodness. But since 
the whole of his work is aimed at the salvation of man, or, to put 
it in other words, is intended for man1s good, his work in its en-
tirety must be regarded as an expression of goodness. In a passage 
quoted earlier, Tertullian tells us that the goodness of God, having 
created man for the purpose of knowing God, prepared for man both a 
lower world and a higher world, that after suitable practice and ad-
vance in the good of the lower world he might be promoted to God's 
best. "In this good work God employs a most excellent minister, even 
His own Word. 'My heart' He says, 'hath emitted my most excellent 
Word. 1 u3 
1. Against Marcion, ii, 27; III, 318. 
3. Ibid., ii, 4; III, 299. 
2. Ibid., ii, 27; III, 319. 
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The work of Christ is clearly God1 s goodness because of Christ's 
relationship to God. Christ was sent by God. "From Him, therefore 
amongst the '.!:!! things' comes also Christ.nl His coming was prean-
nounced by God, which is not surprising, since he is God's own Son.2 
From the very beginning he acted in his Father's name.3 It was he who 
communed with the patriarchs and prophets, he who was "the Son of the 
Creator," the Word of God, 11whom God made His Son by emitting Him from 
His own self, and thenceforth set H1ln over every dispensation and 
(administration of) His will. 114 The intimacy of this relationship Ter-
tullian sets forth in a long and technically-worded passage: 
And we, in like manner, hold that the Word, and Reason, and 
Power, by which we have said God made all, have spirit as 
their proper and essential substratum, in which the Word was 
inbeing to give forth utterances, and reason abides to dis-
pose and arrange, and power is overall to execute. We have 
been taught that He proceeds forth from God, and in that pro-
cession He is generated; so that He is the Son of God, and is 
called God from unity of substance with God. For God, too, 
is a Spirit. Even when the ra:y is shot from the sun, it is 
still part of the parent mass; the sun will still be in the 
ray, because it is a ray of the sun--there is no division of 
the substance, but merely an extension. Thus Christ is Spirit 
of Spirit, and God of God, as light of light is kindled. The 
material matrix remains entire and unimpaired, though you de-
rive from it any number of shoots possessed of its qualities; 
so, too, that which has come out of God is at once God and the 
Son of God, and the two are one. In this way also, as He is 
Spirit of Spirit and God of God, He is made a second in man-
ner of existence--in position, not in nature; and ije did not 
w.i thdraw from the original source, but went forth.S 
1. ~., v, 7; In, 444. 2. Apology, 21; III, 34. 
3. Against Marcion, iv, 10,; m, 358. 
4. Ibid., ii, 27; III, 318. 
-
5. Apolo~, 21; m, 34. 
Since Christ is an extension of or procession from God~ the goodness 
of his work must be an aspect of the goodness of God. 
9. SaJ.vation 
Certainly the salvation of man is to be included among the ex-
pressions of God's goodness. When Tertullian attributes the forma-
tion of man and of a lower habitation which is probationary to a 
higher one--that man might progress from God1 s good to His best--to 
the goodness of God~l he seems to be referring to salvation and to be 
attributing it to God's goodness. At least twice in the course of 
his criticism of Ma.rcion1 s god, he says that salvation is an operation 
of goodness.2 Although with the Marcionites salvation is the prin-
ciple expression of their god1 s goodness3 and, as with Clement, it 
could very logically be with Tertullian~ he makes no explicit state-
ment to that effect. There can be no doubt, however, that salvation 
comes from the same God who is Creator and Judge. 
Since, however, these two attributes of goodness and justice 
do together make up the proper fulness of the Divine Being 
as omnipotent, I am able to content myself with having now 
compendiously refuted his Antitheses, which aim at drawing 
distinctions out of the qualities of the (Creator's) arti-
fices, of His laws, or of His great works; and thus sundering 
Christ from the Creator, as the Most Good from the Judge, 
as One who is merciful from Him who is ruthless, and One 
who brings salvation from Him who causes ruin. The truth 
is, they rather unite the two Beings whom they arrange in 
1. Against Marcion~ ii, 4; ni, 299. 
2. ~., i, 24; III, 28~ and i, 25; III, 291. 
3. ~·~ 1, 17; III, 283. 
those diversities (of attribute), which yet are compatible 
in God.l 
252 
Not only are creation, judgment, and salvation shown by this passage 
to be the work of the same Being, but the fact that ttGood" and 11 sal-
vation11 appear on the same side of the above series of contrasts is 
a further proof that salvation is itself an expression of the Divine 
goodness. 
The failure of Marcion's god to save all men indicates a defec-
tive goodness, since, salvation being an operation of goodness and 
Marcion's god being one of simple goodness, there is no reason for 
him not to save all except unwillingness or inability, both of which 
are unworthy of God.2 But for God, who is just as well as good, it 
is perfect~ proper not to save all, but only those deserving salva-
tion. 
God will be angry, w.i. th perfect reason, w.i. th all who deserve 
His wrath; and with reason, too, w.i.ll God desire whatever 
objects and claims are worthy of Himself. For He will shaw 
indignation against the evil man, and for the good man will 
he desire salvation.3 
But not only w.i.ll a simple goodness appear malevolent if it fails to 
redeem all, but also it will be ineffectual in attempting to do so 
because it lacks the necessary accompanying endowments, that is, 
"those sensations and affections whereby it carries out its purpose 
against" what it deems evil.4 
But it is here sufficient that the extreme perversity 
1. Against Marcion, ii, 29; ni, 320. 2. ~., i, 24; m, 289. 
3. ! Treatise~ the Soul, 16; In, 195. 
4. Against Marcion, i, 25; In, 291. 
of their god is proved from the mere exposition of his 
lonely goodness, in which they refuse to ascribe to him 
such emotions of mind as they censure in the Creator. 
Now, if he is susceptible of no feeling of rivalr,y, or 
anger, or damage, or injur,y, as one who refrains from 
exercising judicial power, I cannot tell how any system 
of discipline--and that, too, a plena~ one--can be con-
sistent with him. For how is it possible that he should 
issue commands, if he does not mean to execute them; or 
forbid sins, if he intends not to punish them, but rather 
to decline the functions of the judge, as being a stranger 
to all notions of severity and judicial chastisement? For 
why does he forbid the commission of that which he punishes 
not when perpetrated?l 
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Tertullian seems to be s~ing that, while salvation is the operation 
of goodness, it can not be the result of a simple goodness but only 
of a complex one, in which justice and other rationally essential 
attributes are blended with the will to do good. The fact that God 
saves proves His goodness; while the fact that He does not save all 
is no evidence against it nor detraction from it. 
10. Resurrection, Eternal Life, and Eternal Punishment 
For Tertullian the resurrection is basic to both eternal life 
and eternal punishment. Although he believes the soul to continue in 
existence after death, yet, since it cannot fully enjoy either good or 
evil without the body, it must be reunited w.lth its body before it can 
undergo judgment.2 Indeed, this is a main reason why the restorati.on 
of the body takes place at all.3 But, also, the restoration must 
occur because the judgment is one of the person conceived as a unity 
1. ~., i, 26; III, 291. 
2. Soul's TestimoAY, 4; III, 177. 3. A£ology, 48; III, 53. 
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of body and soul.. "There would be no grounds for judgment without 
the presentation of the very person to whom the sufferings of jud.g-
ment were due.nl 
And therefore the body too will appear; for the soul is not 
capable of suffering without the solid substance (that is, 
the flesh; and for this reason, also) that it is not right 
that souls should have all the wrath of God to bear: they 
did not sin without the body, within which all was done by 
them.2 
Argument after argument is employed to prove the resurrection of the 
b~. The argument suggested in the passage above is repeated else-
where: that, since man is a union of two natures, God1 s justice re-
quires the resurrection of the body.3 "God would be unjust, if any 
one were not punished or else rewarded in that very condition, where-
in the merit was itself achieved. 114 Also, the Apostle Paul is quoted 
in defense of the resurrection of the body.5 
However, the resurrection and the judgment do not occur i.mmedi-
ately after death. Prior to them 11every soul is detained in safe 
keeping in Hades until the day of the Lord. 116 At death all souls~ 
except those of the martyrs, who go immediate~ into the presence of 
the Lord,7 pass into the lower world where they remain until the resur-
rection. Good and bad alike are there,B receiving punishment or 
1. Soul's Testimony, 4; III, 177. 2. Apologr, 48; III, 53. 
3. Resurrection~~ Flesh, 14; III, 554-55. 
4. Against Marcion, v, 12; m, 456. 5. ~., v, 9; III, 447. 
6. !. Treatise ~ the ~~ 55; III, 231. 
7. ~ the Resurrection~~ Flesh, 43; III, 576. 
8. ! Treatise ~ the Soul, 56; III, 2.33. 
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consolation in accordance with their deserts, in anticipation of gloom 
or glory.l The division of souls into good and bad is the only reason-
able position to take, since it would not be just for the righteous 
and wicked to fare alike. 2 The soul is capable of experiencing certain 
emotions apart from the boqy and, being responsible for certain sins 
of attitude, it is only right that it suffer punishment or reward, for 
these.3 And since the soul initiates the action of the boqy in its 
sin, it is only right that it be the first to suffer.4 
In short, inasmuch as we understand "the prison" pointed 
out in the Gospel to be Hades, and as we also interpret 
11 the uttermost farthering 11 to mean the very smallest offence 
which has to be recompensed there before the resurrection, 
no one will hesitate to believe that the soul undergoes in 
Hades some compensatory discipline, without prejudice to 
the full process of the resurrection, when the recompense 
will be administered through the flesh besides.5 
Roberts comments: 
The legal cast of Tertullian's thought is here obvious. 
Remission of sin by the atonement of Christ is 1mthought 
of. Any atonement for sin which is made is personal, and 
is exact~ equivalent to the wrong done. Likewise every 
reward is proportioned to the desert of the individual 
soul. The preference accorded to the martyrs is based 
on the same legal view. They have bought the right of 
entrance to Paradise by their awn blood. 6 
After the resurrection and the judgment the person enters either 
into eternal life or eternal death, or everlasting punishment. In 
1. Ibid., 58; III, 234. 2. Ibid., .58; III, 235. 
-
3. Ibid. 4. !!?.!!!· 
-
5. Ibid. 
-
6. Theology ~ Tertullian, P• 207. 
either case, one 1s condition lasts for ever.l 
When, therefore, the boundary and limit, that millenial 
interspace, has been passed, when even the outward fashion 
of the world itself ••• passes away, then the whole human 
race shall be raised again, to have its dues meted out ac-
cording as it has merited in the period of good or evil, 
and thereafter to have these paid out through the immeasur-
able ages of eternit,r. Therefore after this there is neither 
death nor repeated resurrections, but we shall be the same 
that we are now, and still unchanged--the servants of God, 
ever with God, clothed upon with the proper substance of 
eternity; but the profane, and all who are not true worship-
pers of God, in like manner shall be consigned to the punish-
ment of everlasting fire--that fire which, from its very 
nature indeed, directly ministers to their incorruptibility.2 
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Both the righteous and the unrighteous are resurrected for an eternal 
existence. But only the righteous enter that state of bliss that may 
be called eternal life, while the unrighteous inherit eternal death, 
or everlasting punishment. Tertullian uses the Scriptural passage 
about God's ever watching those who fear Him, to rescue them from 
death and to nourish them in their hunger, to show that God rewards 
the righteous with eternal life.3 
Tertullian 1s doctrine of resurrection and judgment is set forth 
here because in his system both the resurrection and the two aspects 
of judgment appear as expressions of God's goodness. Since eternal 
life is evidently a synonym for salvation, which has already been 
shown to be a work of go9dness, it will be clearly recognized as an 
expression of the Divine goodness. But this is further known to be 
Tertullian's own thinking when he approves Jesus' declaration that 
1. Soul's Testimony, 4; III, 177. 2. !£ology, 48; III, 53-54. 
3. Against Marcion, ii, 19; III, 312. 
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"the name of God and of the Good11 belong 11 to one and the same being, 
at whose disposal were also the everlasting life and the treasure in 
heaven. 111 Both Tertullian and Ma.rcion agreed that salvation was a 
result of God1s goodness. But Tertullian argues that since Marcion 1s 
god saves the soul but not the body, the salvation accomplished by 
him is an imperfect one and indicates an imperfect goodness. 
Now, Whence comes this halving of salvation, if not from 
a failure of goodness? What could have been a better proof 
of a perfect goodness, than the recovery of the Whole man to 
salvation? ••• Far different is our condition in the sight 
of Him who is the Author, the Judge, the injured Head of our 
race! You display Him as a merely good God; but you are 
unable to prove that He is perf~ctly good, because you are 
not by Him perfectly delivered. 
Thus, while the resurrection is not identical with salvation, it is 
a manifestation of God 1s goodness because it is instrumental to a 
perfect salvation. But it is expressive of goodness on another ac-
count as well. It is also a sign of God 1s judgment in the sense of 
eternal punishment. As we have seen, Tertullian regards this negative 
aspect of judgment, even in the form of everlasting punishment, as in-
dicative of God1s goodness because it shows clearly his eternal oppo-
sition to evil. It is proper for God to punish the evil-doer, for in 
showing His enmity toward evil He reveals His goodness and in destroy-
ing evil He shows Himself a defender of goodness.3 
By both succouring the good and punishing the evil, He dis-
plays His justice, and at the same time makes both processes 
1. Ibid., iv, 36; III, 4J.O. 
3. Ibid., i, 26; III, 292. 
2. Ibid., i, 24; III, 290. 
contribute proofs of His goodness, whilst on the one hand 
He deals vengeance, and on the other dispenses reward.l 
c. ~Meaning of Divine Goodness Implied in~ Human Good 
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A brief description of Tertullian1 s conception of the human good 
is given here, in order to show the basis for additional inferences 
concerning the goodness of God. 
1. Nature of the Human Good 
a. Characteristics 
(1) Derivative~ learned.--While God's goodness is innate and 
without extrinsic origin, man's goodness is derived and learned, since 
it is not by some essential nature he possesses apart from God that he 
is disposed toward goodness but because of the way he has been con-
stituted by creation.2 
To be sure, man has been endowed with freedom,3 but only the 
discipline of God can teach man the proper use of his freedom.4 While 
one can learn something of God Qy observing the world of nature, it 
is knowledge "afar offU and leaves one in ignorance of the particular 
things God enjoins and forbids.5 Even the lmowledge one gains from 
nature comes .from God.6 As Roberts comments, 11Nature is the teacher 
1. Resurrection 2.£ ~ Flesh, 14; In, 554. 
2. !gainst Marcion, ii, 6; III, 302. 
4. ~., iv, 16; ni, 372. 
6. ~ Soul's Testimony, S; In, 178. 
3. Ibid. 
S. ~ Spectaculis, 2; Ill, 80. 
of the soul, and God is the teacher of nature.nl 
From God you may learn about that which you hold of God; 
but from none else will you get this knowledge, if you 
get it not from God. For who is to reveal that which God 
has hidden.2 
No solution may be found by any man, but such as is learned 
from God; and that which is learned of God is the sum and 
substance of the whole thing.3 
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Only Christians have a proper knowledge of good, for they are "taught 
of God Himself what goodness is."4 Heathen systems of morality, rest-
ing as they do upon mere human wisdom and authority, are deficient, 
for "man's wisdom to point out what is good, is no greater than his 
authority to exact the keeping of it; the one is as easily deceived 
as the other is despised."5 
But human goodness is dependent upon God, not only for knowledge 
of what constitutes it, but also for the grace to enact it. For some 
good things are so great that they can neither be attained or practiced 
without the aid of divine grace and inspiration. The highest good de-
pends for the most part upon God and becomes man's possession only when 
He bestows it or helps man to attain it.6 
(2) Voluntary.-~ile human goodness is derivative and learned, 
it is at the same time voluntary. Since it was God's intention to 
make man in His own image, He endowed human beings with free-will, 
1. Theology of Tertullian, p. 66. 
2. ! Treatise ~ the Soul, 1; III, 182. 
3. Ibid., 2; III, 183. 
5. Ibid. 
4. Apology, 45; III, 5o. 
6. On Patience, 1; III, 707. 
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with complete power for obedience or disobedience, for good or evil.1 
Free-will is necessary for man to possess a goodness that is truly his 
own. God might have created man good, but this would have been a 
goodness of necessity and therefore not truly man's own. 1~o, then, 
is pre-eminent in goodness? he who is not allowed, or he wham it dis-
pleases, to be evil? he who is bidden, or he whose pleasure it is to 
be free from cr:l.me?"2 
In order, therefore, that man might possess a goodness of 
his own, bestowed on him by God, and there might be hence-
forth in man a property, and in a certain sense a natural 
attribute of goodness, there was assigned to him in the 
constitution of his nature, as a formal witness of the 
goodness which God bestowed upon him, freedom and power 
of the will, such as should cause good to be performed 
spontaneously by man, as a property of his own, on the 
ground that no less than this would be required in the 
matter of a goodness which was to be voluntarily exer-
cised by him, that is to say, by the liberty of his will, 
without either favour or servility to the constitution of 
his nature; so that man .should be good just up to this 
point, if he should display his goodness in accordance with 
his natural constitution indeed, but still as the result 
of his will, as a property of his na. ture .3 
"Freedom, Tertull1an maintains, was essential to the being who was 
made in God's image. Without it he could not have been good; with it 
he might be either good or bad. 114 Good or evil must be freel:y chosen, 
and not of necessity, if it is to be justl:y rewarded or punished or 
judged praiseworthy or blamewortby.5 "Entire freedom of will, therefore, 
1. Against Marcion, ii, 5; ni, 301. 2. On Repentance, 6; III, 662. 
3. Against Marcion, ii, 6; TII, 302. 
4. Roberts, Theology of Tertullian, p. 162. 
5. Against Marcion, ii, 6; III, 302. 
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was conferred upon him in both tendencies. 11 1 Man alone, therefore, 
is to be blamed in his choice of evil, not God on the one hand, nor 
the devil on the other.2 
(3) Natural and inextinguishable.--Though the goodness of human 
character is voluntary and derivative and learned, human nature has a 
primeval goodness which, though capable of being corrupted and ob-
scured, can never be fully lost. Having commented on Tertullian's 
view of original sin, Roberts says: 
But at the same time there is a portion of good in every 
soul. This qualifies the terrible doctrine of the depravity 
of the human race as taught by Tertul J ian. It must not be 
forgotten, he affirms, that the soul is derived from God, 
and that that divine original good persists in a measure. 
It is not extinguished, but obscured.3 
Although human nature has been corrupted, 11still there is a portion of 
good in the soul, of that original, divine, and genuine good, which is 
its proper nature. For that which is derived from God is rather obscured 
than extinguished. It can be obscured, indeed, because it is not God; 
extinguished, however, it cannot be, because it comes from God.u4 
Therefore, even in the worst of men there is something good.5 "Just 
as no soul is without sin, so neither is any soul without seeds of 
good. 116 So deep~ implanted is good in human nature that even evildoers 
l. ~· 2. Exhortation to Chastity, 2; ri, 51. 
3. Theology of Tertullian, p. 165. 
4. ! Treatise~~ Soul, 41; III, 220. 
5-~· 6. Ibid., 41; ni, 221. 
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themselves are never "bold enough to defend evil as good." In short, 
they have an intuitive awareness of the wrongness of their ways, and 
therefore seek to excuse themselves for them.l 
(4) Absolute.--The goodness required of man is absolute, not 
relative. It does not vary in relation to persons but relates to all 
persons alike. 
We never do good with respect of persons; for in our own 
interest we conduct ourselves as those who take no payment 
either of praise or premium from man, but from God, who both 
requires and rennmerates an impartial benevolence. We are 
the same to emperors as to our ordinary neighbors. For we 
are equally forbidden to wish ill, to speak ill, to think 
ill of all men.2 
It is no matter of mere human opinion but rests upon Divine authorit,y.3 
Therefore, it is not relative to time and place but remains unalter-
ably obligatory in all times and in all places. 
Never and nowhere is that free from blame which God ever 
condemns; never and nowhere is it right to do what you may 
not do in all times and in all places. It is the freedom 
of the truth from change of opinion and varying judgments 
which con~tutes its perfection, and gives it its claim 
to full mastery, unchanging reverence, and faithful obe-
dience. That which is really good or really evil cannot 
be ought else. But in all things the truth of God is im-
mutable. 
The heathen, who have not a full revelation of the truth, 
for they are not taught of God, hold a thing evil and good 
as it suits self-will and passion, making that which is good 
in one place evil in apother, and that which is evil in one 
place in another good.4 
1. Ad Nationes, i, 1; III, 109. 2. Apology, 36; III, 44-45. 
3. Ibid., 45; III, 50. 
4. De Spectaculis, 20-21; III, 88. 
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(5) Free of passion.--While heathen may "hold a thing evil and 
good as it suits self-will and passion, nl such is not the case for 
Christians. The goodness that God enjoins is to be wholly free of 
animal passions. 11 Since, then, all passionate excitement is forbidden 
us, we are debarred from every kind of spectacle, and especially from 
the circus, where such excitement presides as in its proper element. 112 
Therefore, 
God has enjoined us to deal cal:mly, gently, quiet~, peace-
f~ with the Ho~ Spirit, because these things alone are 
in keeping with the goodness of His nature, with His tender-
ness and sensitiveness, and not to vex Him with rage, ill-
nature, anger or grief. Well, how shall this be made to 
accord with the shows? For the show always leads to spirit-
ual agitation, since where there is pleasure, there is keen-
ness of feeling giving pleasure its zest; and where there is 
keenness of feeling, there is rivalry giving in turn its zest 
to that. Then, too, where you have rivalry, you have rage, 
bitterness, wrath, and grief, with all bad things which flow 
from them--the whole entire~ out of keeping with the religion 
of Christ.3 
(6) ~ the whole person.--Tertullian is consistent in maintain-
ing that the total person, conceived as a soul-boqy union, must appear 
before God for judgment, for reward or punisbment.4 
Thus it follows that the fulness and perfection of the 
judgment consists simp~ in representing the interests 
of the entire human being. Now, since the entire man 
consists of the union of the two natures, he must there-
fore appear in both, as it is right that he should be judged 
in his entirety; nor, of course, did he pass through life 
except in his entire state. As therefore he lived, so also 
must he be judged, because he has to be judged concerning 
the way in which he lived. For life is the cause of judgment, 
1. Ibid., 2l; m, 88. 2. Ibid., 16; III, 86. 
3. ~., 15; III, 86. 4. ~Soul's Testimony;, 4; III, 177. 
and it must undergo investigation in as many natures as it 
possessed when it discharged its vital fUnctions.l 
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From the fact that judgment is to be passed upon a man in his entirety, 
it would seem that human goodness is a quality of man as a whole, not 
merely of one aspect of his being. There are times, it is true, when 
Tertullia.n' s words do not seem to justify this conclusion. For example, 
at one point he speaks of the soul as the real author of the works of 
the flesh.2 Surely the boqy, he adds, is not to be punished for sins 
for which the soul is responsible.3 It is certainly absurd to attri-
bute sin to a substance which has no character of its own, since it is 
not a true agent.4 While the b~ itself is not subject to judgment 
for its actions, it is resurrected from death because of its inno-
cence.5 While there are these passages that suggest that judgments 
of good and evil apply only to the actions of the soul, there are 
other passages that indicate that the bo~ shares in the praise-
worthiness or blameworthiness of the soul because of its having been 
an accomplice or means in all the actions of the soul. God would be 
unjust ttwere He to exclude from reward the flesh which is associated 
in good works; and idle, were He to exempt it from punishment, when 
it has been an accomplice in evil deeds: whereas human judgment is 
deemed to be the more perfect, when it discovers the agents in every 
1. Resurrection of the Flesh, 14; III, 555. 
2. Against Marcion, v, 10; lli, 451. 
4.! Treatise~ the~~ 40; m, 220. 
5. Resurrection of the Flesh, 16; III, 556. 
3. ~-
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deed, and neither spares~ guiltl nor grudges the virtuous their 
full share of either punishment or praise with the principals who em-
ployed their services. 11 1 The unity of soul and body in goodness is 
further seen in the fact that no soul can win salvation except while 
it is in the nesh. The flesh is the very condition on which saiva-
tion hinges, since it renders the soul capable of the service to God 
by which it deserves salvation. Since the body and the soul have been 
united in their service, they cannot 11be separated in their recom-
pense.tt2 
For how absurd, and in truth how unjust, and in both re-
spects how unworthy of God, for one substance to do the 
work, and another reap the reward: that this flesh of 
ours should be torn by martyTdom, and another wear the 
crown; or, on the other hand, that this flesh of ours 
should wallow in uncleanness, and another receive the 
condemnation t3 
(7) Intrinsic and profitable.-In Tertnllian• ·s description of 
good as intrinsic and profitable may be seen the suggestion of some 
criteria of goodness. Something that is good only in comparison with 
something undesirable or evil is not truly good. A thing that is 
really good will possess its qualification as good because of its 
own nature, not because it is the lesser of two or more evil alterna-
tives. 
I should wish to give a thorough treatment to the inquir,y 
what ld.nd o.f good he is pointing out which is 11better than" 
a penalty; which cannot seem good but by comparison with 
1. Resurrection of the Flesh, 15; III, 555. 
2. ~., 8; III, 551. 3. Ibid., 36; III, 589. 
something very bad •••• 11 Good.11 is worthy of the name if 
it continue to keep that name without comparison, I say not 
with evil, but even with some second good; so that, even if 
it is compared with same other good, and is by some other 
cas~into the shade, it do nevertheless remain in possession 
of the name 11 good. 11 If, however, it is the nature of an 
evil which is the means which compels the predicating 11 good, 11 
It'is not so much 11 good11 as a species of inferior evil, which 
b.y being obscured by a superior evil is driven to the name of 
good.l 
But not onl;r is the truly good such because of an intrinsic 
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quality of its own, but also it is good because it is profitable, or 
instrumental toward the highest good of salvation. 11 ! should prefer 
no good to a vain good: what profits it that that should exist whose 
existence profits not?ll2 
A thing is not 11 good11 merely because it is not 11 evil, 11 nor 
is it 11 ev1111 merely because it is 11 ha.rmful. 11 Further: that 
which is fully 11 good11 excells on this ground, that it is not 
only not harmful, but profitable into the bargain. For you 
are bound to prefer that which is profitable to what is 
(merely) not harmful.3 
Let it now be granted that repetition of marriage is lawful, 
if everything which is lawful is good. The same apostle 
excl.a:ims: 11All things are lawful, but all are not profit-
able." Pray, can what is 11not profitable" be called good? 
If even things which do not make for salvation are II lawful, 11 
it follows that even things which are not good are 11lawful.n 
But what will it be your duty rather to choose; that which 
is good because it is 11lawful, 11 or that which is so because 
it is "profitable?" A wide difference I take to ex:i.st be-
tween "licence" and salvation. Concerning the 11 goodll it 
is not said 11it is lawful;" inasmuch as 4
11 good" does not ex-
pect to be permitted, but to be assumed. 
1. _Q!! Exhortation~ Chastity, 3; IV, 52. 
2. On Modesty, 1; IV, 74. 3. ~ His Wife, i, 3; IV, 40. 
4. ~Exhortation~ Chastity, 8; IV, 54. 
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b. Essence 
(l) Knowledge of ~.--The highest human good is found in 
knowledge of God. Indeed, God created 11man for the pursuit of the 
knowledge of Himself,"l and gave to him free-will that man, because 
of his power of choice, might be wortey of knowing God.2 It was be-
cause there was nothing 11 so good as the lmowledge and fruition of God" 
that God created the universe by which He might be lmown.3 Therefore, 
all men ought to know God. 4 
The knowledge of God is important because ignorance of Him is 
the major cause of human sin. 
The truth is the human race has always deserved ill at 
God's hand. First of all, as undutiful to Him, because 
when it lmew Him in part, it not onl:y did not seek after 
Him, but even invented other gods to worship; and further 
because, as the result of their willing ignorance of the 
Teacher of righteousness, the Judge and A~rter of sin, 
all vices and crimes grew and flourished.,;} 
This is true not merely of a total ignorance of God but also of an 
ignorance that has been enlightened by such partial knowledge as that 
available through natural revelation, for a person who lacks a really 
intimate acquaintance with God "cannot but be in ignorance alike of 
what He enjoins and what He forbids in regard to the administration 
of' His world. 116 
As ignorance of God leads to sin and evil, conversely, knowledge 
1. Against Marcion, ii, 4; III, 299. 
3. ~., ii, 3; III, 299. 
5. Apology, 40; III, 48. 
2. ~., ii, 6; III, 301-302. 
4. ~., v, 5; ni, 439. 
6. E! Spectaculis, 2; m, 80. 
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of God leads to goodness and consequent~ to a fuller, richer life. 
This is the case because one of its first fruits is obedience to the 
instructions and laws of God. The passage quoted above continues: 
But had men sought, they would have come to lmow the glo-
rious object of their seeking; and knowledge would have 
produced obedience, and obedience would have found a gra-
cious instead of an angry God.l 
And, so 
that we might attain an ampler and more authoritative 
knowledge at once of Himself, and of His counsels and 
will, God has added a written revelation for behoof of 
everyone whose heart is set on seeking Him.2 
Indeed, the secret of a Christian's fidelity, purity, and general 
fineness of character is his knowledge of God, whom Plato had said 
it was very hard to discover.3 For with Christians the only' thing 
that n can receive a hearing11 is that which is "suggested by contem-
plating God.n4 
( 2) Obedience to God.--From another point of view, the chief 
human good consists of obedience to God. This conclusion is the cumu-
l.ative import of a number of passages in Tertullian. "Now Christ is 
the man who tells us what is good, even the knowledge of the l.aw.n5 
The most natural inference from this concerning the knowledge desig-
nated as good, would be that such knowledge is not mere intellectual 
1. Apology, 40; III, 48. 2. ~., 18; III, 32. 
3. ~., 46; III, 51. 
4. ! Treatise~~~~ 43; III, 222. 
5. ~ainst Marcion, iv, 36; m, 410. 
cognition of the law, but an acquaintance and understanding of the 
law which includes obedience. This is clearly the import of the 
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following passage and is supported also by the implication of a number 
of other passages. 
But, that we might attain an ampler and more authoritative 
lmowledge at once of Himself, and of His counsels and will, 
God has added a written revelation for behoof of every one 
whose heart is set on seeking Him, that ieeking he may find, 
and finding believe, and believing obey. 
A number of passages show that disobedience to the law results 
in death. 
But--as is congruous with the goodness of God, and with His 
equity, as the Fashioner of manld.nd--He gave to all nations 
the self-same law, which at definite and stated times He 
enjoined should be observed, when He willed, and through 
whom He willed, and as He willed. For in the beginning of 
the world He gave to Adam himself and Eve a law, that they 
were not to eat of the fruit of the tree planted in the 
midst of paradise, but that, if they did contrariwise, by 
death they were to die.2 
For it was not merely that he might live the natural life 
that God had produced man, but that he should live virtuously, 
that is, in relation to God and to His law. Accordingly, God 
gave him to live when he was formed into a living soul; but 
He chargedl~o live virtuous~ when he was required to 
obey a law. Soalso God shows t man was not constituted 
for death, by now wishing that he should be restored to life, 
preferring the sinner's repentance to his death. As, there-
fore, God designed for man a condition of life, so man 
brought on himself a state of death.J 
The law, it seems was given for a good purpose, to safeguard man from 
death and to guide him toward life. .Since the giving of the law was 
11 congruous with the goodness of God" and since that oontrary to the 
1. Apology, 18; III, 32. 2. Answer to the Jews, 2; III, 152. 
3. Against Marcion, ii, 8; III, 303. 
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law results in death, it follows that life is good and death is evil. 
And, since it is apparent that disobedience to the commandment of God 
results in the evil of death, it seems evident that obedience to the 
law is good because it preserves life and enriches life. Clearly, 
this must t~ represent Tertul li an 1 s position, for he tells us that 
"obedience would have found a gracious instead of an angry God.. 111 
Obedience is good then because it preserves human life. But 
not only does it preserve man,:!!! the good of life from the evil of 
death, but also it improves the conditions and quality of the life 
man enjoys. This is seen in the fact that the lepers whom Jesus 
healed "were cleansed on this account, because they were obedient, 
and went as the law required, when they were commanded to go to the 
priests.n2 Man was not created merely that he might live a natural 
life 11but that he should live virtuously, that is, in relation to God 
and to His law.n3 It is this higher kind of life that obedience makes 
possible. Proof that the law was given "in the interest of the highest 
benevolence," not in severity, is found in the fact 11 that it simply 
bound a man to God. 114 To be bound closer and closer to God is the 
highest good, because He is the ground and source of all goodness. 
There should be no doubt that obedience is good, for 11what God 
enjoins is good and best."S But even if it were not good, man would 
be obligated to obey. In the final analysis, it is not the good of 
1. Apology, 40; III, 48. 2. !gainst Marcion, iv, 35; III, 408. 
3. ~., ii, 8; III, 303. 4. Ibid., ii, 19; III, 312. 
S. ,2!! Repentance, 4; III, 660. 
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a particular course of action that renders it wort~ of obedience but 
the simple fact that it is commanded by God. 
I hold it audacity to dispute about the 11 good11 of a divine 
precept; for, indeed, it is not the fact that it is good 
which binds us to obey, but the fact that God has enjoined 
it.l 
Roberts criticizes Tertullian's notion of obedience as being 
little more than a ceaseless compliance with rules. 
Obedience has nothing of the stability of character arising 
out of submission of the self to God, and consolidated by the 
habit of doing what is right. It is an unending compliance 
with rules, positive and negative.2 
It is true that some passages in Tertullian produce this impression, 
especially when taken by themselves. But that this is not all there 
is to Ter~ulian's idea of obedience and that a more sympathetic under-
standing of it is possible should be apparent from what has already 
been said. 
(3) Likeness to God.--For Tertn1lian, as for Irenaeus and Clement, 
the end of lmowing and obeying God is likeness to Him. As .Roberts aug-
gests, from Tertullian' s emphasis on a freedom of the will uncondi-
tioned by anything external to itself the logical conclusion would be 
a loss of the reliability of character, but Tertullian does not press 
hi.s emphasis on freedom to this conclusion. Interpreting Tertullian, 
Roberts says: 
There is such a thing as Christian virtue, which is built 
up into a definite character. Its ideal is likeness to 
God. • • • Its nature is obedience to the will of God. 
1. Ibid. 2. Theology .2£ Tertn11ian, p. 225. 
~hat will is in accord with perfect goodness, and it is 
revealed perfect~ in Christ, and kept perfect~ in Chris-
tians.l 
From the obedience which lmowing God inspires there spring virtues 
which constitute Christian character. Tertullian shows the inner 
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connection between obedience to the revealed will of God with the end 
of likeness to God when he s~s: 
No one deserves (favour) b,y availing himself of the indul-
gence, but qy rendering a prompt obedience to the will, (of 
his master). The will of God is our sanctification, for He 
wishes His 11 image11 --us--to become likewise His 111ikeness1 11 
that we may be 11 holy11 just as Himself is 11 holy. 11 That good 
--sanctification, I mean--I distribute into several species, 
that in same one of those species we may be found.2 
Again he shows the inner connection between the knowledge of God, or 
more particularly knowledge from God, and obedience when he says: 
Taught of God himself what goodness is, we have a perfect 
knowledge of it as revealed to us by a perfect Master; and 
faithf.'tll:cy we do His will, as enjoined on us by a Judge we 
dare not despise.3 
c. Principle of Life 
A number of passages in Tertullian make it apparent that he 
shared with Irenaeus and Clement of Alexandria the conviction that 
good is the principle of life and evil is the principle of death. It 
is apparent also, however, that for him life and death are not equi-
valent terms for existence and non-existence, for one can experience 
1. ~., P• 229. 
2. On Exhortation to Chastity, 1; IV, 5o . 
3. Apology, 45; III, 50. 
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eternal death without thereby ceasing to exist, as we have seen above. 
It is clear that death comes as a consequence of man1s sin or 
voluntary choice of evil. Roberts says: 
Death is not natural. Even 'When tile decay of old age re-
moves men as by natural course death is a violation of 
nature. For man was not created to die, but sin, which 
was due to man1s £ree volition, brought in complicating 
circumstances 11As for our views, indeed, we lmow what was 
man's origin, and we boldly assert, and persistently main-
tain, that death happens, not by way of a natural conse-
quence to man, but owing to a fault and defect, which is 
not itself natural, although it is easy enough, no doubt 
to apply the term natural to faults and circumstances which 
seem to have been (though from the emergence of an external 
cause) inseparable to us £rom our very birth. 11 (De Anima, 
c. 52)1 --
That death is not natural 11 is proved by the very law which made his 
condition depend upon a warning, and death result from man's arbitrary 
choice. Indeed, if he had not sinned, he certainly would not have 
died. 112 Again, Tertullian quotes God 1s warning to Adam and Eve con-
cerning the forbidden fruit in the Garden of Eden as an indication 
that death is the consequence of transgression or disobedience, or in 
other words, the choice of evil.3 If evil is thus the principle of 
death, one would naturally expect to find that good is the principle 
of life. Tertullian says that God created man, not merely to live a 
natural life, but to live virtuously, in relation to God and His law. 
It is clear that God does not intend for man to die but desires him to 
repent of evil and to live, for He has showed man the way to life.4 
1. Theology of Tertullian, pp. 203-204. 
2. ! Treatise ~ the Soul, 52; III, 229. 
3. Against Marcion, ii, 4; III, 300. 4. Ibid., ii, 8; III, 303. 
God, therefore, rewards the choice of good or obedience to His laws 
with life. 
"For the eyes of the Lord are upon them that fear Him., upon 
them that hope in His mercy, to deliver their souls .from 
death, 'even eternal death,' and to n£urish them in their 
hunger," that is, after eternal life. 
Tertullian1s statement that in His law God has set before man the 
alternatives of "good and evil, life and death,"2 clearly shows good 
to be the principle of life and evil the principle of death. 
Critical reflection suggests that good and evil ought to be 
principles of existence and non-existence, with which life and death 
ought to be synonymous; but in Tertullian1s thought this is not the 
case. Only once, when he writes in opposition to Hermogenes, '~at 
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He judged to be evil by not creating it He also proclaimed to be good 
by permitting it to exist," does he seem to suggest that good is the 
principle of existence, as well as of life. But for the most part, 
he thinks of life as something distinct from existence and of death 
as compatible with existence. In The Soul1s Testimon;z::, he seys that 
it is frequently said of a dead person, "poor man, 11 not because he 
has been deprived of the good of life, but "because he has been given 
over to punishment and condemnation. n3 This punishment is ever last-
ing fire, which is not only compatible with existence but by its 
1. Ibid., ii, 19; III, 312. 
2. Ibid., ii, 5; III, 301. 
3. The Soul's Testimony, 4; III, 177. 
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very nature ministers to the soul's incorruptibility.1 He therefore 
sometimes refers to it as eternal death2 because it is lacking in the 
good that distinguishes life from existence. The consequence of choos-
ing good is life in larger measure. 
For He afforded room for a conflict, wherein man might 
crush his enemy with the same freedom of his will as had 
made him succumb to him {proving that the fault was all 
his own, not God 1 s), and so worthi~ recover his salva-
tion by a victory; wherein also the devil might receive 
a more bitter punishment, through being vanquished by 
him whom he had previously injured; and wherein God might 
be discovered to be so much the more good, as waiting for 
man to return from his present life to a more glorious 
paradise, with a right to pluck of the tree of life.3 
There is one passage in~ Soul's Testimony that seems to de~ 
the proposition that good is the principle of life: 
For though it may be said that death is dreadful not for 
anything it threatens afterwards, but because it deprives 
us of the good of life; yet, on the other hand, as it puts 
an end to life's discomforts, which are far more numerous, 
death's terrors are mitigated by a gain that far outweighs 
the loss.4 
This, however, seems to be an isola ted instance of this way of think-
ing and is outweighed by the more numerous passages identifying life 
with the possession of good. 
2. Meanings of Divine Goodness Implied in the Conception 
of the Human Good 
It is possible to infer additional meanings of the Divine good-
ness, which are consistent with the rest of Tertullian's thought and 
1. Apology, 48; III, 54. 2. Against Marcion, ii, 19; III, 312. 
3. ~., ii, 10; III, 306. 4. ~ Soul's Testimony, 4; III, 177. 
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which he may even have consciously held himself, from his conception 
of the human good as outlined above. Until- now we have considered 
the Divine goodness from the standpoint of characteristics and forms 
of expression. The following inferences make more of an effort to 
probe into the essence of the Divine goodness. 
a. Source of Value Distinctions and Teacher of Virtue 
As we have seen, human goodness is voluntary, derivative, and 
learned. Both moral goodness and the receipt of greater material 
good are the result of knowledge of God and obedience to God. Further-
more, the fact that the standard of human goodness is absolute indi-
cates that it is from beyond man. All of this indicates quite clearly 
that God is the Source of human value distinctions and the Teacher of 
virtue. Since the activity of God in this regard is intended for 
human good, it is clear that this is one meaning of His goodness. 
Indeed, we have already seen in the section dealing with direct allu-
sions to the Divine goodness how certain particular evidences of this 
--His imparting through the Word the capacity to distinguish between 
right and wrong and between higher and lower values and His teaching 
men, through the Law, the prophets, and Christ, to lead virtuous lives 
--are clear indications of God's goodness. 
b. Governing the World in Accord with Human Well-being 
Implicit in the facts that good is the principle of life and 
that h'wnan good is identified with knowledge of God and obedience to 
God is the idea that God governs the universe by fixed laws in accord 
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with human need and the moral injunctions He has revealed in the Law, 
through the prophets, and through Christ. If the good is that which 
preserves and increases life and if knowledge of God and obedience to 
God are good in this same sense, then God's manner of working in the 
world must be regular and uniform and in harmony both with His moral 
commandments and with human need. If knowledge of God is to be h~ 
helpful it must include lmowledge of His manner of dealing with men, 
which in turn must be regular and uni.fonn if it is to be intelligible. 
If paying heed to God 1 s commands and warnings results in human good 
it is because they are in accord with human need and because God op-
erates in faithful conformity to them. Since lmowledge of God and 
obedience to God have already been shown to be the highest forms of 
human goodness, it is clear that that action of God requisite to their 
being so is a meaning of Divine goodness. 
c. Source of Life or Ground of Existence 
Even though Tertullian gives no clear suggestion that good is 
the principle of existence, it is clear from the fact that good con-
tributes to larger life and is profitable toward salvation that God, 
the source of all good, is the Ground of life, if not of existence as 
well. Since lmowledge of Him and obedience to Him are man' s chief 
good and enjoyment of good means a fuller participation in life, God 
would seem to be the source of a fuller measure of existence which 
TertuJlian would distinguish from mere existence by calling it life. 
But surely God is the Ground of existence generally as well as being 
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the source of life. We have already seen that Tertul 1 ian holds dis-
obedience to be evil and evil to be the principle of death. But death 
is everlasting punishment and therefore is not identical with non-
existence. As a result of disobedience or evil choice one may die, 
yet remain in existence. This becomes intelligible when we remember 
that Tertullian believes that in every man there is some good that is 
natural and inextinguishable because it receives its origin from God. 
For this reason, though a man's repeated choices of evil may result 
in his continuous sinking to lower levels of existence, he never quite 
ceases to be. The inextinguishable good which he has received from 
God keeps him on the scale of existence. In fact, we have already 
seen, in the section dealing with direct allusions to God's goodness, 
that God is the Ground of existence in His creation of the universe 
and imparting life to man. Furthermore, since these have already 
been shown to be expressions of goodness it is evident that being the 
Ground of existence is another meaning of God's goodness. 
D. Meanings Implied Ez Attacks 2!! Pagan~ 
Certain characteristics of the Christian God may be inferred 
from Tertullian1s attacks on the gods of heathen nations. 
1. Purity 
In his Apology, Ad Nationes and Execrable Gods ..£!: the Heathen, 
TertuJHan devotes page after page to criticising the Latin deities 
in biting sarcasm and scathing ridicule. Christians were charged by 
the Romans with sacrilege, for not worshipping the proper gods--those 
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of the Romans. Tertullian proceeds, therefore, to show why Christians 
do not worship Roman gods. 1~e do not worship your gods, because we 
Imow there are no such beings. 11 1 Although the Romans contend that 
their gods are trul:y gods, history shows that in reality they were 
once men. This they cannot and dare not deny. 2 Now, if they become 
gods after their death, it was necessary that some one--a God Supreme--
bestow divinity upon them, since it was not theirs by nature. Further-
more, there must have been some reason for them to have been made gods 
at all--either because the Great God needed their assistance or be-
cause, as a Being of transcendent righteousness, He wished to reward 
them for their merit. Since the first reason not only is UD*orthy 
of God but is unnecessary for one who has power to make gods outright, 
the only remaining reason for bestowing divinity is as a way of reward-
ing worth.3 
I would have you then consider whether the merits of your 
deities are of a kind to have raised them to the heavens, 
and not rather to have sunk them down to the lowest depths 
of Tartarus,--the place which you regard, with many, as the 
prisonhouse of infernal punishments. For into this dread 
place are wont to be cast all who, offend against filial 
piety, and such as are guilty of incest with sisters, and 
seducers of wives, and ravishers of virgins, and boy-
polluters, and men of furious tempers, and murderers, and 
thieves, and deceivers; all in short who tread in the foot-
steps of your gods, not one of wham you can prove free from 
crime or vice, save by denying that they ever had a human 
existence. But as you cannot deny that, you have those 
foul blots also as an added reason for not believing that 
they were made gods afterwards. For if you rule for the 
very purpose of punishing such deeds,--if every virtuous 
1. Apology, 10; III, 26. 
3. ~., 11; III, 27-28. 
2. Ibid., 10; III, 26-27. 
man among you rejects all correspondence, converse, and 
intimacy with the wicked and base, while, on the other 
hand, the high God has taken up their mates to share of 
His majesty, on what ground is it that you condemn those 
whose fellow-actors you adore? Your goodness is an af-
front to the heavens. Deify your vilest criminals, if 
you would please your gods. You honour them by giving 
divine honours to their fellows. But to say no more 
about a way of acting so unworthy, there have been men 
virtuous, and pure and good.l 
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The dramatic literature of the Romans pictures the vileness of 
their gods. 2 Cybele yearns lustfully after the young man who had 
scorned her, while Juno, Venus, and Minerva show themselves completely 
lacking in modesty by stripping before the shepherd that he might 
judge which is the most beautiful.3 After his death Ramulus was made 
a god. His virtues consisted of slaying his brother and ravishing 
some foreign virgins. "Therefore of course he becomes a god."4 A 
prostitute named Larentina was deified because, as a result of an 
imaginary wager between the temple warden and the dead Hercules, she 
slept in the temple and dreamed of having sexual intercourse with 
Hercules. Upon leaving the temple she was solicited by a young man 
to wham she yielded because she regarded him as a third Hercules. 
When, later married to this young man, she had daughters, she sought 
to have them deified also.5 And certainly there should be added the 
accomplishments of Hercules, especia~ "his debaucheries with 
1. Apology, 11; III, 28. 
3-~· 
5. ~., ii, 10; III, 138-139. 
2. Ibid., 15; In, 30. 
4. Ad Nationes, ii, 9; TII, 138. 
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concubines and wives, ••• and his base desertion of the Argonauts 
because he bad lost his beautiful boy. nl 
But even worse are the misdeeds of some of the chief gods. Sa-
turn, the offspring of Coelus and Terra (Heaven and Earth), castrated 
his father and was guilty of incest, when in puberty he married his 
own sister.2 Jupiter, who is frequently titled 11 the Best," was really 
the worst of all.3 
This Jupiter, in adult age, waged war several years with his 
father; overcame him; made a parricidal raid on his home; 
violated his virgin sisters; selected one of them in marriage; 
drove his father by dint of arms. The remaining scenes, 
moreover, of that act have been recorded. or other folks' 
wives, or else of violated virgins, he begat him sons; de-
filed freeborn boys; oppressed peoples lawlessly with des-
potic and kingly sway. 4 
Though he hated his father Saturn who had been guilty of incest and 
castrated his grandfather, yet he himself married his own sisterS and, 
while foully making love to her, recounted to her 11former mistresses, 
now for a long time past not so dear as she. 11 6 
Even human laws are far more just and strict than the actions 
of such impure beings as these, who, if still living, would be "under 
the impeachment of all laws. 11 7 11If the laws had been just even at 
1. ~., ii, 14; III, J.44. 2. ~., ii, 12; III, 140. 
3. ~., ii, 13; III, 143. 
4. Execrable Gods of the Heathen; III, 149. 
5. ~ Nationes, ii, 13; III, 143. 
6. Apology, 14; III, 29. 
7. Execrable Gods of the Heathen; m, 150. 
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that early time, Jupiter ought to have been 1 sewed up in both sacks. 1 nl 
Although the Romans claim that many of these tales are related 
only "in sport," yet practices carried on in the temples are indica-
tive of the vile influence and character of the gods. For it is a 
known fact "that in the temples adulteries are arranged, that at the 
altars pimping is practised, that often in the houses of the temple-
keepers and priests, under the sacrificial fillets, and the sacred 
hats, and the purple robes, amid the fumes of incense, deeds of 11-
centiousness are done. 11 2 
The only conclusion to be drawn from all this is that such be-
ings are not gods, at all but evil spirits. The Romans need to begin 
a search for the true God, "for those wham you have imagined to be so 
you find to be spirits of evil. 113 None of these 11 gods11 has the slight-
est claim to deity. Indeed, as Tertullian says, the assumption that 
such beings are divine is a matter for ridicule. 
Shall attendants on kings and princes be more pure than 
those who wait on the Supreme God? You turn your back in 
horror, indeed, on outcasts and exiles, on the poor and 
weak, on the obscurely born and low-lived; but yet you 
honour, even by legal sanctions, unchaste men, adulterers, 
robbers, and parricides. Must we regard it as a subject 
of ridicule or indignation, that such characters are be-
lieved to be gods who are not fit to be men?4 
In striking contrast to this is the God of the Christians, who 
sent His Son, Christ, into the world. 
It was not His lot to have as His father, by incest with a 
sister, or by violation of a daughter or another's wife, a 
1. Ad Nationes, ii, 13; III, 1.43. 
3. ~., 23; III, 38. 
2. Apology, 15; III, 30. 
4. Ad Nationes, ii, 1; III, 135. 
god in the shape of serpent, or ox, or bird, or lover, for 
his vile ends transmuting himself into the gold of Danaus. 
They are your divinities upon whom these base deeds of 
Jupiter were done.l 
The true God is a God of purity, and, since impurity is an indication 
that the Ranan gods are evil, purity must be a mark of God's goodness. 
2. Perfection of Abilities and Attributes 
The unworthiness of the pagan deities is seen also in their 
limitations and imperfections. Their failure to protect their stat-
ues, cities, and devotees shows that they are lacking in either power 
or goodwill. It is foolish to believe that the power of bestowing 
and preserving empire belongs to those who have failed to protect 
their o'Wll cities. 11 If they were strong enough to confer empire on 
the Romans, w~ did not Minerva defend Athens from Xerxes? Or w~ 
did not Apollo rescue Delphi out of the hand of Pyrrhus?11 2 If such 
beings are able to protect the emperor, or anybo~ else, surely they 
would see to the safety of their statues, and images, and temples. 
But these owe their safety rather 
to the watch kept by Caesar's guards. Nay, I think the very 
materials of which these are made come from Caesar's mines, 
and there is not a temple but depends on Caesar's will. Yes, 
and many gods have felt the displeasure of Caesar •••• How 
shall they who are thus in Caesar's power, who belong en-
tire~ to him, have Caesar's protection in their hands, so 
that you can imagine them able to give to Caesar what they 
more readi~ get from him ?3 
1. Apology, 21; III, 34. 
2. ~ Nationes, ii, 17; III, 146. 
3. Apology, 29; III, 41. 
284 
The recurring struggles among the gods indicate that they could 
not exercise such providential oversight even if they had the will to 
do so, since none of them is really supreme in power and authority. 
The gods fought among themselves for the Greeks and the Trojans, Venus 
was wounded by a man as she sought to rescue her son Aeneas from his 
hand, Mars was almost wasted away by thirteen months' imprisonment, 
Jupiter was saved only by the aid of a monster from suffering a fate 
similar to that of Mars, Apollo was turned over to king Admetus to 
tend sheep, Neptune was hired out as a builder, and Aesculapius was 
smitten b,y Jupiter with a thunderbolt for wrongfu~ practicing his 
healing art.l Even the chief and most ancient gods were subject to 
such limits. Coelus was castrated during his sleep by his son Saturn.2 
Later Saturn's son Jupiter also fell upon him and deprived him of his 
ld..ngdom.3 
In addition to limitation in power they are subject also to 
limitation in lmowledge. Saturn had devoured his other sons as soon 
as they were born to protect himself from the possibility of such a 
fate as he had inflicted on his father, but he swallowed a stone which 
had been substituted for his son Jupiter, thinking all the while that 
he had swallowed his son.4 And he remained ignorant of the fact that 
1. ~., 14; III, 29-30. 
2. Ad Nationes, ii, 12; III, 140. 
3. ~., ii, 12; III, 140-141. 4. Ibid., ii, l2; III, 140. 
his son Jupiter was concealed in Crete.l Likewise, Jupiter, 
whom they believe the mightier god, knows not that the father 
whom himself' had banished is lurking in Italy. If' he was in 
heaven, when would he not see what was doing in Italy? For 
the Italian land is 11not in a corner. 11 And yet, had he been 
a god, nothing ought to have escaped him.2 
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A further limitation of the Raman gods is seen in their lacking 
the attribute of eternity. Jupiter, whom the Romans believe to be the 
highest god, was born several thousand years after the foundation of 
the world.3 Saturn, whom many erroneously believe to be the original 
god,4 was actually the son of Coelus and Terra, who were in turn de-
scended from other gods.5 Such temporal limitations indicate that 
these beings are not gods at all. 
That, therefore, which at one time before its beginning 
had no existence, and will by and by after its end cease 
to have existence, cannot of course, by any possibility, 
seem to be a god, wanting as it does that essential 
character of divinity, eternity, which is reckoned to 
be without beginning, and without end. 6 
Tertullian points out furthermore that a real god could never be sub-
ject to change, especially in the way that these beings have been 
shown to be.7 
In contrast to these so-called gods, God is wanting in no re-
spect but is perfect in all attributes. 11 That cannot be imperfect 
which has made all perfect."B Since we have already shown earlier 
1. Execrable Gods of the Heathen, Ill, 149. 
3. ~· 
5. Ad Nationes, ii, 12; III, 140. 
7. ~., ii, 6; III, 134. 
2. Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 
6. Ibid., ii, 3; III, 131. 
8. Apology, 11; III, 27. 
how TertnJHan regarded power and eternity essential to the Divine 
goodness or to a perfect expression of goodness, the perfection of 
God's abilities and attributes must be an aspect of goodness. 
E. Theodicy 
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In answer to Marcion's accusation that the Creator is the real 
author of evil in the world, TertnJJian sets forth his theodicy, or 
defense of God against the charge of evil. He says that the bones 
of contention which Marcion is continually gnawing are why" God, if 
He is good, prescient of the future, and able to avert evil, permits 
man, the very image and likeness of Himself, to be deceived by the 
devil and to fall into disobedience and death. For if God were good 
and unwilling that such a terrible thing should happen, had foreknowl-
edge of what will happen, and possessed the power to prevent any 
occurrences, such a condition would never come to pass. But, since 
it has happened, God must be deemed neither good, nor prescient, nor 
all-powerful.l In reply, he seeks to vindicate the attributes of God 
that have been called into question. He says that proofs must be ob-
tained from works. 11The Creator's works testif.y at once to His good-
ness, since they are good, as we have shown, and to His power, since 
they are mighty, and spring indeed out of nothing.u2 He goes on to 
defend God's forelmowledge and to elaborate his theodicy. After he 
has shown that human freedom is the prime cause of the evil that man 
1. Against Ma.rcion, ii, 5; III, 300-301. 
2. ~., ii1 5; III, 301. 
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suffers and that God's forelmowledge is affected by the gift of free-
dom, he says: 
To conclude: the goodness of God, then ful~ considered 
from the beginning of His works, will be enough to convince 
us that nothing evil could possibly have come forth from 
God; and the liberty of man will, after a second thought, 
show us that it a1.one is chargeable with the fault which 
itself oommitted.l 
By such a conclusion all is reserved unimpaired to God; 
both His natural goodness, and the purpose of His governance 
and forelmowledge, and the abundance of His power.2 
We shall endeavor brief~ to reconstruct the rest of his theodicy. 
In raising a question about the goodness of the universe that 
God has created, Tertnllian says that one must consider not only by 
whom all things were made but al.so by whom they have been perverted, 
for there is a vast difference between the corrupted state and the 
original state of the created order.3 Tertullian seems to be think-
ing here of the devil primarily as the perverter of God's work. But 
since he perverts God's work through his subtle influence on human 
choice, which is not compulsion but a seduction of man's will,4 it 
will be seen that man' a free-will allows h:im also to enter into the 
perversion of God's originally good creation. 
He goes on to point out that the main cause of evil' s befalling 
man is found in man's own i'ree-wi.ll. It is this quality which makes 
him the image of his Maker and by which he is rendered capable of 
1. Against Maroion, ii, 6; III, 302-303. 2. Ibid., ii, 7; III, 303. 
3. ~ Spectaculis, 2; III, 80. 
4. On E:l:hartation ~ Chastity, 2; IV, 51. 
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obedience and a fitting subject for reward and punisbment.l Likewise, 
he says elsewhere: 
And so, when we have learnt from His precepts each (class 
of actions), what He does not will and what He does, we 
still have a volition and an arbitrating power of electing 
the one; just as it is w.ritten, "Behold, I have set before 
thee good and evil: for thou hast tasted the tree of lmowl-
edge •" And accordingly we ought not to lay to the account 
of the Lord's will that which lies subject to our own 
choice. • • • Thus, it is a volition of our own when we 
will 'What is evi.l, in antagonism to God 1 s will, who wills 
what is good.2 
As he goes on to vindicate God 1 s foreknowledge, the question 
of why God, knowing the outcome of man's exercise of free choice, does 
not intervene to offset the evi.l consequences which may transpire, re-
ceives an answer. To preserve the gift of human liberty, God must 
separate from it His forelmowledge and power. If He interposed, He 
would in effect rescind the liberty which He had bestowed as the ex-
pression of a definite and good purpose.3 Indeed, if God checked 
man's freedom, it would suggest that He had no clear foresight as to 
what the outcome of the exercise of such free choice might be. But 
in allowing man freedom, even though He foreknows the bad consequences 
to which it may lead, He shows the earnestness of His purpose.4 As we 
have indicated above, it is the purpose of His goodness to create a 
being who can lmow and obey H:illl. and come into possession of a good-
ness, which due to his own choice, is his by nature.5 Man must, 
1. Against Marcion, ii, 5; III, 301. 
2. On Exhortation to Chastity, 2; IV, 51. 
3. Against Marcion, ii, 7; III, 303. 
5. Above, IP• 197-198. 
4. Ibid. 
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therefore, remain free, even though his freedom may lead to evil. It 
is due to this freedom, which is a property of man's own nature, that 
evils befall man. God is not to blame. 
Certainly as Stier suggests, God could have made man incapable 
of sin. 
Gewiss, der ggttlichen Allmacht wRre es mgglich gewesen, 
den Menschen mit sklavischen Ketten an die Gebote Gottes 
zu fesseln; aber seiner Weisheit hatten es gefallen, ein 
Ebenbild seiner Freiheit zu schaffen--es gefiel ihr nicht, 
diese Freiheit des Menschen-Wesen durch eine nachlHufige 
Korrektur zur Gebundenheit umzugestalten.l 
Even though 11die Setzung einer si ttlichen Freiheit ist auch unmi ttelbar 
die Setzung der Mgglichkeit zur s{bde, 11 2 God chose for man to be free 
that "er sollte sich selbst ein Gesetz seines sittlichen Handelns sein 
und werden."3 Consequently, there results the strange paradox: 11 Indem 
der Mensch Sfinde that, vollzog er einen Akt seiner subjektiven Freiheit; 
und so handel te er, dami t dass er sich verfehl te, dennoch indirekt nach 
dem Willen dessen, der ihm gebildet hatte. 114 
Because some raise the cavil that if God's creature is capable of 
corruption it must be traceable to the nature of the Creator, Tertul-
lian expounds the nature of the soul as a created substance. The soul 
is the image of God's spirit and, as an image, 11 is not in arry case 
equal to the very thing. 115 For though the soul possesses immortality, 
freedom, a measure of foreknowledge, reason, understanding, and the 
1. Stier, £2• ~., p. 50. 2. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., p. 49. 4. ~· 
5. Against Marcion, ii, 9; III, 304. 
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capacity for knowledge--all of which are qualities of God--~t pos-
sesses them in less perfect measure than the Divine Being. "An im-
age, although it may express all the lineaments of the reality, is 
yet wanting in its intrinsic power. 111 The possibility of disobedience 
and sin and evil lies in the soul' s 11 slenderness of nature, as being 
the breath and not the spirit. 11 2 Responsibility, however, for evil 
rests with the soul itself, because of its free-will. 
So that the soul can no longer appear to have sinned, be-
cause it has an affinity with God, that is to say, through 
the afflatus, but rather through that which was an addition 
to its nature, that is, through its free-will, which was 
indeed given to it by God in accordance with His purpose 
and reason, but reckless~ employed by man according as he 
chose. This, then, being the case, the entire course of 
God's action is purged from all imputation to evil.3 
The will of man, who was formed by a perfect~ good God, is 
lured into the choice of evil by the devil and other kindred spirits. 
"Now from the devil proceeds the incentive to sin."4 It has long 
been the work of demons, the offspring of evil angels, to turn men 
from faith to unbelief.5 The Scriptures tell of demons sprung from 
fallen angels whose main business is the ruin of mankind. They in-
flict diseases and calamities on the body and by some obscure influ-
ence awaken in the soul "corruptions with furious passions and vile 
excesses.u6 Consequently, all the "endowments of the soul which are 
1. Ibid. 2. Ibid., ii, 9; III, 305. 
3. ~· 
4. ~ Treatise _£!! ~ Soul, 16; lli, 194. 
5. Ad Nationes, ii, 13; m, 143. 6. Apology, 22; III, 36. 
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bestowed on it at birth are still obscured and depraved by the rna-
lignant being who, in the beginning, regarded them with envious eye, 
so that they are never seen in their spontaneous action, nor are they 
administered as they ought to be.nl 
To those who, though acknowledging the influence of evil spirits, 
say that since God created the devil and the demons He is really the 
source of evil, Tertullian replies that Satan and his angels originated 
from the hand of God as good creatures.2 Because, like man, Satan 
possessed free-will, it was of his own accord that he became evil.3 
So, consistent with His purpose to produce beings naturally good by 
virtue of their own choice, He defers the devil1 s destruction in order 
to afford an area of conflict in which man might prove victorious 
over evil by his free selection of the good.4 Therefore, although 
the devil operates as an evil influence because it is consistent with 
God's purpose to allow him to do so, God is not responsible for his 
existence ~ the devil, having originally made him a good, yet free, 
being. 
The question of whY man and the devil chose to exercise their 
free will in the choice of evil, as Roberts points out, is left un-
answered. 
The fact is, that Tertullian did not rea).4r face the 
question of how the devil and man, after being created 
1. _! Treatise~~ Soul, 39; III, 219. 
2. Against Marcion, ii, 10; III, 305. 
3. ~., ii, 10; III, 306. 4. Ibid. 
with the power of choosing good or evil, chose the latter. 
They chose it--that for him is the all-sufficient explana-
tion. In opposition to the Gnostic doctrine of determina-
tion he advanced the theory of unmotivated free will. 
Where they made men a weather-cock, helpless, at the 
mercy of every changing wind of circumstance, he made man 
a weather-cock that moved for no reason whatever--and created 
the wind by its own motion.l 
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Although Tertullian is primarily concerned with relieving God 
of any responsibility for moral evil, he makes at least one attempt 
to relieve God of evils other than moral, which may include that class 
of evils generally referred to as natural evil. This is when he says 
that things may ~ evil because of the limitations of human percep-
tion while in reali~ they are good. God produces only good, even 
though things resulting in somebody' s harm frequently happen in ac-
cord with the will of God. Harmful experiences may seem evil to the 
one experiencing them, but this is often a mistaken perception of the 
real nature of the event, because many such events are the result of 
some reasonable principle and therefore are good.2 
Now, if that which comes from God is good indeed in its 
natural state (for there is nothing from God which is not 
good, because it is divine, and reasonable), but seems evil 
o~ to the human faculty, all will be right in regard to 
the former; with the latter the fault will lie) 
Similar to this is his effort to justify God's use of penal 
evils, rather than to relieve Him of responsibility for them. Ap-
parently, some were taking God's statement, "It is I who create evil" 
as proof of His being the Author of evil. They, he says, take this to 
1. Theology of Tertullian, p. 163. 
2. De~ in Persecutione, 4; IV, ll8. 3. Ibid. 
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mean that God is the author of all evils, while we recognize that 
there may be two types of evil, evils of sin and penal evils. One 
class is morally bad and the other is the operation of justice 
against sin. Of the latter class of evils God is most certainly the 
Author. 11They are, no doubt, evil to those by whom they are endured, 
and still on their own account good, as being just and defensive of 
good and hostile to sin. 111 Penal evil 11is inseparable from the dis-
pensing of Justice," says Roberts, "and though in its incidence it 
is felt to be bad, in its effect it is undoubtedly good. For the 
punishment attached by God to wrongdoing is not vindictive or arbi-
trary but remedial. 11 2 
F. Summary 
Like God Himself, goodness is eternal, without beg:Lnning or 
ending. It is in God a natural attribute, without which He would 
not be truly divine. Since it is perfect and unrelated to ~ need 
on the part of God Himself, it is no surprise that it is the ground 
or basis for all finite forms of goodness. Its perfection is to be 
seen in the fact that it is no simple and irrational goodness, but 
is a goodness characterized throughout the total range of its expres-
sion wi.th the qualities of justice, wisdom, and power. Unrelated to 
any need on the part of God and uncaused by an external power or 
necessity, the goodness of God is truly a free and omnipotent goodness. 
1. Against Marcion, ii, 14; III, )08. 
2. Theology of Tertullian, p. 1)0. 
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Though, like God, its richness and vastness outstrip the compre-
hensive and descriptive powers of the human mind, goodness has made 
itself to some extent !mown through the reasonable ways in which it 
has expressed itself for the purpose of bringing to perfection a 
being created for the knowing of God. 
So, in order to accomplish its purpose of producing a being 
capable and worthy of knowing God, the goodness of God created all 
things through the Word, revealing its omnipotence by creating them 
out of nothing. Thus it was in keeping with its purpose that man was 
created with free will, that he might become worthy of knowing and 
having fellowship with God. The goodness of creation is evident from 
the fact that it is providentially constructed in such a way as to 
minister to human needs. The good work of providence, intended for 
accomplishing the purpose of goodness to bring man to perfection, 
continued in the providing of the commandments and warnings of the 
Law for the promotion and safeguarding of man's growth in the direc-
tion of goodness. To provide man with motivation toward his intended 
end, the Divine goodness made further disclosure of itself through 
the revelation of God in nature and in the ministry of the Word. In 
its providence, goodness arranged for an ongoing and final judgment, 
so that men might be moved through fear and examples to choose the 
good end which is God t s hope and intention for them and so that men 
might clearly lmow that goodness is supreme and not to be disregarded 
or despised. In its operation through justice, the Divine goodness 
shows itself merciful in the patience with which it withholds judgment 
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in the hope of the sinner's repentance and in forgiving and lightening 
the punishment of those who repent. The goodness of mercy also mani-
fests itself through the providential laws and warnings intended to 
lead man to salvation and in compassionate concern for man's estate 
which issues in acts of benevolence, both of which may also be re-
garded as expressions of God's grace. The Word of God became incarnate 
in Christ that the purpose of goodness for man might be brought to its 
fulfillment in man's redemption. It was the aim of goodness to pro-
vide man, through the Incarnation, with such a knowledge of God as 
to inspire and guide him 11 to act as God, 11 1 and thus to accomplish his 
spiritual salvation. In the gift of eternal life the purpose of good-
ness for man is fully accomplished, and its power and justice are 
clearly revealed as, through the resurrection of the body, salvation 
is made perfect or complete. At the same time that its perfection is 
revealed through the total salvation and rewarding of the righteous, 
through a sentence of the unrighteous to everlasting punishment, good-
ness reveals its purity and genuineness in eternal opposition t o evil, 
a goodness whi ch, it is true, is dominated more by an austere and 
right eous justice than by holy and understanding love. 
1. Against Marcion, ii, 27; III, 319. 
CHAPTER V 
COMPARISON AND CRITICAL EVALUATION 
Having set forth the views of Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, 
and Tertullian on the characteristics and expressions of Divine good-
ness, we turn now to a point-by-point comparison and critical evalua-
tion of their contributions. 
This chapter will follow the same pattern of organization as the 
earlier chapters so far as major subdivisions are concerned. The order 
in which the various qualifications and manifestations of God's good-
ness are listed under these subdivisions has no special significance, 
since we have not attempted to present the Fathers' thought as an 
organic whole. In each subdivision of the chapter will be found a 
summary comparison of the Fathers' positions and critical evaluation 
of the general view expressed and of the relative merit of one Father's 
view over another where there is a significant measure of difference. 
The principal criterion of evaluation in this chapter will be 
the principle of coherence or systematic consistency. This will in-
volve employing the test of self-consistency or non-self-contradiction. 
More important, however, will be the application of the test of con-
sistency to particular propositions concerning the Divine goodness in 
relation to other propositional statements on the same subject. Recog-
nizing, however, that the test of consistency alone is not enough, 
since, as Edgar Sheffield Brightman points out, "a mere jumble of 
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disconnected ideas might avoid contradiction, nl we intend also to em-
ploy as a test the showing of the relevance of particular statements 
about God's goodness to other statements on this subject. Brightman 
uses the term coherence in a broader sense than we intend here. He 
uses it as synonymous with empirical coherence, describing it as "a 
comprehensive, synoptic view of all experience. n2 Our use of the term 
is limited to its usual sense, for in employing the test of coherence 
we seek simply to show whether propositions are consistent and are re-
lated in an orderly and significant way. While the test of empirical 
coherence is ideally more desirable, its application clearly poses a 
task too ambitious for the scope of this dissertation. The principle 
of coherence, interpreted as consistency and relevance, will be employed 
as a test throughout this chapter. 
Secondly, since each of the Fathers believed himself a true repre-
sentative of Scriptural Christianity, we shall seek to show, although 
on not so wide a scale as the application of the test of coherence, 
the Biblical bases for certain of their propositions on the Divine good-
ness. Although' we intend to give some indication of the Biblical 
foundations for the Fathers' thought at a number of points, such pro-
cedure will be employed strictlY as an evaluative test only where the 
Fathers' teachings differ from one another or from the generallY recog-
nized Christian position. 
1. An Introduction to Philosophy (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 
1951), p. 69. --
2. Ibid. 
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Occasional~, in reference to points which seem especial~ impor-
tant or significant, other principles of argument and reasoning will be 
employed to show the implications of the point in question so far as 
our immediate interests in this paper are concerned. 
A. Abstract Characteristics of the Divine Goodness 
1. Essential Attribute of Deit,y 
All three of the Fathers agree that goodness is an element which 
cannot be subtracted from the concept of deity 'Without destroying the 
concept altogether, and their assertions of this fact are all essen-
tially the same. Irenaeus says that "he from whom goodness is absent 
is no God at all. ttl Clement maintains that God must be both "supreme 
and good"2 and that "if He should ever cease from doing good, then He 
would cease from being God. 113 The same matter Tertullian puts in 
question form: "For what is divine and not reasonable and good?n4 
Again he expresses it positively: "Good, therefore, will be the will 
also of him who, unless he is good, will not be God.n5 
Such a conviction is wide-spread, for it is held not o~ by 
1. Against Heresies, iii, 25, 3; I, 459. 
2. Stromata, i, 27; II, 340. 
3. Ibid., vi, 16; II, 513. 
4. De Fuga in Persecutione, 4; IV, 118. 
5. Scorpiace, 5; III, 637. 
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these Fathers but also by most of those who would explain the presence 
of evil in the world by some sort of dualism. Certainly, it is the 
view most widely held by men-of-the-street. In a way it seems strange 
that this should be so, for in the history of religions there have been 
many gods with whom goodness played at best a subordinate part, if any 
vital part at all. The pantheons of the Egyptians, the Persians, the 
Greeks, and the Romans were filled with such gods. Across the years 
and among the many peoples of earth, power and real existence seem to 
have been more fundamental elements in the concept of deity than good-
ness. Indeed, this seems to have been the case even for Tertull.ian.l 
Yet as religion grows more refined and becomes more nearly the all-
important motivating factor in people's lives, the tendenqy to regard 
goodness as an essential aspect of deity seems to be on the increase. 
Why is this so? Can it be because people have grown more reflective 
and are able to sense, if not clearly to conceive, the identity of 
goodness or true value with real existence? Can it be because men 
recognize the impossibility of explaining the world as we know it 
without the assumption of goodness on the part of the Source of all 
being? For indeed, the assumption of God's goodness is necessary, 
not so much to account for the presence of particular good things in 
life, since good is a subjective judgment which may vary from the 
standpoint of different creatures, but rather to account for man's 
experience of value, the predominance of good in his experience, and 
1. Above, pp. 186-87 and 195. 
the adaptation of the world to ministering to his need and desire. 
From the latter perspective, the assumption of a moral~ good Ground 
of existence is required to account for the world and for life as we 
know it. 
Consequent:cy, this proposition is of vital importance in the 
system of these Fathers and for Christian faith in general. A quota-
tion from Albert Cornelius Knudson points up its importance quite 
vividly. 
Christianity assumes that God exists, that He is absolute, 
and that he is a personal Being, but it is primari:cy inter-
ested in his ethical character; and this holds true also of 
religion in general. The bare absoluteness of God might 
awaken the sense of wonder and his metaphysical personality 
might elicit a spirit of inquiry with reference to the ulti-
mate meaning of life; but these mental states belong on:cy to 
the ante-chamber of religion. In its essence religion is trust 
in the goodness of God. If God were a non-moral Being, either 
intelligent or non-intelligent, he would not be a proper object 
of religious faith. It is on:cy insofar as he is moral:cy good, 
and so worthy of being trusted, that he is t~ God in the re-
ligious sense of the term.l 
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But besides its importance for the inspiration of faith in general, 
the proposition is important to these Fathers because it is at the heart 
of their controversy with the Marcionites. We would therefore expect 
it to be consistent with other descriptive statements they make about 
God. Certainly there is no! priori reason ~y it should not be, for 
it involves no self-contradiction. Furthermore, the idea that God is 
good in essence or essentia~ good is relevant to all characteristics 
and expressions of His goodness. However, there is a possibility, 
1. The Doctrine of God (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1930), 
P="""325. ---
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which we shall elaborate at another point, that the idea of goodness 
as essential or necessary to God's being as God is not in harmony 
with the Fathers' description of the Divine goodness as free and sub-
ject to no internal or external necessity. 
Certainly the idea that God is essentially good is in harmony 
with the general teaching of Scripture. The idea of a convenant be-
tween God and His chosen people, the giving of the Law, the teachings 
of various prophets--to mention but a few--all point toward the moral 
character of God. The Scriptures are full of assertions of God 1 s 
goodness. 110 taste and see that the Lord is good. 111 110 give thanks 
unto the Lord for he is good: for his ~mrcy endureth forever .u2 
"For the Lord is good; his mercy is everlasting and his truth endureth 
to all generations.'!) 'tWby call me good? There is none good but 
God. 114 11If ye being evil know how to give good gifts to your children, 
how much more will your heavenly Father give good things to those who 
ask Him?"5 While the proposition that goodness is essential to God1s 
being God may not be explicitly stated in the Scriptures, it is clearly 
implied by much Scripture, especially those sections which depict the 
moral character of God as the chief factor differentiating Him from 
the gods of other nations and from men. 
On this particular point all three Fathers are so clear and 
1. Psalm 34:8. Unless otherwise indicated, quotation of Biblical pas-
sages is from the King James Version. 
2. I Chronicles 16:34. 
4. Matthew 19:17. 
3. Psalm 100:5. 
5. Matthew 7:11. 
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definitive in statement that there is no reason for valuing the posi-
tion of one more than that of the others . 
2. Eternal 
That the goodness of God is without beginning or ending and is 
subject to no essential change or corruption is a unanimous opinion 
of these three Fathers. Both Irenaeus and Tertullian assert that a 
goodness that is not operative from the beginning is defective, thereby 
implying that God's goodness is without beginning. Irenaeus goes on 
to say that this is completely unlike God who is without beginning or 
endl but 11 always full of all good. 11 2 Tertullian insists that it is 
eternity which makes God the highest good and the only true good.3 
Clement simply affirms positively that God's goodness is eternal.4 
It was the cause of His creating5 and has shown itself from the begin-
ning in God's concern for man's salvation.6 Before creation God knew 
that the outcome would be good because of "His purpose that had no 
beginning. 11 7 
In a similar way the Fathers agree that God's goodness is un-
changing and incorruptible. Tertullian says that 11 all His blessedness 
1. Against Heresies, ii, 34, 2; I, 411. 
2. ~., iv, 14, 3; I, 479 . 
3. Against Hermogenes, 7; III, 481. 
4. Stromata, v, 14; II, 476. 5. Ibid., vi, 12; II, 503. 
6 . Exhortation to the Heathen, 1; II, 173. 
1. Stromata, vi, 12; II, 503 . 
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would disappear, if He were ever subject to change.nl Therefore his 
goodness expresses itself in accord with fixed and unchanging prin-
ciples, especially apparent in the operation of justice.2 Clement 
adds that, as goodness had no beginning, so it will never cease to be, 
though all other things come to an end.3 Eternal life is possible 
through participation in a goodness incapable of corruption.4 
In regard to both of these meanings of eternity the three Fathers 
exhibit such a unity of perspective that there is no real disagreement 
or great difference between them. However, both Irenaeus and Tertul-
lian do a better job of showing loThy an eternal goodness is superior to 
one which has a temporal beginning than Clement, where it is simply 
asserted as a categorical statement without any real argument. In 
principle the argument of Irenaeus and Tertullian is the same, al-
though the r ationale for the description of God' s goodness as eternal 
is better seen in Tertullian, since he develops the logical implica-
tions of his argument in greater detail than does Irenaeus. For both, 
eternity implies uncreatedness and independence while temporality 
implies being in a created and dependent state. 
Indeed, the most fundamental element in the conception of God, as 
Tertullian clear~ perceives, is that of real being. Real being par-
takes most of the quality or power of existence, which it shares with 
1. Ad Nationes, ii, 6; III, 134. 
2. Against Marcion, ii, 23; III, 315. 
3. Stromata, v, 14; II, 476. 4. Ibid., v, 10; II, 459. 
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lesser beings or "creatures." This is true both in a qualitative and 
a quantitative sense. The essence of real being is to exist. It 
must carry the cause of its existence within itself, or it will not 
be real being. It cannot be conceived as coming into being, for this 
would imply a cause external to it. For these reasons, real being 
must be conceived as eternal. 
The tendency of the Fathers to define goodness in terms of that 
which undergirds and enriches life and evil in terms of that which under-
mines and destroys life implies the identity of goodness and real being. 
This becomes especially evident in the Fathers' thought of goodness as 
the principle of life and evil as the principle of death. Real being 
must possess the attribute of eternity. And insofar as God1s goodness 
is real, it will be eternal; and the fact that it is eternal is proof 
that it is real. 
The concept of God 1 s eternal goodness is clearly in harmoey with 
the mnnerous references of Scripture to the eternity of God. 11The 
eternal God is thy refuge."l "From everlasting to everlasting Thou 
art God."2 11 Thy righteousness is an everlasting righteousness.n3 
11The Lord is good; his mercy is everlasting."4 "With everlasting 
kindness will I have mercy on thee, saith the Lord.n5 So also the 
notion of Divine goodness as unchangeable is in harmoey with those 
passages expressing the unchanging nature of God, such as Malachi 3:6: 
"For I am the Lord, I change not." 
1. Deuteronomy 33:27. 
4. Psalm 100:5. 
2. Psalm 90:2. 
5. Isaiah 54:8. 
3. Psalm 119:142. 
Irenaeus opens himself to a minor criticism in his argument 
that the created must come short of perfection by virtue of its not 
being uncreated, when one remembers that he describes the highest 
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good for man as likeness to God. Certainly if the created is destined 
to remain forever imperfect and inferior to the uncreated there can 
never be a complete likeness to God. And certainly this must be the 
case if eternity is a necessary condition or ingredient of perfection. 
Yet Irenaeus speaks as if Christ has made the accomplishment of the 
goal of likeness to God possible. 
The thought of the Fathers in regard to the first meaning of 
eternity as without beginning or end seems to be consistent, with 
the exception in Irenaeus referred to above, with the rest of their 
thought on goodness and is especially relevant to their thought of 
goodness as an essential and natural attribute. There is one point, 
however, in connection with the Fathers' notion of the eternity of 
God's goodness at which a common difficulty becomes apparent. They 
all contend that goodness is without a beginning, yet they all hold 
that the universe had a point of beginning and that the creation of 
the universe was a work of goodness. If goodness, the cause of the 
universe, is without beginning and never subject to change, one wonders 
how the world could have had a beginning. Of course, the solution that 
immediate~ presents itself is that they are not referring to overt or 
external expressions of goodness but rather to the disposition, atti-
tude, or essence from which external expressions spring. It is good-
ness in its essential nature that is without beginning and without 
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change. But the insistence of both Irenaeus and Tertullian on the 
fact that a goodness which is not expressed from the beginning is 
defective is disturbing. Probably they meant only that a goodness 
not evident from the beginning of this created order was defective, 
but the principle of their argument when carried to its logical con-
clusion would condemn any change in goodness ' mode of manifestation. 
And, while the essence of goodness might remain unchanged by the 
creation of the universe, yet goodness must have undergone some sort 
of alteration, for in beginning to express itself in an outward way 
its mode of existence was clearly changed. Furthermore, the drawing 
of a metaphysical distinction between the essence of goodness and 
its particular manifestations must be recognized as somewhat artifi-
cial. And certainly such a distinction creates additional problems 
for thought, since it is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive 
how an unchanging essence can manifest itself in changing circum-
stances in a variety of phenomenal forms. 
3. Linked with Power 
This point, too, finds the Fathers in complete agreement. 
Irenaeus says that God's goodness and power are simultaneously ex-
hibited in creationl and that a goodness without sufficient power to 
express itself is not real goodness.2 He even suggests that goodness 
varies in direct ratio to God's power and greatness.3 No plurality 
1. Against Heresies, iv, 38, 3; I, 521. 
2. ~., v, 4, 1-2; I, 530. 3. ~., ii, 30, 2-4; I, 403-404. 
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of gods can exist,l for "His will is the substance of all things 112 
and nothing happens contrary to his will.3 In a similar way, Clement 
asserts that God must be both good and supreme. For if God is not 
supreme as well as good He would effect salvation o~ by accident. 
He must have sufficient power both to bring his creatures into line 
through punishment and to supply their needs.4 Tertullian insists 
more vigorously than either of the other Fathers upon God 1s supremacy 
in power as well as in goodness. He regards it as blasphemous even 
to think that God's power might be insufficient.5 With God the o~ 
limitation is 'What He does not will to do.6 In his writing against 
Hermogenes he insists on God's power to create ex nihilo. It could 
not have been a creation out of some eternal substance, for 11He could 
not have been Lord of a substance which was co-equal with Himself."7 
It is more worthy to believe that God is free and powerful, even as 
the author of evil, than that He is a slave of infirmity. 8 If there 
is aqy deficiency in the expression of God 1s goodness it certai~ is 
not traceable to a lack of power. 
In their reasoning as to lllhy goodness must be omnipotent, the 
1. ~., ii, 11 5; I, 360. 
3. Ibid., ii, 5, 3-4; I, 365. 
2. ~., ii, 30, 9; I, 406. 
4. Stromata, i, 27; II, 340. 
5. Against Marcion, i, 22; III, 287. 
6. On ~ Flesh of Christ, 3; III, 522. 
1. Against Hermogenes, 9; III, 482. 
8. Ibid., 14; Ill, 485. 
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thought of the Fathers is complementary. In his arguments against 
the Marcionite god whose goodness is not known until later in human 
history, Irenaeus indicates the need for an objective as well as a 
subjective goodness as a basis for faith. Tertullian argues that 
goodness cannot be supreme either in the sense of objective manifesta-
tions or in the sense of a subjective goodness of intention within God 
if God is not also supreme in power. Clement points out that unless 
the same Being is supreme both in power and in goodness human needs 
can be met and salvation occur only by accident. 
Except for the notion of everlasting punishment, the concept of 
an omnipotent goodness is consistent with and relevant to the rest of 
each Father's system of theology. It certainly is consistent with 
and relevant to the doctrine of creation, especial]y in Tertullian • s 
system where omnipotence is a basis for a creation~ nihilo. The 
work of providence, the supp]ying of human need, the use of various 
aspects of life and experience for instruction all depend upon the 
supreiOe power of God. Clearly, the Divine judgment depends upon God's 
having power adequate for the rewarding and punishing of men according 
to their deserts. And certainly the work of God in salvation requires 
a power greater than all forms of evil in the universe. The idea of 
an omnipotent goodness is also in harmony with the many Scriptural 
assertions of God • s power and the frequent references to Him as the 
Almighty. 
As we shall show in more detail later, the description of God's 
goodness as omnipotent is inconsistent with the notion of everlasting 
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punishment in a double sense, indicating both an external limi. tat ion to 
the domain of Divine goodness and an inner failure of power in God's 
goodwill to men. 
4. Divorced from Personal Need 
The Fathers agree that God's goodness is unrelated to any need 
of His own. Irenaeus tells us that God needs nothing.1 He requires 
lmman obedimce and service, not because of any need of His own, but 
because of man's need for the fellowship which obedience makes pos-
sible.2 Clement endorses the same idea by saying that God Himself 
needs nothing but rather supplies the needs of everything else. 3 
The goodness of God "terminates" in mankind. 4 Tertullian Bllggests the 
idea more indirectly than Irenaeus and Clanent yet quite definitely. 
He says that God's abolition of the sacrificial ritual proves it 
never was required as a means of rendering actual service to Him.5 
Rebutting those who worship many gods, who, having once been men, 
must be supposed to have been constituted as deities because of the 
need of the God Supreme for their assistance, he says that this ia an 
unworthy thought of One who can make gods outright, for 11 that cannot 
be imperfect which has made all perfect..u6 
The proposition that God's goodness is unrelated to any need on 
1. Against Heresies, ii, 2, 4; I, 361. 2. Ibid., iv, 14, 1; I, 478. 
3. Stromata, vii, 3; II, 527. 4. ~., ii, 6; II, 353. 
5. Against Marcion, ii, 22; III, 314. 6. ApOlogy, 11; III, 27. 
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His part seems consistent with other statements of the Fathers rela-
tive to the Divine goodness. Not only so, but it is direct~ relevant 
to a number of their assertions about the Divine goodness. It is rele-
vant to the characterizations of God's goodness as free and spontaneous 
and as a natural and eternal attribute. It is relevant also to the 
thought that God's goodness is basic and primary as the ground of all 
created goods and the source of all natural blessings. In addition, 
it lends support to the judgment that man 1 s goodness is derivative and 
learned, dependent entire~ upon God. 
Furthermore, this proposition is in harmony with the statements 
of the prophets that God has no need of man's gifts and sacrifices. 
•'What is the multitude of your sacrifices to me?"l "For I spake not 
••• concerning burnt-offerings or sacrifices.n2 "For I desired 
mercy, and not sacrifice; and the lmowledge of God more than burnt 
offerings. n3 ''What doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, 
and to love mercy, and to walk humb~ with thy God?tt4 
The proposition indicates that the goodness of God is not same-
thing of direct value to Himself but rather that which is of value to 
His creatures. Between the need of a creature and that which it judges 
valuable there is a direct relationship. For creatures, the good is 
that which ministers directly to their needs; but such is not the case 
with God. While for creatures value-judgment is basica~ self-centered, 
for God it is other-centered. As we suggested in the Introduction., 
1. Isaiah 1:11. 2. Jeremiah 7:22. 
3. Hosea 6:6. 4. Micah 6:8. 
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the good is not something which God pursues as a means to His own 
perfection or fulfillment, but rather it is that which He bestows 
upon His creatures for the sustenance of their lives, that which they 
must indeed pursue for the sake of their continued existence. What 
these Fathers refer to as the goodness of God is that aspect of God's 
nature which is concerned with His creatures• needs, especia~ those 
of mankind. As we suspected it might be, it is clearly anthropocentric. 
Apart from its sustaining, helping, and saving relationship to man-
kind, it would not be called goodness at all. 
5. Free, Not Necessary 
The external expression of God's goodness, we are told b.Y 
Irenaeus, is the result neither of some internal necessity nor coer-
cion qy same external power,l nor of a need for making His goodness 
perfect,2 but entirely of His free will.3 With Clement the matter 
is less certain. He says that God is not "involuntarily good, as the 
fire is warming, but in Him the imparting of good things is voll.ttl-
tary.n4 But at another point he seems to suggest the operation of some 
internal necessity. "As the nature of the beneficent is to do good, 
as it is of the fire to warm, and the light to give light, • • • 
vice cannot do anything virtuous •••• Philosophy ••• is the work 
of God, whose work it is solely to do good. 115 Although we tried to 
1. Against Heresies, ii, 5, 4; I, 365. 
3. ~., U, 1, 1; I, 359. 
2. ~., iv, 14, 3; I, 479. 
4. Stromata, vii, 7; n, 534-35. 
5. ~., vi, 17; II, 517. 
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spare him the necessit,r of a marked inconsistenc.y b,1 suggesting that 
he may have meant this analogy to mean o~ that God's goodness is 
regular and dependable just as there is an invariable regularity about 
the warming of fire and the illumining of light, we cannot be sure 
that this is not simply an inconsistency. It is possible that a simi-
lar type of inconsistency is also to be found in Tertullian. For 
though he insists quite strongly on the complete freedom of God's 
will,l his insistence also that God's goodness is natural2 suggests 
the operation of same internal necessity. However, he too can be 
saved from a real inconsistenc.y b,1 assuming that he means by natural, 
not same internal necessity, but an unvar,ying habit or form of ex-
pression. 
It is b,1 no means clear what is meant when it is said that God's 
goodness is free and not necessary. Does the freedom under discussion 
refer to the particular acts of God's goodness or to the attribute 
from which such actions spring? Does it indicate the absence of all 
internal relations as well as all external restraints or the absence 
of external restraints alone? 
We have noted above that there may be an inconsistency in the 
thought of Clement and Tertul 1 ian. While maintaining that God 1 s good-
ness is free or voluntary, both leave the suggestion that there may be 
an internal necessity at work. And, although he insists strong~ that 
Divine goodness is the result of neither internal necessity nor exter-
nal coercion, Irenaeus is not complete~ free of difficulty. For the 
1. Against Hermogenes, 14-16; m, 485-86. 2. Above,w. 188-89. 
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insistence of all three men on the fact that God's goodness is an 
eternal and essential attribute seems out of harmony with their con-
tention that it is also free. 
If it is their intention to imply freedom of the attribute of 
goodness itself, there is no wa:y of saving all three Fathers from a 
clear-cut contradiction. The frequent statement of the Fathers that 
God's acts of goodness are the result of no sort of necessity but en-
tirely a matter of His free will certainly makes it sound as if they 
mean to say that God is free to do good or not to do good. Yet they 
have said that goodness is an eternal and essential attribute, with-
out which God would not be God. God then may be free to choose to do 
other than the good, but if He exercises such a choice he ceases to 
be God--a most peculiar kind of freedom, which to exercise is to lose, 
not it alone, but one 1 s essential being as well. The extreme irra-
tionality of this alternative suggests that it probably was not the 
position of the Fathers, although conceivably they might have held 
the position without being tully aware of its consequences. But let 
us suggest another approach. 
If freedom means absence of all internal relations, as Irenaeus' 
statement that it is the result of no internal necessity might imply, 
then the concept of a free goodness becomes virtually unintelligible. 
For to attribute the freedom of indeterminism to God's goodness is to 
destroy all continuity in goodness itself. Particular acts of the Di-
vine Being might be regarded as good because they happen to fulfill 
human need, but unless human need and the nature of goodness itself 
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are to be regarded as changing in keeping with an indeterminate Divine 
will goodness must be related to some internal structure which would 
give it identity or continuity. If goodness is to be an essential 
and eternal quality of God, as all three Fathers indicate that it is, 
then it must have some internal structure of its own. The attribute 
can be an eternal and essential. element in the nature of God but it 
cannot at the same time be free in the sense that God can choose to 
be good or not to be good. Particular acts or expressions of goodness, 
however, may be free in relation to that which is outside God, in that 
they are caused by no external coercive force, and also in relation to 
the attribute out of which they spring, in that no particular act re-
quires expression. 
Such an interpretation is consistent with Clement's insistence 
that Divine goodness is self-consistent and with Tertullian's asser-
tion that it is rational and purposive. An interpretation of the 
freedom of Divine goodness as indeterminism would be wholly incon-
sistent with the rest of their theology. Therefore, we conclude that 
the above interpretation is correct. 
6. Complex 
Both Irenaeus and Tertullian maintain that God's goodness is a 
complex rather than a simple attribute. In Irenaeus, the various at-
tributes not only permeate one anotherl and operate conjunctive~ 
1. Against Heresies, ii, 13, 3; I, 374. 
2. Ibid., iv, 38, 3; I, 521. 
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but are modified in their operation by other attributes.l Tertullian 
tells us that God's goodness is not a simple one, for such a goodness 
is neither natural, rational, nor perfect.2 It is not fitting that 
a being possessing a goodness unmodified in any way should be regarded 
as God.3 Since a simple goodness permits no rival emotions, it cannot 
act in judgment or maintain any system of discipline. 4 (he must con-
clude that since the "deliverance of man is an operation of goodness, 
it follow's that this goodness avails nothing without its endowments, 
that is to say, without those sensations and affections whereby it 
carries out its purpose. 115 Although Clement makes no statement to 
that effect, it is reasonable to assume that the goodness in which 
he believes is one intermixed with other attributes. Cer~, an 
interrelation of sane attributes is to be seen in mercy's withholding 
for a time the execution of judgment. Also sane interaction is sure~ 
implied between goodness and justice when goodness and righteousness 
are equated with each other.6 
Though the truth of this proposition tends to dangerous exaggera-
tion in Irenaeus, the basic idea is sound in the systems of all three 
Fathers. The validity of the proposition is evident from its internal 
relations with the rest of the system of which it is a part. It be-
comes reasonable in the light of the implicit assumption of these 
1. ~., iii, 25, 3; I, 459. 
2. Against Marcion, i, 25; III, 290. 
4. ~., i, 26; III, 291. 
6. stromata, vi, 14; II, 5o5. 
3.~. 
5. ~., i, 25; III, 291. 
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Fathers that the world is a laboratory of character development. Hu-
man freedom is required if man is to come into the possession of a 
goodness or true being of his own. If through the exercise of his 
freedom man is to develop a character and real existence of his own, 
he must be faced in his choosing with alternatives that are genuine:cy 
different in quality and the consequences of choosing evil must be 
different fran the consequences of cho_osing good. This implies God's 
acting in judgment on human action in such a way as to indicate His 
approval of same actions and choices and His disapproval of others. 
His goodness is a will for man's ultimate good which can afflict the 
pain or 11evil11 of disciplinary judgment in order to accomplish its 
purpose. If there were no difference in consequence between the 
choice of good and the choice of evil, man would have no knowledge 
that one ought to be chosen in preference to the other and would lack 
the incentive to make such choice, even if he had the lmowledge. Then 
God • s purpose that man have a goodness or true existence of his own 
would not be realized. This is the fatal weakness of a simple goodness, 
concerned only with man's immediate happiness and well-being. 
It becomes clearly apparent from this that the goodness of which 
these Fathers speak is neither hedonistic nor eudaemonistic. God's 
goodness is a will, not for man's immediate pleasure or happiness, but 
for his ultimate well-being. 
What the Fathers are concerned with showing is desirable--that 
God does not need the faculties through which men function and communi-
cate. The Divine nature is not composed of attributes which represent 
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cam.pa.rtments or partial functions of total Deity. Rather what we call 
attributes are logical amstructs to represent the various ways in which 
the Divine Being in totality engages in action. They are real and dis-
tinct ways in which God expresses Himself but they do not correspond 
to departments or divisions of activity within the Divine Being itself. 
It is probab~ attribute in this sense that the Fathers have in mind 
when they say that God1 s goodness is no simple goodness but is one 
that partakes of the qualities of other attributes. But this process 
must not be carried too far for if the logical distinctness of the 
various attributes is complete~ lost no concepts or terms will remain 
for the description of the Divine activity. 
Valid as this notion may be in a general way in the systems of 
the three Fathers, it exhibits dangerous tendencies in Irenaeus and, 
less direct~, in Clement also. Irenaeus has told us that goodness 
is not a simple attribute but that instead it is colored and modified 
in its operation by other attributes of the Divine Being. The idea 
he advances is valid up to this point. However, it is when he tries 
to remove the distinction between one attribute and another from the 
nature of God and to show that in essence God is a simple, homogeneous 
substance that the dangerous tendency of his thought becomes apparent. 
It is one thing to s~ that the goodness of God is not a pure and 
simple goodness but rather partakes of the coloring of the other Di-
vine attributes. This still leaves it with a unique and distinctive 
quality of its own from which it derives its separate designation. 
But it is quite another thing to maintain that it is both complex and 
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simple, or that precisely because it is complex it must be simple and 
homogeneous. The danger of saying that God 11 is a simple, uncompounded 
Being, ••• altogether like and equal to Himself, since He is wholly 
understanding, • • • wholly hearing, and wholly seeing, and wholly 
light, and the whole source of all that is good1 11 and that 11 1n what 
manner He sees, in that also He hears; and in what manner He hears, 
in that also He sees11 is that the various qualities and abilities at-
tributed to God tend to lose whatever distinctive and intelligible 
meaning they may have. The tendency of this thinking to describe one 
attribute in terms of other Divine attributes is to lose sight of the 
unique and distinctive quality of an attribute in the interest of 
understanding it in terms of the operation of other attributes. The 
result is that goodness is seen as a homogeneous complex of the opera-
tion of other attributes, such as justice, wisdom, power, etc. and 
justice is seen as a complex of the operation of goodness, power, wis-
dom, etc. In short, the end result is a hopeless muddle. If this 
should happen, it would be wise to remain silent about the nature of 
God. 
1. Rational 
Irenaeus finds evidence of the alliance of wisdom, goodness, and 
power in His producing of His own will a creation whose parts consti-
tute 11 one harmonious and consistent whole.nl The work of the Divine 
wisdom is evident in the harmonizing of His goodness and His justice 
1. !gainst Heresies, iv, 38, 3; I, 521. 
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in their operation.l From C~ement•s endorsement of a Stoic philoso-
pher's description of the good as "regular," "fitting," and "agreeing 
with itself" as a clear statement concerning the nature of God, one 
might draw the conclusion that he regards the Divine goodness to be 
self-consistent.2 With Tertullia.n we get an unequivocal statement 
that God's goodness is rational. He criticizes the god of the Mar-
cionites because it is lacking in rationality. When he says that Di-
vine goodness is rational he means first that it is bestowed upon its 
proper object, that is, upon God's own creatures, not those belonging 
to some other god.3 Secondly, goodness will be rational when it op-
erates according to a fair principle in reference to its creatures4 
or, failing to meet the first test, when it operates upon alien crea-
tures without wrong to Him to whom they belong.5 And thirdly, good-
ness is rational when it is consistent and coherent in its manner of 
operation.6 He goes so far as to say that something is good because 
it is rationally directed, because it is "a divine and reasonable ap-
pointment."? 
We noted in discussing the meaning of a free goodness that it 
1. ~., iii, 25, 3; I, 459. 
2. Exhortation ~ ~ Heathen, 6; II, 192. 
3. Against Marcion, i, 23; III, 288. 
4.~. 5. Ibid. 
6. ~., i, 28; III, 293. 
1. ~Fuga in Persecutione, 4; IV, 118. 
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cannot be complete~ lacking in an intelligible structure of its own 
without falling into self-contradiction. For none of these Fathers 
does goodness seem to be a matter of unrelated Divine fiat. Rather 
is the reasonableness of goodness evident in a number of the ways in 
which goodness makes itself manifest. The proposition that goodness 
is rational is coherent with the statement that it is purposive. The 
wisdom of goodness is apparent in its gift of freedom to man that its 
purpose to accomplish man's salvation through developing in him an 
autonomous goodness like unto God might be accomplished. It is seen 
in the provision of commandments and warnings and a moral environment 
conducive toward this end. It is seen also in the discrimination of 
Divine judgment in such a way as to provide a deterrent to wrong-doing 
and an incentive toward goodness. 
The proposition that God1s goodness is rational helps to decide 
the old question: Is something right because God wills it, or does 
He will it because it is right? While from the point of view of man 
something is good because God wills it, it is so because of the nature 
of God's will itself. The old question of the scholastics as to whether 
God's will or His intellect is primary is a false dilemma, for it is 
doubtful that a will can be a will apart from a definite rational 
structure which supplies it with content and direction. Something is 
not good merely because it happens to be willed by God1 but rather be-
cause God's willing brings into existence an order of relationships 
in which the nature of the good is already implicit. While sane spe-
cific good may owe its nature as good to the fact that God has willed 
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a certain order of relationships into existence, its goodness is due, 
not to an arbitrary will, even though it be the will of God, but to the 
definite order of relationships in which it occurs. The fact that good-
ness within a given order is not a variable suggests quite clear~ that 
the Divine goodness has a definite and intelligible structure which im-
parts direction and content to the Divine will. Indeed, with Tertul.-
lian this is clearly seen to be the case when he affirms that God's 
goodness is purposive. For to purpose is to accept an intelligible 
goal; and to will, for God at any rate, is to undergird purpose with 
power or with efforts to accomplish. 
8. Natural 
Tertul.lian is the on~ one of the three Fathers who insists ex-
plicit~ that God's goodness is natural. However, it is certainly 
implicit in the thinking of both Irenaeus and Clement, even if it is 
not explicitly mentioned. For it is clear~ related to the ideas 
that God1 s goodness is eternal and is an essential attribute. As 
Tertullian points out, it could not be eternal--without beginning or 
end--in its expression unless it is a natural or native attribute of 
God.l Furthermore, there seems to be no real difference in meaning 
between the idea that goodness is natural and the idea that it is an 
essential attribute. 
What was said in our evaluation of the proposition that God's 
goodness is an essential attribute applies here also. However, the 
1. Against Marcion, i, 22; III, 287. 
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term natural connotes a slight~ different perspective than the word 
essential. It suggests not only that goodness must be regarded as 
a necessary and irremovable element in the conception of God but also 
that goodness is no mere adaptation or mode on the part of God but 
is rather a part of His very make-up. Therefore, we concluded earlier 
that goodness considered as an attribute is not free. Only the par-
ticular external expression of the attribute is free. Tertullian seems 
to say that God does not choose to do good, for it is His nature to do 
good. However, He chooses the particular acts through which His good-
ness finds expression. 
The validity of this proposition within Tertullian' a system is 
apparent from its coherence with other propositions which he sets 
forth. We have already noted that it is fundamental to affirming the 
eternity of God's goodness and that it is virtual~ identical with 
the assertion that Divine goodness is an essential attribute. We sug-
gested above its relationship with the proposition that Divine good-
ness is free. Also, it is supported by the statement that God's 
goodness is rational, or possessed of an intelligible structure of 
its own. Furthermore, the fact that goodness is natural accounts for 
its being unrelated to God in a need-value relationship. 
To take a new approach to the question of the objective validity 
of the proposition that goodness is a natural or essential attribute 
of God, it can be said that goodness is a necessary element in the 
conception of God because only upon this assumption is God the ulti-
mate explanatory principle of life as we find it. Life as we know it 
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includes the experience of value as well as of existence. Value and 
existence are not separate aspects of experience, but they are per-
spectives from which experience may be viewed, occurring in a common 
object or at a common point. Now such interaction is explainable only 
by an appeal to some unitary principle which is the ground of the 
interaction. Therefore, existence cannot be attributed ultimate~ to 
one Being and value-experience to Another. Rather existence and value 
must find their explanation in One who is the common ground of both. 
Therefore, we conclude that the statement that goodness is a part of 
the nature of God is an objectively valid proposition. 
9. Perfect 
In Irenaeus and Tertullian the thought of God's goodness as 
perfect is clearlY developed, while in Clement it is but barelY sug-
gested. The idea appears in Irena.eus onlY as an indication that the 
expression of God's goodness is completelY free and the result ofmoort 
of necessity. It is not because of any necessity but onlY because He 
is perfect and "full of all good" that God creates and bestows good 
upon man.l By implication, God does not need to perfect His goodness 
because it is already perfect. Tertullian emphasizes the idea much 
more strongly by making it a third test to apply to the goodness of 
Mar cion 1 s god. Nothing can be more certain than that He who supplied 
the universe with a government of perfect wisdom is Himself perfect.2 
It is foolish to try to form an opinion of God's qualities, such as 
1. Against Heresies, iv, 14, 3; I, 479. 2. Apology, ll; m, 27. 
meelmess, patience, mercy, and "the very parent of them all, good-
ness, tt on the basis of similar human qualities since God alone pos-
sesses them in perfection.l 
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Apparently Irenaeus does not believe it necessary for God to 
engage in any moral athletics for the sake of His goodness. Unlike 
man who must do good in order to acquire a good character, God does 
good because His character is good. He does good, not to perfect His 
goodness, but because His goodness is alreaqy perfect. The fact that 
it is full and complete enables Him to bestow it freely upon His crea-
tures. 
Clement's concept of a Divine goodness which can never cease to 
be active certainly seems contradictory of any static conception of 
perfection. However, an outright contradiction may be avoided by 
assuming his view of perfection to be dynamic rather than static. 
Goodness must be active if it is real. An unexpressed goodness simply 
is not real. For Clement, perfection evidently means the full actuali-
zation of all potentialities of being. God's perfection therefore con-
sists in His unceasing, good activity. If God should cease to do good 
Hawould cease to be perfect, for He would then lack moral goodness 
which can really exist only in expressed attitudes and actions toward 
other persons. 
The proposition that God 1 s goodness is perfect is close~ related 
to the proposition that Divine goodness is complex rather than simple. 
It is clear, especially in Tertullian, that a simple goodness is 
1. Against Marcion, ii, 16; III, 310. 
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imperfect. It simp~ does not fit the facts of life, for clear~ sin 
and suffering are a part of the human situation. Since this is the 
case, it seems like~ that God does not save, or has not saved, all. 
But a pure and simple goodness which does not save all, while having 
the power to do so, must be imperfect. Yet even if such failure to 
save all did not indicate a failure of intention, a simple goodness of 
perfect intention would be remiss in granting men free will, by which 
they might sin and injure their fellows, since it has no intention of 
exercising judgment. In the light of the facts of experience a simple 
goodness of perfect intention can be maintained only by d~g the 
omnipotence of God--and this was something these Fathers were not will-
ing to do. Certainly, for Tertullian, to s~ that God1s goodness is 
perfect means that it possesses all the endowments necessary to ac-
complish its purpose to save man and to make goodness the law of life. 
The objective validit,y of this proposition becomes evident as 
one considers the alternative. The alternative is that God•s goodness 
is imperfect and if so, it either remains in a fixed state of imper-
fection, varies in the degree of perfection and imperfection, or graws 
gradually and steadily toward perfection. In the first instance, if 
God were in a fixed state of imperfection, it would be impossible to 
know it, since, as the source of al.l finite good, He would be the high-
est standard of excellence available. If one assumes the existence of 
some standard by which the imperfection of God•s goodness might became 
apparent, then he will be led in search of some higher explanatory 
principle, which will turn out to be the real God. The second 
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alternative is subject to all the difficulties of the first, since in 
order to know that there is variation in the degree of perfection one 
must appeal to some standard of perfection--and an absolute one at 
that, since God's highest degree of perfection is not perfection. It 
is subject also to the problems inherent in the concept of a growing 
God, which becomes especially apparent in the third alternative. The 
concept of growth is unintelligible apart from same sort of environ-
ment that contributes to it and in which it may occur. This suggests 
that God is as much in need of a higher Being as man. At any rate, 
for God to grow toward a goodness more perfect that His own indicates 
that He is dependent upon same standard of goodness external to Him-
self. This sends one in search of a higher Being who ought rightly 
to be called God. In all these cases God fails to be the ultimate 
ground of goodness, which He must be to account for the world as we 
lmow it. 
10. Purposive 
Tertullian alone states clearl\1 that there is an intrinsic rela-
tionship between God1 s goodness and His purpose, although the idea is 
implicit in the thought of Irenaeus and Clement. 11His purpose is no 
purpose without goodness; nor is His goodness goodness without a pur-
pose.nl God's gift of freedom to man, with its capacity for abuse and 
for choice of evil, can be good only in the light of His purpose that 
1. Against Marcion, ii, 6; III, 301. 
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man might have a goodness truly his own because of his choice of it.l 
The proposition that goodness is purposive is inconsistent with 
no point in their s.1stem, except possib~ the one that goodness is 
free and not necessary, and then o~ if the notion of a free goodness 
is taken in the sense of indeterminism. On the other hand, it is rele-
vant to the proposition that goodness is possessed of a definite and 
rational structure. It is relevant also to the thought that the gift 
of freedom to man is an expression of God 1 s goodness since it enables 
man to achieve a goodness which is in a sense his own. It is congruous 
also with the Fathers' notion of providence as God's foreseeing and 
arranging all things for the salvation of man. It is in keeping with 
the thought that laws and warnings and chastisements are expressive 
of goodness since they are intended for man's future good. It is in 
harmony with the Incarnation of the Saviour as the climax and fulfill-
ment of the work of the Word. In fact, the idea of goodness as pur-
posive ties the various expressions of goodness in creation, provi-
dence, instruction, law, punishment, and mercy together through the 
goal of salvation. 
ll. Basic or Primary 
Although the structure of thought in Irenaeus indicates that 
God's goodness is basic or primary, he does not specifical~ say so. 
Clement, however, says at several points that God's goodness is primary, 
1. ~., ii, 6; m, 302 and ii, 10; m, 306. 
the cause or source of all finite forms of goodness.l All things 
necessary and profitable for life are supplied by God.2 With Tertul-
lian also God's goodness is basic. From God all things come.3 He 
created them out of nothing.4 Therefore, 11He will be first, because 
all things are after Him, and all things are after Him, because all 
things are by Him; and all things are by Him, because they are of 
nothing. 115 
The statement that Divine goodness is basic or primary seems 
fully coherent with the rest of the Fathers' thought. It is consist-
ent with and relevant to the thought of creation as an expression of 
goodness. It agrees with and lends support to the thought of provi-
dential care and the various forms of Divine instruction as manifesta-
tions of goodness. It is harmonious with regarding the work of the 
Saviour as an instance of goodness and definitely accords with the 
idea of goodness as derivative and learned. 
12. Beyond Comprehension and Expression 
To Irenaeus, God in His fullness is beyond the reach of human 
comprehension, unknowable in essence,6 because He is unlike, and in 
1. Stromata, vii, 4; II, 529 and iv, 25; II, 439. 
2. Ibid., vi, 8; II, 495. 
3. The Soul's Testimogy, 2; III, 176. 
4. ~ Prescription Against Heretics, 13; III, 249. 
5. Against Hermogenes, 17; III, 486. 
6. Against Heresies, ii, 24, 2; I, 458-59. 
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reality above, all human qualities.l Because of His kindness, men may 
know that He is the author of His works.2 But on the basis of His 
works it is not possible to comprehend His greatness3 or to declare 
fully His goodness,4 11 for as His greatness is past finding out, so 
also His goodness is beyond expression.u5 Although Clement does not 
specifically describe God's goodness in such manner, he does say that 
God is infinite and inscrutable, above species, genus, number, and 
predication of any and all properties.6 The fullness of His nature 
is inexpressible even by His own power.7 Through grace some knowledge 
of Him is possible,a but it is more a knowledge of what He is not than 
of what He is.9 Scripture's attribution to Him of human terms is but 
an accommodation to human weakness, not an attempt to express His real 
nature.lO Tertullian continues to stress the thought that in many 
respects God is unknowable.ll Only the Spirit of God knows "what is 
in God.ul2 He is beyond man's utmost thought. It is the very fact 
that He is beyond all conceptions, that we are incapable of fully 
grasping him, which affords us knowledge of what He really is. There-
fore in His greatness He appears to us both as One known and unknown.l3 
1. ~., ii, 13, 3-4; I, 374. 2. ~., iii, 24, 2; I, 458-.59. 
3. Ibid., iv, 19, 3; I, 487. 4. Ibid. 
.5. ~., iv, 20, .5; I, 489. 6. Stromata, v, 12; II, 463-64. 
7. ~., v, 10; II, 460. a. Ibid., v, 14; II, 464. 
9. Ibid., v, 11; II, 461. 10. Ibid., ii, 16; II, 363. 
11. Against Marcion, ii, 2· 
' 
III, 298. 
12. Ibid. 
-
13. Apology, 17; III, 31-32. 
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Formally, the idea that God is incomprehensible and inexpressible 
is in contradiction to many other things which the Fathers have to say. 
The thought of Irenaeus that God is unknowable in essence, above and 
beyond all human qualities, and unable to be fully manifested and under-
stood by means of His work and Tertullian's position that God is beyond 
all human conceptions and lmowable only in part create some difficulty 
for the conviction of the Fathers that the knowledge of God is life. 
But Clement's teaching that as the first cause of the universe God is 
indeed hard to find out, that He is above species, genus, number and 
the predication of any and all properties, that it is only through 
grace that He is lmown at all, that such knowledge as we have is more 
a knowledge of what He is not than of what He is, and that the fullness 
of His nature is inexpressible even by His own power seems absolutely 
fatal to the idea that the knowledge of God is life. What fellowship 
can one have with a Being who cannot be really known, "who is a mere 
metaphysical abstraction, of whom we can predicate nothing but nega-
tions, who seems only 'the deification of zero,' and whose transcend-
ence seems to put Him out of all possible relation to us?"l 
There is a sense, however, in which these sayings of the Fathers 
are in harmony with Scripture and express a profound truth. In several 
of the prophets, especially Isaiah, in numerous Psalms, and in the 
Book of Job, the transcendence of God is clearly expressed. That man 
cannot by searching find out God, that no man hath seen God at any 
J.. Patrick, Clement of Alexandria, p. 71. 
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time, that He is holy and indescribably excellent, that His ways and 
thoughts are Uirl.Jna.ginably higher than ours are Scriptural expressions 
which the Fathers, and particularly Clement, cast in such abstract 
language. Patrick says of Clement's thought: 
And if, like him, we try to define the essence rather than the 
nature of God as manifested in that which is external to Him, 
to express what God is in Himself, apart from any relation to 
the universe or to man, can we conceive of Him or name Him in 
any other way than by denying to Him any attributes that imply 
anything that is distinctive of the finite? ••• What God is 
in Himself only God Himself can fully know. • • • The language 
of Clement expresses a truth which has been recognized by the 
highest teachers of all ages, and which forms an essential 
element in all true theism--viz., that the essence of God must 
ever escape our analysis, that we may apprehend but cannot com-
prehend the nature of Deity, that He may be known to be infinite 
though not known as infinite.l 
What Patrick says is true to the extent that what we have in the 
Fathers' thought is an exaggeration of a Scriptural and experiential 
truth. Yet it seems to be more than a simple exaggeration. God is both 
known and unknown, not in the sense that there is knowledge of Him only 
in part or to a limited degree, but rather that the Father remains for-
ever inaccessible to any direct knowledge to any degree, being known 
oricy" through the Word and the Spirit. Now it is one thing to say that 
because of His greatness and complexit,y God forever defies complete 
human understanding. This does not deny limited or partial knowledge 
and understanding of Him. But it is quite another thing to say that 
God is so far removed from the finite order and human categories that 
man can have~ knowledge or understanding of Him at all. Indeed, this 
1. Patrick, Clement of Alexandria, p. 72. 
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casts doubt upon the idea that He is the author of the universe, 
since the thing produced is so dissimilar to the One who produced it 
that it does not reveal Him. So .fkr has Clement removed God from the 
world which He fashioned that He requires an intermediary to serve as 
the agent of His revelation and His activity. The o~ revelation of 
the Father is that which comes through the Word, who is the visible 
of the Father--the Father remains invisible. On the surface it seems 
as though Irenaeus and Tertullian have not gone this far, since they 
hold that God is revealed to some extent through nature. But when 
one remembers that the work of creation is attributed by them to the 
Word, and sometimes to the Spirit, also, the matter must be viewed in 
a different light. Whatever knowledge of God one hasnust be of the 
Word or the Spirit; any knowledge one has of the Father will be mediated 
through the Son or the Spirit, for the Father Himself is invisible and 
unknowable. The question which we wish to raise here is whether any 
doctrine of intermediaries, such as the Word and the Spirit, is really 
adequate to bridge the gap between the knm1er and the unknown, if the 
unknown is essentially unknowable. The Son is sometimes described as 
the visible of the invisible Father. But how can the visible truly 
reveal the invisible? How can the known be any genuine indication of 
the nature of the unknown and unknowable? If the unknown and unknow-
able God can be made known by a divine intermediary, what prevents 
His being known directly? How can knowledge of God or about God 
through the Word ever be equal to knowing God? It seems to me that 
there is an implicit inconsistency between the statements of the Fathers 
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concerning the lmowability of God and their teaching that lmowledge 
of God and fellowship with God is li:fe for man and that the method by 
which they sought to solve this problem actually complicates the prob-
lem further. 
B. Goodness Shown in Divine Activity 
1. Creation 
With all of these Fathers the creation of all things is a funda-
mental expression of God's goodness. In contrast to the doctrine of 
the Gnostics,l Irenaeus maintains that the same God is responsible 
both for the creation of the world and the salvation of man and that 
both are expressions of His goodness. 2 "Creation is an attribute of 
the goodness of God.n3 Clement agrees that the same Being is both 
Savior and Creator.4 In fact, it was His very intention to save the 
man He planned to create that caused Him to "make the rest also.n5 
Indeed, it was because of His goodness that He wished to be Creator 
and Father.6 The thought of Tertullian at this point is in essential 
agreement with Irenaeus and Clement, although he treats the idea at 
greater length. There is only one God who created all things and 
appeared also in Jesus.7 The activities of creating and saving are 
1. Against Heresies, iii, 25, 5; I, 459-60. 
2. ~., ii, 25, 2; I, 396. 3. ~., iv, 39, 2; I, 523. 
4. Stromata, v, 1; II, 445. 5. Ibid., vi, 17; II, 516. 
6. Instructor, i, 9; II, 232. 
1. On Prescription Against Heretics, 13; III, 249. 
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not divided between two gods, as the Marcionites contend. The good-
ness of creation itself is a certain proof of the goodness of the 
Creator.l Furthermore, God's goodness is the chief motivating cause 
of creation.2 "The first goodness, then, was that of creator. 113 
Clement has indicated at least one reason why creation is an expres-
sion of God's goodness. It is because creation is instrumental or 
basic to the unquestioned good of saving mankind. In a similar way, 
Tertullian reveals one big reason behind his similar contention. 
Creation is good because it serves the good purpose of bringing knowl-
edge of Himself, which is necessary for faith in His existence and 
therefore essential to human salvation.4 
Creation is basic and necessary to the manifestation of God's 
goodness. If His goodness is to be manifested at all, then obviously 
there must be some one to whom it is manifested and something through 
which it is manifested. The creation of man is required in order that 
there may be a recipient of the revelation of God's goodness. The 
creation of things is required to provide a vehicle or medium for 
transmitting the revelation. 
Tertullian1s insistence on a special sort of creation, creation 
~ nihilo, clearly shows the inadequacy of certain types of dualism 
in accounting for the world as we know it. It is impossible to explain 
1. Against Marcion, iv, 25; III, 390 and ii, 17; III, 310 and ii, 5; 
III, 301. 
2. ~., ii, 12; III, 307. 3. Ibid., 11, 3; m, 299. 
4. ~., i, 10-17; III, 278-83. 
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the mixture of good and evil in human experience by attributing the 
evil to an eternally existing substance, evil in nature, which God 
must utilize in creating and by tracing the good that somehow appears 
to God. For if matter is essential~ evil, it can never receive the 
impress of good. If it should, its essential nature would no longer 
be evil and it would cease to be an eternally evil substance. At 
first glance, a valueless or neutral substance would seem to avoid 
these difficulties, but an essentially neutral substance will always 
be neutral and never good. Thus Tertullian1 s contribution is impor-
tant in showing that any manifestation of God 1 s goodness is explain-
able only upon the assumption that God is the sole and absolute ex-
planatory principle of the universe, with power fully adequate to the 
accomplishing of His will. 
We have already noted that creation is an expression of goodness 
coherent with the conception of goodness as basic or primar,y. But 
also the Fathers' tendency to regard creation as good because of its 
instrumentality to the salvation of mankind is a consistent expression 
of a goodness that is purposive. The act of creation is good because 
it enables God to accomplish His purpose of realizing the highest good 
(or salvation) for man, His envisaged creature. Furthermore, the 
thought of creation as a manifestation of goodness is in full accord 
with the propositions that good is the principle of life and that God's 
disclosure of knowledge of Himself is an expression of goodness. 
It is hardly necessary to show that the thought of creation as 
an expression of Divine goodness is in harmony with Scriptures, for 
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the Genesis account of creation makes this quite plain. The oft-re-
peated judgment, following the various stages of creation, that it was 
good and the final judgment of God, in surveying His completed work, 
that it was very good ought to be a sufficient indication that the 
author of the creationnarrative regarded creation as an expression of 
God1s goodness. 
We noticed above the tendency of all three Fathers to vacillate 
in their opinion as to who is the agent of creation, speaking at times 
of creation as the work of God (the Father) and at other times of 
creation as the work of the Word or as the result of the joint activity 
of the Word and the Spirit. However, we concluded that this did not 
indicate a:ny real inconsistency on their part since they tended to re-
gard the Word or Son and the Spirit as subordinate to God the Father. 
For Irenaeus, the Spirit and the Word are the hands of God. The sub-
ordination of the Word to the Father in Clement is indicated by his 
contrasting the visibility of the Word with the invisibility of the 
Father and his saying that those things men deem worthy of God will 
be found in the Father while any characteristic of the Christian God 
which men deem unworthy will apply to the Word. Tertullian • s subordi-
na tionisrn is revealed in his saying that God did not make a beginning 
of being good as He did of being Lord and Father. It makes little dif-
ference whether creation is accomplished by the direct agene,y of the 
Father or through the instrumentality of the Word and/or the Spirit, 
since neither the Wordror Spirit is an agent acting independently of 
the Father's will and purpose. Quite probably the attributing of 
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creation to the Word and the Spirit is an attempt by the Fathers to 
preserve the notion of Divine transcendence, a device which, as we 
noticed above, created theoretical difficulties in knowing God. 
Finally, to speak of God's goodness as the cause or source of 
creation suggests the conclusion that, from the creature's point of 
view goodness consists in being on the scale of being. The higher one 
is or rises on the scale of being the greater the goodness, and vice 
versa. This must be the case because creation enables God to carry 
out his purpose of saving man or of bestowing upon him the highest 
good of eternal life. The good of life or dependent existence pro-
vides the opportunity for God to endow man with the highest good of 
real existence. Once again we are pointed to the identity of the 
highest good with real existence. To participate in the Divine good-
ness at all is to be on the scale of being. 
2. Life and Freedom of Man 
In Irenaeus and Clement the idea that giving life to man is an 
expression of Divine goodness is simply a deduction from the proposi-
tion that creation is a work of goodness. Tertullian, however, de-
velops the idea at same length. He criticizes the god of the Mar-
cionites for forbidding marriage and thus disapproving of the creation 
of man.l When they assert salvation is a sufficient indication of 
their god's goodness, he asks, '~t superior god is this, of whom it 
has not been possible to find any work so great as the ~ of the 
1. Against Marcion, i, 29; III, 294. 
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lesser godllll thus :illlpl.Jring that the creation of man is an indication 
of God's superior goodness. 11The goodness of God 
for the pursuit of the knowledge of Himself. 112 
• • • provided man 
Tertullian alone suggests the idea that human freedom is an in-
dication of God's goodness. God's goodness is shown by this gracious 
gift.3 Even though He foreknows the misuses man will make of his 
freedom, He does not interfere with its operation, 11because to do so 
would be to rescind the freedom which He had permitted with set pur-
pose, and in goodness •11 4 
As we noted, the idea that the imparting of life is an expression 
of God's goodness is implicit in the thought of creation as a manifesta-
tion of goodness. It is consistent with and relevant to the protective 
and benevolent work of providence, the various methods of Divine in-
struction and discipline in moral living, the gift of salvation and 
eternal life. The gift of freedom to man as an expression of God's 
goodness is coherent with the purpose of goodness to produce a being 
capable and worthy of knowing God and of being in character like unto 
God. It is coherent also with the idea that Divine judgment is a mani-
festation of goodness. 
Both ideas are in harmony with Scripture. In the creation story 
in Genesis, God's judgment of His workmanship after the creation of 
man as very good compared with His judgment of it before the creation 
1. ~., i, 17; III, 283. 
3. ~., ii, 6; III, 302. 
2. Ibid., ii, 4; III, 299. 
4. Ibid., ii, 7; III, 303. 
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of man as merely good, shows the proposition that the giving of life 
to man is a manifestation of goodness to be in full harmony with 
Scripture. The reality of man's freedom appears in Scripture not so 
much as a specific teaching as the assumption underlying its many com-
mandments, exhortations, warnings, and prohibitions. While the Scrip-
tures may not directly' teach that man 1 s freedom is an indication of 
Divine goodness, this teaching is consistent with and relevant to the 
teachings of Scripture. 
3. Providence and Natural Blessings 
That providence is one form of the Divine goodness in expression 
is the common opinion of all three of these Fathers. With all three 
Fathers a most important aspect of God1 s "oversight of h'Wll.all affairs" 
is His provision for h'Wll.all need in bestowing natural, and even spir-
itual, blessings. Irenaeus says that God is the "fountain of all 
good things, 111 and never ceases "to confer benefits upon, or to enrich 
man, nor does man ever cease from receiving the benefits, and being 
enriched by God. 11 2 Clement sums up God's work in providing for human 
needs by saying that, "to speak comprehensively, all benefit appertain-
ing to life, in its highest reason, 11 is supplied by God) His good-
ness in this respect is even more apparent because it is impartial, 
bestowed on good and evil alike,4 and is wholly unsolicited and 
1. Against Heresies, i, 12, 2; I, 333. 
2. Ibid., iv, ll, 2; I, 474. 
4. Instructor, i, 8; II, 227. 
3. Stromata, vi, 17; II, 518. 
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unmerited.l God's goodness clearlY expresses itself in taking care 
of man.2 With all of this Tertullian agrees. He quotes Jesus' words 
about the Father's awareness of human need as proof of His goodness.3 
He has shown His goodness in this regard in providing a habitation far 
man4 and in caring for the Hebrews in their days of wandering in the 
wilderness.5 Furthermore,His goodness is an impartial beneficence, 
showered upon good and evil alike, thus "sustaining and nourishing 
and assisting even Marcionites, themselvesl~ 
Irenaeus says tm t God "exercises a providence over our affairs11 7 
and has made provision 11that all things shall turn out for good. 11 8 In 
developing this idea, Clement says that God does not prevent the occur-
rences of evil but rather transmutes it into good.9 
thought at this point may agree with Irenaeus' more general statement, 
but it follows a somewhat different turn than Clement's. He suggests 
that it is part of the providence of God to endow man with natural 
faculties and with laws and precepts designed to promote and safe-
guard his growth in the direction of goodness. He defends man's senses 
against the criticism of a certain school of philosophy as being the 
1. Stromata, vii, 12; II, 544 and Instructor, i, 8; II, 227. 
2. Instructor, i, 8; II, 225. 3. Against Marcion, iv, 29; III, 397. 
4. Ibid., ii, 4; III, 299. 5. Ibid., iv, 26; III, 393. 
6. Ibid., iv, 36; III, 410. 
7. Against Heresies, v, 26, 2· , I, 555-56. 
8. Ibid., iv, 30, 3; I, 504. 9. Stromata, i, 17; II, 319-20. 
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work of 11the good providence of God, 11 given that man might "understand, 
inhabit, dispense, and enjoy11 the works of God.l In a similar way 
God 1 s laws and warnings are 11His gracious providences" for guiding and 
saf e.g u.arding manld.nd. 2 
Tertullian alone makes explicit the relationship between provi-
dence and judgment. Keeping watch results quite naturally in both a 
continuing and a final judgment. The final judgment is clearly one 
element in "His providential arrangings. 113 But, His providence re-
sults also in an on-going judgment in which He expresses the tokens 
of His favor or disfavor according to the merits of the present mo-
ment, thus providing a basis for the Marcionites to criticize Him as 
11inconstant in respect of persons.n4 
The thought of Divine providence in its various aspects as ex-
pressive of goodness is harmonious with numerous other thoughts of the 
Fathers. It agrees with the proposition that Divine goodness is pur-
posive. The giving of Divine conunandments and warnings for the guid-
ance of a free moral being is clearly an indication of the good work 
of providence. God 1 s action in providing for the needs of man is in 
harmony with the statement that Divine goodness is basic and primary 
and clearly indicates His benevolence. Even His judgment of the 
righteous and the wicked reflects the concern of a benevolent 
1.! Treatise~ the Soul, 17; III, 196-97. 
2. Against Marcion, ii, 4; III, 300. 3. Apology, 41; III, 48. 
4. Against Marcion, ii, 23; III, 315. 
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providence (or overseeing of human affairs) for man's finding his ulti-
mate well-being to be in the choice of good. 
NUmerous passages of Scripture reflect the provident work of God. 
Jesus urged his followers: 11Do good to them that hate you, • • • that 
ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven, for He maketh 
His sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the 
just and on the unjust. 111 The great Apostle says that "God binds to-
gether all things into good for those who love God. 11 2 In the Old 
Testament, the providence of God, in the sense of provision for human 
need, is indicated in God's care for the children of Israel in their 
days of desert wandering. Providence in the sense of God1s watchful 
guardianship is also referred to: "The eye of the Lord is upon them 
that fear him, ••• to deliver their soul from death. 113 Also, God's 
providence in the sense of His general oversight and direction of human 
affairs with an eye to man 1 s ultimate well-being is suggested in the 
numerous warnings of God's on-going judgment. There can be no doubt 
that the concept of Divine providence is Scriptural, and, even though 
there may be few passages which direct~ suggest that providence is a 
manifestation of Divine goodness, such a thought is consistent with and 
relevant to all Scriptural statements about God 1s providence. 
4. Instruction and Revelation by the Word 
Irenaeus emphasizes the role of the Ward in aiding the faculties 
1. Matthew .5:44-45. 
3. Psalm 33:18-19. 
2. Romans 8:28. My own translation. 
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of human understanding and in revealing God. The Word has operated 
from the beginning, says Irenaeus, to give human minds the light of 
understandingl and the power to lmow and to distinguish good and 
evil. 2 It is also through the Word and through the Word only, that 
knowledge of God is possible.3 It was by the inspiration of the Word 
that the prophets spoke of God and of His divine commands and warn-
ings.4 But such knowledge of God finds its fullest and most adequate 
expression in the incarnation of the Word in the person of Christ. 
Clement stresses the role of the Word as the divine Instructor. 
Like Irenaeus, he seems to conceive of the Word's aiding the human 
faculties of understanding to clear and accurate functioning. In-
deed, the human soul has become so enfeebled that it cannot lmow 
spiritual reality in general without the help of a Teacher.5 Indeed, 
man could have no lmowledge of God at all without help of "a certain 
divine effluence" which has been instilled in all men.6 Thus for both 
him and Irenaeus the Word seems to act as the inner light of human 
reason. But the Word also makes an objective manifestation of God 
through the life of Christ, for both these men. "The Word of God be-
comes man," says Clement, "that thou mayest learn from man how man may 
1. Against Heresies, iv, 20, 3; I, 488 and ii, 30, 9; I, 406. 
2. Ibid., iv, 39, 1; I, 522. 3. Ibid., iv, 5, 1; I, 466. 
4. Ibid., ii, 30, 9; I, 406 and iv, 20, 3; I, 488. 
5. Stromata, v, 1; II, 446. 
6. Exhortation to the Heathen, 6; II, 191. 
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become God.nl For Irenaeus this seems to be the ultimate instruction 
of the Word. Clement, however, appears to differ from him, for he 
conceives of a continuing instruction from the Word.2 
Though Tertullian has less to say explicitly on the office of 
the Word, the subject is not entirely lacking from his writings. In 
summarizing the rule of faith, he says that God "produced all things 
out of nothing through His own Word, first of all sent forth; that 
this Word is called His Son, and, under the name of God, was seen 
'in diverse manners' by the patriarchs, heard at all times in the 
prophets, at last brought down by the Spirit and Power of the Father 
into the Virgin Mary, was made flesh in her womb, and being born of 
her, went forth as Jesus Christ. 113 We can see from this quotation 
alone that he was in essential agreement with Irenaeus and Clement 
at most points. The Word is the source of prophetic inspiration and 
perhaps of intellectual and spiritual illumination for other men as 
well. In fact, the Word is God's minister in promoting man from a 
good position to the best that God has planned.4 He also seems to be 
the agent of God1s self-revelation, in creation, in His appearances 
to the patriarchs, and especially in the coming of Christ, Tertullian 
lays great stress on God1 s self-revelation. The failure to make such 
1. ~., 1; II, 174. 
2. Instructor, i, 12; II, 235 and i, 2; II, 210 and i, 1; II, 209. 
3. On Prescription Against Heretics, 13; III, 249. 
4. Against Marcion, ii, 4; III, 299. 
345 
a revelation is a mark of weakness on the part of Marcion1 s god,1 but 
God's revelation of Himself in nature and in inspired utterances is 
a clear expression of His goodness, since knowledge of God is man's 
chief good.2 Since the Word is God's agent in creation, in the vi-
sions of the patriarchs, in the inspiration of the prophets, and in 
the incarnation in Christ, the important work of self-revelation is 
clear:cy His. Like Irenaeus, he seems to regard the revelation in 
Christ as the ultimate and final office of the Word and thus to differ 
from Clement who apparent:cy regards the Word as continuing His in-
struction. 
In principle, the instruction and revelation of the Word is con-
sistent with the rest of the Fathers' thought and relevant to a number 
of particular statements made by them. Certainly it is coherent with 
the thought that the human good is found in the knowledge of God and 
with the notion that the Incarnation is a supreme instance of goodness 
because it is the ultimate revelation of God to man. It is coherent 
also with the propositions that God's goodness is basic and primary 
and that human goodness is derivative and learned. In so far as such 
activity on the part of the Word is regarded as the self-expression 
of God, it is consistent with other parts of their s.ystems. It is, 
however, when the Fathers, naving over-emphasized the transcendence 
of God, seek to employ the Word as a device of thought accounting for 
God's obvious immanence that such difficulties as we noticed above in 
1. Ibid., i, 9-18; III, 277-284. 2. Above, pp. 267-68. 
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our discussion of God's goodness as beyond human thought became evi-
dent in their thinking. 
No doubt the use of the Logos concept is an attempt to bridge 
the gap between God in His transcendence and the knowledge of Him 
which must be i.mrna.nent in human experience if _man is to apprehend it. 
In so far as this indicates a recognition on their part that the knowl-
edge of God by man has its problems, it is helpful and valid. However, 
the Logos concept does not solve their problem. Problems in this area 
are created by the Fathers' assumption that God in essence is com-
pletely beyond the reach of human knowledge. Probably this began as 
an exaggeration of the truth that the Infinite, or perhaps it would 
be better to say Indeterminate, cannot be fully known or wholly under-
stood by finite minds. But, at any rate, the exaggeration became so 
real and important to them that they recognized the need for a mediat-
ing agent. However, what they apparently failed to recognize is that 
if God is so transcendent as to be unknowable in essence, or essen-
tially unknowable, the doctrine of the Logos does not make God know-
able, for no immanent manifestation of the Logos can be an expression 
or revelation of an essence which is cognitively transcendent of human 
experience. Almost all their difficulty in this area is due to their 
initial mistake of conceiving and defining God as wholly transcendent 
in essence. If He is wholly transcendent, then no device of human 
thought can make Him immanent or show Him to be the author of creation. 
The doctrine of creation implies that some revelation of God's nature, 
even His essence, is immanent in His work and in the inner life of the 
347 
human spirit. No artificial distinction between God 1 s essence and its 
phenomenal expression serves to relieve this difficulty, for in so far 
as a phenomenal 'expression is an expression of His essence it must re-
veal something about the essence itself. 
The matter takes on a completely different complexion if it is 
said that because of His greatness God is not and never will be fully 
known. If the Fathers had been content with this type of statement, 
whose meaning seems to be the real intention of their thought anyway, 
and if they had not tried to fuse the Christian conception of God with 
the notion of a philosophical absolute, they would not have created 
for themselves and the Church the formal intellectual impasses which 
are inherent in the Logos concept. 
5. Commandments and Warnings 
Commandments and warnings are simply an instance of the imparting 
of knowledge by the Word. As Irenaeus points out, the commandments of 
the Law and the instruction and warning of the prophets are good be-
cause they are the result of God's goodwill1 and are given for man's 
benefit,2 that he might eventually receive the salvation that communion 
with God through obedience makes possible) Clement argues vehemently 
that the Law is good, because its purpose is to lead one from spiritual 
illness to spiritual wholeness,4 from the practice of evil to virtue.5 
1. Against Heresies, iv, 16, 3; I, 481. 
2. ~., iii, 12, 11; I, 434. 
4. Stromata, i, 27; II, 339. 
3. Ibid., iv, 14, 1-2; I, 478-79. 
5. Ibid., i, 27; II, 339-40. 
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To produce such a transformation of character is, indeed, an instance 
of "the highest and most perfect good. nl The Law is beneficial be-
cause it is 11 the opinion which is good, and what is good is that Wl.ich 
is true, and what is true is that which finds 'true being, 1 and at-
tains to it. n2 Tertullian differs from Irenaeus and Clement only in 
the verbal statement of his conviction, not in the substance thereof. 
He first proceeds in refutation of Marcion 1 s charge that the Law is not 
good to show how certain specific injunctions, because they are not 
ethical norms, but actual~ provisions for restraining violence or 
correcting a worse evil, are really good.3 He regards the Law as good 
because it is intended to accomplish the good purpose of bringing man 
into obedience and fellowship with God and of then assuring his happi-
ness.4 He also regards God's threats and warnings as good because they 
are meant to secure obedience to God 1 s good laws .5 
The view that commandments and warnings are a manifestation of 
God 1 s goodness is clear~ coherent with the thought of the Word as 
moral instructor ani revealer of God. It seems also to be relevant 
to the statement that God's goodness is purposive. It serves as an 
important link of thought in relating the proposition that the gift 
of freedom to man is an expression of goodness to the proposition 
that God's goodness is purposive. It serves also as a bridge between 
1. Ibid. 2. Ibid., i, 25; II, 338. 
3. Against Marcion, ii, 18; III, 311. 
4. ~., ii, 4; III, 300. 5. Ibid. 
349 
human freedom and Divine judgment as expressions of God's goodness. 
It is clearly coherent with the statements that man's good is found 
in obedience to God and that good is the principle of life for man. 
Also, it is in harmony with Scripture. 11 See, I have set before thee 
this day life and good, and death and evil; in that I command thee 
this day to love the Lord thy God, to walk in his ways, and to keep 
his commandments and his statutes and his judgments, that thou mayest 
live. 111 Paul declares that 11 the law is holy, and the commandment 
holy, and just, and good. 11 2 And again, 11We know that the law is good. 113 
6. Judgment 
These three Fathers display a close resemblance to one another 
in thinking most~ of judgment in the negative sense of a sentence of 
punishment for wrong-doing. It is this sense of judgment that they 
are primarily concerned with defending as good. For Irenaeus, jus-
tice's claim to being good seems to rest in the fact that is necessar,r 
to preserve the perfection of God's goodness. A goodness that does 
not treat all alike will seem defective either in power or in inten-
tion, unless it operates in accordance with some principle which would 
account for such difference in treatment, i.e., the principle of judg-
ing according to a man's deserts.4 This same thought appears also as 
a minor note in Tertullian when, in pointing out the imperfection of 
goodness in Marcion's god in his not saving all, he says that this is 
1. Deuteronomy 30:15-16. 
3. I Timothy 1:8. 
2. Romans 7:12. 
4. Against Heresies, iii, 25, 3; I, 459. 
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proper for One who is a God of both goodness and justice.l For both 
men, justice is good because it is the perfecting principle of good-
ness. 
In defending this negative aspect of judgment, Clement says that 
God's administering punishment is proof of His concern for, rather 
than His hostilit,r toward, man. It is the mark of goodwill rather 
than ill since it is done with the intention of correcting one's 
faults.2 The truest expression of love is not mere~ acting in such 
a way as to please the one loved, but doing that which is for the 
other's well-being even though it causes temporary pain.3 Punishment 
is good, because through its improvement of spirit and attitude those 
who are punished are really benefited.4 It is a mark of the highest 
and most perfect good to be 11able to lead back any one from the prac-
tice of evil to virtue and well-being. 115 Indeed, the fact that judg-
ment or punishment is meant to be educative and reformative is the 
keynote in Clement's argument for the goodness of justice. This idea 
also appears brief~ in Tertullian. The disciplinary action of God 
is good because its purpose is to turn the one disciplined from evil 
to good.6 Mainly though, for him, punishment exercises a reformative 
role through the fear aroused by anticipation and example.7 But for 
1. Against Marcion, i, 24; ni, 289-90. 
2. Instructor, i, 8; II, 226. 3. Ibid., i, 9; II, 228. 
4. Ibid., i, 8; n, 226. 5. Stromata, i, 27; n, 339. 
6. Against Marcion, ii, 13; III, 308. 
1. ~., ii, 13; III, 307 and Apology, 45; IIT, 50. 
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the most part, for Tertullian, punishment is retributory rather than 
reformative. 
Punishment is good also, says Clement, because it helps to hold 
wickedness in check. Fear may lead to the obedience to One so good 
as to punish all evil, while a love that is always mild may be de-
spised and ignored.l In this particular we see that Clement and Ter-
tullian are agreed. Clement himself lists three reasons why a good 
God punishes: that the one punished may be reformed, that others may 
be saved b,y example, and that the injured may not be despised.2 
These last two reasons are logically implicit in the idea of holding 
wickedness in check. 
Here, as at a nwnber of other points, Tertullian1 s treatment is 
much more extensive than that of Clement and Irenaeus. He devotes a 
great deal of space to stressing the certainty of a coming day of 
judgment. Without judgment and its accompanying expressions goodness 
appears defective, as giving tacit permission to evil.3 Then he pro-
ceeds to show the relationship between goodness and justice. Good-
ness seems to be more essential to God than justice. Justice appears 
as His principle of adapting His goodness to the conditions of human 
sin.4 Having shown that God is good by nature and just as a conse-
quence of human sin, he then asserts their virtual identity. It is 
not simply a species of goodness, but the practical observance of it. 
1. Instructo~i, 9; II, 231. 
3. Against Marcion, i, 27; III, 292. 
2. Stromata, iv, 24; II, 438. 
4. Above, pp. 224-26. 
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"For nothing is good which is unjust; while everything ••• which is 
just is good."l Why does he regard justice as good? He mentions 
several reasons. 
First of all, he tells us, it is good because it bestows good 
as a reward upon those who deserve to receive it. 11For by both suc-
couring the good and punishing the evil, He displays His justice, and 
at the same time makes both processes contribute proofs of His good-
ness, whilst on the one hand He deals vengeance, and on the other 
dispenses reward.u2 Tertullian alone specifically mentions this as 
a reason for regarding justice as good, although the fact that Irenaeus 
and Clement do not dwell on this point should perhaps be construed as 
latent evidence that they regarded this as such self-evident truth 
that it needed no explicit statement. They both maintain that justice 
or judgment is good. The problem seemed to be to show how the nega-
tive, or punishment, aspects of judgment, which seems so obviously 
evil to the one undergoing it, can be good. 
Second~, judgment is good because it serves as a deterrent to 
wrong-doing. One's own past punishment, the example of others pun-
ised, and the anticipation of unending punishment to be meted out at 
a coming day of judgment arouse fear which restrains from wrongdoing 
and motivates toward positive good.3 At this point we have seen there 
1. Against Marcion, ii, 11; III, 307. 
2. Resurrection of the Flesh, 14; III, 554. 
3. Against Marcion, ii, lJ; III, 307 and Apology, 45; III, 50. 
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is complete agreement between Clement and Tertullian. 
Third~, judgment is good because it clearly shows Him to be 
the friend of' goodness and the enemy of' evil. Tertullian makes much 
of' this point. This is one of' the glaring deficiencies in the good-
ness of' Marcion' s god.l God, however, 11 is whol~ good, because in 
all things He is on the side of' good. 11 2 His conviction that goodness 
must show itself' as hostile to evil perhaps is a major ground for his 
belief' in a coming final judgment when there would be handed down to 
the evil a sentence of' eternal punishment. Perhaps this is the reason 
why in his concept of' judgment or punishment the dominant note seems 
to be struck b.Y the thought of' retribution. 
We have already noted above in Tertul 1 ian' s thought two incon-
sistencies concerning God's judgment. One has to do with the order 
of' the manifestation of' justice in respect to goodness. The view most 
frequent~ repeated by him is that justice appears later than goodness, 
called forth as an accommodation to human sin for the purpose of' regu-
lating goodness in relation to sin. Elsewhere justice and goodness 
are represented as appearing together, the one creating and the other 
arranging. It is obvious, of' course, that Tertullian uses justice in 
two different senses, yet his argument suggests that he wants his 
reader to assume that justice is the same in the one case as in the 
other. 
The second inconsistenc.y is far more serious in consequence. It 
1. Against Marcion, i, 27; III, 292. 2. Ibid., ii, 13; III, 308. 
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is to be seen in the conflict between the principle of judging accord-
ing to the merits of the present moment which underlies God's day-to-
day judgment and the principle of a final judgment meting out an ever-
lasting condition of reward or punishment. These two principles seem 
to be in clear contradiction. According to Tertullian1 s awn principles, 
a sentence to everlasting punishment would be due o~ if a man's life 
had been wholly evil and had in it no good for which he might deserve 
a reward. Likewise, a reward of everlasting bliss is consistent, for 
a God who is concerned with judging fairly, only when a person's life 
is entirely free from sin or evil, which would deserve punishment. 
The inconsistency is not removed by assuming that the final judgment 
is concerned with the preponderance of good or evil in a person's 
life and, therefore, God may judge even here according to the merit 
of the moment. It is impossible to strike an average to determine 
whether a person's action has been predominantly good or evil, for 
good is different from evil and the one cannot be cancelled by the 
other. The fact that either good or evil may have been predominant 
in a man's life in terms of total amount cannot negate the fact of 
the other's presence. However, if God should issue a decree of eter-
nal reward or punishment according to whether a man at the last moment 
happened to be caught in a good or evil deed, He would be acting con-
sistently with the principle of judging according to the merits of the 
present moment but His action would be so harsh and capricious that all 
men would have to regard His goodness as a gross fiction. 
We have been conscious of a tendenqy in all three of the Fathers 
3SS 
to draw a distinction between goodness and justice even when they are 
trying to identify them, and to think of justice most often in the 
negative sense of meting out punishment. It is to the defense of 
justice in this negative sense as good that they devote so much of 
their argument. This sense of difference, which creeps out even in 
their efforts to identify the two, is due perhaps to their recognition 
that judgment does involve the dispensing of penal evils, which may 
seem evil at the time experienced to the one experiencing them but 
which are intended by God for good and may be so judged in the light 
of a larger perspective even by the one experiencing them. So far as 
God's judgment in this life is concerned, each of the FatherS has 
done a creditable job of removing any contradiction between the con-
cept of justice and goodness. However, there is a good deal of dif-
ference in the quality of their arguments. 
We sa}'l that in Irenaeus justice serves as a necessary principle 
for the perfection of the Divine goodness, is referred to most frequently 
in the negative or punishment sense, and is retributory rather than 
disciplinary and reformative. Justice is seen to be expressive of God's 
good intention for man, only because, through serving as an example 
and arousing fear, it acts as a deterrent to evil and as a warning 
against wrong-doing. More important, however, to Irenaeus than dem-
onstrating the genuineness of God's concern for human well-being is 
preserving and defending the character of God from any evidences of 
imperfection. Tertullian likewise is more concerned with justifying 
God 1 s action than with understanding how justice in the penal aspect 
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is a real expression of goodness. It is true that, in tr,ying to prove 
the goodness of penal justice by pointing out both its power as a 
moral deterrent through fear and example and its demonstration of God1e 
hostility to evil and of the supremacy of goodness, he accords to jus-
tice a minor educative and reformative role. Nevertheless, justice re-
mains largely retributory in nature. Whatever disciplinary and re-
medial effect it has is more often indirect, arising as a consequence 
of the fear that springs from beholding the punishment of others, 
rather than arising as a direct revaluation from one's own experience 
of chastisement. God's concern for the well-being of man shown through 
the administration of justice seems to be more for the good of the 
whole than for the good of the individual who is punished. There re-
mains a lurking hostility, and even hatred, in this expression of 
goodness, which all but vitiates its goodness entirely. Only with 
Clement does penal justice assume a fu~ educative and reformative 
role, which is fully consistent with God's goodwill for man, even for 
the one punished. 
A difficulty and internal inconsistency more serious than any 
yet discussed arises from Tertullian1s description of judgment in 
terms of everlasting reward and punishment. So long as one is in 
this li.fe and there is a possibility of amending his life, the .fear 
of punishment and the actual experience of punishment may prove to be 
for his good. When penal evil is thus .for the well-being of the one 
punished it is easy to interpret it as an expression of goodness. This 
is possible even in regard to the threat of everlasting punishment, ~ 
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this life. But it is entirely another matter when one undergoes pun-
--
ishment without any possibility of making it instrumental to his good. 
It is true that, as an example, eternal punishment may still serve as 
a deterrent to evil in the lives of others and that it may also display 
clearly God's eternal enmity toward evil. But it does more--it shows 
also God's enmity, hatred, and ill-will toward the one sentenced to 
eternal punishment, in whom, so long as he is on the scale of being, 
there must remain some good. Through the everlasting punishment of 
same persons, it is conceivable that God may wish to express His con-
cern for the well-being of the rest of mankind; but it is also clear 
that everlasting punishment can be no expression of God's concern for 
the ultimate well-being of the one so punished. Nothing could be any 
more certain than the fact that as far as his being won to goodness 
and the enjoyment of the good life is concerned, God has given up. 
Thus, when goodness is interpreted as love or as a concern for a 
person's well-being, eternal punishment reveals a failure of goodness 
in a double sense. It has failed to accomplish its ultimate goal of 
winning the one punished to the ultimate good; it has failed in its 
inner intention of goodwill toward the one it chooses to punish ever-
lastingly. Whatever love God may once have had for the one sentenced 
to everlasting punishment has turned into the poison of hate--other-
wise, God could never have sentenced him to everlasting punishment. 
Implied in what we have said is the inconsistency of the notion 
of eternal punishment with the omnipotence of the Divine goodness. Ac-
cording to Tertullian, goodness has been shown supreme in an external 
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sense--but it has not been shown supreme in the life of the one under-
going everlasting punishment. Contrary to Tertullian 1s thinking, the 
doctrine of everlasting punishment does not clearly show the supremacy 
of goodness but rather it indicates the eternal enthronement of the 
devil and the power of evil over part of God 1 s creation. Goodness has 
failed in part. Its power has been insufficient to win the allegiance 
and love of those in hell. There has been a failure also in the power 
of its intention, for the good will1-:rhich God once had for His creature 
has now become a will for ill--in order that He might shol-r, oddly 
enough, His complete goodness and unalterable opposition to evil. Con-
trary to the teaching of the Incarnate Word who was sent to reveal the 
heart of God and to sholi the true wa:y for man to live, God chooses to 
repay evil with evil, to exact vengeance for that which no amount of 
vengeance can ever make right. 
Only Clement maintains a consistent position in his doctrine of 
judgment and of the after-life. While he clearly indicates that the 
status of evil-doers will be different from that of the righteous in 
the life to come, even there the punishment which he depicts as their 
lot is seen to be remedial. Though, when one remembers the fact of 
man 1 s free will, it may be a long, long time before the victory of 
goodness is complete, Clement anticipates a time when all will be 
saved and goodness will reign in every heart. In such a view, good-
ness is clearly shown to possess omnipotence and to be completely pure 
and incorruptible. 
What are the Scriptural bases for the Fathers' teaching? If one 
resorts to proof-texting, he can find a good deal of support both for 
everlasting punishing and for universal salvation. A number of pas-
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sages suggest a universalistic point of view. "And I, wen I am lifted 
up from the earth, will draw all men to Ieyself. 111 "For God has con-
signed all men to disobedience, that He may have mercy upon all. 112 
"Then as one man 1 s trespass led to condemnation for all men, so one 
man's act of righteousness leads to acquittal and life for all men.n3 
11For in him all the fullness of God was pleased to dwell, and through 
him to reconcile to himself all things, whether on heaven or in earth. 11 4 
11For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive. 
• • • He must reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet. • • • 
And when all things shall be subdued unto him, then shall the Son also 
himself be subject unto him that put all things under him, that God 
may be all in all."5 "Therefore God has highly exalted him and bestowed 
on him the name which is above every name, that at the name of Jesus 
every knee should bow, ••• and every tongue confess that Jesus is 
Lord. 116 On the other hand, numerous passages are frequently quoted in 
defense of everlasting punishment. The parable of the rich man and 
Lazarus in Luke 16:19-31 speaks of reward and punishment and of a fixed 
gulf between the blissful and the tormented in the life after death. 
It does not, however, state that the gulf is fixed permanently or for 
all eternity. Th.e Christian apocalypticis t tells of the beast and the 
1. John 12:32 (RSV). 
3. Romans 5:18 (RSV). 
5. I Corinthians 15:22-28 (KJV). 
2. Romans 11:32 (RSV). 
4. Colossians 1:19 (RSV). 
6. Philippians 1:10, 11 (RSV). 
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false prophet who are together thrown into the lake of fire burning with 
brimstonel and of the second death in the lake of fire meant to be the 
lot of the wicked, the fearful, and the sexual deviates.2 In one of his 
parables of the Kingdom, Jesus sa;ys: "Just as the weeds are gathered 
and burned by fire, so will it be at the close of the age. The Son of 
man will send his angels, and they will gather out of his kingdom all 
causes of sin and all evildoers, and throw them into the furnace of 
fire: there men will weep and gnash their teeth. 11 3 Jesus advises his 
followers that if some member of their bodies causes them to sin, it 
would be better to remove it from the body and enter life without that 
part than, w1 th a whole body, "to be thrown into hell, where their worm 
does not die, and the fire is not quenched.n4 The author of Hebrews 
warns that for those who sin deliberately after receiving the truth 
there awaits only the "fearful prospect of judgment, and a fury of 
fire. ,,5 Again, the Lord says, 11If a man does not abide in me, he is 
cast forth as a branch and withers; and the branches are gathered, 
thrown into the fire, and burned. u6 These passages, along with others 
that could be quoted, imply a period of punishment in the life after 
death. None of them, however, specifies how long that punishment is 
to last--whether, it is to be of temporal duration or everlasting. 
Actually, the passage last quoted implies annihilation rather than 
everlasting punishment. Yet there are passages which seem to teach 
1. Revelation 19:30. 2. Revelation 21:8. 
2. Matthew 13:40-42. 4. Mark 9:48 (RSV). 
5. Hebrews 10:26, 27 (RSV). 6. John 15:6 (RSV). 
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everlasting punishment with more certainty. One of these is found in 
the Parable of the Last Judgment when those on the King's left are 
ordered to depart into the everlasting or eternal fire prepared for the 
devil and his angels.l The King James Version states in no uncertain 
terms: "And these shall go away into everlastlng punishment. 112 In II 
Thessalonians 1:.5-10, Paul warns that those who do not know God and 
obey the gospel of Christ "shall suffer the punishment of eternal dew 
struction and exclusion from the presence of the Lord.") The prisoner 
on the Isle of Patmos says that the devil shall be thrown into the lake 
of fire with the beast and the false prophet, where "they will be tor-
mented day and night for ever and ever. n4 Then he adds that all whose 
names are not written in the book of life shall be thrown into the lake 
of fire • .5 In these passages the fact of everlasting punishment seems 
to be clearly asserted. However, there may be some question as to 
whether they are correctly translated. In the Parable of the Last Judg-
ment and in the passage from II Thessalonians, the word translated eter-
) / 
nal or everlasting is a form of the adjective ~LWV f..D .S , which may mean 
eternal or everlasting but does not necessarily have this meaning. 
\ ,.. \ I .I ) 1\ , L ... 
11/0 7TUP Tt> CA.LW'11Lo1) II and tto/\€/Jpo'JJ ~l.W"Vl..Ov II may mean fire and de-
struction which last for a very long period, not everlastingly. The 
Greek of Revelation 20:10, which is translated "for e<oer and ever" in 
) \ ' 1'\ ~-/. 
RSV. is uE,LS TDUS ~Ll.tJ'zJI\5 TW1J (f..LWVW'Vrr and means literally "into the 
1. Matthew 2.5:41. 
). II Thessalonians 1:9 (RSV). 
.5. Revelation 20:1.5. 
2. Matthew 2.5:46. 
4. Revelation 20:10 (RSV) • 
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ages of the ages." Such quibbling about the accuracy of translation is 
inconclusive and does little more than raise a question as to whether 
a~ Scriptural passage clearly implies everlasting punishment. Debating 
in great length about Which translation is correct is pointless. After 
all, the issue before us is not to be decided by weighing the authentic-
ity and reliability of one set of proof-texts against another. Rather 
it must be resolved by resorting to other principles. Even if the Scrip-
tures do speak with an uncertain (or divided) voice concerning the future 
life, the issue should be resolved by deciding which of the alterna-
tives--everlasting punishment or universal salvation--is consistent with 
the Christian conception of God, Who, as Jesus described Him, is like 
the good shepherd who has no will that one of his little ones should 
perish.1 If God knoweth even the sparrow's fa112 and regards man as 
worth much more than sparrows,3 it does not seem reasonable to think 
that He will sentence any of His loved ones to everlasting punishment. 
1. Mercy, Grace, and Love 
a. Mercy 
For all three Fathers, mercy is an expression of the Divine 
goodness. In Irenaeus, mercy is seen as the continuing of counsel 
and direction in spite of human waywardness,4 as the lightening of 
the severity of judgment,5 and as a general compassion which bestows 
1. Matthew 18:14. 2. Matthew 10:29. 
3. Matthew 10:31. 4. Against Heresies, iv, 17, 2; I, 483. 
5. Ibid., iii, 25, 3; I, 459. 
blessings on all alike1 and makes it possible for man to know Him 
and fellowship with Him. 2 Clement says that because of His mercy 
God waits for men to repent before executing judgment against them,3 
threatening and warning them all the "While, that through fear they 
may be turned from sin.4 Also, punishment itself is an expression 
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of His merc.y, since its intention is to bring man to repentance, grace, 
and salvation.5 Clement agrees with Irenaeus that God's mercy is seen 
in a general compassion for man in his low estate. Because of His 
pity He watches over men and cares for them.6 It is because of His 
mercy that He saves. 7 Therefore, no doubt, everything He does con-
tributary to salvation, such as the giving of the Law, the warnings 
of the prophets, and the guidance of the Instructor must be motivated 
by His mercy. Like Clement, Tertullian finds one evidence of God's 
mercy in the patience with which he waits for the sinner's repentance 
before He proceeds in judgment against him. 8 Another aspect of His 
mercy, which Tertullian shares with Irenaeus, is seen in forgiveness, 
pardon, or lightening of punishment for those who repent.9 Like both 
Irenaeus and Clement, Tertullian says that God's mercy is shown in the 
1. Ibid., iii, 25, 4; I, 459. 
2. Ibid., iii, 6, 4; I, 419 and iv, 14, l; I, 478. 
3. Who Is the Rich Man?, 39; II, 602. 4. Instructor, i, 8; II, 226. 
5. Ibid., i, 8; II, 227. 6. Stromata, vii, 7; II, 535. 
7. Exhortation to the Heathen, 1; II, 172 and Instructor, 1, 9; II, 230. 
B. Against Marcion, ii, 17; III, 310-11. 
9. ~., v, 11; III, 452 and ii, 24; III, 315. 
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giving of laws and warnings intended to lead man away from sin and 
destruction toward salvation.l Also, he agrees with both of them that 
mercy is seen in a general compassion for man's estate. He ministers 
to human need and instructs men to minister in like manner to those in 
need.2 Because of His pity He became incarnate in Christ3 and ex-
tended through him a universal invitation to salvation.4 
In so far as mercy is treated as a synonym for goodness, it will 
naturally be consistent and relevant with other expressions of good-
ness. Certainly in its broader sense of compassion or pity for man's 
estate, it is inconsistent with none of the Fathers' statements about 
goodness, except perhaps the proposition that eternal punishment is a 
manifestation of God's perfect goodness. It is clearly relevant to the 
work of providence in its supplying the necessities of life and in its 
various means of safe-guarding the life of man, to the guidance of the 
Law, the prophets, and the gospel, to the revelation of God aimed at 
man's well-being, and to all the expressions of goodness intended to 
promote the salvation of man. Likewise in its narrower sense of de-
laying or lightening the sentence of judgment, mercy as an expression 
of goodness is consistent with all other thoughts concerning goodness' 
form of manifestation except that of everlasting punishment. Its rela-
tion to judgment, to the work of providence in transmuting the evils 
1. ~., ii, 4; III, 300. 2. Ibid., iv, 17; III, 373. 
3. Against Marcion, ii, 28; III, 319. 
4. ~., iv, 16; III, 372. 
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man experiences into long-range goods, and to the use of penal evils 
by the great Instructor as a means of instruction and discipline is 
clearly evident. 
The Old Testament repeated~ affirms mercy to be an expression of 
God's goodness. In II Chronicles it is twice said that 11 He is good; 
for his mercy endureth forever."l Psalms 106 and 107 and Jeremiah re-
peat this statement verbatim.2 Mercy and goodness are virtua~ 
equated \'Then it is said that 11the Lord is good; his mercy is everlast-
ing") and that "goodness and mercy will follow me all the days of Il\Y' 
life. 114 The identity of mercy and goodness becomes explicit in the 
petition, "Because thy mercy is good, deliver thou me.n5 These few 
from the many Scriptural references to God's mercy are sufficient to 
indicate the harmony of this aspect of the Fathers' thought with 
Scripture. 
b. Grace 
For Irenaeus, grace is not a ful~ developed concept. He uses 
it simply to indicate God's acts of unmerited goodness toward man. 
Life is bestowed "according to the grace of God,"6 and salvation is 
the gracious work of God.7 While Clement occasionally employs the 
1. II Chronicles 5:13 and 7:3. 
2. Psalms 106:1 and 107:1 and Jeremiah 33:11. 
4. Psalm 23 :6. 
6. Against Heresies, ii, 34, 3; I, 411. 
1. ~., v, 2, 1; I, 528. 
3. Psalm 100:5. 
5. Psalm 109:21. 
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term grace in an unrestricted manner to the actions of Divine goodness 
in general,l he also uses it in the more definite sense of the help 
that God affords man along the way to salvation. 2 In Tertullian grace 
exhibits a great variety of meanings. Sometimes, like Irenaeus and 
Clement, he employs it as a general s.ynonym for goodness.3 At other 
times he uses it as an alternate term for mergr4 and for forgiveness.5 
At times grace means the unmerited favor of God in His provision for 
man's needs and well-being.6 Also, it means Divine guiding and em-
powering.7 
It is obvious that to the extent that grace is employed as an 
alternate term for goodness, it will be harmonious with goodness in 
all its modes of expression. Even in its narrower and generally ac-
cepted sense of unmerited Divine favor in the form of God's guiding 
and empowering, grace seems consistent with other views of the Fathers 
on goodness' modes of expression, except perhaps the thought that eter-
nal punishment is an expression of goodness. We cannot see how this 
can be an instance of Divine favor or of His guidance and empowerment 
1. Fragments from Cassiodorus, 1; II, 572. 
2. Stromata, v, 1; II, 445 and Instructor, i, 1; II, 224. 
3. Against Marcion, v, 5; III, 438. 
4. ~., v, 11; III, 452 and Ad Nationes, ii, 7; III, 135. 
5. Against Marcion, v, 5; III, 438. 
6. ~., ii, 4; III, 300 and iv, 17; III, 373. 
1. Of Patience, l; III, 101. 
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for the one undergoing everlasting punishment. On the other hand, the 
conception of grace as a form of God's goodness is clear~ relevant to 
the propositions asserting the instruction of the Law and the prophets, 
the illumination of the Word, and the inspiration of the Spirit to be 
manifestations of Divine goodness. 
This particular aspect of the Fathers' thought agrees more nearly 
with the New Testament use of the term grace than with the Old Testament 
use. In the Old Testament the term is used generally to indicate the 
attitude of favor on the part of God, while in New Testament usage it 
refers frequently to the benefits coming as a consequence of the Divine 
favor. Paul speaks of grace as a giftl and of living by grace.2 The 
abundance of New Testament references to grace as undeserved Divine 
aid should be sufficient indication that the Fathers at this point 
mirror the teaching of Scripture. 
c. Love 
Irenaeus uses love to account for ma.ey of the same actions of 
God which are also attributed to goodness, suggesting that the two 
terms are virtual~ synonymous. However, the things he traces to 
God's love seem to have the goal of fellowship with God as their ulti-
mate end. It is a result of love that He overcomes the weakness of 
human nature,3 becomes accessible to human knowledge,4 and sends Christ 
1. Romans .5:15 and I Caizt.hians 1:4. 2. Romans 11:6. 
3. Against Heresies, iv, 38, 4; I, .522. 
4. Ibid., iii, 24, 2; I, 458. 
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into the area of human affairs.l For Clement also, love tends to be-
come a synonym for goodness. It underlies all God's particular acts 
of goodness.2 It is revealed especially in God's actions in behalf 
of human salvation.3 Tertullian is strange~ silent concerning God's 
love, although, as we noted, because it may be the motive behind acts 
of mercy and kindness and behind all God's efforts toward human salva-
tion, the similar attitude of compassion may be regarded as a form of 
God's goodness.4 
As a s.y.nonym for goodness, love is coherent with other descrip-
tions of goodness' manifestation. It is clearly relevant to God's 
providential care, to His provisions for human instruction and guid-
ance, to His self-revelation, to the Incarnation of the Word, to all 
His efforts for man's salvation as expressions of the Divine goodness. 
Tertullian's silence concerning God's love is not so surprising when 
we remember that of the three Fathers, he alone becomes the unques-
tioned champion of the only supposed manifestation of goodness which 
is a cancellation of love--the concept of everlasting punishment. 
The harmony of this thought with Scripture is clearly apparent 
in the many teachings of the New Testament about the love of God. 11For 
God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son.n5 11But God 
1. Ibid., iii, 4, 2; I, 417. 
2. Stromata iv, 18; TI, 430 and Instructor, i, 8; II, 225. 
3. Exhortation to the Heathen, 9; II, 195-97 and Instructor, i, 8; II, 
225-28 and Who Is the Rich Man?, 31; II, 601. 
4. Above,pp. 245-46. 5. John 3:16. 
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commendeth his love toward us in that while we were yet sinners Christ 
died for us.nl -"But God, who is rich in mercy, for his great love 
wherewith he loved us, ••• hath quickened us together with Christ.n2 
"Hereby perceive we the love of God, because he laid down his life for 
us.n3 11Love is of God; and every one that loveth is born of God, and 
knoweth God. He that loveth not knoweth not God; for God is love. 114 
8. Salvation 
For Irenaeus, a definite expression of the goodness of God is 
the giving of eternal life or immortality to those who become His 
friends through obedience.5 In all probability this is the meaning 
of salvation for him, even if he does not expressly say so. For 
Clement, salvation is the culmination of all the expressions of God's 
goodness. 11 It has been God's fixed and constant purpose to save the 
flock of men: for this end the good God sent the good Shepherd. 116 
All things are arranged with this end in mind, 1 for truly 11it is the 
prerogative of goodness to save.n8 Tertullian agrees with Clement, 
and with Marcion, that salvation is an operation of goodness.9 The 
goodness expressed in salvation will be a goodness in conjunction 
1. Romans 5: 8 • 
3. I John 3:16. 
2. Ephesians 2:4-5. 
4. I John 4:7-8. 
5. Against Heresies, iv, 13, 4; I, 478. 
6. Exhortation to the Heathen, 11; II, 204. 
1. Stromata, vii, 2; II, 526. 8. Instructor, i, 9; II, 230. 
9. Against Marcion, i, 24; III, 289 and i, 25; III, 291. 
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with justice, for God will not indiscriminately save all, but only 
those deserving salvation.l Therefore, salvation will be the work, 
not of a simple goodness, but of a complex one, in which justice and 
other rationally essential attributes are blended with the will to do 
good.2 
This proposition is certa~ consistent with the other state-
ments that the Fathers make concerning the Divine goodness, and its 
relevance to a number of them is easily seen. Salvation is the reali-
zation of the objective of a purposive goodness. It is the crown and 
climax of the process of creation. It is the objective toward which 
the providential expressions of God's goodness have been directed. 
The aim of the Law, of the teaching of the Word and the Spirit, of the 
disciplinary judgments of God, and of the Incarnation is fulfilled in 
the salvation of man. 
There can be no doubt that the thought of salvation as an expres-
sion of God's goodness is Scriptural, for the Scriptures abound with 
statements attributing salvation to God. Again and again reference 
is made to God as the God of salvation. 11 God is my King of old, 
working salvation in the midst of the earth. 113 11The Lord hath made 
known his salvation: his righteousness hath he openly showed in the 
sight of the heathen. He hath remembered his mercy and his truth 
toward the house of Israel: all the ends of the earth have seen the 
1. ! Treatise~~~, 16; III, 195. 
2. Against Marcion, i, 26; III, 291. 3. Psalm 74:12. 
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salvation of our God. 111 Although the Scriptures may not state cate-
gorical~ that salvation is an expression of the Divine goodness, this 
is clearly implied in the passage above. The implication that salva-
tion is a work of goodness becomes even clearer in the words of Isaiah: 
11 How beautiful upon the mountains are the feet of him that bringeth 
good tidings, that publisheth peace; that bringeth good tidings of good, 
that publisheth salvation.u2 
9. Incarnation and Work of Christ 
For all three of the Fathers the appearance and work of Christ on 
earth is a climactlc expression of the Divine goodness. According to 
Irenaeus, 11 the Word of God was made man, ••• that man having been 
taken into the Word, and receiving the adoption, might become the son. 
of God.n3 He uses various figures and expressions to convey his 
thought. At times, thinking of the knowledge of God as the chief 
human good, he speaks of Christ's incarnation in terms of the vision 
of God.4 At times, he speaks of Christ as a Divine Champion, who re-
capitulates with opposite results the experience of Adam5 and thus 
wins a decisive victory over man's chief enemies, sin, death, and the 
devil. 11For he fought and conquered; for He was man contending for 
the Father, and through obedience doing away with disobedience 
1. Psalm 98:2-3. 2. Isaiah 52:7. 
). Against Heresies, iii, 19, 1; I, 448. 
4. Ibid., iv, 20, 7; I, 490 and v, 1, 1; I, 526. 
5. Ibid., iii, 18, 7; I, 448 and v, 21, 1-2; I, 548-49. 
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completely: for He bound the strong man, and set free the weak, and 
endowed His own handiwork with salvation, by destroying sin. 111 At 
other times, he describes Christ's work in terms of a moral influence, 
which in all probability is the method underlying the achievement of 
his goal in all the figures which Irenaeus employs. 
For he came to save all through means of Himself. • • • He 
therefore passed through every stage of life, becoming an 
infant for infants, ••• a youth for youths, becoming an 
example to youths, and ~ sanctifying them for the Lord. 
So likewise He was an old man fo! old men, ••• becoming 
~ example to them likewise. 2 LI talics mine .:J 
Elsewhere Irenaeus says that "we could have learned in no other way 
than by seeing our Teacher, and hearing His voice • • • having become 
imitators of His works as well as doers of His words, 113 that Christ 
accomplished his victory over the 11 apostasy11 11 by means of persuasion" 
and not Qy force,4 and that the devil would not have been proper~ van-
quished unless vanquished by man himself,S thus indicating the impor-
tance of the moral influence strand of his thought. 
Clement, having already made it clear that 111t is the prerogative 
of goodness to save"6 and that He who saves is good,7 declares that the 
Saviour has appeared as our Teacher and thereby has accomplished our 
salvation.8 For Clement the Incarnation is viewed as part of and 
1. Ibid., iii, 18, 6; I, 447-48. 2. Ibid., ii, 22, 4; I, 391. 
3. Ibid., v, 1, 1; I, 526. 4. Ibid., v, 1, 1; I, 527. 
5. ~., iii, 18, 7; I, 448. 6. Instructor, 1, 9; II, 230. 
7. Stromata, i, 18; II, 3 21. 
8. ~ortation to the Heathen, 1; II, 173. 
continuation at a higher level of the ministry of the Word. 
The Saviour, who existed before, has in recent days ap-
peared •••• The Word who 11was with God, 11 and by whom all 
things were created, has appeared as cur Teacher. The Word, 
who in the beginning bestowed on us life as Creator • • • 
taught us to live well when He appeared as our Teacher. • •• 
He did not now for the first time pity us for our error; but 
He pi tied us from the first, from the beginning. But now, at 
His appearance, lost as we alreaqy were, He accomplished our 
salvation.l 
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As Hitchcock says, it is for him 11the crown and consummation of crea-
tion.112 
Tertullian employs several figures to describe the mission of 
Christ. It was his purpose 11 to introduce a new generation • • • into 
the possession of eternal life, 113 11 to renovate and illuminate man's 
nature, 11 4"to call men from the law to grace,n5 to accomplish man's 
redemption.6 All of these, however, were simply the outgrowth of 
his main work, which was to reveal God and thus transform men's lives. 1 
He has already shown that God's revelation of Himself is necessary 
as an indication both of His existence and His goodness. 8 While God 
has revealed Himself in nature and in Scripture, an adequate revela-
tion of Himself is found only in Christ.9 There is no doubt that in 
so far as Christ's work is a revelation of God, it is a manifestation 
1. Ibid. 2. Clement ~ Alexandria, p. 186. 
3. !gainst Marcion, iii, 16; III, 334-35. 
4. Apology, 21; III, 34. 
5. Against Marcion, v, 2; III, 432. 
1. Apology, 21; III, 36. 
9. A Treatise on the Soul, 1; III, 181. 
6. ~., v, 7; III, 443. 
8. Above,pp. 220-21. 
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of God t s goodness, inasmuch as Christ is an 11 extensionrt of God.1 But 
since the whole of Christ's work is aimed at the salvation of man, or 
is intended for man's good, his work in its entirety must be regarded 
as an act of God's goodness. But let Tertullian speak for himself: 
The goodness of God having, therefore, provided man for the 
pursuit of the knowledge of Himself, ••• prepared a habita-
tion for him, the vast fabric (of the world) to begin with, 
and then afterwards the vaster one (of a higher world,) that 
he might • • • practise and advance in his probation, and so 
be promoted from the good which God had given him • • • to 
God's best •••• In this good work God employs a most exc~ 
lent minister, even His own Word.2 
There can be no doubt that the idea of the incarnation and work 
of Christ as an expression of the Divine goodness is in harmony with 
Scripture, for it is echoed again and again in the pages of the New 
Testament. The author of the Fourth Gospel says that 11 God so loved 
the world that He gave His onlY begotten Son that whosoever believeth 
in him should not perish but have everlasting life. 113 Paul declares 
that God commends His love toward us in the fact that "while we were 
yet sinners Christ died for us. 114 In one of the general epistles we 
find it said: 11 In this was manifested the love of God toward us, be-
cause God sent his only begotten Son into the world, that we might 
live through him.n5 
In general, this idea is coherent with the rest of the Fathers' 
thought. It is consistent with and relevant to Irenaeus' notion of 
1. Apology, 21; III, 34. 
2. Against Marcion, ii, 4; III, 299. 
4. Romans 5:8. 
3. John 3:16. 
5. I John 4:9. 
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creation as a process having the perfection of man as its end. It is 
in full harmony with Tertullian's description of goodness as pur-
posive and with the implicit assumption of Irenaeus and Clement that 
the perfection of man was the intention of God's goodness from the 
first. It certainly is consistent with and relevant to the idea of 
salvation as a work of goodness, since salvation is Christ's primary 
intention. It is coherent also with the idea that all things have 
been providentially arranged for the development and perfection of man. 
When Christ• s work is viewed as revealing act, it is coherent in prin-
ciple with the ideas that impartation of knowledge of God is an act of 
Divine goodness and that knowledge of God is an aspect of the chief 
human good. However, it was in connection with the mode of God's 
disclosure of knowledge of Himself that we noted earlier some dif-
ficulty. 
Inasmuch as Christ is regarded as divine and his revelation may 
be interpreted as a self-disclosure there is no inherent difficulty. 
So long as this work of Christ is viewed as an eternal mode of the Di-
vine nature's activity and self~expression, it creates no inconsistency 
within their systems of thought. But when the Fathers so distinguish 
and differentiate the persons of the Trinity that they become as sepa-
rate beings, difficulty arises. We have already noted that the Fathers 
regard the Father as invisible, unknown and unknowable, until He is re-
vealed by the Spirit and the Son. Clement maintains throughout that 
the revelation of the Father depends upon the Logos or Son, while 
Irenaeus and Tertullian seem to leave some room for a revelation of 
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God through nature--until we remember that they regarded the creation 
as the work of God through the agency of the Word and the Spirit. The 
thought of Clement seems to involve the greatest degree of inconsistency, 
for He maintains that so long as the Word renains invisible in His activ-
it,y the Father is not revealed but that when He becomes visible as the 
agent of His activity the Father is manifested through Him. Irenaeus and 
Tertullian apparent~ attribute some revealing quality to the work of the 
Word, whether He is visible as its agent or not. However, one wonders, 
when there is such diversity in the Godhead that the Word and Spirit may 
be active in the world without the actual involvement of the Father in 
their activity, how at the same time there can be such unity that the ac-
tivity of the Word and the Spirit reveal to any extent the nature of the 
Father, Who does not Himself actual~ take part in their work. Besides 
exhibiting tendencies toward tritheism, the Fathers have left us with an 
insoluble problem. They have spoken of the Father as essential~ invis-
ible and unknowable. While they have described the Word as His image, 
they have not explained how the visible Word can be the inage of the in-
visible Father or how the essential~ unknowable can be made known. 
10. Resurrection and Life After Death 
For Irenaeus, God 1s goodness is indicated not only through His 
gift of eternal life or salvation to the faithful but also in the 
resurrection of the boqy. The immortality that God bestows is not of 
the spirit alone, but also of the bocty.l It is evident that God 
1. Against Heresies, ii, 29, 2; I, 403. 
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possesses both greater goodness and power than Marcion's god because 
He promises a resurrection of the body as well as immortality of the 
soul while Marcion's god promises only an immortality of the soul.l 
Unlike Irenaeus, Clement has no doctrine of resurrection. He does, 
however, use eternal life as a synonymous term for salvation, thereby 
showing it to be an expression of God's goodness.2 Clement seems to 
be lacking in any concept of eternal punishment, such as we find dis-
played in Tertullian, while eternal life or salvation is the reward 
of the good.3 Like Irenaeus, Tertullian believes that a doctrine 
of resurrection is quite important. God's final judgment requires 
the reunion of soul and body. 4 Only in this way is His justice main-
tained5 and His goodness fully evident.6 After the resurrection and 
the judgment one enters either into eternal life or eternal death, 
or everlasting punishment; in either case forever. 7 In his emphasis 
on eternal life as an expression of Divine goodness,8 we see that he 
is in agreement with Irenaeus and Clement, but in stressing eternal 
punishment also as an expression of God's goodness he seems to part 
1. Ibid., v, 4, 1; I, 530. 
2. Exhortation to the Heathen, 1; II, 173 and 12; II, 206. 
3. ~., 1o; n, 197. 
4. Soul's Testimony, 4; m, 177, and Apology, 48; III, 53. 
5. Against Marcion, v, 12; III, 456. 6. Ibid., i, 24; III, 290. 
1. Soul's Testimony, 4; III, 177. 
8. Against Marcion, iv, 36; III, 410. 
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company with them. At this point Irenaeus is silent and Clement has 
nothing to say. Tertullian contends that vengeance upon the evil-
doer is itself an expression of goodness,l especial~ since it shows 
God's positive opposition to evil.2 
Sane difficulties are apparent in Irenaeus' and Tertullian' s 
doctrine of the resurrection. Far too sophisticated perhaps for the 
time in which they lived yet nonetheless constituting real difficulty 
for a literal resurrection of the body are the questions posed by 
recognition of the fact that in the course of history, as bodies have 
returned to the earth from which they came, the same elements and 
minerals have been used in the composition of numerous different 
bodies. To which boqy shall they belong in the resurrection? Will 
same be left as disembodied spirits because all body-material has 
been consumed before their turn to be resurrected comes? A more 
serious difficulty lies in understanding how these limited, and same-
times handicapped and deformed, bodies can be suitable equipment for 
those who are destined to inherit eternal bliss. Is there to be an 
element of suffering and misery even in the realm of the blessed? 
If these two Fathers are consistent with Scripture in this 
doctrine, as they no doubt tried to be, the above-mentioned diffi-
culties will not really apply, since the resurrection body will not 
be this limited and imperfect fleshly organism but will be the spiritual 
1. Resurrection of the~' 14; III, 554. 
2. Against Marcion, ii, 13; III, 308. 
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and glorified body referred to by St. Paul. This, however, opens the 
door to other difficulties. If the resurrection body is a spiritual 
and glorified body rather than this mortal flesh, the identity of the 
resurrection body with the body of one 1 s earthly life will be purely 
fictitious. This makes apparent an inconsistency in both Irenaeus 
and TertuJ lian. For both have contended in opposition to the Mar-
cionites' doctrine of a spiritual resurrection that the goodness of 
God is shown superior and more perfect than that of the god espoused 
by the Marcionites in His saving the total person through the resur-
rection of the body. However, this argument implies that the resur-
rected body is the same body inhabited in this life, the natural 
body rather than the spiritual body of St. Paul. If the resurrected 
body is the spiritual and glorified body of St. Paul, then their argu-
ment is invalid, for the natural body has not been saved. If they 
should choose the other horn of the dilemma that it is this same 
earthly body which is resurrected, then they would be in contradiction 
to Paul who states that the resurrection body is not this earthly body. 
A second difficulty of similar nature is evident in Tertullian's 
thought. He argues that justice demands the resurrection of the body, 
that just as the body was the accomplice of the soul in its good or 
evil actions so also it should share with it in reward or punishment, 
as the case may be. However, if the resurrected body is a spiritual 
rather than a natural body, this principle breaks down, for it is not 
the~ body which accompanied the soul in its moral actions that is 
rewarded or punished. In fact, justice is actually flouted, for an 
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innocent b~ receives the punishment due another and an undeserving 
body receives the reward earned by another. 
The difficulty for both Fathers springs from a faulty theory of 
personality. They consider personality to be a soul-body union and 
therefore feel the necessity of a doctrine of resurrection. Although 
both have the valid insight that the soul is the real agent of action, 
they fail to develop its implications. For both tend to regard the 
body as constitutive rather then transmissive of personality. Instead 
of being an instrument or tool through which the soul communicates and 
acts, the body is regarded as a determinative element of personality 
itself. 
c. Meanings of Divine Goodness Implied in the Human Good 
1. Nature of the Human Good 
a. Characteristics 
Among the characteristics of human goodness which we were able 
to elucidate from the writings of the Fathers, there were only a few 
which appeared in each of the Fathers and upon which there was general 
agreement. Several of the characteristics of human goodness elaborated 
in our exposition of the individual Fathers appeared only in one of 
the Fathers and were of minor importance. Certainly the list of 
characteristics here elucidated is by no means regarded as exhaustive 
or complete and is therefore inadequate for any one who desires a 
full understanding of the Fathers' theories of ethics or morals . 
)81 
(1) Inferior to Divine goodness.--11Man is infinitely inferior to 
God," says Irenaeus.l Especial:cy is he inferior in his goodness, first 
because his goodness is created and lacking in eternity, and, second, 
because his goodness is secondary and dependent in comparison 'td th 
God's which is primary and constitutive.2 With this both Clement and 
Tertullian would no doubt agree, for it is thoroughly consistent with 
their teaching, even though we have not elucidated it from their writ-
ings. 
The proposition that man's goodness is inferior to God1 s is co-
herent with the propositions that God's goodness is basic or primary 
and that human goodness is derivative and learned. Also, it is harmonious 
with the prophetic descriptions of man as infinitesimal in comparison 
with God, with our Master's statement that there is none good but God, 
and with the Apostles assertion that all have sinned and come short 
of the glory of God. 
(2) Derivative and learned.--There is common agreement among 
these Fathers that man's goodness is derivative and learned. Irenaeus 
says that God never ceases to confer benefits on man "nor does man 
ever cease from receiving the benefits, and being enriched by God."3 
God has therefore determined things beforehand 11for the bringing of 
man to perfection; for his edification, and for the revelation of His 
dispensations, that goodness may both be made apparent, and 
1. Against Heresies, ii, 25, 3; I, 396-97. 
3. Against Heresies, iii, 11, 2; I, 474. 
2. Above, p. 73. 
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righteousness perfected. 111 In like manner, Clement asserts that 11it 
is not by nature, but by learning, that people become noble and good. 11 2 
Indeed, the soul is unable to apprehend reality without the aid of a 
divine teacher.3 Tertullian makes it clear that whatever goodness man 
has is due to no essential nature of his awn but to the way God con-
stituted him with possibilities for development at his creation.4 For 
a proper knowledge of good one must be "taught of God Himself what 
goodness is. 115 
There is little reason for praising the teaching of one Father 
at this point more than that of another, for the proposition is con-
sistent in each of them with the rest of their system and is also 
relevant to many of their statements. It is relevant to the state-
ments that God's goodness is basic or primary, that the guidance of 
the Law and the prophets is for man's good, that the Word and the 
Spirit illumine the heart of man and reveal God to him, that the knowl-
edge of God is the chief human good. 
Clear~ this thought is implicit in the Scriptural assumption 
that the Law is given by God and the prophets are inspired to preach 
righteousness by God for the guidance and moral edification of man. 
The thought comes to clear expression in II Timothy 3:16: uAll 
1. Against Heresies, iv, 37, 7; I, 520-21. 
2. Stromata, i, 6; II, 307. 3. Ibid., v, 1; II, 446. 
4. Against Marcion, ii, 6; III, 302. 
5. Apology, 45; III, 50. 
scripture is given by inspiration of God, ••• for instruction in 
righteousness. 11 
(3) Voluntary and rationa.l.--For Irena.eus human goodness must be 
the result of free choice if it is to be praiseworthy, proper~ valued 
by man, and in a sense man's own property. For goodness to be man1 s 
own property it must be the result of a free choice resulting from 
rational understanding of its worth. This is possible only if man 
has not only the power of choosing but of actual~ experiencing both 
good and evil. It is the experience of both which brings him to a 
proper appreciation of goodness.l Clement, also, maintains that hu-
man goodness is a matter of free choice and rational understanding. 
Human freedom is required if man's actions are to be praiseworthy or 
blameworthy and subject to judgment.2 Good can not be free~ chosen 
until it is rationally understood. Therefore, man is given reason 
that he may pursue the good and avoid the bad,3 for the best in-
struction is worthless "without the exercise of the receptive faculty 
on the part of the learner. 114 For Tertullian, too, human goodness 
must be the result of free choice, rather than of necessity or even 
of creation, if it is to be man's own property5 and if it is to be 
1. Above,pp. 75-79. 
2. Stromata, i, 17; II, 319 and ii, 14; II, 361. 
3. Greek Fragments (Marcarius Chrysocephalus, Oration on Luke 15), 
11; II, 583. 
4. Stromata, ii, 6; II, 353. 5. Against Marcion, ii, 6; III, 302. 
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justly rewarded or punished.l 
In comparison with Irenaeus and Clement, Tertullian 1 s position 
seems deficient. While the idea that goodness must be rational~ 
understood may be implicit in his assertions that man must have freedom 
if he is to possess a goodness tr~ his own, it seems strange that one 
who placed such a high premium on the reasonableness of things would 
have neglected the elaboration of this point. 
The notion that man's goodness must be free~ chosen and ration-
ally understood seems consistent with the remainder of the Fathers' 
teaching and is clearly relevant to several of their teachings. Its 
relevance to their thought concerning the purposiveness of God's good-
ness, the gift of freedom to man, the instructing and revealing ac-
tions of the Word and the Spirit, and the principle of Divine judg-
ment is clearly evident. Also, the Scriptural assumption of the 
righteousness of God's judgment implies the freedom and intelligence 
of human actions. 
(4) Passionless.--Both Clement and Tertullian describe human 
goodness as free of passion, but though they use the· same term they 
do not mean the same thing by it. For Tertullian, the passions are 
the sensual enjoyments and pleasures which reveal man's kinship with 
animals. He would not deny all feeling a place in human goodness but 
only the baser and more sensate feelings.2 Clement, however, goes 
much further. Not only does he deny a place for the enjoyment of any 
1. ~· 2. Above, p. 263. 
animal appetites in the life of the good man, but he rules out virtuous 
feelings, such as courage, joy, zeal, etc., as we11. 1 His ideal of 
the inner life of the good man is that of Stoic apathy. 
With the description of human goodness as passionless, we ap-
proach the realm of the trivial and the nonsensical. Definite~ the 
position of Tertullian is preferable to that of Clement. To be free 
of the baser emotions is good and is consistent with other aspects of 
the Fathers' thought. But Clement, in his desire to attribute the 
desirable aspects of the Stoic teaching of apathy to the Christian 
gnostics, has exaggerated this thought to the point of irrationality. 
His teaching that the perfect man is unmoved in attitude or emotion 
by the condition of the world about him becomes contradictory of other 
points in his system. For Clement taught that the chief end of man is 
likeness to God and one important aspect of this likeness to God is the 
state of apathy or passionlessness. And yet Clement has said that God 
cares for man and that consequently He acts in such a way as to turn 
the evils which befall man to good advantage. Now if the state of 
being unmoved or influenced in attitude or emotion is an indication of 
man's likeness to God, can Clement possib~ be consistent when he 
claims that God is concerned about what happens in the life of man 
and responds in appropriate ways to human and terrestrial events? I 
think not. 
Furthermore, in spite of Clement 1 s explanation that the Scriptures' 
reference to God as being angry or grieved or experiencing various 
1. Stromata, vi, 9; II, 496-97. 
other emotions is simply an accommodation to the weakness of human 
understanding and that these 11 emotions 11 in God are not at all like 
their human counterparts, the notion of apa~ or passionlessness is 
foreign to Scripture, in which it is clear that human actions matter 
to God and make a real difference in His own action. 
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(5) Miscellaneous eharacteristics.--A number of characteristics 
of human goodness are of minor importance, in addition to not being 
found in all of the Fathers. Clement, for ex~le, maintains that 
man's goodness presupposes a medium external to itself in which and 
through which it finds expression.! He says also that man's goodness 
is primarily spiritual, a quality of the soul rather than the body.2 
In contrast, Tertullian maintains that goodness is of the lihole person 
conceived as a soul-boqy union.3 Clement insists that goodness must 
be positive in character4 and inclusive of the total life, inner and 
outer, thought and deed.5 A common note is struck when Clement says 
that goodness must be sought for its own sake6 and Tertullian affirms 
that true goodness is found in that which has intrinsic value without 
a.ny necessity of comparison with something else. 7 To this list, Ter-
tullian adds that man has a goodness "Which is natural and inextin-
guishab1e, due to the fact that he has his origin from God.a He also 
1. Stromata, iv, 6; II, 41.6. 2. Above, pp. 159-60. 
3. Above, pp. 263-65. 4. Stromata, vi, 12; II, 504. 
5. Above, pp. 160-61. 6. Stromata, iv, 22; II, 434. 
7. Above, pp. 265-66. a. ! Treatise ~ the Soul, 41; m, 220. 
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characterizes the good for man as profitable. 11 I should prefer no 
good to a vain good: what profits it that that should exist whose 
existence profits not?111 Irenaeus1 thought that good and evil are not 
a matter of human opinion but of Divine distinction2 is repeated in 
Tertullian's assertion that goodness is absolute and is never relative 
to time or place or human opinion. "Never and nowhere is that free 
from blame which God ever condemns; never and nowhere is it right to 
do what you may not do in all times and in all places. 113 
Since all of these are minor characteristics of the human good, 
we will attempt no detailed evaluation. None of them seems incon-
sistent with the rest of their systems. 
b. Essence 
Concerning the essence of the chief human good there is a great 
amount of agreement among these three Fathers. The differences that 
appear are probably more a matter of emphasis and perspective than of 
real disagreement. 
(1) Obedience ~ God.--For Irenaeus, the first perspective from 
which the human good is seen is obedience to God. Obedience is good 
for man because, as a result of his lmowledge and love, God has com-
manded that which is essential for the preservation and development 
of human nature.4 Obedience to God means good for man also in the 
1. ~ Modesty; IV, 74. 2. Above, p. 79. 
3. De Spectacules, 20; III, 88. 
4. Against Heresies, iv, 39, 1; I, 522 and iv, 17, 1; I, 482. 
sense that thereby he wins the favor of God and is rewarded with ad-
ditional good things and the fruits productive of eternal life.1 Ter-
tullian also regards obedience to God as the essence, from one point 
of view, of the human good. "Now Christ is the man who tells us what 
is good, even the knowledge of the law. 11 2 Disobedience to the law re-
sults in the evil of death, but it is the intention of the law to safe-
guard man from death and preserve him in life.3 Obedience is good be-
cause it preserves man in the good of life and improves the condition 
and quality of the life man enjoys.4 
Although the thought that obedience to God is a form of the chief 
human good finds more frequent expression in Irenaeus than Tert1ulian, 
there is no evident reason for regarding his expression of the idea as 
preferable. For both Fathers ' the thought is consistent with the rest 
of their teachings and displays a definite relevance to a number of 
them. It certainly is relevant to the propositions dealing with the 
demands of the Law and the prophets, the action of God's judgment in 
rewarding and punishing, salvation to a life of eternal bliss, and 
good as the principle of life. Also, it is obviously implied in the 
exhortation of the Scriptures to obey God, especially in that passage 
where obedience and disobedience are portrayed as a choice between 
good and evil, life and death.5 
1. ~., iii, 5, 3; I, 418 and iv, 18, 6; I, 486. 
2. Against Y~rcion, iv, 36; III, 410. 
3. Ibid., ii, 8; III, 303. 
5. Deuteronomy 30:15-19. 
4. Above, p. 270. 
(2) Knowledge of God.--Irenaeus frequently depicts the chief hu-
man good in terms of the vision of God. To see God is to receive life 
and immortality.l Such vision of God is not the result of man's exer-
cising his natural powers but rather of the Son's manifestation of the 
Father and of the Spirit's illumining.2 Comparable to Irenaeus' notion 
of the vision of God is Clement's concept of the knowledge of God as 
an expression of the ultimate hwnan good. It was for this end that 
man was made.3 It is to be preferred to everything else,4 for it "is 
the immutable and immovable source and support of life. 115 So great 
is this good that it would be preferable to salvation or eternal life 
if it were not already identical with it.6 Tertullian says that God 
created "man for the pursuit of the knowledge of Himsel£. 11 7 Because 
there was nothing 11 so good as the lmowledge and fruition of God 11 God 
created the universe by which He might be known.8 Ignorance of God 
is the major cause of sin and evil; conversely, knowledge of God leads 
to goodness and consequently to a fuller, richer life.9 
Although there may be some variation in the form in which the 
Fathers express this thought, in content there is no significant 
1. Against Heresies, iv, 20, 6; I, 489. 
2. Ibid., iv, 20, 5-6; I, 489. 3. Stromata, vi, 8; II, 495. 
-
4. Exhortation !£ the Heathen, 10; II, 201. 
5. 'Who,!.:! the Rich Man?, 7; II, 593. 
6. Stromata, iv, 22; II, l.i34. 
1. Against Marcion, ii, 4; III, 299. 
8. ~., ii, 3; III, 299. 9. Above,pp. 267-68. 
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difference. With the exception of their exaggeration of the transcend-
ence and incomprehensibility of God, this thought seems to be consist-
ent with the rest of their systems and definite~ relevant to several 
of their statements. It is relevant to their teachings about God's 
creation for the purpose of providing evidence of Himself, the reveal-
ing acts of the Word and the Spirit, and the work of the Saviour in 
giving a fuller revelation of God. Furthermore, the thought is in 
harmony with Scripture. Hosea says that people perish for want of 
knowledgel and that knowledge of God is preferable to burnt offer-
ings, 2 while the author of the Fourth Gospel says that "this is life 
eternal, that we might know thee the only true God, and Jesus 
Christ113--to mention only a few passages. However, it is out of har-
mony with the Fathers' emphasis on the transcendence and unknowability 
of God. Since we have already dealt at several points above with the 
difficulties created by this exaggerated emphasis, we shall not repeat 
our reasoning here. 
(3) Likeness to God.--All three of the Fathers regard "likeness 
to God11 as a way of viewing the chief human good. For Irenaeus, to be 
in the image and likeness of God was the end of man from the very 
first. The Son descended that the creature might "be made after the 
image and likeness of God"; 4 and to accomplish this end the Spirit 
dwells in the hearts of man, that it may 11 render us like unto Him, 
1. Hosea 4:6, 
3. John 17:3. 
2. Hosea 6:6. 
4. Against Heresies, v, 36, 3; I, 567. 
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and accomplish the will of the Father," for it shall make man after 
the image and likeness of God.1 While at times Irenaeus regards the 
accomplishment of this end as the restoration of man's original con-
dition, the end is more than the beginning, for it includes a con-
scious knowledge of itself which was lacking in man's original condi-
tion.2 Clement adopts the view of Plato that the chief human good is 
found in likeness to God.3 11 The good man is godlike in form and sem-
blance as respects his soul. 114 Especially is this true of the Gnostic, 
or perfect man, "who imitates God as far as possible, deficient in 
none of the things which contribute to the likeness as far as cam-
patible.115 Regarding the degree to which assimilation to God is pos-
sible Clement is not consistent. As Patrick points out, at times he 
speaks as though it is partial, being an assimilation to 11God the 
Saviour ••• as far as possible from human nature. 116 But at times 
the idea of assimilation goes beyond a mere likeness to God to a 
virtual identity ld th God. 7 For Tertullian, the outcome of obedience 
to the law of God is likeness to God. "The will of God is our sancti-
fication, for He wishes His 1image'--us--to become likewise His 'like-
ness, 1 that we may be 'holy' just as Himself is 'holy. ttt8 
1. ~-, v, 8, 1; I, .533. 2. Above, P• 
3. Stromata, ii, 22; n, 376. 4. Ibid., vi, 9; II, 497. 
5. ~-, ii, 19; II, 369. 6. Clement of Alexandria, p. 149. 
7. Tollinton, Clement of Alexandria, II, 91-92. 
8. On Exhortation to Chastity, 1; IV, 50. 
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So long as man's likeness unto God is not regarded as complete 
and absolute, this proposition seems harmonious with the rest of the 
Fathers' thinking. Its agreement w.i.th Scripture, also, is evident in 
the Master's words: 11Be ye therefore perfect as your Father in heaven 
is perfect."l But if man's eventual likeness to God is understood in 
an absolute sense, it becomes an impossibility in the light of other 
statements made by the Fathers. This is particularly true with 
Irenaeus and Tertullian, who insist that eternity is an earmark of 
real goodness. Irenaeus says that God could not be perfect if He 
were lacking the attribute of eternity, and Tertullian says in effect 
that God would lack real being if He were not eternal. From Irenaeus• 
point of view, man can never be perfect as God is perfect or realize 
the goal of complete likeness to God, for he will always be lacking 
a necessary ingredient of perfection--eternity. But the goal cannot 
be reached from Tertullian1s perspective either, for man's goodness 
must always be dependent because it lacks the true being indicated 
by the possession of the trait of eternity. 
(4) . Fellowship with God.--Close~ related to all the above is 
Irenaeus 1 concept of fellowship with God. Obedience paves the way to 
fellowship with God,2 which is "to know God and enjoy His goodness. 113 
Irenaeus gives no clear indication of the relationship of these ele-
ments in his thought. However, it seems logical to suppose that the 
1. Matthew .5:48. 2. Against Her~s, iv, 14, 1; I, 478. 
3. Ibid., iv, 20, 5; I, 489. 
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vision of God inspires obedience, which in turn produces likeness to 
God, resulting in fellowship with God . But fellowship with God results 
in new vision, further obedience, increased likeness, and fellowship 
at a deeper level. 
The view of fellowship with God, clearly stated in Irenaeus and 
implicit in Clement's and Tertullian1 s concept of the knowledge of God, 
is a consistent and logical outgrowth of obedience to God and knowledge 
of God. Also, it can be understood as serving as a ground for addi-
tional knowledge of God, so that fellowship with God and knowledge of 
God became alternating stages, if not different ways of describing 
the same thing, in man's relationship with God. 
(5) Virtue and good deeds.--Clement would begin the list of forms 
of the human good with virtue and deeds of positive goodness . Man1s 
motive in doing good is his desire to be like his heavenly Father.l 
Also, a man works benevolence, because, becoming ever more like unto 
God, he becomes increasing fit to be an 11 instrument of the goodness of 
God.u2 While the emphasis of Clement on the doing of positive good is 
not completely analogous with the emphasis of Irenaeus and Tertul 1 ian 
on obedience to God, it probably corresponds to a considerable degree 
with the total meaning their terms may have had for them. 
This thought certainly is consistent with the rest of Clement's 
thought and with the teaching of Scripture, wherein numerous virtues, 
such as faith, hope, and love, and acts of love and service are 
1. Stromata, ii, 18; II, 368-69. 2. Ibid., vii, 13; II, 547. 
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constantly being extolled. 
c. Principle of Life 
Good and evil are principles of life and death respectively for 
each of these Fathers. While this expression appears in Clement and 
Tertullian, it receives its most forceful statement in Irenaeus. 
Irenaeus contends that just as a living soul forfeits life when he 
turns aside to what is evil, so he finds life "when he reverts to what 
is good. 111 While Irenaeus does not draw from his doctrine that evil 
is the principle of death the logical conclusion that the continuous 
choice of evil results eventually in the full extinction of being, 
his thought does tend in that direction. For he defines life as "to 
lmow God, and to enjoy His goodness.112 The choice of evil which re-
duces the total amount of good enjoyed and thus subtracts from life 
at its fullest is in effect a decrease in being. Clement espouses a 
similar view. He quotes favorably a passage from Ezekiel which, he 
says, indicates that eternal life is the reward of a life of good-
ness,3 and also another passage of Scripture which equates good with 
life and evil with death.4 Although one of these Scriptural passages 
implies that life is separate and additional to goodness, Clement's 
thought that goodness is actually the principle of life becomes ap-
parent when he says that the knowledge of God, which he regards as 
the chief human good, "is the immutable and immovable source and 
1. Against Heresies, v, 12, 2; I, 538. 
3. Instructor, i, 10; II, 233. 
2. Ibid., iv, 20, 5; I, 489. 
4. Stromata, v, 14; II, 467. 
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support of life."l For Tertul Han, the matter is slightly different. 
While it is clear that good and evil are principles of ill e and death 
for him, it is also evident that life and death are not the same as 
existence and non-existence, for one may experience eternal death 
without ceasing to exist.2 
There can be no doubt that the statements that good is the prin-
ciple of life and evil the principle of death are consistent with all 
and relevant to much of the Fathers' teaching . We have noticed its 
relevance to the thought of obedience to God as chief human good. We 
have seen that it supports the idea that knowledge of God is life. It 
is easy also to recognize its affinity with the Fathers' thoughts on 
Divine judgment, salvation, and the life after death. Its bamony 
with Scripture is especially apparent in the passage: 11 I have set 
before thee this day life and good, and death and evil.n3 
Once again we are reminded of the identity of goodness and true 
being: to participate in goodness is to have being. 
2. Meanings of Divine Goodness Implied 
Since there is general agreement here and the meanings that have 
been deduced are not direct expositions of the Fathers' thought, we 
make no attempt at detailed comparison but simply reiterate the im-
plications that we have drawn. In the characteristics and essence 
of the human good as set forth in the writings of the Fathers, we 
1. Who Is the Rich Man?, 7; II, 593. 
3. Deuteronomy 30:15. 
2. Above,F.P• 272-75. 
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found at least three meanings of the goodness of God implicit; (1) it 
indicates Him as the ground of existence; (2) it means that He governs 
the world in accord with human well-being; and (3) it means that He is 
the source of value distinctions and the teacher of man in goodness. 
None of the manifestations of Divine goodness inferred from the 
Fathers 1 teaching on human goodness is inconsistent with other proposi-
tions in their teaching. The first proposition that Divine goodness 
expresses itself as the ground of existence is really equivalent to the 
statement that creation is a manifestation of goodness and, like the 
latter statement, is coherent with the propositions that goodness is 
basic or primary, that goodness finds purposive expression in the 
salvation of man, and that good is the principle of life. The second 
proposition that Divine goodness receives expression in God's governing 
the world in accord with human well-being is implied in God's issuing 
of commandments and warnings, in the work of Divine providence, in the 
operation of justice, mercy, and grace, and in the proposition that 
good is the principle of life. The proposition that God's goodness 
finds expression in the imparting of value-distinctions and the teach-
ing of virtue to man is likewise implied in God's establishment of 
laws and commandments, in His execution of judgment, in the illumina-
tion and guidance of the Word and the Spirit, and in the example of the 
Incarnate Word. 
D. Meanings of Divine Goodness Implied in the Criticism 
of Pagan Deities 
1. Purity 
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For both Clement and Tertullian, the sexual impurity and moral 
corruptions of the alleged pagan divinities serve to bring the goodness 
of the true God into sharper focus by way of contrast. The approach 
of the two Fathers is quite similar.l Both attack the characters of 
various pagan deities, especially those of the Greek and Roman pan-
theons, with severe moral criticism and biting, sarcastic ridicule. 
Clement says that such beings are in reality "unclean and impure 
spirits11 2 and that even men are 11better than these gods, who are but 
demons.n3 Tertullian says to the Romans, 11 Those whom you have imagined 
to be so fjod~7 you find to be spirits of evil. 114 The only real dif-
ference between the two Fathers at this point is that Clement's at-
tack is directed primarily toward the Greek gods while Tertullian 1 s 
is aimed at Roman divinities. The implication of their attack and 
their criticism of the impurity and unworthiness of the pagan gods is 
that God is unquestionably good in the sense of sexual and moral 
purity. 
The thought of Divine goodness as purity is in no way contra-
dictor.y of other parts in the Fathers• systems, although its relevance 
1. Above, pp. 149-51 and 278-83, 
2. Exhortation to ~ Heathen, 4; II, 187. 
3. ~., 3; II, 183. 4. Ad Nationes, 23; III, 38. 
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to other parts of their systems is not immediately obvious. The notion 
of goodness as purity may be related in a way to the thought that God 1 s 
goodness is divorced from any need on His part, so that purity might 
indicate that God has no unsatisfied sex urges or any other cravings 
that would cause Him to use His creatures for His own gratification. 
The agreement of this thought with Scripture is to be seen in the 
Scriptural emphasis on the forms of uncleanness which are displeasing 
to God. 
2. Perfection of Attributes and Abilities 
Clement finds another point of attack in the limitations and 
imperfections of the Greek divinities. He criticizes them for their 
lack of power and supremacy, evident from their constant conflict 
with one another, for their lack of omniscience, and, in some cases, 
for being deformed and imperfect in development.! Tertullian finds 
indications of lack of power on the part of the Latin gods in their 
failure to protect their patron cities and in the quarrels and fights 
and struggles for supremacy among the gods themselves.2 He cri ti-
cizes them also because they are deficient in knowledge and lack the 
attribute of eternity.3 In contrast to these imperfect and impotent 
beings, God is perfect and all-powerful. "That cannot be imperfect 
which has made all perfect, 11 says Tertullian.4 Certainly Clement• s 
judgment that even man is better than such impotent, imperfect and 
1. Above, pp. 151-53. 
3. Above, pp. 284-85. 
2. Above, pp. 283-84. 
4. Apology, 11; III, 27. 
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deformed deitiesl implies that perfection of the Divine qualities is 
a mark of His goodness. 
Here again neither Father seems to deserve approbation more than 
the other. For both Fathers, the proposition that God's goodness is 
to be seen in the perfection of His abilities is consistent with the 
remainder of their systems and is relevant to the propositions that 
God's goodness is perfect and that it is a complex rather than simple 
goodness. It seems to be in harmony with the numerous references of 
Scripture to the perfections of God--His omnipotence, His wisdom, His 
righteousness, His patience, His kindness, His mercy, His love. In 
all respects the excellence of God so transcends the traits of human 
excellence that Isaiah feels himself prostrated before His awful 
holiness. 
All of the descriptions and manifestations of God's goodness up 
to this point have implied a moral interpretation of goodness. Such 
an implication is present also in the reference we made above to the 
teaching of the Scriptures. However, a moral connotation of goodness 
is not necessarily implicit in the arguments of Clement and Tertullian 
from which this meaning was inferred. Here goodness may well mean the 
perfection of the thing-in-itself, separate and apart from any rela-
tions it may be capable of sustaining. Perhaps it would be appropriate 
to describe it as goodness in the esthetic sense--a goodness apparent 
from one's enjoyment of a thing's beauty and proportion. The rarity 
of this type of thought about the Divine goodness, coupled with the 
1. Exhortation~~ Heathen, 3; II, 183. 
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recognition that a meaning inferred from the logic of the Fathers' 
thought may not have been a part of their conscious thought at all, 
indicates that the expectation expressed in the Introduction, that 
meaningful applications of the term goodness to God would not be to 
God in isolation but to God in some relationship to man or to some-
thing important to man, was not unfounded. 
E. Theodicy 
Irenaeus places his theodicy in the midst of the argument directed 
against the Gnostics, that the same God is inspirer of the Old and the 
Nevr Testaments, of Judaism and Christianity. Man1 s goal is to become 
like God, but, since he can reach this goal on~ gradually, God com-
municates or withholds his revelation in accord with man's state of 
development and in keeping with the state of world affairs, w~ich is 
itself the result of man's free agency.1 In keeping, therefore, with 
the nature of man, God has arranged different levels of salvation, re-
quiring a gradual education, for which He communicates His revelation 
at the proper time.2 Instead of tr.ying to explain the origin of evil 
Irenaeus argues that it is a necessar,y element in man's moral develop-
ment. Although man died as a consequence of his sin in the Garden of 
Eden, he was not immortal anyway, for immortality had been withheld 
because God had foreseen that death might serve as a blessing in cut-
ting off man' s sinning. Sin could have been avoided only if God had 
made man a lower order of being who was good by nature rather than b,y 
1. Above,JP. 92-93. 2. Against Heresies, iv, 38, 1-3; I, 521-22. 
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choice. But man can have a goodness of his own, in accord with God's 
purpose, only by learning through experience what it is both to have 
and to lose the good. In this way only can he learn properly to ap-
preciate the value of goodness. 1 
By way of contrast, Clement tries definite~ to relieve God of 
responsibility for ev:il. He argues that evils other than penal evils, 
which should not be regarded as evil since they are intended f or the 
well-being of the one who experiences them, happen without the pre-
vention of God. Causation attaches to activit,y, but not to failure 
to prevent.2 God does all He can, however, to prevent sin by persua-
sive, non-coercive means.3 A second principle in Clement's theodicy 
is that God makes evil contribute to larger good.4 Clement also 
stresses the idea that the evil and suffering which befall men, even 
though they may not be penal evils, are made disciplinar,y and condu-
cive to their future good; and all penal evils are meant to be edu-
cative and reformatory.5 
Tertullian seeks to vindicate God's goodness, foreknowledge, and 
power in the face of the charges of the Marcionites by showing that 
the human freedom which God allows in order that man may grow into an 
autonomous goodness like God's is the cause of the evil man suffers.6 
God cannot interpose to prevent evil without in effect rescinding 
1. Above, FP• 93-95. 
3. Instructor, i, 2; II, 210. 
5. Above, P• 179. 
2. Stromata, iv, 12; II, 424. 
4. Stromata, i, 17; II, 320. 
6. Against Marcion, ii, 5-7; III, 301-303. 
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man's :f'reedom.l Such action on His part would suggest that He had 
acted unwisely and without foresight in granting man freedom to begin 
with. 2 Furthermore, the fact that man is capable of sin and corrup-
tion is no reflection on the nature of the Creator. Rather man's 
susceptibility to corruption is necessarily inherent in the fact that 
he is merely in the image of God and an image, though expressing 11 the 
lineaments of the reality, is yet wanting in its intrinsic power.3 
God is not to be criticized for not preventing the influence of evil 
spirits, for, since they do not force man to sin, responsibility re-
sides in his free choice. Nor is God to be regarded as the author of 
evil because He created the devil and his angels, for he was originally 
fashioned, like man, in the image of God, with the power to choose 
good or evil. He became evil by his own choice.4 Tertullian makes 
one attempt to relieve God of responsibility for non-moral evil when 
he says that some things which seem evil are in reality good.5 He 
justifies God' s use of penal evils by the thought that they are 11 just 
and defensive of good and hostile to sin. 116 
Since the theodicies of the Fathers set forth above are our own 
construction from principles selected from their teaching rather than 
a conscious construction of the Fathers themselves, we shall not 
l. ~., ii, 7; III, 303. 2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., ii, 9; III, 304-305. 4. Ibid., ii, 10; III, 305-306. 
5. De Fuga in Persecutione, 4; IV, 118. 
6. Against Marcion, ii, 14; III, 308. 
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attempt to weigh the merits of one over against another, for the de-
ficiencies of one in comparison with another may well be the fault of 
our selectivity. Rather we wish to speak of the merits and deficien-
cies of all three considered together. 
First of all, we can point out that there appears no principle 
which is in contradiction to the rest of their teaching about the 
goodness of God. If the purpose of a theodie,y is merely to relieve 
God of responsibility for evil, without accounting for the origin of 
evil, then the Fathers have done as good a job as one might expect. 
But in doing so they have left some important questions unanswered. 
Their failure to answer them or even to recognize the questions makes 
their theodicies somewhat deficient and circular in reasoning. Prob-
ably the most important unanswered question concerns the origin of 
evil. If God is asswned to be the sole Ground of all existence and 
one would have us believe that evil did not originate from Him, he 
has an intellectual obligation to suggest an alternative origin. If 
the origin of evil is not in God, from whence does it come? Negative 
belief in one direction logicallY implies positive belief in another. 
Now, perhaps, the Fathers felt that they had suggested a genuine alter-
native when they attributed the origin of evil in the world to hwnan 
sin and hwnan sin to man's .tree will. If one pushed the Fathers, 
especially Tertullian, with the question of why man would choose to 
act in sinful ways rather in ways pleasing to God he might receive 
the answer that mmn had been influenced in that direction by the devil 
and his angels. However, eventually the Fathers must face the problem 
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of an apparent]3" unmotivated free choice. Why did the devil and man, 
having the power to choose good or evil, choose the latter in the first 
place? What Roberts says of Tertullian is true of the other Fathers, 
too. Tertullian never real~ faces the question of why the devil and 
man, having been given the power of choosing good ar evil, happened to 
choose evil. The fact that they chose it is sufficient explanation for 
him. In opposition to the Gnostics who had made man's will helpless in 
the determination of circumstances, he set forth the view of a will mo-
tivated by nothing 'Whatever.1 If the evil in the world originated from 
human sin and if human sin originated from the choice of evil, how 
could ei tb.er sin or evil come into being? For man would be faced with 
the problem of choosing an alternative which his own choice was due to 
create. If man is to choose, then, there must be genuine alternatives. 
The nature of reality must be such that it includes potentialities for 
relationships harmful to man and potentialities for relationships bene-
ficial to man. In other wards, good and evil must be potential~ present 
or latent in the natural environment man confronts. This potentiality 
must exist, if human sin is to be possible. But this potentiality man 
did not create. Because of the interrelatedness of good and evil in 
life, this potentiality cannot be attributed to a duality of creative 
principles but must, as we have pointed out earlier in this disserta-
tion, be the result of one and the same creative principle. There is 
1. Theology of Tertullian, p. 163. 
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no way to avoid tracing the origin of this potentiality to God. 
However, there is one helpful insight in Irenaeus 1 thought to 
'Which we call attention. Irenaeus does not attempt to answer the 
question as to the ultimate source of evil. Instead, he points out 
that God reckoned with the fact of evil from the very first. In the 
light of His purpose~ produce a being of autonomous goodness, not 
merely the possibility, but the actual experience of evil is a neces-
sity. Only through actual experience of the loss of good, of 'Which 
evil consists, can man learn the worth and desirability of goodness. 
The fact that evil is a necessary element in the moral development 
of man should indicate that man 1s experience of temporal evil does 
not detract in any way from the perfect goodness of God. 
We should not close this section without noting that the theodi-
cies of all three Fathers are deficient in their failure to recognize, 
much less to deal with, the problem of natural evil. Apparently the 
Fathers believe that all evil is moral evil, accepting the uncritical 
view that all evil is the result of human sin. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
From the survey made of the views of these Fathers on the good-
ness of G<>d and the critical evaluation which has been made of their 
contributions, we are led to the following conclusions. 
1. Goodness is~ element of such fundamental importance in~ 
conception of God~ it cannot be omitted without destroying the value 
of~ concept!!! the first principle in metaphysics. 
This conclusion is implicit in the Fathers' contention that good-
ness is an essential element in the conception of God. No doubt their 
holding this position is related to their belief that God is the sole 
creative principle and the Ground of all existence. However, as we 
noted above it is not correct to deduce God's essential goodness from 
the assumption that a good creative principle is necessary to account 
for particular goods in the world, since the same thing may be good 
from the standpoint of one creature and evil from that of another. 
Yet the assumption that G<>d is good in the sense of His willing and 
working for the realization of the ultimate good for man ~ necessary 
to explain man's experience of value, the predominance of good in his 
experience, and the adaptation of the world to ministering to his 
needs and desires. From this latter perspective, the assumption of a 
morally good ground of existence is required to account for the world 
and for life as we lmow them. 
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2. While certain statements may be ~ about it, the ~ nature 
of God • s goodness cannot be perceived ~ logically anal.yzed. 
This conclusion is clearly implied by the Fathers' oft-repeated 
assertions that God in His essence is unknowable and incomprehensible. 
Yet, from the manifestations of God's goodness in the world, the 
Fathers do not hesitate to draw conclusions and make descriptive state-
ments about it. Such descriptive terms as they employ, however, they 
intend to be intellectual boundary lines, convenient handles, or mental 
supports, which the mind must use in grasping concepts of such nature, 
but which are not descriptive of any perceptual content in the Divine 
goodness. Terms such as eternal, rational, active, powerful, etc. 
provide the mind with a sort of logical form or abstract concept but 
with no perceptual content. One may know that God is good and that 
His goodness has certain abstract characteristics, but he cannot per-
ceive or understand the exact nature of the Divine impulse from which 
external expressions of goodness spring. 
3. Whatever knowledge ~ has of the goodness of God is derived 
~ the activity it inspires, not from ~ direct perception of its 
essence. 
This conclusion is implied not only in the Fathers' description 
of God's goodness as incomprehensible but also in their criticism of 
the so-called good god of the Marcionites for having wrought no works 
whereby he might be recognized and his goodness manifested and their 
pointing out in contrast how the Creator's works attest His power, 
wisdom, and goodness. 
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4. Whatever its inner essence may be, God's goodness has always 
existed perfect and rmchanging,!!! its essence. ~ in~ particular 
temporal expressions of !:!! ~ it~ regarded~ subject to change. 
This conclusion was based on the Fathers' description of God's 
goodness as eternal and rmchanging and perfect. Since they also de-
scribe the Divine goodness in terms of particular acts or expressions 
in a changing temporal order, we assumed that their description of God's 
goodness as perfect and unchanging referred to the motive or inner 
state of being which underlies the particular and temporal manifesta-
tions of goodness, which cannot themselves be regarded as eternal and 
unchanging. 
5. God's goodness is inseparable from other elements of His .!?!:-
ture, ~ ~ His intelligence, His will, and His power. 
This conclusion is based on several positive affirmations which 
the Fathers made about the Divine goodness. They have told us that 
goodness is rationally-structured, joined with power, complex, and 
purposive. They have gone to great lengths to show that goodness and 
justice permeate and influence one another in their operation. This 
conclusion slashes at the modern-day thinking on the problem of evil 
referred to in the Introduction in two directions at the same time. 
It does not permit the inclusion of its hedonistic and eudaemonistic 
presuppositions in the abstract definition of goodness, and it denies 
the validity of limiting God t s power in order to preserve His good-
ness. 
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6. God's goodness is the basis for all finite good. 
Thi s conclusion is explicit in the statement of two of the 
Fathers that God 1s goodness is basic or primary, the ground of all 
finite forms of goodness. It is implicit also in the Fathers 1 teach-
ing that creation and providential care are expressions of the Divine 
goodness and that the human good is derivative and learned. This con-
clusion confirms the position suggested in the Introduction, that 
God •s goodness will be greater than all forms of finite goodness be-
cause it is primal goodness--the basis for all other goods. 
1. God's goodness, ~revealed in the activities regarded!!:!! 
expressions of it, appears to be creature-centered--.£!:~ particu-
larly, in these three Fathers, man-centered. 
This conclusion is suggested by the nature and point of refer-
ence of the things listed by the Fathers as manifestations of good-
ness. Creation is an expression of goodness because it brings man 
into existence, enables God to carry out His purpose of creating a 
being who could be autonomously good and enter into fellowship with 
Himself, and provides some one to know Him and evidence by which He 
may be known. God 1 s providential care, the instruction of the Word 
and the Spirit through the Law, the prophets, and the gospel, God's 
continuing judgment, the Incarnation of the Word, the salvation of 
man, the resurrection of the body, and the gift of eternal life all 
point toward man as the beneficiar,r of God1s good will. This con-
firms the assumption made in the Introduction that the description of 
God's goodness would probably be in terms of what is good for man. 
8. Yet while God's goodness may be man-centered, it is evident 
from its expression in judgment and other forms .2£ activity~ in-
tended for immediate human enjoyment that it is in .!!2 degree hedo-
nistic or eudaemonistic. 
This conclusion is based on the teaching of the Fathers that 
the goodness of God is no simple goodness, but one that is tempered 
throughout the range of its expression by other "attributes. 11 The 
conjunction of goodness with justice is the principal instance of 
lil.O 
this. The fact that God chastises wrong-doers and administers penal 
evils for their reproof and correction clear~ indicates that His 
goodness is no saccharine concern for the unbroken happiness or pleas-
ure of His creatures. Rather it is a desire for their ultimate well-
being and perfection of character--a good will which can inflict 
temporary pain or evil to accomplish its end. This confirms a supposi-
tion made in the Introduction, that God 1s goodness would probably be 
found lacking in the hedonistic overtones implicit in much modern 
thinking relative to the problem of evil. 
9. There is, therefore, ! clear relationship between what is 
called the goodness of God~ human need, but .!!2 such relationship 
between .!:!: .!!!2 .!SY.: need .2!! the part of God. 
This conclusion rests upon the Fathers 1 teaching that God has 
no need of anything, since He is perfect and full of all good. It is 
implied in the fact that God has given man laws to obey, not because 
He needs human obedience, but in order that he may reward human obedi-
ence with the good of knowledge of Himself and fellowship with Himself, 
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which is essential for the life of man. The teachings of the Fathers 
that goodness is the principle of life for man and that God's provi-
dential care is an expression of His goodness both point to the same 
conclusion. Furthermore, the conclusion represents the confirmation 
of an assumption of identical substance made in the Introduction. 
10. ~though in its essence it is beyond human comprehension, 
~ is apparent ~ ~ essence of God's goodness has ~ ~ with the 
impartation of existence ~ His creatures. 
This is the implication of the Fathers' teaching on creation 
and the giving of life to man as an expression of goodness. Also it 
is inherent in the various manifestations of God's goodness--instruc-
tion of the Law and the prophets, the inspiration and guidance of the 
Word and the Spirit, the disciplining acts of judgment, the incarna-
tion of Christ--aimed at raising man to a higher level of existence. 
And, of course, it is explicit~ set forth in the Fathers' teaching 
that good is the principle of life. 
ll. Therefore~ aspects 2f God's activity~ characterized 
~ good because they ~ instrumental ~ the end of imparting and pre-
serving creaturely existence. 
This conclusion is really a restatement or elaboration of the 
one just previous and rests upon the same basis as it does. Since 
creation, providential care, the warnings of the Law and the prophets, 
the inspiration and guidance of the Word and the Spirit, rewards and 
punishments, incarnation of the Word, and salvation are all intended 
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for the benefit of man they are no doubt regarded as good. If what 
God does is good for man, then without doubt it must be an expression 
of Divine goodness. Thus is confirmed the assumption made in the In-
troduction, that what terms of value one attributes to God 1t-Lll be 
terms of value for him and that any meaningful statement about the 
Divine goodness must be in terms of what seems good to man. 
12. There is present in the thinking of these Fathers ~ .!!!!-
plicit assumption, which later becomes explicit in Augustine, of ~ 
identity of goodness and real being. 
This conclusion is based upon several statements made by the 
Fathers. We have already noted that their assertion that goodness is 
essential to God's being God implies that the Ground of existence must 
be good. We noticed also that Irenaeus and Tertullian place a great 
deal of stress on the eternity of God, even suggesting that eterni.ty 
is essential to His perfect goodness. For both these Fathers, eternity 
implies independence and uncreatedness, or real being. Real being 
partakes most of the quality or power of existence, which it shares 
with lesser beings or creatures. Since God's goodness is eternal, it 
must be identical with real being. But another line of thought points 
in the same direction. The Fathers agree that good is the principle 
of ~e for man--that the greater man's participation in goodness, the 
greater becomes the measure or degree of his existence. Therefore, to 
choose the good consistent~ is to move constant~ in the direction of 
real being. 
This confirms the tentative definition of good given in the 
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Introduction--that the good is that which fulfills human needs and de-
sires, or in other words, that which enriches or intensifies life in 
its range and quality. 
13. The goodness of God is interpreted consistently and almost 
entirely .!?z these Fathers in~ moral sense, ~ the will to do that 
which is ~ creatures' ultimate good. 
This conclusion results from the recognition that all of the 
direct expressions of the Divine goodness we have observed in the 
writings of these Fathers indicate God's entrance into a relationship 
with His creatures. The only description of Divine goodness which 
might apply to God in isolation was one of the meanings inferred from 
Clement's and Tertullian1 s criticism of pagan gods--goodness as the 
perfection of the Divine attributes and abilities. But since this 
meaning was inferred from the logic of their thought, we cannot be 
sure that it was in their thinking at all. On the other hand, the 
personal relationships of God to His creatures are obviously aimed 
at the benefit of the creature and are, therefore, morally good. 
14. Though God is the source of all existence, He is not to be 
----- --- -------
regarded~ the author of~' except "Eenal evils," which may~ 
evil ~ they ~ experienced but ~ be judged good in the light 
of their disciplinary~· 
This conclusion is based upon the statements of the Fathers to 
a similar effect in their theodicies and other parts of their 5,fstems. 
All it is meant to indicate is that it was a conviction held by the 
Fathers, not that they were able to show its objective validity. Fur-
thermore, this conclusion should be accepted and understood in the light 
of the fact that the Fathers make no effort to relieve God of responsi-
bility for natural evil, to all appearances being unaware of the exist-
ence of a problem in this area. 
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Gottingen: 
ABS'IRACT 
The problem of the dissertation, the discovery in the major writ-
ings of three Early Church Fathers of expressions giving clear meaning 
to the term "goodness of God, 11 arises from the general ambiguity of the 
word good, whose amorphous nature greatly complicates thought concerning 
the concept of God. The hedonistic suppcsi tions of much thinking rela-
tive to the problem of evil reveal the need for study of this term. 
The writings of Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, and Tertullian, 
the outstanding thinkers of an era when Christian faith was receiving 
clearer formulation due to critics within and without, provided rich 
insights into this problem. 
Exposition of direct statements of the Fathers, based on original 
and secondary sources, supplemented by inferences drawn from their de-
scriptions of the human good and their attacks on pagan gods, was the 
method of investigation. 
The investigation disclosed surprising unanimity of thought in 
the Fathers' description of Divine goodness, both in its abstract 
character and its phenomenal manifestation. While it is described 
abstractly as essential to Deity, eternal, omnipotent, natural, free, 
complex, purposive, primary, perfect, self-sufficient, and beyond 
human thought; it finds manifestation in creation, in the gift of 
freedom to man, in supplying life's necessitles, in the protection 
and guidance of providence, in the inspiration and guidance of the 
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Word and the Spirit, in the giving of laws and warnings, in the exer-
cise of judgment, in mercy, love, and grace, in the salvation of man, 
in the Incarnation, and in the gift of eternal life. 
Analysis of the human good suggested that "goodness of God" could 
refer to God's granting existence, governing the world for human well-
being, and teaching goodness and value-distinctions. The criticism of 
Clement and Tertullian of the impurity and wealmess of pagan gods im-
plied purity and perfection of qualities as meanings of God's goodness. 
The Fathers' teachings on goodness were found consistent for the 
most part with themselves, with one another, and with Scripture. How-
ever, they raised critical questions concerning (1) how an eternal, 
unchanging essence could find temporal expression; (2) how an essen-
tially unknowable goodness could be manifested; (3) how a goodness 
essential and eternal in God could be free; and (4) how everlasting 
punishment could be consistent with goodness as omnipotent love. 
Following comparison and critical evaluation of the Fathers 1 
views, the follo1dng conclusions--in summary form--were reached: 
1. Goodness is essential to the concept of God, if it is to 
remain the first principle of metaphysics. 
2. Though it may be to some extent !mown and abstractly 
described on the basis of its phenomenal manifestation, 
its essence is beyond perception or logical analysis. 
3. It is eternally perfect and unchanging in essence, varying 
onlY in its temporal manifestations. 
4. It is inseparable from other elements in the Divine nature, 
such as intelligence, will, and power. 
5. It is the basis for all finite good. 
6. God's goodness is focussed on man, a will for his ultimate 
good. 
?. Yet , from its expression in judgment and other activities 
unintended for irmnediate human enjoyment , it is clearly 
neither hedonistic nor eudaemonistic . 
8 . There is a close relationship between it and human need, 
but none between it and any need on t he part of God. 
9. Though beyond human comprehension, its essence evidently has 
to do with imparting creaturely existence . 
10. Therefore , many activities of God are described as good be-
cause they are concerned with imparting and preserving 
creaturely existence . 
11. There is an implicit assumption of the identity of goodness 
and real being . 
12 . Though the ground of existence , God is the author of no evil , 
except disciplinary evils , which in aim are good. 
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